

# The Spatial scope of Youth-related Claims-Making in nine European countries

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# The Spatial scope of Youth-related Claims-Making in nine European countries<sup>1</sup>

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## Abstract

This comparative examination sheds light on the spatial scope of actors making youth-related claims in mainstream media. Drawing upon the 'political opportunity structure' approach, our main argument is that the spatial scope of political debates on youth-related issues are driven by institutional arrangements reflecting windows of opportunities for the representation of various youth interests. Methodologically, we draw upon 'claim-making' analysis of five newspapers for each of the nine countries of the EURYKA project, i.e. France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. Our cross-national exploratory analysis aims to show, a) how state configuration and youth regime contexts impact on the spatial scope of youth and nonyouth actors, and furthermore, on specific state, civil society and interest group actors, as well as, b) whether this leads to a new clustering of countries across spatial divides in the age of youth precarity. Cross-national variation is especially considered by looking at how institutional arrangements vary in each country, based on their youth policy regimes, the specific state structure and the impact of recent economic crisis on youth welfare policies.

**Keywords:** political claims analysis, youth and space, young, welfare regimes, youth regimes, European

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# The Spatial scope of Youth-related Claims-Making in nine European countries

## Introduction

This study focuses on the spatial scope of youth and nonyouth claimants in the public sphere given that a new interdisciplinary research agenda on youth and spatiality has only recently received scholarly attention (Schildt and Siegfried 2016, Farrugia 2017, Farrugia and Wood 2017, Baczewska et al 2018,). This stream of research underlines the need to recognize geographical scale as an important factor in the construction of youth and in how young people “situate” themselves in relation to place. The scalar dimension seems to significantly contribute in understanding youth politics, which suggests that despite young people distance themselves from institutional politics they nevertheless are involved in politics through localized contexts (Baczewska et al, 2018) which allow them more direct and active forms of participation (della Porta, 2014).

The sub-national or regional dimension is also neglected when it comes to comparative research and youth-related political claims making, as most are either cross-national focusing on the socio-economic conditions of youth (Wallace and Bendit 2009, Andreotti and Mingione 2012, Schmidt et al 2017, Chevalier 2015), or are nationally based (Meuth et al 2014, Pickard 2014, Petmesidou and Polyzoidis 2015, Gomółka, 2019, Schildt and Siegfried 2016). This neglect is all the more important since other research on “weak” and vulnerable groups - like migrants or the unemployed - has shown that such groups are especially able to act and to make use of the sub-national level (Cinalli and Giugni, 2010 and 2011).

By focusing on the spatial dimension of youth related claims in the public domain of nine European countries our main ambition is to assess the spatial scope through which these claims are debated in European public spheres as well as to point to factors that affect youth-related claims making across the national and the sub-national level in different national and youth policy contexts. In fact, subnational (i.e.

local or regional) spaces of public intervention may be especially important for youth at times of crises, since this is when specific claims by a panoply of groups coping with hard times are more likely to emerge (Cinalli and Giugni, 2016a). Yet, crisis in itself cannot be taken as a source for ubiquitous trend. The simple dynamics between the different levels of authority influence the spatial dimension of public debates, so that federalism and decentralisation give a lead to regional and local voices while centralised decision-making gives precedence to actors with national scope.

Drawing on a dataset of 4,281 political claims produced under the EURYKA project and covering the 2010-2016 period for nine European countries, this article maps out the ways in which the public sphere is structured across national and subnational debates in the aftermath of the global financial and refugee crises, for youth and nonyouth claimants as well as for state and civil society ones. Our cross-national exploratory analysis aims to show a) how state configuration and youth regime contexts impact on the spatial scope of youth and nonyouth actors, and furthermore, on specific state, civil society and interest group actors, as well as b) whether this leads to a new clustering of countries across spatial divides in the age of youth precarity.

