

**UNIVERSITY OF CRETE
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

ELEFTHERNA

**SCIENTIFIC YEAR-BOOK
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY**



**VOLUME III
RETHYMNO 2006**

ELEFThERNA



Σωκράτης: «...ει δ' αναγκαίον εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι,
ελοίμην ἀν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν.»

Πλάτων, Γοργίας 469c.1-2

Σωκράτης: «...αν ἦταν ἀναγκαῖο νὰ ἀδικήσω ἢ νὰ ἀδικηθῶ,
θα προτιμοῦσα νὰ ἀδικηθῶ παρὰ νὰ ἀδικήσω.»

Πλάτων, Γοργίας 469c.1-2

*Socrates: "...if it were necessary either to do wrong or to suffer
it, I should choose to suffer rather than do it."*

Plato, Gorgias 469c.1-2

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Rector's Foreword

It gives me great pleasure to welcome the third volume of the scientific year-book of the Department of Psychology of the University of Crete to the academic research community. This volume is a collective work, which is characterised by its high standard and scientific thoroughness. Eleftherna never ceases to amaze us, urging us to consider, to puzzle over, and to question ourselves on the particularly contemporary issue of ethical dilemmas.

Ethics and the issues related to it constitutes one of the desiderata of contemporary scientific thought, related to many of its fields and sub-fields, such as Medicine, Genetics and Biology, Political Science, Sociology.

Ethical discussion, with Aristotelian thought as its point of departure, has been initiated in recent years by philosophers such as T. Hobbs, D. Hume and A. Schopenhauer, who tried to define the human being as an ethical subject, to supply a satisfactory response to the problem of the proper foundation of ethical judgements, and to determine the process of uttering and founding ethical proposals by human beings.

In this Eleftherna volume, the reader, the scientist, the student, will find excellent essays on these issues, examined from a psychological perspective. It must not evade our memory that Ethics is an entirely human issue, founded on stable characteristics of human nature and on human life conditions, and for this reason it has many expressions and remains constantly contemporary. In our research course, let us have the aphorism of the "ethical dilemmas person", Robert Oppenheimer as a guide, who held that "Science is not everything but it is very beautiful".

Ioannis Pallikares
University of Crete Rector

Introduction Note

As it had already been announced, the third volume of the “ELEFThERNA” scientific year book by the Department of Psychology, University of Crete, is in English. It is a special issue concerning “Psychological Science: Contemporary ethical dilemmas.” This is a matter that keeps coming into question not only in Philosophy or Theology but in all the fields of Social, Humanistic, Educational sciences and Law.

The present volume features scientific research and dialogue on an international level regarding the complex issue of ethical dilemmas. It also presents the problem of crime in modern societies (“Society and crime in post-modern societies”) as it is illustrated in Fritz Sack’s, Professor of Criminology and Honorary Professor of the Department of Psychology, speech. I would like to believe that through these presentations we help to promote and support scientific research, dialogue and stimulate social concern.

On behalf of the Department of Psychology of the University of Crete I would first and foremost like to congratulate the authors for their high-level research but also everyone that worked for this issue and to wish them to continue to successfully work for upcoming and improved editions of the “ELEFThERNA” year-book.

Georgios N. Galanis
Head of the Psychology Department

Introduction

As it had been announced from the first even volume of the “ELEFTHERNA” scientific yearbook by the Department of Psychology, School of Social Sciences of University of Crete, as well as in the call for papers, the third volume (2006) is in English and is a special issue, that is, “Psychological science: Contemporary ethical dilemmas”.

The rapid scientific and technological evolutions on an international level have formed new conditions on organizing social work structures and living conditions.

However, this “new knowledge” and new conditions are bound to cause new problems that cannot be resolved by “former knowledge” (former theories, that is) and “old recipes”. This new type of problems that come to surface require solutions that are based on new knowledge, which in several cases modifies but also overcomes former data. I will mention an example from the field of biogenetic research to make this clearer: According to modern day scientific data a child may have five parents instead of two (mother-father), meaning: the sperm donor, the egg donor, the genetic mother that offers the uterus and the two step-parents that adopt it. Needless to say that these new circumstances overcome standard psychology and pedagogical science data and create, for that matter, new scientific and social issues which need to be resolved on a scientific, social and political level.

Another issue related to the previous example are the ethical dilemmas and the concern about brothers that come from the same sperm donor (given the fact that sperm banks preserve genetic material from men that have certain qualities that are in demand). As a result, a single donor may father many children without the children-brothers being aware of their common origin.

Another suggestive example comes from the field of science that deals with gene mutation. Should there be experiments in order to treat hereditary transmitted diseases?

The research on neurology and “mind control” or use of methods to limit criminal tendencies (as in the feature film *Minority Report*) also poses several ethical dilemmas.

Scientists from various fields may present their findings to society in order for them to be discussed and politicians need to make decisions and legislate. Scientists may not be responsible for the misuse of their findings, they are,

however, responsible for the way their research is conducted. If, for example, their research does concur with the set and acknowledged Deontology Rules that exist in any scientific field.

More and more it's not only the researcher-scientist that faces ethical dilemmas but also every individual on a personal level.

The present volume consists of a text that marks the personality and work of Fritz Sack, which is basically the proposal text concerning his nomination as Honorary Professor of the Department of Psychology, University of Crete, that the Head of the Department of Psychology, Georgios N. Galanis, and Assistant Professor, Andreas Kastellakis, introduced to the Department's General Assembly. It also consists of the "resolution" which was presented to Fritz Sack, Professor of Criminology, during the nomination ceremony on Thursday, June 1st 2006 in Rethymnon, Crete, by the University Rector, Professor Ioannis Pallicares¹.

These are followed by the text that is entitled "Society and crime in post-modern societies" which was Honorary Professor Fritz Sack's speech on June 1st 2006, delivered on the occasion of his being awarded the "Dr. Honoris causa" title.

The seven essays that follow deal with the volume's main issue "Ethical dilemmas in Psychology", the last of which is a review.

In the first essay, entitled "Society and Crime in post modern societies", Fritz Sack offers a detailed review of the development of criminology from a sociological perspective. Although the biological school was preceded by the moral statisticians of the 19th century, the sociostructural approach was suppressed and replaced by the Italian individualistic perspective. The full strength of a sociological perspective was achieved by the paradigmatic shift in the '60s. Crime was no longer an ontological phenomenon. Its definition, operation and function became the aim of empirical and theoretical study. Finally, the author offers his reflection on the fundamental change of the penal system in modern societies.

In the second essay, entitled "Classical ethical positions and their relevance in justifying behavior: A model of prescriptive attribution", Erich H. Witte separates empirical research on ethics from classical research on morality and relates it to other major issues on social psychology and sociology and makes reference to some founding studies of ethical research and its historical development. Through the presentation and discussion of six empirical studies

¹ For a more detailed preview of the Laudatio which was announced during the nomination ceremony, see Galanis, Georgios N. (2007): "...to set an end to naivity and to understand that what is did not have to be." Regarding the work and personality of Fritz Sack. In Galanis, Georgios N. (ed.): "Political Psychology, theoretical and empirical studies" Political Psychology Series, Volume I, Papazisis Publications, chapter 10, pp. 299-325.

Witte illustrates the proposal that a deeper understanding of explanations leads towards the classical perspective attribution theories, whilst a deeper understanding of the energizing forces behind an action lead towards the concept of empirical perspective attribution research.

In the third essay, “Empirical research on ethics: The influence of social roles on decisions and on their ethical justification”, Erich H. Witte and Imke Heitkamp discuss the question whether different social roles lead to different decisions and justifications concerning ethical problems. They present two studies: in the first study, participants were asked to decide on a financial problem while assuming a related social role. In the second study, role expectations were asked for. The decision of the participants had to be justified by weighing the importance of four ethical positions: hedonism, intuitionism, utilitarianism and deontology. The authors illustrate that decisions and their justifications are dependent on social roles, while the differences between role-behavior and role-expectation indicate a misunderstanding crucial in terms of group decisions.

In the fourth essay entitled “Ethical issues to working with suicidal clients” Theodoros Giovazolias discusses the fact that in the clinical practice of counseling psychology and psychotherapy the therapist may often encounter a client who has attempted or is likely to commit suicide. Such an encounter may well evoke a variety of moral conflicts in the therapist. The author explores the moral conflicts that arise when working with suicidal clients and discusses a number of fundamental questions concerning the morality of suicide, its relation to mental illness, etc.

In the fifth essay entitled “Psychology and Ethics: The double face of Janus”, Manolis Dafermos attempts to explore the relation between psychology and ethics. The author discusses the epistemological contradictions that occur while examining the relation between the positivistic, objective, experimental science of psychology that should be free of any moral values (“value neutrality”) and the humanistic orientation that attempts to highlight the moral dimension of psychological knowledge. Reference is also made to the social constructionists’ approach that has stirred up criticism on individual humanism and has proposed a relational humanism that would make the relation networks encompassing individuals explicit.

In the sixth essay, “Evolution of Medical Ethics and Bioethics in Greece: Ancient – Christian – Contemporary Greece”, Nikolaos Koios, Lambrini Veloyanni and Demetrios Alvanos discuss the evolution of medical ethics in Greece ever since the Hippocratic Oath. The Oath has influenced Greek ethical thinking not only during antiquity but also during early Christian times and the Byzantine era. During the Turkish occupation period, the Oath reoccurs in Greece in the texts of the Greek Enlighteners. In modern times this Oath is

taken by the Medicine graduates and offers a stimulus of debates concerning the challenges of modern Bioethics and Medicine.

In the seventh essay, entitled “Oral and Moral Expression in Language Settings – Implied Dilemmas in Literacy Acquisition: An empirical phenomenological study of 7-9 Year-Old Greek Children’s Ethical Reflection on Creative Storytelling”, Smaragda Papadopoulou examines the ethical concepts in verbal expressions of children through narratives. 39 girls and 43 boys were interviewed in school settings. They were asked to tell their own story about “the sun”, as a story character. The Empirical Psychological Phenomenological method (EEP) was used for the analysis of the data. The results illustrate 13 qualitative categories of ethical meaning, which have been decided by “judges” providing an image analysis of the ethical traits and deeds of the stories’ heroes. The author discusses the importance of storytelling in children’s moral criteria reflected in their own speech.

The last essay, entitled “Towards an Ethic without Dogma and Moral Forces – Two perennial works by Argentinean psychiatrist, philosopher and ardent champion of reason José Ingenieros”, Lazaros C. Triarhou presents a synopsis of the works “Towards an Ethic without Dogma” and “Moral Forces” by José Ingenieros. The Argentinean psychiatrist J. Ingenieros has been a physician, philosopher and political activist, Professor of Experimental Psychology at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Buenos Aires. He tried to establish a comprehensive system based on developmental, evolutionary and sociogenetic biopsychology and on positive philosophy. He has presented studies on mental pathology and criminology, on philosophy, psychology and sociology. The works that L. C. Triarhou presents constitute two of J. Ingenieros’ fundamental contributions in the field of Ethics.

In the “2006-2007 academic year journal” there is information about the Teaching and Research Faculty, the Administration, alumni, graduate and post-graduate students, professor nominees, professors as well as about several of the Department’s activities.

As Head of the Department and head of the yearbook publication I would like to thank the authors that trusted us with their essays that are being published, the judges of the essays that helped to improve the quality of the issue, the members of the Year Book Publication Committee, as well as all who contributed in any way to this volume of the yearbook. I would especially like to thank Andreas Kastellakis, Emmanouil Sisamakias and Theoni-Fani Triantafyllou.

Finally, I would like to thank the University of Crete Rector, Ioannis Palikares, who was kind enough to preface this edition.

Professor Georgios N. Galanis

Society and crime in post-modern societies¹

Dr. Fritz Sack²

ABSTRACT

The paper throws a detailed view on the development of criminology from a sociological perspective. In contrast to the usual historical narrative of the discipline that credits Lombroso and his Italian school with the establishment of criminology the point is made that the biological school was preceded by the moral statisticians of the 19th century with the Belgian A. Quetelet as its scientific leader. However, the socio-structural approach by the moral statisticians was suppressed and replaced by the Italian individualistic perspective that gained hegemony for almost one century. The sociological viewpoint re-entered the criminological agenda as biographical and other social-environmental factors, albeit on a strictly individual level.

The full strength of a sociological perspective was achieved by the paradigmatic shift in the sixties of the last century. Instead of crime and the criminal the process of criminalization received emphasis and prominence in the discipline. Crime was no longer taken as an ontological phenomenon and the “natural” input of criminological research and reasoning, but its definition, operation and function became a matter of empirical and theoretical study. Among others, authors like Foucault and Christie have contributed to this change. The paper ends with a reflection on the fundamental change of the penal system in modern societies as D. Garland has documented in his famous book “Culture of Control”.

KEY WORDS: *"History of criminology"; "sociology and criminology"; "the punitive turn of criminal policy"; "neo-liberalism and criminology".*

1 This is the speech I delivered on June, 1st, 2006 at the University of Crete on the occasion of being awarded the title “Dr. honoris causa”. The oral structure of the speech is almost maintained.

2 Prof. Universität Hamburg

I am extremely honoured by the award this university is offering me in terms of a Ph.D. *honoris causa*. My special thanks go to Georgios Galanis whom I met two decades ago when he took part in a postgraduate program in criminology at the University of Hamburg. He belonged to the very first group of students of a new program that I had the privilege to be in charge of establishing. Since then we have met several times, in Hamburg as well as in this country, notably in Ioannina in the very north from here, close to the Albanian border.

I. THE SCIENTIFIC GRAMMAR OF MY THINKING

Let me take this opportunity to present you my ideas about the general perspective that I have followed in my scholarly and scientific life with respect to the analysis of crime in society. I will try to specify my approach by applying it to the situation in our present-day societies which are no longer plainly called modern societies. Instead there is a wide consensus to add a prefix to the adjective “modern”, either “post” or “late”, depending on the conviction whether our societies follow a line of development that makes them still more modern or whether there is a rupture or break in their development that leads to a different type of society beyond its modernity. I’ll come back to this question somewhat later.

My professional origin and –to use a well-known concept of the late P. Bourdieu– my practised habitus was formed and forged by the combination of an economic and sociological study, mainly at the university of Cologne, but also by a year-long study at two American universities – Columbus/Ohio and Berkeley/Cal.

The almost axiomatic premise of my work and my conviction is, therefore, first and foremost – against the more or less official history of criminology – the assumption that it is society that we have to look at and upon in order to grasp the dynamics of crime and its control. It is in this sense that my lecture and my reflections resonate with the position of one of the grounding fathers and figures of modern sociology, the French sociologist E. Durkheim.

Durkheim’s position boils down to a sociological prerogative and preference as far as the theoretical dimension of analysis is concerned. It is expressed and reflected in his famous principle of explaining social phenomena by social phenomena only. It treats crime and its control theoretically as social facts and nothing else, without making any reference and borrowing from other disciplines or principles.

There is no further need to mention the service Durkheim delivered not only to sociology but to criminology itself when he constructed the concept of

anomie and above all when he discovered the functional sides of crime and its normalcy for every society. Crime is normal and crime has under certain circumstances positive functions – this knowledge remains valid until now though it never has fully been accepted by science, the crime fighters of the police and the general public – except probably in occasional weekend talks and speeches.

It has to be regained and revitalized in a world in which crime is used to create moral panics, leads to literal “wars against crime”, produces overcrowded prisons and a constantly growing army of prisoners and in which the illusion of a crime-free society finally ends up in the vision of a societal utopia, which comes close to a kind of “magical denial of reality”, to use an apt phrase again from P. Bourdieu,³ this eminent sociologist and critical intellectual of our neo-liberal societies. In his general sociological orientation Bourdieu is perhaps the closest sociologist to the afore-mentioned Durkheim. In direct reference to Durkheim’s known dictum “society is God”, Bourdieu holds that whatever men expect from god, they will get it from society or they won’t get it,⁴ in good as in evil.

The emphasis and persistence on a sociological perspective is due and justified in view of a general tendency not only in criminology, but also generally in the social sciences. Since some time there is a kind of renaissance of biological thinking in our field. In criminology it started with the very controversial book of J. Q. Wilson and the late R. Herrnstein about “Crime and Human Nature” which was published in 1985 and which reintroduced biological reasoning in the area of crime. Still more in this direction went the rather infamous book by Herrnstein again and Charles Murray (1994), “The Bell Curve. Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life” which followed “crime and human nature” ten years later and which applied biological thinking on crime’s twin or counterpart area, that of intelligence –to remember: Ch. Murray is the ardent critic of welfarism– “Losing Ground” was the title of his notorious attack on the welfare state, R. Herrnstein was a renowned psychologist at Harvard University.

This is not the place to argue the case of biological interpretation of deviant behaviour or crime at any length. There seem to exist something like

3 P. Bourdieu, who died in 2002, made this fine remark in his famous inaugural lecture when he took over the chair of sociology at the French most prestigious institution of Higher Education, the “Collège de France” in 1981; I translated it into English from its German version in: P. Bourdieu (1985, p. 57)

4 Ibid, p. 77/78.-

the Nietschzean law of eternal recurrence – again and again in history men come back to the idea that crime might lie “in the genes”, as a biting reviewer commented the Wilson/Herrnstein book in the eighties. Suffice it to refer to a very apt remark M. Weber made in the chapter “sociology of domination” of his famous “economy and society” about “the relationship between privileged and underprivileged groups of mankind”. “The ‘legend’ or narrative”, he writes, “of every highly-privileged group is perhaps its natural superiority by blood”. And he specifies: “...the better placed person will develop the never ending wish to consider an existing contrast to his favour as ‘legitimate’, his own position as ‘deserved’ and that of the less well-to-do as caused by themselves”.⁵

Let me now sketch in several steps the way criminology has dealt with integrating or separating society and its structure into or from its analysis of crime.

II. THE IGNORED SOCIAL BEGINNING OF CRIMINOLOGY

1. It is part of the criminological orthodoxy and institutionalized conviction that its historical beginning is inextricably connected with the so-called Italian school, notably with its head, the psychiatrist and prison chief Cesare Lombroso (1835-1909). His *L'uomo delinquente* was first published in 1876 and became very fast a scientific bestseller that was translated into all leading languages of that time. While as forerunners of this development philosophers like J. Bentham and C. Beccaria are honoured, no mention usually is made of several scholars who worked around the middle of the nineteenth century and belonged to a group of scientists which was called the moral statisticians. It is this group that is referred to by an article in the *American Journal of Sociology* in 1937 under the title “The Lombrosian Myth in Criminology”.⁶ Two prominent criminologists point to this group of scientists which simply is put aside when it comes to identify the historical roots of our discipline.

2. The Belgian scholar A. Quetelet (1796-1874) was its founder; the title of the book that established his reputation points to the philosophy and the methods of his approach: He called it “*Physique sociale*”, which was published in 1835, four decades before Lombroso’s seminal book. Quetelet applied the quantitative methods of statistical analysis and the logic of the very successful

⁵ Cf. M. Weber (1956), p. 549 (transl. by the author).

⁶ Cf. A. R. Lindesmith and Y. Levin (1937).

natural sciences to all sorts of societal data, among them to the first series of regular data about the output of the criminal justice system. The findings of his analysis Quetelet summarized in a famous statement that has been quoted since then again and again and which also deserves mentioning here: “There is a budget which has to be paid with a terrifying regularity, that of the prisons, the galleys and the scaffolds”.⁷ This result, to be clear, was based on the society as a whole, not on individual properties and qualities. Some of the work of the moral statisticians presaged the approach and the perspective of the famous ecological Chicago school of the twenties and thirties of the last century. High priority was also given to the impact of economic factors on crime and its social distribution across the society.

3. Quetelet and his group were not the only scholars who were suppressed by the hegemony of the Italian school and its exclusively individualistic approach, by their claim; in other words, that the analysis of crime can only be based on the individual person. There was indeed a fierce struggle between the so-called environmentalists and the biologists. The Italian camp around Lombroso’s idea of the born criminal was heavily opposed by a French group of anthropologists around the then leading A. Lacassagne (1843-1924) who coined the famous phrase and principle that “the society has the criminals which it deserves”.⁸

Despite all this, as is well-known and in no need of details, despite also the vigorous interventions of the afore-mentioned Durkheim Lombroso won over and gained supremacy in the field for the decades to come. Positivist criminology dominated and governed the research and determined the rules of the game. For the time to come there was an endless search for the causes of crime that followed a certain strategy and methodology which was as simple as it was flawed. The basic methodological pattern as it was applied by lots of researchers and published in countless pieces of literature consisted in measuring the criminal individual with respect to its bodily, psychological and mental properties and characteristics – according to the components and aspects that the pertinent disciplines – biology, psychology, anthropology etc. – have either discovered or constructed. This is what Lombroso did with the human body, with the skull especially, and what his students, advocates and followers from his own and from the other disciplines of the human individual did excessively.

⁷ Quot. from H. Kern (1982), p. 39.

⁸ “Les sociétés ont les criminels, qu’elles méritent”. Lacassagne invented this motto of the French fundamental opposition against Lombrosianism on the first international congress of criminal anthropology in Rome in 1885; cf. “Actes du premier congrès international d’anthropologie criminelle”, Rome 1885, p. 167.

4. However, the lasting and crucial point of Lombrosian or Italian criminological positivism that survived its initial genetic and biological bias was this methodological strategy of solving the puzzle of crime by dissecting and decomposing the criminal and his make-up. This strategy became more refined and elaborated since then, the most important of which was the invention and introduction of the control group of normal, crime-free members of society. The comparison between the measured properties and characteristics of the individual members of the two groups was the methodological basis for identifying and singling out the causes of crime.

5. But what about the further chance and destiny of the contribution of society and its science, sociology, in this methodological frame and perspective? More and more the positivistic strategy of explaining crime had to include social factors in its agenda. The outcome was the famous “strategy of multiple factors” which became the etiological orthodoxy of criminological research for decades and which is, as we know, still with us. It was the merit of the early sociologists who incorporated biographical, educational, familial, group and class characteristics into the individualistic research for the causes of crime.

6. They were also social scientists, however, who were the first to express their discontent with the results of this methodological strategy. They complained about the massive accumulation of so produced differential data which were denounced and criticized as criminological graveyards of an endless and never-ending search and chase for the causes of crime. The main criticism referred to the theoretical neglect of this strategy and its epistemological ignorance. Without going into details of this flawed strategy of inductive knowledge, so heavily criticized by Sir Popper, it is due to criminology’s intransigent attachment to this “anti-theoretical” position that it is sometimes reproached for its unscientific procedures.

The most prominent scholar who did not hide his contempt for criminology’s epistemological and methodological faults and flaws was certainly M. Foucault. When asked why he criticizes criminology so harshly and ruthlessly and blames it for its “babbling and intrusive discourse”, Foucault gave this nasty answer: “Have you ever read criminological texts? That will knock you down. I don’t say this aggressively but I am just wondering, why this discourse could survive at this level. It seems to be so useful and necessary for the system that it deems possible to do without theoretical justification and methodological consistence”⁹

⁹ Cf. M Foucault (1976), p. 41 (transl. by author).

In reaction to this somewhat desperate situation in criminology there was some theoretical remedy offered again by sociology. What was called the etiological crisis of criminology paved the way for borrowing from the theoretical reservoir of the social sciences. It was the period when theoretical concepts of anomie, subculture, strain in its various types and forms entered the criminological terrain and gained momentum in the discipline.

7. Though this theoretical step brought criminology much closer than before to society and its structure, there was still an unsolved problem and defect that has haunted the discipline since its beginning in the period of the moral statisticians. The crucial weakness of all criminology up to this point was the empirical basis of all its reasoning. The kind of positivism that was practised by criminology consisted in the identification of the reality of crime with the output of the criminal justice system, with that part of criminal acts and actors that were known to the police, adjudicated by the courts and arrested by the prisons. This boils down to the disastrous fact that the empirical “laws” of criminology are based on a very biased and partial section of the factual crimes and criminals. To put it still somewhat more fatally for the academic identity of criminology, it comes close to a scientific deception or even fraud: what is pretended to mirror and reflect criminal reality, is the political product of the processes of criminalization.

The relevant concept that has to be mentioned at this point is, of course, that of the famous-infamous dark figure. It would take too much time and space to discuss this complex problem for criminology in its entirety. Suffice it to say that it is more than just a technical or methodological issue that can be remedied or repaired by any methodological tool such as victim surveys or self-report studies. It is a virtual epistemological problem which requires a fundamentally different scientific approach and perspective. That is why I will now turn to what is known in criminology as its paradigmatic shift.

III. FROM THE ANALYSIS OF CRIME TO THAT OF CRIMINALIZATION

The criticism of and attack on criminological positivism has been launched by a group of sociologists in the sixties, the most well-known of them were H.S. Becker, E. Lemert, D. Matza. The main objection against the dominant criminology at that time was just its empirical grounding upon that reality of crime which gets delivered by the official data and statistics of the state bureaucracy. Instead of taking this official reality as positive and given objects of study which have to be accepted by criminology as an ontological premise, it has to be taken itself as an object of study. Criminal statistics are not an

analytical tool for science but they belong to the object to be studied – this was one central critical message against the mainstream position in criminology.

It was the axiomatic starting point of a whole new path of empirical research and theoretical reflection in criminology. The overall uniting concept of this research was that of criminalization – the study of the empirical processes of defining – or labelling – certain behaviour as criminal in the first place and of applying these legal or statutory labels to concrete instances of acts or actors in the second place – “primary” and “secondary criminalization” (Ph. Robert 1990: 176/78). The theoretical underpinning of this new paradigm was provided by a number of scholars from different disciplines. Let me only mention one of them who most succinctly has hit the essential difference between the two antagonistic perspectives. According to a somewhat ironical observation of Matza, the biggest achievement of positivistic criminology was the successful separation of the state from crime, the neglect of the inextricable link between the state and the category of crime.¹⁰

This perspective recognizes in all plain frankness the relationship between society and crime and allows to study it in all its ramifications. It is the society, better to say: the state on behalf of the society which has the privilege and the power to define the behaviour that gets the quality of a crime and it is their security forces which transform the law in the books into the law in action. This procedure is not a mechanism that is self-implementing, but it is a procedure which requires a lot of decisions and implies some work of cooperation and coordination to produce the output that society is confronted with in form of statistics and official reports. These reports and official data reflect these decisions and processes of the security forces and they do reflect only in a very oblique, indirect and above all misleading way the criminal inclinations of the society and its members. Under this perspective one might say that crime is a product of these state-bound and social processes. It is a social construction that differs according to historical, geographic, economic and socio-political circumstances and conditions.

IV. THE REFLECTION OF SOCIETY IN THE WAY IT TREATS CRIME

Let me now come closer and more direct to the relationship between the society and crime and its control. The paradigmatic shift in criminology requires, however, a different framing of the issue. To speak of crime and

10 Cf. D. Matza (1969), p. 155 f., where Matza treats the invention and construction of the category of “crime” by the state at some length; see also Bourdieu (1985: 23 f.) who conceptualizes this phenomenon as the “state power of nam-ing”.

crime control as two separate processes corresponds to the old way of analysis. Instead of that one has to treat both aspects as intricately related to each other so that crime in its emphatic, social and practical sense is constituted by its control. The most prominent and famous example of this strategy of an empirical study of crime and the role it plays - to be more precise: it is taken or forced to play - has been given by the already mentioned M. Foucault. His book "Surveiller et punir. La naissance de la prison" (1975) represents a research about the structure and function of the system of crime control and the change that has taken place in this social area. The analysis of crime itself, how we know it from traditional criminology, takes only, if at all, a minor place in his work.

It is the emphasis on the methods of reaction to crime that has replaced the question of the causes of crime, as has been rightly observed by J. Young (2002: 228). The brutal way of treating the criminal with its different methods of torturing and tormenting the accused perpetrator, the masochistic variety of the infliction of pain that was so characteristic of the medieval penal system gave way to the prison and its system of treating the criminal in order to improve him, to teach him decent and lawful behaviour. The interpretation that Foucault suggested with respect to this development was quite different, even opposite to that of the official and hegemonic view. According to Foucault, it was not humanity that was the driving force of that transformation from medieval atrocities to the modern rule of law in dealing with the criminal but the process of instrumental rationality and utilitarian handling of the problem of crime. As is well known, Foucault took J. Bentham's panopticon as the emblematic sign and symbol of the new and modern strategy of crime control.