## **Theoretical framework**

Claims making develops in a strong relationship with political opportunities (McAdam and Tarrow, 2018; Cinalli and Giugni, 2016b; Lahusen et al. 2016), corroborating the underlying connections between any group of claimants on the one hand, and their surrounding *milieu* providing for threats or new opportunities (Tilly, 2005). We therefore argue that public debates by youth and on youth need to be comprehended within the broader macro-level context provided by the institutional arrangements within

which policies pertaining to youth develop. While policy regimes delineate the general orientation of youth policies, the state configuration at a centralized or decentralized model contributes in mapping their spatial traits. Despite clear-cut cases such as Switzerland and France (being recognized as a federated and centralized state respectively), there are many cases such as Spain and the UK which fall somewhere in the middle. Four general categories stand out: a) centralized unitary states, such as Greece, where regions are subordinate to the central state; b) decentralized unitary states, such as France and the Nordic countries, which have elected regional authorities above the local level; c) regionalized unitary states, such as Italy, Poland, Spain and the UK, in which regional governments have constitutional status, legislative powers and a high degree of autonomy and d) federal states, such as Germany and Switzerland, where power distribution between the different levels is guaranteed by the constitution (Michalski, 2012).

Further adds the rescaling of governance with France, Sweden and Poland having national social assistance legislation, while Switzerland, Italy and Spain have primarily regional social assistance legislations (Kazepov and Barberis, 2013). The intersection between the vertical and the horizontal dimensions of inter-institutional relations outlines a complex picture, as seen in the Polish case, where an ongoing plural but fragmented decentralization is taking place in a centrally-framed heritage, where national actors prevail (Kazepov and Barberis, 2013) or, when comparing Sweden and France. Despite both being decentralized unitary states with strong welfare policy traditions (Thévenon, 2015), Sweden is locally autonomous with local public and private actors having enhanced roles in the management and delivery of social policies, while in France the rescaling process is less extensive with national power limiting local autonomy (Kazepov and Barberis, 2013). The UK is a complicated case, with asymmetric federalism, its 'regionalisation' being the result of top-down planning (Swenden, 2006) and with its local governance model being tailored to the neo-liberal mandates (Davies, 2004). Table 1 summarises our nine country profiles with respect to their state configuration and rescaling trends.

Table 1. State configuration and rescaling trends by spatial frame of public debates and countries

Country	State configuration and rescaling trends	Spatial frame
France	decentralised unitary with strong state and limited rescaling	central frame
Germany	federal	federal frame
Greece	centralized unitary with limited rescaling	central frame
Italy	regionalized unitary	regional frame
Poland	regionalized unitary with strong heritage of central governance	central frame
Spain	regionalized unitary	regional frame
Sweden	decentralized unitary with extensive rescaling	central frame/ local autonomy
Switzerland	federal	federal frame
United Kingdom	regionalized unitary with assymetric regionalization and limited rescaling	central frame

More specifically, given the works presented above, our 1<sup>st</sup> Hypothesis is that all actors with youth-related claims in the public sphere of countries with centralized state configuration, are expected to be national in scope, while those in countries with federal or regional configurations are expected to be subnational in scope.

Moving beyond all actors in national public domains, comparisons between youth from nonyouth actors as claimants with national and subnational scopes are nonexistent. However, recent research indicates that when it comes to youth-related claims, even though the majority are made by nonyouth actors, including state actors, political parties, professional organizations, education actors and labor unions (EURYKA, WP2 Report, 2018). Based on related political analysis research nonyouth actors have a large share of claims (Cinally and Giugni 2010, Lahusen et al 2016). Given this tendency their spatial scope is more likely to be influenced by the spatial frame of their respective state configuration.

By contrast, the considerable portion of youth-related claims made by youth actors are expected to be subnational, as recent works point out youth political engagement takes place predominantly at the subnational level (Banaji and Cammaerts, 2015, EURYKA, WP2 Report, 2018). Spatial proximity emerges as a critical trait that strengthens youth involvement in social and political life. Yet, this dimension is not

incorporated in works connecting youth policies and the transition to adulthood on which youth policies are based to Esping-Andersen's (1990) rationale of welfare regimes (Vogel, 2002; Walther, 2006; Wallace and Bendit, 2009). Such studies do differentiate between the *universalistic regime* of Nordic countries, the *community-based regime* of the liberal/minimal welfare state of the U.K., the *protective regimes* of the so called corporatist – employment based model of France and Germany and the Latin Rim welfare *centralised regime* of South European countries (Wallace and Bendit, 2009).