It was D. Garland's monograph that translated Foucault's analysis into a more restricted and empirically controlled penal system with its typical institutions which he called the "penal-welfare complex". It represented and reflected the wider structural properties of society in the field of criminal politics and - Garland's own phrase - "penal strategies".¹¹ It was a project that emphasized correction, discipline, inclusion and aimed at the resocialization and rehabilitation of the offender. Ultimately and in the long run it nourished the idea, utopian as we know meanwhile, of replacing the state-based and controlled penal law and its system of punishments with a system of measures

11 Cf. D. Garland's (1985) study of the transformation of classical penal law based on the pure act and the guilt of the actor into the modern penal law based on the actor and his social context and on the principle of rehabilitation.

that are organized and controlled by the civil society and its forces. This was the program and the message of the movement of abolitionism that was widely propagated and elaborated some decades ago. A penal scientist described this development in historical terms by commenting that the history of the penal law is a history of its demise and disappearance.

The internationally known Norwegian criminologist N. Christie set the tone with his famous article “Conflicts as property” (1977). There he probed the idea of returning the regulation and solution of criminal conflicts back to society and its involved members. This was the period that was characterized by a whole series of discourses about how to reduce and to undo total institutions and its legal basis and superstructure – concepts like de-penalisation, de-criminalization, de-institutionalization were widely used and passed round, not only in the world of academics and science but also in that of politicians and experts.

However, things have dramatically changed during the last two or three decades. The process of liberalization of the penal law and its transformation to more informal, lenient, soft measures and sanctions has been virtually and literally been reversed. Criminologists and experts speak of a “punitive or repressive turn”. To take the most spectacular and telling example of this tendency, the prison has become restored and revived. “Prison does not work” - this was the slogan and the widely-held conviction not only within the community of scientists but also among the experts and functionaries who ran these penal institutions. It was based on a broad and extensive empirical knowledge that practitioners from the inside as well as observers from the outside have brought home in overwhelming abundance.

The slogan of these days is just the opposite: “prison works” has become the banner of criminal and penal policy. This is true as is well known for the United States to an extent that is still beyond the scope and tools of criminological and sociological explanation and imagination. It induced two American authors to take refuge to metaphorical images instead of rational explanatory devices in dealing with the explosion of the prison population since the middle of the seventies. J. Irwin and J. Austin speak about the “American imprisonment binge”¹² – “binge” is a colloquial expression for “excessive eating and drinking”.

There are many other indicators and symptoms for this punitive turn in the States. Let me just mention the worldwide-known criminal policy of “three strikes and you’re out” or let me remind you of the police strategy of zero

12 Cf. J. Irwin and J. Austin (32000, zuerst 1994), who were among the first American criminologists to pinpoint the growing popularity of the prison.

tolerance which made its way around the whole globe. Instead of continuing the list that points in the same direction I leave it with the reference to the best monographic document of this tendency that again is written by D. Garland in his most recent book about "The Culture of Control" (2001). It describes and analyzes this development for the US and for Britain.¹³

Although to a considerably lesser extent and scope the same tendency can be observed and is widely documented for almost all of the European countries, even those, like the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries, which once were known as examples of liberal countries in terms of their penal systems and strategies. As far as the prison situation is concerned suffice it to allude to the well-known and in several languages translated book of N. Christie "Crime Control as Industry" with the biting subtitle "Gulags – western style" (2000) – an interpretation and conclusion of his findings that Christie presented only tentatively and with a question mark in the first edition of his book in 1993, but which he dropped since its second edition one year later.

Let me add, however, some additional evidence and voices that support at least the descriptive account and assessment of a punitive turn also for the European countries. This seems necessary to me in view of a certain tendency of ignoring or even denying the repressive reversal among European experts. Notably French colleagues and researchers hesitate to acknowledge and accept a similar evolution of penal policy in Europe as it is the case in the United States. This seems to me to result from a kind of general political or even ideological rejection of any parallelism between the worlds on this and on the other side of the Atlantic.

Also, colleagues and researches of my own country are reluctant to admit and acknowledge the described tendency for Germany. They do not at all accept and agree with the observation W. Hassemer, a penal professor of the University of Frankfurt and presently a member and the vice-president of Germany's constitutional court in Karlsruhe, has made already several years ago. In a lecture he gave on a meeting of jurists he identified and pinpointed a definite and undeniable new recourse to the most repressive aspects of the penal law. His paper was documented in a national newspaper under the headline "The new desire to punish".¹⁴ The denial and rejection of this

13 Cf. D. Garland (2001), who has presented an excellent analysis of the regression of the penal system to its repressive past. The book has been translated into several languages and is going to be discussed for years to come.

14 Hassemer's talk was later published in several places (2001); it was documented in the German newspaper "Frankfurter Rundschau" from Dec. 20, 2006. German criminologists, however, have more or less ignored his analysis, as I have specified elsewhere (Sack, in press).

statement usual is of a hardly convincing argument that does not go far beyond the commonplace platitude of the sort that talk is cheap and that the law in action is far away from the law in the books.

If one needs, however, additional indicators for this general observation one can easily find and name them. One way would be to throw a closer look at the discussion about the change of the juvenile justice system: lowering the age limit of criminal responsibility, reducing the aim and measures of rehabilitation, applying the adult law to the upper age levels of juveniles, even dropping it altogether. Another way could be to specifically look at the increase of harsher sanctions by law and by its application by the courts. During the last two decades there have been a series of legal amendments which all have pointed to a more serious level and scope and which partly come close to America's "three strikes strategy". A special case of this tendency could be identified with respect to the criminalization of sexual offences, paedophilia among them taken as the most suggestive and representative type of the punitive turn.

This brings me to a final remark as to the mere descriptive account of the punitive turn in my own country. Since some time there is a very hot and controversial discussion among jurists and defenders of the rule of law in penal justice about the assumption that the penal law is about to move in two very different, even antagonistic tracks or pathways: one track for the "citizen" who occasionally, though in principle law-abiding, violates the law – a second track for the "enemies" of the law and of society who notoriously break the law and cannot be adjudicated according to the full range of the rule of law. What makes this discussion especially remarkable and delicate is the person who has set it in motion. It was G. Jakobs, a highly reputable and recognized professor of penal law at the University of Bonn.¹⁵ I think, I need not go into further details to bring home to you the idea that Germany, too, is part of the punitive turn.

V. THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE PUNITIVE TURN

To come to an end of my reflections, let me finally throw a view on the forces that to my view are behind the described development. I will try to sum

¹⁵ Since G. Jakobs has first published his analysis of the development of a so-called "Feindstrafrecht" in 2000, there is a highly controversial debate about this assumption. Most of his colleagues reproach him of paving the way for the legitimating of a violation and even destruction of the principles of the rule of law; elsewhere I have defended his empirical analysis (Sack 2005).

up some of the considerations one finds in the literature on this question and add some of my own thoughts.¹⁶ I'll do it as briefly as possible.

Let me first rule out and exclude an assumption and view that is preferably adopted and defended by politicians and a large part of the public and the media. It is the position which has aptly been called by K. Beckett "the democracy-at-work-hypothesis". This hypothesis suggests a causal order that begins with the increase of crime, leads to social unrest and media coverage, which in turn arouses the concern of politics and the state who react by penal legislation. All evidence and most of the literature about crime statistics and crime surveys reject this causal order. Time does not allow me to go into more details.

A second assumption to be rejected and dismissed refers to the highly overrated role that the media play with respect to the punitive turn. Though it is true that the media take profit out of crime reporting and practice widely what is properly called "infotainment" – entertainment via information - , the media are rather symptoms than causes.

If not the crime and its increase, if not the nasty and insidious media, especially the sex-and-crime part of it, what, then, is the gist of the matter, what the essence of the punitive turn? It is my conviction that one has to take as a point of departure a very recent phenomenon on the field of crime and the way the society reacts to it. This new phenomenon lies in the dissociation and the de-coupling of the fear of crime from the reality of crime. This conclusion is based on a lot of empirical evidence and research. There is no correlation or sequence of developments in the sense of the "democracy-at-work-hypothesis". In other words, we have to look for other factors and insecurities than crime itself to find the roots of the fear of and obsession with crime. To put it still in another way, "crime" is a kind of vehicle that serves, is used and misused by political and social actors as a mechanism and instrument of substituting attention and aggression that is caused from problems of insecurity of other parts of society by concern about and focus on crime and criminals.

What these other problems are and where they are located, belongs to the last step of my argument. Modern societies obviously are confronted with and challenged by a growing part of their population which is exposed to unemployment, to poverty and to a precarious social situation. "Exclusion"

16 Cf. M. Tonry (2004), who has put together the half dozen attempts to give an explanation for the repressive and punitive turn in so many advanced countries; the reader is highly recommended to consult this analysis of an out-standing expert on the issue.

has become a widely used and proposed concept to grasp this social mechanism of loosening the bonds of this part of the population to society. The concept has gained some prominence in criminology (J. Young 1999) – as well as in the social sciences. “Ontological insecurity” is the concept that is used to describe the mental and psychological effects that result from this dramatic development.¹⁷

I have entered now the area that gets us closer to the driving forces – the economic transformation and its primacy over the political forces and actors in society. We have to thoroughly pinpoint and depict the development of what has come to be called neo-liberalism, its economic roots and political dimensions. As you know, this development goes back to the opposition against the socio-political strategy of the English economist J. M. Keynes and his demand-based economic policy that is based on a high level of state responsibility and intervention. Keynes was opposed by the economic movement of the so-called “ordo-liberalism” of the Austrian F. Hayek. Hayek’s most effective follower and propagator was the leader of the Chicago-based economic school, Milton Friedman, who pushed the way towards a supply-oriented economic policy. Milton’s and the voice of his followers and students was heard and followed by the iconic political leaders R. Reagan and M. Thatcher and became also the philosophy of the global actors in economics, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation and other high-level organisations of semi-democratic legitimacy only.

What is relevant and important for my argument is the economic imperialism that is connected with neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism penetrates all areas and institutions of the state and the society with the imperative order and principle of cost-benefit-analysis and orientation. One of the favourite areas that have been colonized by and submitted to the neo-liberal logic outside the proper field of economics is crime and criminal policy. The application of neo-liberal economic thinking on the problem of crime boils down to a strategy of influencing the demand curve for crime by increasing the “prices” of crime. This can be achieved by harsher punishment, through raising the transaction costs by measures of crime prevention and property guarding, etc. Obviously, these measures contribute to and encourage the observed punitive turn.

A parallel development and implication of the economisation of the society is the attack on the welfare principle and state as we have known it

17 Cf. J. Young who has elaborated on this concept quite broadly, refers to several authors who have contributed to it (1999, *passim*).

for decades. As can easily be shown, the return of the prison and penal repression is followed by and correlated with a demise and reduction of welfare services. Both instances and developments are submitted to the same neo-liberal logic and principle. Several authors have pointed to this complementary evolution, L. Wacquant (1997) calls it the path from the welfare to the punishing state, Z. Bauman puts it even more brutally by saying from “the welfare state into prison” ... into prison.¹⁸

An English political scientist summarized the upshot of his analysis of the Thatcher regime and area under the following title: “The free economy and the strong state” (A. Gamble 1988).

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18 Cf. Z. Bauman (1999), ch. 3 (p. 66 f): “Die Fremden des Konsumzeitalters: Vom Wohlfahrtsstaat zum Gefängnis”.

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Classical ethical positions and their relevance in justifying behavior: A model of prescriptive attribution¹

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ABSTRACT

This paper separates empirical research on ethics from classical research on morality and relates it to other central questions of social psychology and sociology, e.g., values, culture, justice, attribution. In addition, reference is made to some founding studies of ethical research and its historical development. Based on this line of tradition the development of prescriptive attribution research is introduced, which concentrates on the justification of actions by weighting the importance of the four classical ethical positions, hedonism, intuitionism, utilitarianism and deontology, as to why it was "good" or "right" that an action is performed. Six empirical studies are discussed, the first, using a questionnaire based on the four positions reveals marked differences in the justifications given by East and West German workers regarding their work performance. The East Germans tend more towards collectivism, weighting the utilitarian and deontological positions more highly. The second study makes use of a content analytical technique, and concentrates on the difference between the justifications of various professional groups. Economists, doctors and lawyers are asked to justify the introduction of a human germ-cell therapy. Economists are more hedonistic than the other two professional groups, who are more utilitarian and deontological.

The third study, based on a questionnaire, compares East and West German opinion as to whether it is right to remain in a close partnership (marriage) with interpersonal conflicts or whether it is right to dissolve the relationship. In this study, too, the justifications based on utilitarianism and deontology are given

1 The author would like to thank Barbara Cox-Tepp for the translation of the original German version of this paper.

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precedence by East German subjects, whereas hedonism is more important for West German respondents. After this regional comparison, the fourth study compares the justifications of a more collectivist (ROK) with a more individualistic culture (Germany). Here the differences reveal a greater importance of consequentialism (hedonism, utilitarianism) in the individualistic culture (Germany) and a greater weighting of the rule-directed position (deontology) in the collectivist culture (ROK). No differences are apparent regarding the intuitionist position.

The fifth and sixth studies use a content analytic approach to investigate the justifications of social behavior found in newspapers and prescriptions in the ethical standards of scientific societies. This resulted in an inverse relation between utilitarian and deontological arguments: 2 vs. 1 in newspapers and 1 vs. 2 in ethical standards.

To summarize, one could say that a deeper understanding of explanations leads towards the classical de-scriptive attribution theories, whilst a deeper understanding of the energizing forces behind an action lead towards the concept of empirical prescriptive attribution research as proposed here.

KEY WORDS: *attribution, justification, culture, ethics, individualism*

INTRODUCTION

In the field of psychology empirical research into ethics and moral judgement was for a longtime confined to issues of developmental psychology in the tradition of Piaget and Kohlberg (Kurtines, Azmitia & Jewirtz, 1992). To a certain extent these issues took on a new note when, for example, studies in line with the concepts of Kohlberg (Löhr, 1998) were conducted with students of economics (as a special group) or with groups from various cultural backgrounds (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987), thereby moving away from the realm of developmental psychology in its traditional form. Nonetheless these studies remained within the framework of Piaget's and Kohlberg's approach to ethics. More recent considerations have dealt with the further development of ethical concepts (Flanagan, 1991; Flanagan & Oksenberg Rorty, 1990), the discussion of their fundamental meaning and applicability to everyday life (for examples, see Blickle, 1998; Witte, 1995). And yet, these complex ethical concepts are rarely investigated empirically (Blasi, 1980; Forsyth, 1980).

The aim of this article is, a) to present a new line of research, b) combine this approach with other well-known approaches, c) present selected research findings from the a working environment and, d) point out the significance of this approach for practical purposes. First, we wish to give a short outline of the approach, to give an insight into the way it took shape. In this way similar-

ities and differences to existing research and theoretical concepts can be drawn making it possible to appraise the practicality of the method under discussion.

From a historical perspective it is clear that in contrast to developmental psychology any existing investigations into ethics (i.e., not morality) in the field of social psychology have rarely been taken up or developed further. It is true that Heider's work (1958) is regarded as a major source for the balance theory, for research into justice and the attribution theories, but the excerpts on "what should be" "Oughts" and "Values" have so far met with little interest. In terms of their stimulating quality they are comparable with studies on causality, justice and balance. If, however, one goes even further back to the historical roots one comes across a study that more than a hundred years ago empirically examined processes of moral judgement (Sharp, 1897/98) and which, in connection with points of discussion arising from a series of follow-up experiments conducted by Sharp (1908) and the expositions found in Heider (1958), could serve as a model for future empirical research. These studies point out the influence of norms and culture on ethical opinions and supplement the cognitive developmental levels related to age as found in developmental psychology.

In the field of social psychology the lack of empirical research into moral judgement and ethics stands in direct contrast to intensive empirical research into values (Schwarz, 1992; Seligman, Olson & Zanna, 1996), which does not exist in this form in developmental psychology, but can also be found in the field of sociology (Inglehardt, 1997; Klages & Gensicke, 1999). This research into values leads to universal dimensions that are closely related to classical ethical positions. To name just a simple example, the differentiation between materialism and post-materialism is closely linked with utilitarianism and deontology (see below).

Within the framework of this research into values one also comes across the comparison of different cultures with the significant dimension of differentiation between individualism and collectivism (Triandis, 1995). This form of differentiation draws attention to the focal point of reference in ethical studies, namely the individual or society. The comparison of different cultures within empirical research into ethics is, however, still in its initial stages, and yet, the topicality of this issue can be clearly seen through the world-wide clashes between different ethnic groups who each manage to morally justify the violence and bloodshed they incur (Huntington, 1996).

Finally, when dealing with research into ethics one also has to consider empirical research into justice and responsibility (e.g., see summaries by Greenberg, 1996; Reichle & Schmitt, 1998, Tyler & Smith, 1998) as well as into pro-

social behavior in general (Batson, 1998; Fritzsche, Finkelstein & Penner, 2000; Witte, 1994). There are extensive experimental findings related to these fields, but as yet they have rarely been linked with other ethical studies.

All approaches – stemming from the history of social psychology, research into values in social psychology and sociology, justice, pro-social and responsible behavior – concentrate on the value level and could quite well serve to provide one another with mutual stimulus, but this unfortunately does not occur. A possible point of orientation in this rather unstructured context is to take practical philosophy, which has been dealing with value-related questions for many thousands of years, as a basis from which to develop further studies. This would facilitate working out a core that could develop into a basis for future empirical research on ethics.

The use of such a core of content matter as a starting-point is naturally also essential for empirical findings. In this respect, employing a qualitative stage theory based on the notion that the higher level is morally more valuable, as was introduced by Piaget and Kohlberg in developmental psychology, is not entirely unproblematic. This stage theory uses the following sequence: 1. punishment and obedience oriented morality, 2. naive instrumental hedonism, 3. moral behavior of the "good" child, 4. authority oriented morality, 5. democratic morality, 6. conscience oriented morality, 7. cosmos oriented morality (as yet with little empirical corroboration).

But problems in the field of ethics are not of such a simple nature that they can be universally dealt with on the basis of a stage theory. This now leads to the differentiation between ethics and moral judgment. In the field of values one can regard morality as the content and ethics as the foundation (Steinvorth, 1990). Berkel (1998) has already worked out this difference for the field of organizational psychology, and it cannot be repeated here (see also Sternberg, 2000). A question one does finally arrive at in this context is: how do individuals justify their own value-oriented behavior? This question has a retrospective character which can be supplemented with a prospective character: how can one justify various alternatives for action and by so doing make recommendations for the future? Both cases revolve around the issue of justifications for past and future actions (recommendations). Thus, we have to briefly consider the term "justification". In order to connect this term with social psychological research, it should be constructed in a similar way to the term "attribution", which denotes subjective explanations through stating causes or reasons (Anderson, Krull & Weiner, 1996; Read & Miller 1998). Thus, an attribution is a differentiated statement of the varying relevance of reasons and causes with the aim of explaining an effect. Unlike an explanation on the factual level a justification is based on the value level, so that in an ethical sense

one can characterize a justification as a statement about the importance of ethical positions which characterize an action as “good“ or “bad” , “right“ or “wrong” (Witte & Doll, 1995). The other way around, one could naturally also ask, how are actions, that are judged as positive or negative, justified? Here we are confronted with the problem that not all actions can be justified. There are, for example, routine actions, that are value free, e.g., “Why is it right that you got on the bus? In contrast, however, the following action: “Why did you offer your seat to the elderly lady on the bus?”, can be given a justification. In the first case one would have to make complicated additional assumptions to arrive at a sensible answer.

The research program which we developed, and which follows the lines taken by social psychological research, could be described as a prescriptive attribution theory (Gollenia, 1999; Hackel, 1995; Maeng, 1996; Witte, 1995). Inherent in this term is the notion that comparable to an explanation that states causes and reasons one can arrive at a justification by referring to classical ethical positions, which assess an action as “good“ or “bad“. It is not only possible to justify past actions, but also to make recommendations for future actions, just as according to the attribution theory it is possible to induce future actions. Analogously to the terms explanation or prediction, as used in the descriptive attribution theory, the terms justification or recommendation can be introduced to the prescriptive attribution theory (Witte, 1994, p.301ff, Witte & Doll, 1995) :

1. There are actions: A.
2. There are classical ethical positions that can be used for the judgement of an action E_i .
3. There is the judgement of an action that is based on the relationship between the ethical positions and the action $R(A; E_i)$.
4. There is the differentiation of the judgment according to the importance (I) of the ethical position for the judgment of the action $I_i [R(A; E_i)]$.
5. There is the justification (J) of an action as “good“ or “bad”, “right“ or “wrong”: $J (I_i [R (A, E_i)])$
6. Hence the term prescriptive attribution theory (PRATT) is a quintuple equation $PRATT = \{A; E_i ; R (A, E_i); I_i [R (H, E_i)]; J (I_i [R (A, E_i)])\}$.

By breaking down the term “prescriptive attribution theory (PRATT)“ into its individual components one can recognize the specific requirements for this field of research. The first question concerns the actions (A). What types of action does it make sense to differentiate, in order to determine various justifications? Along with the judgement dimension “good“ vs. “bad“, the differentiation between: individual, inter-individual and social has proved valuable (Witte & Doll, 1995). During an individual action actor and recipient are

identical (I chose my job because I wanted to do something useful). In the case of an inter-individual action actor and recipient are different people, but both can be identified (during a seminar I offered my seat to a disabled student). A social action is characterized by one actor and many, not individually identifiable recipients who are affected by the action (I cheat on my tax declaration).

The second question concerns the ethical positions. How many and which ones can be differentiated? Naturally, this question is not easy to answer, but from the perspective of practical philosophy two important dimensions can be derived, namely the differentiation between means and ends oriented ethics and the line of evaluation drawn between the individual and society in general. These two dimensions provide a system of classification by which these ethical positions can be differentiated. From the point of view of empirical research it now additionally becomes important to find methods of empirically determining these positions. With this in mind, a questionnaire was compiled and a content analytical classification system was constructed (see below).

The third question concerns the relationship between the ethical standpoints and an action. This relationship and its immediate significance for the action is assessed using a rating scale or with a content analytical classification system which determines the number of arguments put forward.

The fourth question which deals with the differentiation of the judgement of an action and the connection to the patterns of justification reveals e.g., that positive individual actions are justified hedonistically and or by intuitionist standpoints, positive inter-individual actions according to intuitionist views and positive social actions based on hedonistic, intuitionist and utilitarian positions, but very rarely on deontological grounds. Negative types of action are given no justification, or if at all, as hedonistic (Witte & Doll, 1995).

The fifth question examines the division of actions that are judged as socially positive and socially negative. Such a division is feasible, whereby there are also neutral actions. Naturally, the judgements are also dependent on social indicators, e.g., sex, age, culture, profession etc.

In view of our previous research our chosen methods have proved successful and have potential for future studies that aim to focus more on the value level and determine a basis for this level.

Perhaps a brief comment should still be made concerning the practical and theoretical insights that can be won when the person and fact related attribution theory is supplemented with a value-related prescriptive attribution theory. Every action or each observed effect is equivocal and has to be interpreted. To do this one can use the factual level, which depending on the interpretation can have a number of consequences, e.g., the self-serving bias, diverging

explanations given by observer and actor, the conspicuous effect etc.. The value level is comparable in so far as it is also possible to differentiate patterns of justification for the same action performed by members of different cultures, professions, positions etc. Using the factual level of the descriptive attribution theory which uses the subjective allocation of causes and reasons it is easier to understand the model of thinking (Anderson et al., 1996; Read & Miller, 1998). Using the value level of the prescriptive attribution theory it becomes easier to comprehend the model of motivation which the actor or observer of an action subjectively assumes as a justification or recommendation and considers appropriate (Weiner, 1995). As behavior is often a result of cognitive-affective interactions, both forms of the attribution theory are of comparable significance for social psychology, whereby the prescriptive aspect is still in its initial stages. Through this link with the existing descriptive attribution theory one could stimulate future research on ethics by conducting comparable research on the factual and on the value level. The practical application is arrived at almost automatically by asking the question, which ethical positions were primarily followed when an action was performed, in other words what were the value aims, one wished to fulfill, as this reveals the basis of motivation that induced the action. Naturally there is still a long way to go before the action is actually performed, but it is possible to gain a more accurate interpretation of the energizing processes that are of particular importance for individuals, groups or cultures respectively.

ETHICAL POSITIONS

Before commencing with the empirical studies we should consider the ethical positions more closely. As in the field of practical philosophy the approaches are not very clearly laid out, we have to develop categories which provide a certain structure. Nonetheless, it has to be pointed out that one individual can support several ethical positions at the same time, possibly weighting each position somewhat differently. The first widely-known ethical differentiation is the division of means-oriented and ends-oriented ethics, i.e., positions that primarily focus on the process or positions that lend more weight to the result. A second differentiation factor is the level of observation. The focus here can be on the individual or on society in general. With these 2*2 differentiation features it is possible to classify the ethical positions: hedonism, intuitionism, utilitarianism and deontology. With regard to hedonism, the striving for pleasure and conviviality had already been raised to the level of an ethical norm as far back as antiquity. In contrast, intuitionism considers the reason for an action to stem from individual insight or individual feeling

regarding it as something self-evident. Utilitarianism is based on the principle of achieving the utmost good for the majority. Finally, deontology is derived from general principles such as the categorical imperative.

Table 1: *Differentiation of ethical positions for items on which to base a questionnaire*

Content matter	Ends Consequences	Means Rule
Level of judgement		
Personal	Hedonism (I try to make sure that I'm fine)	Intuitionism (I am sure this action is appropriate.)
General	Utilitarianism (I believe one has to consider the consequences an action has actions.)	Deontology (I believe that general principles serve as a guideline for our on everyone.)

In this table items have been formulated which were used for a questionnaire. In all, there are 20 items, 5 per ethical position respectively. Each time, subjects were asked how important these aspects were when an action was performed. The answers are given on a rating scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) (Witte & Doll, 1995). This short questionnaire has already proved worthwhile in several experiments with a satisfactory internal consistency 0.65 and 0.92 (Cronbach's alpha). It facilitates detecting differences between various cultures, local regions and professional groups when performing various actions (see below).

In addition to using this four-field-scheme for the compilation of the questionnaire, it was also used for the construction of a content analytical system of classification. According to our findings it provides us with an initial basis for empirical ethics research in accordance with the prescriptive attribution theory.

Our focus now is on the work environment and the usefulness of the prescriptive attribution theory for this context. Here, we refer to the findings of a questionnaire study and the content analytical scheme.

PROFESSIONAL BEHAVIOR AND ETHICAL POSITIONS

I would like to go into two dissertations in more detail that present the significance of this approach. First, the study conducted by Hackel (1995), exam-

ining differences between East and West German workers and second, the dissertation by Gollenia (1999) about the differences in justification strategies found in various professional groups. The first dissertation makes use of the questionnaire, the second one uses a content analytical categorization system which is adapted to the four-field-scheme presented above. The results of four other studies are also outlined here to provide a broader overview of this field of research.

Justification of one's own work performance: a comparison of East and West German workers

In a comprehensive study on differences in the professional socialization of workers in East and West Germany a total of 157 individuals were interviewed in 1992 and 1993, shortly after the reunification of Germany (Hackel, 1995). All subjects worked in the production sector. 70 came from East Germany (OiO), 30 from West Germany (WiW), 30 were West Germans who worked in East Germany (WiO), and 27 were East Germans working in the West (OiW).

All subjects were asked the question: "If you think about your work performance, how significant are the following justifications? Subjects were given a questionnaire with 16 items, i.e., due to the length of the entire questionnaire only 4 items per ethical position were used. Cronbach's alpha-values of the 4 scales range from .71 to .83 and are entirely sufficient for the comparison of means between the groups. The assessment of each item was made on a scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important).

Table 2: Comparison of justifications by OiO (N=70) and WiW (N=30)

Scales	WiW	OiO	t-Test sign.	Effect : d
Hedonism	4.09	4.26	.23	–
Intuitionism	3.63	3.55	.66	–
Utilitarianism	3.65	4.04	.04	.49
Deontology	3.41	4.14	.00	.81

Table 3: Comparison of justifications by OiW (N=27) and OiO (N=70)

Scales	OiW	OiO	t-Test sign.	Effect: d
Hedonism	3.57	4.26	.00	1.01
Intuitionism	2.75	3.55	.00	0.81
Utilitarianism	3.35	4.04	.00	0.81
Deontology	3.10	4.14	.00	1.14

Table 4: Comparison of justifications by OiW (N=27) and WiO (N=30)

Scales	OiW	WiO	t-Test sign.	Effect : d
Hedonism	3.57	4.06	.01	.73
Intuitionism	2.75	3.78	.00	1.26
Utilitarianism	3.35	3.63	.25	–
Deontology	3.10	3.24	.60	–

The two samples WiW and WiO reveal no differences.