Recent research highlighting the limitations of the welfare regime approach shifts attention to youth unemployment regimes (Cinalli and Giugni 2013) and youth regimes of youth welfare citizenship (Chevalier 2016). France differs from Germany in the strategy of economic citizenships to the youth, by exhibiting a selective and thus exclusionary strategy of youth integration which differs from the German encompassing strategy that leads to youth autonomy rather quickly (Chevalier, 2016). In addition, similarities are identified between the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries due to their common individualization perspective in welfare support which considers young people as independent citizens unlike the familialization perspective which considers youth as being dependent on their families.

The emphasis on youth citizenship enhances our understanding of the spatial traits of youth agency in the mediated public domain. Under this approach, the familialization of social benefits for young people together with a selective strategy of economic citizenship shape a “denied” youth citizenship from the welfare state in France (Chevalier, 2016: 14), which cedes limited independence to young people compared to other North European countries. This is expected to be reflected in the proliferation of subnational youth voices in the public sphere, with France deviating from the other countries of our sample, Germany, UK, Sweden and Switzerland. The impact of the familialisation of youth policies in understanding youth social citizenship helps us also understand the post-socialist/transition regime of Poland (Hatzivasiliou et al 2016). Youth policy is very recently introduced as a specific policy field in Poland -with the National strategy for young people for 2003–2014 representing the only document determining the development of Polish youth policy since the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland in

1997- and downgraded in 2015 by becoming a part of family policies in 2015 (Gomółka, 2019). Thus, an underdeveloped and family-oriented youth strategy in Poland combined with its centrally framed heritage is expected to be reflected on the predominantly national scope in youth collective mobilisation.

Given the literature above, our 2<sup>nd</sup> hypothesis is: Youth related claims by youth and nonyouth actors in the public sphere differ in their spatial scope depending on their youth policy regime. While nonyouth actors are expected to be national in scope in countries with centralized state configuration, youth actors are expected to be of subnational scope across all countries except France due to its “denied” youth citizenship and Poland due to its weak but centrally framed youth citizenship.

Comparing the spatial scope of youth versus nonyouth claimants is important, however more light is shed by recent works when distinguishing nonyouth actors into state, civil society and interest group actors who have been involved in structural adjustment and neoliberal reforms of the past two decades, as well as austerity and crisis policies since 2008 (Schmidt et al 2017, Jones and Trianou 2019, Norman et al 2016, Dabrowski et al, 2014). State actors, professional groups and political parties, labor unions, education actors and youth groups are differentially positioned within these dynamic national milieus and voice claims reflecting the impacts of these reforms at the spatial level. Thus, studying the influence of national and youth regime contexts on the spatial scope of these claimants aims to reveal new clusterings across countries.

More specifically, **state actors** involved in transformations under neo-liberal and austerity reforms before and after the 2008 crisis in European countries are influenced by state configuration and the decentralization of social policies - a critical part of these reforms. Due to the strong control exerted by the central state over resources, the crisis may lead to more central control by the state (Andreotti and

Mingione, 2016). Thus, in South European countries, a recentralization trend is noted, particularly in Greece, where the drastic reduction of resources has been overwhelming (Andreotti and Mingione, 2016). **Professional actors** making youth-related claims, such as banks, private companies, media and journalists, or research institutions, have adopted national or global frames under neo-liberal policies promoting privatization and deregulation, before, and especially since the 2008 crisis (Loughlin 2001). Although different in their objectives and position in these reforms, **political parties** tend to be nationally oriented during austerity and crisis times (e.g. Sommer 2018, Kousis 2016). The penetrating neoliberal and austerity national scale reforms in labor markets and welfare systems have also significantly affected youth-related claims making by **labor unions**, given their deep consequences for youth, across all European countries (Hermann 2014, Schmidt et al 2019, Lehndorff et al 2017, Bengtsson and Ryner 2017, Selby 2019, Vandaele forthcoming).