In the East German sample one typically finds a greater weighting of the two ethical positions utilitarianism and deontology. The effect-size measures *d* are average to high. Based on the assumption that shortly after German reunification former social conditions were still in effect, then this result reflects a stronger collective tendency with regard to work performance among the East Germans. It is conceivable that the motive to achieve can be additionally increased through reference to the factory plant and society in general than, for example, by addressing individual merit alone, resulting in a stronger hedonistic justification, which was also found to be relevant but was not different in the two regional groups. One can infer this from the mean value of 4.0, the theoretical point of neutrality of the rating scale being 3.0. However, a comparison of the East Germans who work in the West and those who stayed in the East demonstrates how quickly such patterns of justification change, or how other modes of behavior emerge. Subjects who had experienced social changes no longer saw the significance in any form of justification, perhaps with the exception of hedonism, the means being barely above the point of neutrality of 3.0. Even intuitively they are no longer sure which position they should support, ($M=2.75$). They appear insecure as to the options open to them when justifying their work performance. In comparison with the parallel cultural group in the East they no longer see the significance of any ethical position. (That was the case around 1993). The West German commuters, on the other hand, are no different to the West Germans who remained in the Federal Republic. This group of commuters places most weight on personal positions, including hedonism, so it appears that the motive to work in the East was chiefly induced on the individual level as opposed to the collective level, namely the aim of improving conditions in the former GDR. It was therefore more an issue of personal incentive and not so much of general values, as could later be observed in a number of instances. The notion of assisting in the rebuilding of the new Federal States was of no added importance for their work performance, as was often reported by the media as the main motiva-

tion. The commuters sought their own personal advantage similar to the other West German employees. It seems that voluntary commitment in favor of the community was of lesser importance.

On account of these data found by Hackel (1995) it is possible, even in retrospect, to gain a better understanding of certain developments. The West German commuters' prime concern was with their own personal gains, whilst East Germans tended less towards inter-personal competition and focused more on the community. This explains why certain incentives failed as well as why certain avoidance tendencies to compete were apparent among the East Germans and it also shows the inadequacy of referring to the socialization deficits of a socialist system as the sole explanation. It is possible to recognize which value areas are given more weight, enabling the construction of incentive systems that go beyond remuneration alone. Nonetheless, these types of incentive systems are difficult to integrate into a primarily economic-individualistic culture. To summarize, these examples demonstrate in what manner the value level can influence work motivation. It is necessary to look at this in greater detail to gain an understanding of observed work performance and go on to create appropriate incentive systems. This naturally also applies to individual cases, when it comes to identifying employees who are motivated more by individualist or collective concerns, in other words more by a sense of duty or more by reward. In individual examinations, however, a more differentiated instrument has to be employed which can determine and differentiate individual prescriptive attributions with greater accuracy than the method presented here for the comparison of mean values.

Professional identity and patterns of justification

Recent years have seen the emergence of various forms of applied ethics that respectively discuss the problems inherent in specific sectors of society: medicine, economics, technology, politics, law etc. These ethical discussions each focus on various aspects. But what actually happens when representatives of various professional groups have to mutually arrive at a project decision and the perspectives held by each professional field result in varying ethical stances? How is it possible to find a common denominator? This is an exceptionally difficult question as it has been observed that even within a single discipline it is difficult for a professional group to carry on successful discussions arriving at an acceptable outcome. There is a strong indication that common discussion which integrates the perspectives of different professional groups can only be envisaged with the assistance of targeted moderation.

Gollenia (1999) dealt with this question in greater detail in her dis-

sertation. In this context, the only question we want to focus on is how various professional groups justify their decisions in a simulated ethical commission set up to discuss the introduction of a therapy using human germ-cells. This therapy involves the genetic manipulation of an individual's genetic make-up to prevent the passing on of hereditary diseases.

N=84 subjects participated in this experiment. All subjects were either just about to graduate from university or had completed their studies and were already working in the following three professional fields: economics, medicine, law. As members of a simulated ethical commission these subjects were presented with the question whether they would advocate the introduction of this therapy in Germany. They were to make a decision and then give a justification for their choice.

Here, we are only interested in a small sector of the overall, complex experiment (see Gollenia, 1999). The reasons for justification were classified according to the four ethical positions. Inter-rater reliability was sufficient and it was possible to classify almost all the justifications.

Differences between the three groups are even apparent in the number of arguments that were put forward.

Table 5: Means and standard deviation of the number of justifications per person

Professional group	Economics	Medicine	Law
Means and standard deviations	9.86 (s=3.7)	11.86 (s=4.8)	14.8 (s=4.5)

An analysis of variance followed by a Scheffé-test showed that on average the lawyers produced more justifications. It is possible to eliminate this influence by percentaging the number of contributions and then distributing the justifications over the four ethical positions. One then arrives at the following distribution of percentages.

Table 6: Percentage distribution of justifications for the ethical positions and professional groups

Ethical position	Economics	Medicine	Law
Hedonism	39.2 %	18.0%	18.6%
Utilitarianism	37.6%	54.5%	49.0%
Deontology	15.6%	24.7%	29.2%
Intuitionism	3.7%	2.7%	2.6%

A comparison of the professional groups reveals the following preferences:

1. The economists show a preference for hedonistic justifications in contrast to the doctors and lawyers.
2. Doctors and lawyers show a preference for utilitarian arguments in contrast to the economists.
3. Doctors and lawyers show a preference for deontological positions as compared to the economists.
4. In general intuitionist justifications were rare revealing no differences between the groups.

This distribution shows a strong similarity between members of the medical and legal professions who in turn differ from the economists. A distribution of this kind was only partially expected. The expected distribution was a predominance of hedonism for the economists, utilitarianism in the medical field and deontology for members of the legal profession. The actual preferences are not quite so straightforward but certain unmistakable differences cannot be overlooked. The result can be regarded as an indicator that a discussion involving all three groups would not be easy. It also indicates the kinds of misunderstandings that have to be considered when trying to improve the quality of dialogues between professional groups which could lead to important decisions for our society. The inference that one ethical position is better than another is too simple.

A FURTHER COMPARISON OF EAST AND WEST GERMANY: A QUESTIONNAIRE STUDY

By conducting a further questionnaire study our aim was to gain a deeper understanding of the differences between East and West Germany (Witte & Doll, 1995). Two interpersonal actions were to be justified: a) dissolving a close partnership (marriage), and b) trying to maintain a close partnership in spite of interpersonal conflicts.

Justifications for both actions were assessed using a questionnaire that was based on the same four ethical positions with four items per scale respectively. These were to be rated in terms of their importance for the given justification. The internal consistency (Crombach's alpha) was as follows:

Hedonism	:	$\alpha = 0.77$
Intuitionism	:	$\alpha = 0.61$
Utilitarianism	:	$\alpha = 0.83$
Deontology	:	$\alpha = 0.87$

1300 subjects participated in the experiment, 1045 were from West Germany and 255 came from East Germany. The respondents' age was $M=33$

years. In all, 78 % were women and 22 % men. Throughout the study 88 % lived with a permanent partner. Participants in the experiment were found through advertising in a women's magazine 1990 /91 (Witte & Doll). Of this large sample the only results that interest us here are those which show at least a small effect ($d=0.20$ according to Cohen, 1988). According to the t-test significant effects (d) between East and West Germany were as follows:

Hedonism	:	$d = 0.60$
Utilitarianism	:	$d = -0.36$
Deontology	:	$d = -0.51$

Here, as in the justification of work performance, it is possible to recognize a similar pattern of justification. East Germans give more weight to collectivist ethics, whilst hedonism is more significant for West Germans. Intuitionism ($d=0.03$) reveals no difference. This may be due to the slight internal consistency. It was, however, evident that different justifications for the same two actions could be linked to each respective region. The result had, however, been expected due to "socialist" socialization in East Germany.

A comparison between a collectivist and an individualistic culture: a questionnaire study

In a questionnaire study aimed at disclosing differences between collectivist and individualistic cultures subjects from South Korea (Seoul) (ROK) and from Germany (Hamburg) were interviewed (Maeng, 1996). The sample comprised 144 individuals from Korea and 118 from Germany. In addition, two groups were differentiated, men and women between 20 and 25 and between 40 and 45, in order to examine potential generation differences. Each cell was composed of around 30 respondents. Questions were based on the following interpersonal actions:

I get up and offer my seat to the elderly lady, b) my child's upbringing takes precedence over my professional career, c) I consider my parents' opinion when choosing a future spouse.

In all, 12 actions were to be justified. The very extensive results can be summarized as follows: Germans are more hedonistic and utilitarian in their justifications whilst the justifications of Koreans are mostly founded on deontological arguments. Again, there was no relevant difference in the case of intuitionism.

In contrast to the comparison between East and West Germany, which primarily addressed the personal as opposed to the general level, the difference here is between ends and means.

A point of interest in this context is that empirically the respondents can be

easily classified employing a cluster-analysis analysis) (Ward-procedure) which results in 8 clusters of which 3 clusters present either purely Korean or German individuals whilst the other two clusters are mixed. Differentiation according to sex and age has no significant influence.

The public justification of social actions: a content-analytic study

The issue here, is how we justify social behavior publicly. For this study 37 leading editorial articles of a German daily newspaper the "Hamburger Abendblatt" were investigated. These articles comprised 1,138 sentences, of which 174 (15%) included justifications. A classification of the justifications according to the four ethical positions, resulted in the following percentages: 5% hedonism, 22% intuitionism, 45% utilitarian and 28% deontology. Slight differences that arose during the classification process were solved through discussion by a group of 3 experienced raters. If we now focus on social behavior which made up 76% of all reported actions - regardless of whether they were positively or negatively portrayed - the justifications were chiefly utilitarian (52%), followed by deontological positions (27%). The relationship between the number of utilitarian to deontological justifications is approx. 2: 1.

Prescriptions in "Ethical Standards" of scientific societies: a content-analytic study

Social behavior that can be observed in every-day situations is often presented in magazines. Certain social actions, that can be predicted to occur in the future, were set down in "Ethical Standards" (Keith-Spiegel & Koocher, 1995). Such "Ethical Standards" stemming from the "Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie (SOZ)" (the German Society for Sociology), the "Berufsverband Deutscher Psychologen (BDP)" (the Association of German psychologists) and the American Psychological Association (APA) in the 1977 edition were used as a basis for this study (Witte, Aímann & Lecher, 1995). We concentrated on those areas that focused on empirical investigations.

Two independent raters used a classification system to allocate the justifications to the four ethical positions. Apart from very few minor deviations the values tallied extremely well. There were no personal statements, i.e., hedonistic and intuitionist justifications did not occur.

We limited ourselves to the quantitative relationship between utilitarian and deontological justifications (see Table 5).

For justifications in terms of "Ethical Standards" the relationship between utilitarianism and deontology regardless of professional application and culture were extremely similar and diametrically opposed to public behavior. Utilitarian statements can also be regarded as justifications for the deviation from rules (deontological statements), e.g., it was agreed that subjects should be fully informed about the investigation; deception was only permitted, be-

Table 5: Number of utilitarian (*u*) and deontological (*d*) justifications in three Ethical Standards SOZ, BDP, APA

Professional group	Economics	Medicine	Law
Ethical Standards	U	D	U/D
SOZ	10	22	0.42
BDP	6	12	0.50
APA	22	45	0.50
Sum	38	79	0.47

cause this was the only way of obtaining results that could be compared to real-life behavior outside the laboratory. At the end of the experiment this deviation was then compensated by debriefing.

CONCLUSIONS

These and other results have led to two lines of development. First, the intensification of research into the value level in the field of social psychology as alluded to above and second, the study of practical problems based on the four ethical positions and the respective preferences shown by certain cultures, professional groups or individuals. The differences in weighting these justifications lead to misunderstandings and conflicts because no party is willing to consider the justification level of the others, which finally results in everyone speaking at cross purposes. With this in mind it would be plausible, for example, to expand the concept of mediation (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Witte, 1994,a) to specifically include the value perspective. By employing this approach some conflicts could be avoided or dissolved (Tyler & Blader, 2000). At the same time an ethical analysis should be carried through to ensure that the discussion proceeds in a manner which corresponds to these four ethical standpoints. The idea is to select those alternatives for action that comply with the four positions as closely as possible. This is a means of identifying actions that lend themselves more readily for justifications. It also makes it possible to obtain indications for future decisions, if appropriate scenarios are enacted and the justifications for these scenarios are studied in greater detail. It is feasible that the quality of the decision is partially determined by the factual level but also in part by the value level. The relationship between these two levels naturally depends on the type of decision being made, but one can assume that when issues become more complex both levels are always addressed. The scheme outlined here provides certain guidelines for professional use with the

aim of differentiated discussion of value levels that tries to exclude the premature intrusion of preferences. In addition, on the individual level an understanding of the motivation model of a respective employee will enable the construction of an individual incentive system so that management tasks can be carried out with greater focus. It may well be that certain motivation models in the form of patterns of justification for one's own work performance are sometimes more and sometimes less appropriate depending on the type of position or task (team work, sales representatives or other employees working outside the firm). Arriving at answers to questions such as these naturally means that further studies have to be carried out. This more applied perspective is, of course, only an example of the usefulness of this approach. One could conclude by saying that all conflicts between groups based on values have their roots in the differences in weighting ethical positions. There is an urgent need to gain a deeper understanding of these conflicts. This is one approach in this direction.

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Empirical research on ethics: The influence of social roles on decisions and on their ethical justification

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ABSTRACT

Two questionnaire studies try to answer the question if different social roles lead to different decisions and justifications concerning ethical problems. In study I participants were asked to decide on an economic problem (Should the production of a mobile company be transferred abroad?) while going into a related social role, in study II role expectations were asked for. The decision had to be justified by weighing the importance of four classical ethical positions: hedonism, intuitionism, utilitarianism, and deontology. The results show that decisions and their justifications are dependent on social roles. The effect, which is interpreted as stemming from social standardization, is greater for role-behavior. The differences between role-behavior and role-expectation indicate a misunderstanding crucial for group decisions.