Two groups appear to have been affected more at the subnational level. **Education actors** - of high significance due to their importance for youth related claims - witnessed sweeping neoliberal reforms under austerity and the subsequent decentralization, at the local level for the last two decades (e.g. Astiz et al, 2002, Weissert & Uttermark 2017, Jones and Traianou 2019). Recent works however show that many countries adopt national decentralization as well as centralization policies and that local education communities are those who could offer the chance to avoid the mis-representation of expertise (Robertson (2011). Youth has been hit by austerity and the crisis harder than any other group, as mirrored in rising unemployment rates among youth as well as in rising numbers of youth living in poverty or engaged in solidarity initiatives (Carcillo et al. 2015:8, Uba and Kousis 2018) in times of welfare state retrenchment (Norman et al. 2016). Consequently, young people bring politics in their everyday life, in line with the idea that “the personal is political” (Flesher Fominaya 2012: 6). **Youth actors** include youth-led and youth-oriented organisations and collectivities reflecting the above in their claims making. Their presence in the public domain includes unconventional routes (Mejias and Banaji, 2018: 3), but also through political

claims in established media (EURYKA WP2 Report, 2018). Youth political vivacity stands out for reinforcing 'democracy from below' (della Porta, 2014). All these indicate the propensity of young people to politically socialize and mobilise at proximal, local levels rather than the national level.

Systematic comparative work nevertheless, is not available on the spatial dimension of youth-related claims by state, civil society and interest group actors, particularly during austerity and the crisis period period. Our aim therefore is to contribute to the related literature by offering findings on the impact which state configuration and youth welfare and citizenship regimes have on the spatial scope of state and civil society and interest group actors across nine public domains.

Following the works presented above, according to our 3<sup>rd</sup> Hypothesis: The spatial scope of state, youth and civil society actors is variably affected by state configuration, youth regimes and welfare. The spatial frame of state actors follows that of state configuration, with central state actors being national in scope and regional/federal ones with subnational scope. Influenced more by youth welfare regimes, education and youth claimants are subnational in scope, given their experience with decentralization policies and precarity. By contrast, labor unions voice claims of national scope, regardless of state configuration or youth policy regimes, in confrontation to national level sweeping labor rights reforms, especially affecting youth in the past decade. Given their objectives, professional organization and political party actors voice youth-related claims of national scope, influenced by state configuration, following state actors.

## **Method**

Our cross-national data derive from political claims analysis applied by nine national teams in the context of Work Package 2 of the EURYKA project.<sup>2</sup> The method allows for the study of all actors making claims in

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. the opening editorial to this special issue Further details can be found in the EURYKA Work Package 2 Report, available at [www.unige.ch/sciences-societe/euryka/files/4515/3854/9194/WP2Report-1.pdf](http://www.unige.ch/sciences-societe/euryka/files/4515/3854/9194/WP2Report-1.pdf).

the public sphere, including state or social movements actors, through the use of newspapers. Aiming at a representative and unbiased sample, five daily newspapers (and when necessary, tabloids) were used for each country. They were of as high circulation as possible and of different political orientations, and covered the period starting on 1 January 2010 and ending on 31 December 2016<sup>3</sup>. The articles were sampled from all sections of the selected newspapers, excluding the editorials and sports sections, through key words searches using any word derivative of the words <young> or <student> or <teenage> in the home language. The nine national random samples consist of 500 claims in each country and thus allow us to focus on typical events (usually most visible in the media), but also to include the everyday debate about youth and related issues.

Our analysis is focused on the scope of claimants in the public sphere. The scope of the actors making youth-related claims refers to the organizational extension of the organization or institution. For unorganized collectivities and groups, it refers to the scope of mobilization. More specifically on their national and subnational (regional or local) scope. The global/supranational/transnational/ multilateral level has not been used in the analysis, since it involves only very few cases, corresponding to 3.2% of the total number of claims. In addition, claims which are raised by actors in the World Wide Web – which have been coded as “cyberspace” in scope - are also excluded, as their frequency was even lower. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, we used 4,281 out of the total number of 4.545 coded claims. Comparative analysis is done across the nine countries, as well as across youth and nonyouth actors, and the types of actors making the claim<sup>4</sup>.

Seven types of actors making youth-related claims are analyzed: a) state actors and judiciary (e.g. government, parliament, courts, police); b) political parties/groups (political parties, individual politicians,

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<sup>3</sup> <https://www.unige.ch/sciences-societe/euryka/files/4515/3854/9194/WP2Report-1.pdf>

<sup>4</sup> See Codebook at: [https://www.unige.ch/sciences-societe/euryka/files/9315/2363/9891/Codebook\\_for\\_the\\_Political\\_Claims\\_Analysis.pdf](https://www.unige.ch/sciences-societe/euryka/files/9315/2363/9891/Codebook_for_the_Political_Claims_Analysis.pdf)

political movement groups); c) professional organizations/groups (e.g. banks, private companies, media and journalists, research institutes); d) labor organizations and economy related groups (e.g. unions, workers and employees, self-employed groups); e) education related actors (non-union, higher education representatives e.g. school administration, teachers, education experts); f) youth actors (incl. youth in general, various youth subcategories based on sociodemographic criteria, such as age, gender and studenship and youth-related civil society groups, incl. youth-led and youth-oriented organisations and collectivities); and g) other actors (such as general public, elites, parents, minority groups).