KEY WORDS: *social role, social standardization, ethics, justification*

The following studies try to enlighten the influence of social roles on decisions and their ethical justifications. Social roles are looked upon as critical features of decision makers, even more accentuated, obvious, and influencing in a group context. Ethics commissions deliver such a group context. They debate about right and wrong, have to make a decision and are requested to justify it. Each social role is connected to role expectations and to role behavior; decision-making and the justification of a decision are likely to be influenced by both role behavior and role expectations. Thus, the first study focuses on role simulations. Participants were asked to go into a defined social role and to act correspondingly (internal perspective). The second study poses the

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questions which way of acting people expect from keepers of different social roles (external perspective).

Ethical questions are demanding answers more urgently than ever. Recently, the Schiavo case agitated people all over the world and split them up into advocates and opponents of euthanasia. Gene manipulation is widely and contentiously discussed, lately triggered by a Korean researcher on the go. Not only medical questions and questions due to ever-advancing biotechnological feasibilities (Mitcham, 1990) keep the world busy but also problems of politics and society, environment and business: How can the war on Iraq be ethically justified? How should war prisoners be treated? Should the Kyoto convention on climate change be ratified? Is it right to begin a trade war on textiles with China? It is not surprising that commissions deliberating ethical problems are more and more common and increasing in number. Although they decide, or at least give recommendations, about life and death, peace and war, just and unjust, very little is known about their way of working and factors influencing their decisions. A look back into history shows that groups are in general are vulnerable to mistakes. And wrong decisions can have serious consequences (Janis, 1972; Tuchman, 1984).

Any time people debate about ethical problems it becomes evident that societies are divided into several subgroups of people who differ in their way of value-thinking. Conflicts arise, whenever people try to come to an agreement as to the offering of gene-manipulated food, the legality of different rites of burial, the usage of cannabis in medicine, or whatever ethical questions come up. These conflicts comprise not only decisions between consent and rejection, but also the ethical positions behind these decisions. People justify their decisions referring to different ethical positions. Empirical research on ethics found four different ethical positions: utilitarianism, deontology, hedonism, and intuitionism (see chapter about ethical positions). People weight these ethical positions differently depending on the issue they are justifying.

A question follows these implications: Which is the attribute that causes people to decide one way or the other and that provokes schemes of justifications? The answer may lie in the social roles people keep. The society can be seen as composed of by role-keepers. This point of view implicates two effects:

1. Social roles influence values and value-thinking.
2. Social roles do not only influence actual behavior. Each social role triggers expectations as to role behavior.

Thus, the society is fragmented into groups of people who prefer different decisions as to ethical problems and who justify their decisions referring to different values. Another aspect apart from competing values may lead to conflicts: the incongruity between role behavior and role expectations. If role

behavior and expectations diverge and people do not behave according to the expectations their social role arises, this may lead to deep misunderstandings. The debate about fundamental ethical problems could be lastingly disturbed because of such misunderstandings. An example for such a misunderstanding may be a catholic priest fighting for the women's right to abort.

The studies try to answer the question, if there is a connection between the social role someone holds and the decision and its justification concerning an ethical problem. Thereby it is of special interest whether decisions and their justifications are socially standardized. The following general hypotheses are to be tested:

H1: Social standardizations influence ethical decisions and their justifications by means of gen-eral value orientation and social roles. These standardizations can be made explicit by the different weighing of the four ethical positions.

A second question of investigation refers to the match between actual behavior of someone holding a spe-cial social role and the expectations towards this person.

H2: There are differences concerning ethical decisions and their justifications between the con-ditions role behavior and role expectation measured through the importance ratings of the four ethical positions.

Hitherto, these connections have not been analyzed. In the scope of a growing number of ethics commissions and their decisions concerning questions of life and death and sometimes affecting whole nations, a survey of influencing factors of these decisions and their justifications seems necessary.

In the following, theoretical background as to ethics commissions, social roles, and ethical positions is given.

ETHICS COMMISSIONS

When forming a commission, members representing special professions, fields of expertise or ideologies are selected. Such a commission can be seen as a mirror of what takes place in society as a whole. Generally defined, ethics consultation is "a service provided by an individual consultant, team, or committee to address the ethical issues involved in a specific case" (Tulsky & Fox, 1996, p. 112). Ethics committees and commissions are multidisciplinary composed ethical advisory bodies in the form of small groups; they work in a defined institutional context and should meet a special advisory need; they especially reflect the morally problematic part of issues and problems.

Ethics commissions can be characterized concerning several factors with different specifications:

- political level or institutional dependence: from panels of individual hospitals up to national commissions (e.g. President's Council on Bioethics, 2001)
- composition of their members: representatives of different sciences, sometimes of political parties
- topics: often problems concerning medical practice or bio-/gene technology
- application: e.g. advice, recommendation, information, control of norms, and
- type of statement: consensus, votes for several voices, or neutral option catalogues.

Ethics commissions have various faces. Albeit the committees' variety and increasing number (McGee, Spanogle, Caplan & Asch, 2001), the knowledge about them does not meet the number and use of ethics committees. What is known about them refers mainly to hospital ethics committees and comprises statistical data (e.g. McGee, Spanogle, Caplan, Penny & Asch, 2002) such as the quantity of commissions, the number and professions of their members or the type of medical problems discussed (organ donation, child treatment, life-prolonging measures, etc.). Even if the work of ethics commissions is analyzed, it does not always lead to expanded knowledge. Tulskey and Fox (1996) identified 42 empirical studies on the evaluation of clinical ethics commissions in the USA and Canada (no time period mentioned). They stated that all of these studies were in some way methodologically flawed and only relatively few evaluative conclusions about ethics consultation could be made. The group processes within ethics commissions, their way of working, and the quality of their results are more or less a "black box" (Witte, 1991).

Normally, the advantage of commissions is seen as greatly due to their members: different experts come together to join and exchange their specific knowledge and to complement each others' perspective. The implications behind this procedure are not looked at. From a social psychological point of view, the work of ethics commissions is a complex group task (Witte, 2002a; Witte & Heitkamp, 2005). Groups are characterized by a variety of losses (Steiner, 1972). Many of them refer directly to group members: groupthink (Esser, 1998; Janis, 1972), power (French & Raven, 1968) or restricting group norms (Postmes, Spears & Cihangir, 2001) for example.

Group members (Arrow, McGrath & Berdahl, 2000) belong to the basic elements of groups – and therefore of ethics commissions as well. – belong to group members (Arrow, McGrath & Berdahl, 2000). Their composition can influence many aspects of group life, including group structure, dynamics, and performance (Moreland, Levine & Wingert, 1996). An eye-catching and basic feature of group members is their social role. Each group member keeps a social role while representing a profession, field of expertise or ideology. Look-

ing at social roles may thus be a first step to better understand the dynamics behind ethics commissions and may help to improve their work.

SOCIAL ROLES

The gathering of people who keep different social roles is a common attempt to try to handle ethical un-certainty and to gain rational reasoning. These studies focus on a salient and influencing characteristic of commissions' members: the social role. The social role is a well- established category of every-day life with stereotyped images like doctor, priest, or housewife (Goffman, 1961) which are dimensions of the social identity (Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi & Ethier, 1995). Tacit ground rules form social identities and make everyday life possible (Chriss, 1999). While there seems to be a tendency towards a consensus about the contents of roles (Coser, 1991; Turner, 1972), the definitions of "role" diverge. On the one hand, social role is defined as "the typical response of individuals in a particular position" (Goffman, 1961, p. 93), a definition which concentrates on behavior. On the other hand, there are definitions which focus on the expectation towards role keepers (Woodland, 1968). Role is the "expectation held by the group for how members in particular positions ought to behave" (Kenrick, Neuberg & Cialdini, 2005, p. 400). Because each definition alone forms a stereotype (Turner & Colomy, 1993), the synthesis of both seems to be adequate: the role is the point of intersection between the behavior orientations of actors, the expectations of others and the functional requirements of the society (Sarbin & Scheibe, 1983). Definitions of social role stress role behavior, role expectations, or both. It is not clear to what extent role expectations and role behavior go together. It is likely that there are differences between role behavior and role expectation because of the differences of cognition and conation.

Close to social roles are social norms. The definition of social norm by Kenrick, Neuberg and Cialdini (2005) is: "A rule or expectation for appropriate social behavior" (p. 4). Each role seems to be defined through social norms which thus have an impact on the behavior of role keepers. Social norms, which can also be conveyed through a given situation, lead to standardized interactions (Seeman, 1997).

Normally a social role is identified as an entity (Turner, 1972). In contrast to that, Turner and Colomy (1993) propose a role differentiation. They sketch three principles: functionality, representation, and tenability, which are highly interactive in their effects. Thereby, role conflict resulting from ethical situations is significantly greater than that of any other source (e.g. job, family) (Chonko & Burnett, 1983).

Every differentiating principle can be detected in the context of an ethics commission. Functionality seems to be the main principle for the composition of the committee's members. Different competencies and dispositions are associated with different professions or offices. In contrast to Turner and Colomy, conflicts of interests are thereby not avoided but wanted. An example is the committee on local water management that comprises representatives of the water works, politicians, and residents of the affected area (McDaniels, Gregory & Fields, 1999).

Another differentiating principle is representation. It is able to cover functionality (Turner and Colomy, 1993). A current example is the decision of the German National Ethics Council on cloning for reproduction or for biomedical research. Fields of expertise or offices of the commission's members ceased to play a role; they were superseded by three divergent positions which had emerged during discussion. In the end, it only mattered how many members opted for (i.e. represented) which option (see German National Ethics Council, 2004). As the members of the German National Ethics Council were not able to form a consensus, the importance of the third differentiating principle comes into consideration. This means, if a consensus had been achieved, some of the members would have given up their roles. This obviously too costly alternative must have been against the third principle: tenability.

In sum, social roles can be detected and their influence can be regarded as to be highly probable. But if and how they work is unresolved/settled. The differentiation between functionality and representation of roles (e.g. profession and decision of a committee member) appears to be noteworthy. It has to be shown how far social roles are functional as schemes and models for personal behavior (Athay & Darley, 1982). Because social roles are associated with duties, norms, and expectations (Donahue, Robins, Roberts & John, 1993), the influence of social roles is especially crucial in the area of ethical decisions and their justification: Is everyone able to decide freely and rationally or can roles lead to standardized decisions and judgments which do not mirror the real situation? What if people do not feel free to decide individually but will orientate themselves in accordance to social norms? Do people assume potential norms or do such norms really exist? What would standardizations mean for decisions and their ethical justifications?

ETHICAL POSITIONS

This study tries to analyze the connection between value orientation, social roles, decisions and their justification. Above, the influence of social roles on behavior and cognition is displayed. Now shall be presented how ethical posi-

tions which are the main aspects of values can be measured.

The general question is: How can decisions be ethically justified at all? Psychological research on ethics is not in the focus of active research, with one exception: the research on justice (Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith & Huo, 1997).

Ethical research can be compared to a medal with two sides: one side refers to ethics theory, which means to thousands of years of philosophy (Mac Intyre, 1976), the other one refers to empirical psychology. Both sides can be conjoined in one of our research question that is if theoretical ethical positions of practical philosophy can be found empirically. The psychological perspective should be value-free.¹ In contrast to philosophy, psychology is not interested in ascertaining the however- based superiority of one position. Psychology is only interested in the given facts of empiricism. The question behind it is not how people should justify their actions but rather how they do it in practice and what factors influence their justifications. For example the connection between identity, moral cognition (e.g. justification) and behavior (e.g. decision) is of interest (Aquino & Reed, 2002).

Normative ethical positions which are empirically stated are hedonism, intuitionism, utilitarianism, and deontology, (Witte, 2001, 2002b, 2002c; Witte & Doll, 1995).

The meanings of these value attitudes have also been similarly found. Hedonism goes back to Aristippos and contains that an action has to be performed when it brings pleasure to oneself. This could be intermingled with egoism but it does not have to be. To formulate it in a more neutral way, the action performed should not be in opposition to the individual human dignity (Witte & Doll, 1995). Intuitionism considers the reason for an action as stemming from individual insight or individual feeling. Intuitionism prevents justifications from running to a dead end, to an endless regress (Rawls, 1971; Witte & Doll, 1995). Utilitarianism prescribes to perform that action which brings the greatest happiness for the greatest number (of feeling beings). It is associated with the names of J. Bentham and J. S. Mill. In contrast to utilitarianism, from a deontological point of view the end does not justify the means, but the means themselves underlie the need of justification. According to deontology, justifications should match universal principles such as the categorical imperative (see I. Kant). Empirically, people assign various degrees of importance to all four ethical positions (Witte, 2002b, 2002c). The four ethical positions can be included in a taxonomy, which takes two dimensions into account: content matter and the level of the judgment (table 1).

Forsyth and colleagues (Barnett, Bass, Brown & Hebert, 1998; Forsyth, 1980, 1992; Forsyth & Nye, 1990; Forsyth & Pope, 1984) found similar ethical positions. But they represent the point of view of personality psychology, define

Table 1. *Taxonomy of the four ethical positions (Witte & Doll, 1995)*

Content matter	End/Consequence	Mean/Rule
Level of judgement		
Personal	Hedonism (I am concerned with my personal well-being.)	Intuitionism (I am sure that this action is appropriate.)
General	Utilitarianism (In my opinion, one has to consider the consequences of an action for everyone.)	Deontology (In my opinion, general principles serve as guidelines for our actions.)

the theoretical background of positions slightly differently and use a taxonomy based on the scales relativism and idealism with the values high and low. Their approach of the empirical ethics research differs from the one presented here.

It is essential that “different ethical judgments do not imply different ethical frameworks and similar ethical judgments do not imply similar ethical frameworks” (Hunt & Vitell, 1986, p. 14). In line with this statement ethical positions have been found empirically in different contexts. The importance of different value attitudes varies with culture (Maeng, 1995), with the quality of the actions that have to be justified (individual, interpersonal, social actions) (Witte & Doll, 1995), with social identity (Gollenia, 1999), and with professional socialization (Hackel, 1995).²

The variation with profession is especially important for this study, which puts its stress on different social roles or professions members of (ethics) commissions have, respectively. Gollenia (1999) asked people of three different professional backgrounds, economic, medical, and juridical, how they justify the germline therapy. She found that economists prefer hedonistic positions, but that physicians and jurists favor utilitarian and deontological positions. Many studies empirically found connections between ethical decisions, actions, and ethical positions in an economic context (e.g. Akaah & Riordan, 1989; Barnett et al., 1998; Tansey, Brown, Hyman & Dawson, 1994). It is proved that economists prefer utilitarianism when it comes down to economic decisions (Fritzsche & Becker, 1984; Premeaux & Mondy, 1993). Is that also true for other role-keepers in an economic context?