## Findings

Our findings offer a systematic comparative analysis of the spatial scope of actors making youth-related claims in nine national public domains, based on the analysis of national and subnational frequencies (see Tables 2A and 3A of the online Appendix), expressed in ratios in Tables 2 and 3 below.

Highlighting the spatial differences between youth and nonyouth claimants in the public sphere, two clustering patterns emerge from the findings in Table 2 and 2A: similar oriented clusters following state configuration frames for all claimants as well as for nonyouth claimants, but a diverting, more subnational oriented cluster of countries for youth claimants, following works on the impacts of neoliberal reforms, austerity and crises related policies on youth, at the subnational level.

As seen in Table 2, overall, state configuration and rescaling trends impact on the scope of the actors who predominate in the public sphere. Our data show that national scope claims are made by all actors together, *as well as by nonyouth claimants* in countries with centralized state configuration and central frames, i.e. France, Poland, the UK and Greece, leading to a public domain which varies from strongly to moderately nationalized. In addition, all claimants and nonyouth claimants in countries with a federal or regional

configuration, i.e. Germany, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland, portray a sub-nationalised public domain on youth-related claims. The case of Sweden stands out, with centralization and decentralization being more balanced as expected, based on its particular state configuration and local autonomy features. These findings confirm our first hypothesis.

A different clustering of countries however is illustrated in Table 2 when looking at the spatial scope of youth claimants. Youth claims are subnational in scope, as expected based on the youth regimes, welfare and citizenship literature in all countries except Poland and France, where youth are organized at the national level most of the time. Therefore this finding is in agreement with our second hypothesis, according to which youth claimants act predominantly at the subnational level, while the familialisation of youth policies combined with the central framing that characterize France and Poland can help to understand their deviation from the subnationalisation trend in youth claims-making. Variations exist within each clusters, reflecting country specificities and diverse youth welfare regimes and austerity reforms.

Table 2. Clustering of countries by spatial scope of Youth and nonYouth Claimants

Spatial scope	Youth orientation of Claimants (national/subnational ratios*)		Total
	NonYouth Claimants	Youth Claimants	
National	PL (3,27)	PL (1,84)	UK (4,65)
	UK (2,08)	FR (1,55)	PL (2,97)
	FR (2,08)		FR (1,88)
	GR (1,75)		GR (1,10)
	SW (1,15)		SW (1,05)
Subnational	DE (0,86)	UK (0,86)	SP (0,79)
	SP (0,82)	SP (0,65)	DE (0,72)
	IT (0,59)	CH (0,59)	CH (0,58)
	CH (0,58)	SW (0,59)	IT (0,53)
		IT (0,38)	
		DE (0,35)	
		GR (0,29)	

Note: \*See Table 2A in the Online Appendix, showing the frequencies from which ratios are calculated.

The examination of the spatial scope of specific groups of state, interest group and civil society actors making youth-related claims in Tables 3 and 3A offers new evidence for the effects of state configuration and youth welfare regimes and reforms of the later period. A different clustering of countries emerges depending on the specific actor involved, ranging from the almost fully subnational clustering for youth and education claimants to a fully national one by labor unions, the remaining ones being in between the two.

More specifically, as previously seen in Table 2, youth claims are subnational in scope, reflecting their experience with neoliberal decentralization policies and precarity and the recent debates on youth regimes, welfare and citizenship in all countries except Poland and France, whose youth are mostly organized at the national level. Similarly subnational in scope, according to Table 3, are education (nonunion) actors such as higher education representatives, school administrators, teachers and education experts who witnessed the sweeping neoliberal reforms under austerity and the subsequent decentralization on education structures at the local level during the last two decades. When it comes to education actors, Germany is an exception to the trend of stronger presence of subnational education-related actors, due to its youth regime which is characterized by a major emphasis on building a sound national education (Thévenon, 2015).