It is likely that these results can be transferred to the contexts of (ethics) commissions: members of distinct fields of expertise or professions should come to dissimilar decisions and emphasize varying ethical positions as being

important for their decision. On the one hand, this would strengthen the claim for gathering people of various backgrounds because only in this way optimal results could be attained in a commission. On the other hand, a new question arises: If people actually decide and justify according to their social roles, would this mean that the decisions made by (ethics) commissions are not only predictable but also suggestible? Thus, the decision depends on the role keepers represented in the committee and might be manipulated by the organizer.

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS DESIGN

An ethical problem of an economic context was provided, since problems of business ethics are fervidly discussed (for example in the media). Especially the loss of parent jobs is debated on because of production-transfer to another country – the efficiency of the company is in opposition to parent jobs (e.g. Geishecker & Gørg, 2004; Konings & Murphy, 2001). The economic problem presented the questionnaire study outlines the dilemma of a fictitious mobile company trying to work efficiently and to save German workplaces at the same time: “Should the production be transferred abroad and thus jobs being cut in order to save the company as a whole?” Each participant had to decide on the economic question while going into a related social role (study I) or while expressing expectations of the behavior of someone holding a special social role (study II). Each participant is linked to one social role, so that the study follows a 1 x 6 -design. The subjects were assigned randomly to the roles. The social roles are: member of the board of management, member of the supervisory board, labor union representative, employee of administration, external consultant, and politician. These 6 roles comprise a broad spectrum of positions and opinions, but at large, they were chosen at random. Partly, they include contrarian advocacy groups, which is also the case in real groups discussing a problem.

Each participant had to fill out a questionnaire containing

- a) a general decision on the main question,
- b) 20 questions on the justification of the decision using ethical positions, and
- c) personal data.

The 20-questions-part comprises four to six statements to every ethical position whose importance had to be marked with a cross on a five-point-scale (from 1 = not important to 5 = very important). Examples of items are “I am concerned for my personal well-being.” for hedonism, “I am sure that this is the right behavior.” for intuitionism, “In my opinion, one has to consider the consequences for everyone.” for utilitarianism, and “In my opinion, general values are decisive for behavior.” for deontology. There is empirical evidence

of the quality of the questionnaire which has been developed by Witte and Doll (1995). Since then it has been tested repeatedly and proved to be a reliable, suitable instrument to measure ethical positions (Gollenia, 1999; Hackel, 1995; Maeng, 1995).

SAMPLE

All subjects took part voluntarily, they did not receive a payment. Students from the University of Hamburg make for the greatest part of the sample. Students of psychology got a certificate for being subjects in research. Several certificates are needed by students of psychology to be admitted to the diploma exams. People were contacted directly, for example before lectures at university. An online-version of the questionnaire was posted on the web-pages of the Department of Psychology of the University of Hamburg and 74 subjects filled it out (only study II).

Study I

682 subjects took part: 383 females and 288 males. 11 persons did not mention their gender. On the average the age was 27.4 years. The youngest subject was 17 of age, the oldest one was 81. 21.7% of the subjects mentioned a university grade as their highest educational achievement. 66.7% mentioned a university-entrance diploma. It is not possible to determine the proportion of students.

Study II

551 subjects took part: 275 females and 256 males. 20 persons did not mention their gender. On the average the age was 30.5 years. The youngest subject was 15 of age, the oldest one was 70. 24.8% of the subjects mentioned a university grade as their highest educational achievement. 54.2% mentioned a university-entrance diploma. 49.1% of the participants were students. 74 participants filled out an online-questionnaire, which was exactly like the paper-and-pencil version.

RESULTS

Because study I and II were similar apart from their perspectives and in order to be able to compare their results directly, their findings are described one straight after the other.

Results concerning ethical positions

In study I, a factor analysis of 19 items (item 10 for intuitionism had to be excluded to strengthen Cronbach's alpha) could educe the four ethical positions (number of factors set to four). 51.7% of the variance could be explained. Hedonism cleared up 15.4% of the variance (eigenvalue = 2.93), deontology 13.1% (eigenvalue = 2.50), intuitionism 11.7% (eigenvalue = 2.67), and utilitarianism cleared up 10.89% (eigenvalue = 2.07) after varimax rotation (table 2).

Table 2. Rotated matrix of components; matrix of loadings after varimax-rotation

	Component			
	1	2	3	4
Item 1 (hedonism)	.092	.675	.268	.043
Item 2 (intuitionism)	.452	.281	-.424	.177
Item 3 (utilitarianism)	.540	-.169	.116	.426
Item 4 (deontology)	.457	.063	-.137	-.383
Item 5 (hedonism)	.412	.455	.329	.203
Item 6 (intuitionism)	.564	.117	-.322	.150
Item 7 (utilitarianism)	.387	-.084	-.160	.560
Item 8 (deontology)	.608	-.151	.313	-.193
Item 9 (hedonism)	-.148	.729	.018	.173
Item 11 (hedonism)	-.016	.570	.066	-.057
Item 12 (utilitarianism)	.574	-.428	.360	.106
Item 13 (deontology)	.564	-.060	.247	-.323
Item 14 (hedonism)	-.056	.766	.234	.015
Item 15 (intuitionism)	.281	.404	-.421	-.431
Item 16 (utilitarianism)	.548	-.284	.128	.150
Item 17 (deontology)	.621	-.060	.150	-.450
Item 18 (hedonism)	.247	.657	.268	.056
Item 19 (intuitionism)	.423	.228	-.576	-.009
Item 20 (utilitarianism)	.503	.010	-.221	.096

In study II, a factor analysis of the 20 items could educe the four ethical positions. Totally, 55.3% of the variance could be explained. Utilitarianism cleared up 21.2% of the variance (eigenvalue = 4.23), hedonism 16.1% (eigenvalue = 3.22), intuitionism 10.3% (eigenvalue = 2.08), and deontology cleared up 7.7% (eigenvalue = 1.53) after varimax rotation (table 3).

Table 3. *Rotated matrix of components; matrix of loadings after varimax-rotation*

	Component			
	1	2	3	4
Item 1 (hedonism)	-.190	.709	-.001	.024
Item 2 (intuitionism)	.095	.020	.640	.248
Item 3 (utilitarianism)	.500	.045	.424	-.190
Item 4 (deontology)	.286	-.187	.268	.506
Item 5 (hedonism)	.261	.599	.315	-.077
Item 6 (intuitionism)	.108	.034	.732	-.015
Item 7 (utilitarianism)	.635	-.076	.299	-.103
Item 8 (deontology)	.786	.035	-.181	.141
Item 9 (hedonism)	-.434	.702	-.055	.012
Item 10 (intuitionism)	-.088	.360	-.094	.626
Item 11 (hedonism)	.081	.567	-.165	.211
Item 12 (utilitarianism)	.784	-.122	-.014	-.175
Item 13 (deontology)	.830	.065	-.165	.150
Item 14 (hedonism)	-.229	.813	.036	.031
Item 15 (intuitionism)	-.180	.061	.297	.706
Item 16 (utilitarianism)	.674	-.231	.124	-.203
Item 17 (deontology)	.700	-.053	.159	.071
Item 18 (hedonism)	.035	.732	.273	.095
Item 19 (intuitionism)	-.121	.251	.571	.358
Item 20 (utilitarianism)	.450	-.183	.249	-.076

In study I, final scale reliabilities (Cronbach's alphas) for hedonism, intuitionism, utilitarianism, and deontology were .63, .60, .61, and .65, respectively. To reach an alpha of .60, the item "One cannot justify every decision." had to be eliminated of the intuitionism scale.

In study II, final scale reliabilities (Cronbach's alphas) for hedonism, intuitionism, utilitarianism, and deontology were .79, .65, .75, and .73, respectively.

There is empirical evidence of the four ethical positions derived from practical philosophy. The results suggest that the subjects accounted for on all four ethical positions in both studies. These results go in line with the findings of other studies and prove to be stable.

Results concerning ethical positions

One of the first questions to answer is: Do ethical positions differ in their

importance when a decision has to be justified? A look at means and standard deviations of the ethical positions reveals that there are such differences in the estimated importance (table 4). These differences can apparently also be found between study I and II, that is between the personal weighting of importance of the four ethical positions and the expected weighting.

Table 4. Means and standard deviations (study I + II)

	Study I							
	Hed		Int		Uti		Deo	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
external consultant	3.11	0.81	3.30	0.87	3.85	0.70	3.50	0.83
member of the supervisory board	2.93	0.82	3.07	0.81	3.83	0.67	3.40	0.96
member of the board of man-agement	2.72	0.74	3.07	0.90	3.96	0.48	3.40	0.70
labor union representative	2.85	0.69	3.14	0.93	4.13	0.61	3.47	0.75
employee of administration	3.47	0.66	3.24	0.71	3.96	0.62	3.60	0.83
politician	2.90	0.74	3.28	0.84	3.96	0.60	3.49	0.72
economic context total	3.00	0.74	3.18	0.84	3.95	0.61	3.48	0.80
	Study II							
	Hed		Int		Uti		Deo	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
external consultant	2.82	0.98	3.10	0.76	3.54	0.81	2.85	0.81
member of the supervisory board	3.27	0.98	3.24	0.69	3.38	0.89	2.73	0.88
member of the board of man-agement	3.40	0.81	3.34	0.71	3.26	0.78	2.92	0.79
labor union representative	3.01	0.76	3.13	0.74	3.96	0.68	3.70	0.80
employee of administration	3.66	0.49	3.16	0.66	3.32	0.83	3.23	0.91
politician	3.45	0.80	3.05	0.75	3.46	0.79	3.17	0.76
economic context total	3.27	0.86	3.18	0.73	3.47	0.82	3.09	0.87

Note. Data refer to a five-point-scale with 1 = not important and 5 = very important; hed = hedonism, int = intuitionism, uti = utilitarianism, deo = deontology

Secondly, it was examined to what extent variance could be explained by roles. A repeated-measures ANOVA was used with roles as between-subject factors and the four ethical scales as intraner-subject factors.

Table 5 shows the results of the repeated-measures ANOVA in study I. They indicated significant effects for the ethics scales ($F = 14.31, p < .00$). 5% of the variance could be explained by the ethics scales with utilitarianism as the most important ethical position. The interaction between ethical positions and roles explained 10% of the variance ($F = 6.43, p < .00$). To detect differences in the justifications, post hoc t-tests were used. The significant results of

Table 5. Repeated-measures ANOVA, innersubject-design: ethics (study I + II)

	Source		<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>sign.</i>	η^2
Study I	ETHICS	sphericity assumption	3	8.09	14.31	.00	0.05
	ETHICS * ROLES	sphericity assumption	15	3.64	6.43	.00	0.10
Study II	ETHICS	sphericity assumption	3	62.44	135.24	.00	0.27
	ETHICS * ROLES	sphericity assumption	15	1.03	2.23	.00	0.03

t-tests in table 6 show that most of the differences between the roles derived from hedonism (six significant results), followed by utilitarianism (two significant results). This finding suggests that ethical positions were significant for a differentiation between the justifications of diverse role keepers. The different manners of justification between diverse role keepers occurred to justifications referring to ends and consequences.

Table 6. Significant results of post hoc t-tests between the roles (study I)

	Economic context	<i>M</i>	<i>SD.</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>sign.</i>
Hedonism	employee of administration	3.47	0.66	-4.45	.00
	politician	2.90	0.74		
	employee of administration	3.47	0.66	-2.60	.01
	external consultant	3.11	0.81		
	employee of administration	3.47	0.66	-4.95	.00
	labor union representative	2.85	0.69		
	employee of administration	3.47	0.66	-3.70	.00
	member of the supervisory board	2.93	0.82		
	employee of administration	3.47	0.66	5.36	.00
	member of the board of management	2.72	0.74		
	labor union representative	2.85	0.69	2.05	.04
	external consultant	3.11	0.81		
Utilitarianism	labor union representative	4.13	0.61	2.61	.01
	member of the supervisory board	3.83	0.67		
	external consultant	3.85	0.70	-2.51	.01
	labor union representative	4.13	0.61		

Note. Data refer to a five-point-scale with 1 = not important and 5 = very important

Table 5 also shows the results of the repeated-measures ANOVA in study II. They indicated significant effects for the ethics scales ($F = 135.24, p < .00$). 27% of the variance could be explained by the ethics scales, which can be seen as a great deal of variance explained, also with utilitarianism as the most important ethical position. The interaction between ethical positions and roles explained about 3% of the variance ($F = 2.23, p = < .00$). The small value of 3% can be neglected. The significant results of t-tests in table 7 show that most of the differences between the roles derived from hedonism and deontology (each with nine significant results), followed by utilitarianism (five significant results) and intuitionism (one significant result).

Table 7. Significant results of post hoc t-tests between the roles (study II)

	Economic context	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>sign.</i>
Hedonism	external consultant	2.82	0.98	-2.12	.04
	member of the supervisory board	3.27	0.98		
	external consultant	2.82	0.98	-3.65	.00
	member of the board of management	3.40	0.81		
	external consultant	2.82	0.98	-5.53	.00
	employee of administration	3.66	0.49		
	external consultant	2.82	0.98	-3.43	.00
	politician	3.45	0.80		
	member of the supervisory board	3.27	0.98	-2.40	.02
	employee of administration	3.66	0.49		
	member of the board of management	3.40	0.81	2.62	.01
	labor union representative	3.01	0.76		
	member of the board of management	3.40	0.81	-2.20	.03
	employee of administration	3.66	0.49		
	labor union representative	3.01	0.76	-4.89	.00
	employee of administration	3.66	0.49		
	labor union representative	3.01	0.76	-2.66	.01
	politician	3.45	0.79		
Deontology	external consultant	2.85	0.81	-5.24	.00
	labor union representative	3.70	0.80		
	external consultant	2.85	0.81	-2.21	.03
	employee of administration	3.23	0.91		
	member of the supervisory board	2.73	0.88	-5.22	.00
	labor union representative	3.70	0.80		
	member of the supervisory board	2.73	0.88	-2.53	.01

	employee of administration	3.23	0.91		
	member of supervisory board	2.73	0.88	-238	.02
	politician	3.17	0.76		
	member of the board of management	2.92	0.79	-5.24	.00
	labor union representative	3.70	0.80		
	member of the board of management	2.92	0.79	-2.00	.05
	employee of administration	3.23	0.91		
	labor union representative	3.70	0.80	2.65	.01
	employee of administration	3.23	0.91		
	labor union representative	3.70	0.80	3.24	.00
	politician	3.17	0.76		
Utilitarianism	external consultant	3.54	0.81	-2.77	.01
	labor union representative	3.96	0.68		
	member of the supervisory board	3.38	0.89	-3.24	.00
	labor union representative	3.95	0.68		
	member of the board of management	3.26	0.78	-5.00	.00
	labor union representative	3.96	0.68		
	labor union representative	3.95	0.68	4.67	.00
	employee of administration	3.32	0.83		
	labor union representative	3.96	0.68	3.19	.00
	politician	3.46	0.79		
Intuitionism	member of the board of management	3.34	0.71	2.15	.03
	politician	3.05	0.75		

Note. Data refer to a five-point-scale with 1 = not important and 5 = very important

Taken together, there were differences in the weighing of the ethical positions between value-orientation, the conditions role-behavior (study I) and role-expectation (study II). With role-expectation more variance could be explained by differences of ethical justifications than with role-behavior (27% vs. 5%). The variance explained by the interaction of ethics and roles was rather low, but in comparison it was higher for role-behavior than for role-expectation (10% vs. 3%).