As for the **state actors**, the findings in Table 3 show a similar pattern to *all* and *nonyouth* claimants. National scope claims are made by state actors in countries with centralized state configuration and central frames, i.e. in the UK, Poland, Greece and France, while subnational scope claims are made by state actors in countries with a federal or regional configuration, i.e. Switzerland, Italy, Spain and Germany. Again, Sweden shows a balanced centralization and decentralization tendency as previously stated. When it comes to state actors, Greece exhibits a very high share of national scope actors, as expected from the related literature, given the severe and successive austerity-driven interventions across all policy fields.

Overall, a more classic clustering is evident for state claimants, following the state configuration and rescaling model.

A strong leaning towards the national scope is illustrated for professional and political party claimants, across almost all countries, except for Switzerland in the former and Switzerland and Germany for the latter. Subsequently, state configuration does not appear to significantly influence the spatial scope of professional and political party claimants. This reflects the different positions these actors adhere to under neoliberal decentralization policies and precarity, leading them to a strong national orientation in reaching their objectives.

In contrast to all of the above actors, an exclusively nationally oriented clustering is clearly visible for **labor unions as claimants**. In spite of state configuration, rescaling and youth welfare regimes context, labor unions making youth-related claims have a highly national scope, following the very high national ratios of professional organizations and political parties, but due to different factors. Unlike the latter, labor unions make youth related claims to confront the national-level sweeping labor rights and labor market reforms, especially affecting youth and precarity in all countries during the period of our study (2010-16).

Table 3. Clustering of countries by spatial scope of types of Claimants

Spatial Scope	Types of Actors (national/subnational ratios)					
	Labor Unions	Professional	Political Parties	State	Education	Youth
National	UK (9,00)	UK (35,5)	GR (22,00)	UK (4,90)	UK (1,65)	PL (1,84)
	FR (8,50)	PL (15,5)	UK (7,25)	PL (3,59)	PL (1,15)	FR (1,55)
	SW (8,50)	DE (9,00)	PL (5,75)	GR (2,79)		
	PL (5,33)	SP (2,63)	SW (3,00)	FR (2,73)		
	DE (4,75)	FR (2,36)	FR (2,36)			
	IT (3,31)	IT (2,13)	IT (1,56)			
	SP (2,00)	SW (1,71)				
	CH (2,00)	GR (1,43)				
	GR (1,91)		SP (1,03)			
Subnational		CH (0,78)	CH (0,84)	SW (0,98)	DE (0,90)	UK (0,86)
			DE (0,35)	CH (0,84)	SP (0,50)	SP (0,65)
				IT (0,58)	GR (0,49)	SW (0,59)
				SP (0,56)	FR (0,35)	CH (0,59)
				DE (0,52)	CH (0,26)	IT (0,38)
					SW (0,11)	DE (0,35)
					IT (0,10)	GR (0,29)

\*See Table 3 in the Online Appendix, depicting frequencies from which ratios are calculated.

Based on the findings illustrated in Tables 3 and 3A, the spatial scope of state, youth and civil society actors making youth-related claims are not similarly affected by state configuration or youth welfare regimes. Our 3rd Hypothesis is partially confirmed. First, while the findings for the state actors strongly confirm our hypothesis, with state actors of central state configuration being national in scope, the data on professional organization and political party actors offer weak support, as the later are mostly national in scope and therefore only slightly influenced by state configuration. This is likely a result of their strong national orientation in reaching their objectives. Secondly, our findings support our hypothesis on the subnational scope for education and youth actors, except for two countries with claims of national scope, i.e. UK and Poland, as well as Poland and France (of central frames) respectively. Our third revealing finding offering strong support for our hypothesis concerns the exclusive/universal national scope of labor union youth-related claims, regardless of either state configuration or youth policy regimes. Overall, our

findings reflect the spatial tensions created in addressing the impacts of sweeping liberal reforms and austerity affecting youth across national European public spheres, especially in the past decade.

## **Conclusion**

Our examination offers new systematic evidence on the spatial scope of youth-related claims making across nine national public domains, for the 2010-16 period, revealing that public debates by youth and on youth can be understood within the broader macro-level context provided by the institutional arrangements within which youth-related policies develop. Furthermore our exploratory analysis reveals new patterns of country clusters based on specific types of actors making youth-related claims in the public domain, which reflect the deep and pervasive impacts of the macro-level conditions on youth moving beyond the state configuration and youth regime approaches.

More specifically, our first hypothesis is confirmed, with state configuration and rescaling trends exerting influence on the scope of all (and nonyouth) actors who predominate in the public sphere. In Greece and Sweden, centralisation and decentralisation are more balanced. As to the latter, this is due to a mixture of decentralization and recentralization trends that make welfare more responsive to local needs without weakening national standards, while as regards Greece, it reflects the growing welfare deficits at both levels due to the economic crisis (Andreotti and Mingione, 2016).

As to our second hypothesis, confirmed by our data, youth claims are mostly subnational in scope, as expected based on the youth regimes, welfare and citizenship literature, except in Poland and France, where youth are predominantly organized at the national level. These findings reflect the related works on the localized (Baczewska et al, 2018; Banaji and Cammaerts, 2015), unconventional (Almond and Verba,

1963), as well as participatory, bottom- up (della Porta, 2014) character of claims made by youth actors in the public sphere.

Our analysis offers partial support for our third hypothesis that relates to the spectrum of major actors making youth-related claims. Two new findings are especially noteworthy, as these have not been documented in related works. First, according to our data, professional and political party claimants have strong leanings towards the national scope, despite of state configuration - reflecting their different positions on neoliberal decentralization policies. Secondly, labor union claimants adopt a national scope, albeit for very different positions – and not of the same intensity as that of the two previous actor groups. These two clusterings of countries mirror the spatial tensions involved in youth-related claims across European macro-level contexts.

Based on our findings, the majority of public claims on youth-related issues in the nine European countries studied is raised by non-youth actors, which indicates that youth voices are not well represented by the mass media. We therefore note that given our methodological approach and time constraints, our analysis has been limited to data derived from five mainstream newspapers in each country, and not other sources. Future work may shed further light on the spatialization of youth-related claims in, a) national public spheres by incorporating other media sources with a higher representation of youth and the incorporation of other actors, and b) transnational or cyber public spheres, to better reflect all spatial levels involved in the deep transformations of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

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Table 2a: Scope of Youth and non-youth Actors making youth related claims, by country

Country	nonYouth/Youth Actor	Actor Scope (N)		Nat/Subn Ratio
		National	Subnational	
France	NonYouth	67,53	32,47	2,08
	Youth	60,76	39,24	1,55
	<b>Total</b>	<b>65,24</b>	<b>34,76</b>	<b>1,88</b>
Germany	NonYouth	46,23	53,77	0,86
	Youth	25,74	74,26	0,35
	<b>Total</b>	<b>41,98</b>	<b>58,02</b>	<b>0,72</b>
Greece	NonYouth	63,69	36,31	1,75
	Youth	22,31	77,69	0,29
	<b>Total</b>	<b>52,41</b>	<b>47,59</b>	<b>1,10</b>
Italy	NonYouth	37,10	62,90	0,59
	Youth	27,34	72,66	0,38
	<b>Total</b>	<b>34,46</b>	<b>65,54</b>	<b>0,53</b>
Poland	NonYouth	76,61	23,39	3,27
	Youth	64,79	35,21	1,84
	<b>Total</b>	<b>74,78</b>	<b>25,22</b>	<b>2,97</b>
Spain	NonYouth	45,13	54,87	0,82
	Youth	39,36	60,64	0,65
	<b>Total</b>	<b>44,01</b>	<b>55,99</b>	<b>0,79</b>
Sweden	NonYouth	53,59	46,41	1,15
	Youth	37,14	62,86	0,59
	<b>Total</b>	<b>51,23</b>	<b>48,77</b>	<b>1,05</b>
Switzerland	NonYouth	36,72	63,28	0,58
	Youth	37,21	62,79	0,59
	<b>Total</b>	<b>36,81</b>	<b>63,19</b>	<b>0,58</b>
UK	NonYouth	84,49	15,51	5,45
	Youth	46,15	53,85	0,86
	<b>Total</b>	<b>82,31</b>	<b>17,69</b>	<b>4,65</b>
Total	NonYouth	67,53	32,47	2,08
	Youth	60,76	39,24	1,55
	<b>Total</b>	<b>65,24</b>	<b>34,76</b>	<b>1,88</b>

Table 3a: Actor types by actor scope and by country

Country	Claimant Actor Type	Actor Scope		National/Subnat. Ratio
		National	Subnational	
<b>France</b>	State actors and judiciary	73,17	26,83	2,73
	Political parties/groups	86,84	13,16	6,60
	Professional organizations/groups	70,27	29,73	2,36
	Labor organizations and Economy groups	89,47	10,53	8,50
	Education related actors	26,19	73,81	0,35
	Youth Actors	60,76	39,24	1,55
	Other Actors	63,27	36,73	1,72
	Total	65,24	34,76	1,88
<b>Germany</b>	State actors and judiciary	34,26	65,74	0,52
	Political parties/groups	26,15	73,85	0,35
	Professional organizations/groups	90,00	10,00	9,00
	Labor organizations and Economy groups	82,61	17,39	4,75
	Education related actors	47,25	52,75	0,90
	Youth Actors	25,74	74,26	0,35
	Other Actors	51,47	48,53	1,06
	Total	41,98	58,02	0,72
<b>Greece</b>	State actors and judiciary	73,60	26,40	2,79
	Political parties/groups	100,00		
	Professional organizations/groups	58,82	41,18	1,43
	Labor organizations and Economy groups	65,63	34,38	1,91
	Education related actors	32,84	67,16	0,49
	Youth Actors	22,31	77,69	0,29
	Other Actors	48,39	51,61	0,94
	Total	52,41	47,59	1,10
<b>Italy</b>	State actors and judiciary	36,76	63,24	0,58
	Political parties/groups	60,98	39,02	1,56
	Professional organizations/groups	68,00	32,00	2,13
	Labor organizations and Economy groups	76,92	23,08	3,33
	Education related actors	8,16	91,84	0,09
	Youth Actors	27,34	72,66	0,38
	Other Actors	27,16	72,84	0,37
	Total	34,46	65,54	0,53
<b>Poland</b>	State actors and judiciary	78,20	21,80	3,59
	Political parties/groups	85,19	14,81	5,75
	Professional organizations/groups	93,94	6,06	15,50

	Labor organizations and Economy groups	84,21	15,79	5,33
	Education related actors	53,57	46,43	1,15
	Youth Actors	64,79	35,21	1,84
	Other Actors	65,57	34,43	1,90
	Total	74,78	25,22	2,97
<b>Spain</b>	State actors and judiciary	35,76	64,24	0,56
	Political parties/groups	50,82	49,18	1,03
	Professional organizations/groups	72,41	27,59	2,63
	Labor organizations and Economy groups	66,67	33,33	2,00
	Education related actors	33,33	66,67	0,50
	Youth Actors	39,36	60,64	0,65
	Other Actors	60,71	39,29	1,55
	Total	44,01	55,99	0,79
<b>Sweden</b>	State actors and judiciary	49,38	50,63	0,98
	Political parties/groups	75,00	25,00	3,00
	Professional organizations/groups	63,08	36,92	1,71
	Labor organizations and Economy groups	89,47	10,53	8,50
	Education related actors	10,26	89,74	0,11
	Youth Actors	37,14	62,86	0,59
	Other Actors	46,03	53,97	0,85
	Total	51,23	48,77	1,05
<b>Switzerland</b>	State actors and judiciary	45,53	54,47	0,84
	Political parties/groups	44,62	55,38	0,81
	Professional organizations/groups	43,75	56,25	0,78
	Labor organizations and Economy groups	66,67	33,33	2,00
	Education related actors	20,65	79,35	0,26
	Youth Actors	37,21	62,79	0,59
	Other Actors	23,81	76,19	0,31
	Total	36,81	63,19	0,58
<b>UK</b>	State actors and judiciary	83,04	16,96	4,90
	Political parties/groups	87,88	12,12	7,25
	Professional organizations/groups	97,26	2,74	35,50
	Labor organizations and Economy groups	90,00	10,00	9,00
	Education related actors	62,26	37,74	1,65
	Youth Actors	46,15	53,85	0,86
	Other Actors	88,04	11,96	7,36
	Total	82,31	17,69	4,65