The comparison between the conditions role-behavior and role-expectation leads to the conclusion that for role-expectation the personal interpretation of the social role is greater than for role-behavior. This also means that expected patterns of ethical positions seem to be more personal than that for the justification of one's own behavior.

Results concerning the connection of decision, justification, and role

The question which led to the next step was if there is a connection between decision, justification, and role. Multiple correlations were used with decision as dependent variable and the four ethics scales and the roles as independent variables. The object was to determine to what extent the individual decisions could be predicted by the individual importance weights of the ethical positions. Significant multiple correlations indicate individual freedom to choose and justify the decision between roles and in roles. If instead social norms dictate a decision the variance will be small and thus lead to an insignificant correlation.

Table 8 shows the results of the multiple correlations in study I and II. In study I, intuitionism, utilitarian-ism, and deontology could explain the individual decisions. These ethical positions could contribute significantly to the prediction of the individual decision. In contrast to that, the factor role did not contribute to the prediction. The interpretation was interindividually standardized, as expected from the theoretical position and the definition of a role. Evidently, only the non-individual part of the role interpretation was important as can be gathered from the interaction of role and ethics. The effect ($\epsilon^2 = 0.15$) can be interpreted as a median effect, for Cohen (1977) determines a median effect at $\epsilon^2 = 0.15$.

In study II intuitionism and deontology – both referring to duty – could explain the individual decisions. These ethical positions could contribute significantly to the prediction of the decision. The individual interpretation of the role did also contribute independently to the prediction. Evidently, the individual part of the role interpretation was important in the part of role-expectation. The effect ($\epsilon^2 = 0.59$) can be interpreted as a high one. However, ethical decisions and ethical positions were connected significantly in both studies.

In study I, the individual interpretation of the social role did not contribute to the prediction of the decision. The subjects were able to form a consistent interpretation of role-behavior which is also an indirect validation of the ma-

Table 8. Multiple correlations: Relationships between role and ethical position (study I + II)

		sign. contribution to prognosis								
		<i>N</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>sign.</i>	<i>R</i> ²	<i>Hed</i>	<i>Int</i>	<i>Uti</i>	<i>Deo</i>	<i>Role</i>
Study I	Economic context	368	0.37	.00	0.13	.84	.00	.00	.00	.57
Study II	Economic context	300	0.61	.00	0.37	.73	.00	.00	.35	.00

Note. hed = hedonism, int = intuitionism, uti = utilitarianism, deo = deontology

nipulation: Subjects are able to give a consistent answer taking a specific role. This was possible for the standardized part of the role, which means that the behavior was prescribed by social norms that are connected with a social role. In study II, the personal expectations about the social roles contributed to the prediction of the decision. Standardization could not be stated. The individual interpretation of the social role was responsible for its influence on the decision. It was tested whether there are differences in the connections between decision, justification, and role between the conditions role-behavior (study I) and role-expectation (study II). The above-mentioned differences between the findings of study I and II lead to acceptance.

Results concerning the connection between decision and justification

Above, the connection between decision, justification, and role was tested on a social level. It was not differentiated between different roles. Afterwards, a probable connection between decision and justification was checked. It was to be proven on an interindividual level whether the decisions could be predicted by the means of the justifications within the different roles. Multiple correlations with the decision as dependent and the four ethics scales as independent variables were used. Study I: Table 9 shows that hedonism which had

Table 9. Multiple correlations: Relationships between roles and ethical positions (study I + II)

Economic context		Sign. contribution to prognosis							
		<i>N</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>sign.</i>	<i>R</i> ²	<i>Hed</i>	<i>Uti</i>	<i>Deo</i>	<i>Int</i>
Study I	all roles	368	0.36	.00	0.13	.86	.00	.00	.00
	external consultant	70	0.45	.01	0.20	.91	.23	.08	.01
	member of the su-pervisory board	54	0.48	.01	0.23	.17	.04	.13	.10
	member of the board of management	50	0.35	.21	0.12	.75	.75	.25	.07
	labor union represen-tative	68	0.16	.80	0.03	.75	.36	.82	.43
	employee of admini-stration	50	0.57	.00	0.32	.33	.17	.59	.00
	politician	76	0.29	.18	0.08	.15	.80	.45	.16
Study II	all roles	300	0.50	.00	0.25	.08	.02	.00	.04
	politician	44	0.32	.37	0.10	.63	.22	.51	.85
	external consultant	53	0.43	.04	0.18	.10	.51	.07	.91
	labor union representative	47	0.38	.15	0.15	.46	.14	.47	.70
	member of the su-pervisory board	36	0.28	.02	0.08	.93	.90	.29	.78
	employee of administration	47	0.56	.00	0.36	.70	.19	.03	.57
	member of the board of management	73	0.47	.00	0.22	.68	.07	.02	.73

Note. hed = hedonism, int = intuitionism, uti = utilitarianism, deo = deontology

been able to differentiate between roles on the basis of mean differences could not contribute significantly to the prediction of the decision, neither when single roles were considered nor when considering all roles together. The interindividual prediction did not contribute significantly. In contrast, intuitionism, utilitarianism, and deontology contributed significantly to the prediction of the decision.

Only intuitionism was able to predict the decision of external consultants ($\epsilon^2 = 0.25$) and employee of administration ($\epsilon^2 = 0.48$). Both roles had a positive beta-weight for intuitionism (which means denial). This finding suggests that people, who act as external consultants or as employees of administration and interpret their role individually, would rather deny the production transfer abroad if they preferred intuitionist positions. These roles tolerated individual decisions in contrast to the other roles. Their decisions and justifications were standardized to a much greater extent.

In study II, intuitionism which had not been able to differentiate between roles on the basis of mean differences could contribute significantly to the prediction of the decision when considering all roles together. Utilitarianism and deontology contributed significantly to the prediction of the decision, too, which supports the results of the multiple correlation concerning the differentiation between roles. On the level of single roles, deontology was able to predict the decisions of members of the board of management and employees of administration. Both roles had a positive beta-weight for deontology (which meant denial). This finding suggests that people, who act as members of the board of management or as employees of administration and interpret their role-expectations individually, would rather deny the production transfer abroad if they preferred deontological positions. These role-expectations tolerated individual decisions in contrast to the other roles whose decisions and justifications were standardized to a much greater extent.

The decision could be predicted by the interindividually different justification of the decision. But the finding is narrowed referring to single roles and ethical positions. The decision could be predicted for two of the six roles. Taking together all roles this applied to a deontological position. The interindividual differences in these ethical positions influence the decision within specific roles. In study II the scope of the results is limited again: the decision could be predicted for two of the six roles. Taking together all roles, this applied to intuitionism, utilitarianism, and deontology.

The above -mentioned findings give evidence that there are differences in the connections between decision and justification between the conditions role-behavior (study I) and role-expectation (study II) within a role.

Results concerning the decisions made

It was tested whether the frequency distribution of the decision made is dependent on the role. Table 10 shows the frequency distributions as to the decision. The decision against job transfer was at a ratio of about 3:1 at large. Three-fourths of the people voted against the production transfer abroad although the ethical position of utilitarianism was most important for the justification (see above). The labor union representative was an exception: almost all of them denied a production transfer abroad (94.1%). The chi-square-test to determine whether there is a connection between decision and role became significant ($\chi^2 = 96.04$; $p < .00$).

In study II, the decision for or against production transfer was at a ratio of about 1:1 at large. The labor union representative was an exception: almost all of them denied a production transfer abroad (95.7%). The chi-square-test to determine whether there is a connection between decision and role did not become significant ($\chi^2 = 0.57$; $p > .44$). That means that the expected decision was not dependent on the role. The role-expectations do not seem to be as strict as it seems to be the case for role-behavior.

Table 10. Frequency distribution: decisions in the economic context (study I + II)

		Agreement		disagreement		total
		<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>
Study I	external consultant	23	33.9	47	67.1	70
	member of the supervisory board	16	29.6	38	70.4	54
	member of the board of management	15	30.0	35	70.0	50
	labor union representative	4	5.9	64	94.1	68
	employee of administration	13	26.0	37	74.0	50
	politician	19	25.0	57	75.0	76
	total	90	24.5	278	75.5	368
Study II	external consultant	40	75.5	13	24.5	53
	member of the supervisory board	28	84.8	5	15.2	33
	member of the board of management	57	77.0	17	23.0	74
	labor union representative	2	4.3	44	95.7	46
	employee of administration	22	47.8	24	52.2	46
	politician	5	11.4	38	86.4	43
	total	154	52.2	141	47.8	295

The subject of the next paragraph is whether the frequency distributions of the decisions made are dependent on the role and whether it differs between the conditions role-behavior (study I) and role-expectation (study II). To test this, a chi-square-test was calculated. Table 11 shows a comparison of frequencies of denial and acceptance between study I and II. For each role a single chi-square-test was calculated. Observed frequencies refer to study II. Anticipated frequencies are calculated on their basis and are the frequencies which would be anticipated if the results of study I had been exactly replicated. This procedure was necessary to adjust the different numbers of subjects and frequencies between study I and II. Data and results have been written in a row in each case to save space. Frequencies differed significantly between study I and II ($\chi^2 = 122.39$; $p < .00$). On the level of roles, only one comparison did not become significant (labor union representative). For this role, similar standardizations seem to be expressed in role-expectations and role-behaviors. For the other roles, expectations and behavior differed and suggest misunderstandings in committees if the role is known and a specific decision expected.

Table 11. *Comparison of frequencies of denial and acceptance between study I and II*

Role	observed frequency				anticipated frequency				<i>chi</i> ²	<i>sign</i>
	agreement		disagreement		agreement		disagreement			
	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%		
external consultant	40	75.5	13	24.5	17.4	32.9	35.6	67.1	43.51	.00
member of the supervisory board	28	84.8	5	15.2	9.8	29.6	23.2	70.4	48.34	.00
member of the board of manage-ment	57	78.1	16	21.9	21.9	30.0	51.1	70.0	80.37	.00
labor union repre-sentative	2	4.3	45	95.7	2.8	5.9	44.2	94.1	0.23	.63
employee of ad-ministration	22	47.8	24	52.2	12.0	26.0	34.0	74.0	11.39	.00
politician	5	11.6	38	88.4	10.8	25.0	32.3	75.0	4.10	.04
Economic context total	154	52.2	141	47.8	72.3	24.5	222.7	75.5	122.39	.00

Note. Observed frequencies refer to study II; anticipated frequencies are calculated on their basis and are the frequencies which would be anticipated if the results of study I had been exactly replicated

DISCUSSION

The first results of both studies refer to the ethical positions questionnaire which has once again proved to be a reliable and efficient instrument for the survey of ethical positions. The scales have a suitable internal consistence and the fundamental positions of practical philosophy - hedonism, intuitionism, utilitarianism, and deontology - could be confirmed via factor analysis.

Study I and II give evidence for the importance of all four ethical positions when it comes to justifying a decision in an economic context with utilitarianism as the most important position in both studies.

As regards content the studies try to answer the question if there is a connection between the social role someone is holding and the decision and its justification concerning an ethical problem. Thereby it was of special interest whether decisions and their justifications are socially standardized. The results of the studies gave the following answers:

- Different roles showed similar patterns of justification. The ethical differences were greater for role-behavior than role-expectation. The economic context forwarded socially standardized decisions which were to deny production transfer. Social standardizations were more influential for role-behavior.
- Different social roles led to different justifications which meant social standardization through roles. The effects were irregular concerning different roles and different ethical positions. More differentiations and thus less standardization could be stated for the condition role-expectation.
- Social roles influenced the direction of the decisions which could be interpreted as influence of social norms.
- Differences between role-behavior and role-expectation could be stated. They headed for the direction of greater influence of social norms in role-behavior.

In the light of these results the question arises whether forming ethics commissions is an adequate procedure or if it rather strengthens social standardization carried over by the social roles of commission members. Violations of relationships are the basic sources of conflict (Fiske, 1993). From this knowledge can be derived that conflicts are preassigned if social standardizations of roles influence the justification of decisions. These conflicts could be even worse if expectations are not met. Thus, the findings have an important impact on the composition and treatment of groups discussing an ethical problem, especially ethics commissions. In general, it is helpful to include the role when differences in the justifications are considered. This also means that it is possible to guide discussions better if the importance of ethical positions for

the justification of a role keeper is known. It may also be promising to lead group members to take a perspective contrary to their own (Rutherford, 2004) because group discussions can lead to a polarization as well as to stereotypes (Brauer, Judd & Jacqueline, 2001). Especially disagreements increase stereotyping (Kunda & Spencer, 2003) and can thus lead to “rigid fronts” during discussions. Role keepers should be able to express the self and connect with group members (Bettencourt & Sheldon, 2001; Davis, Conklin, Smith & Luce, 1996) without having misguided perceptions about negotiating parties or the conflict itself. (Ames, 2004). If different justifications can actually be found and ethical positions are variously weighted, respectively, then it must be assured that not only all important positions are represented (Scanlon, 1999; Schönecker, 2005) but equally considered during the ethical discussion. In this way, the influence of the composition of members could be decreased and the quality of the group’s performance and the finding of a consensual result could become easier. Finally, the equal consideration of different ethical positions meets the demands of our value pluralistic society.

As to the decisions: In the condition role-behavior (study I), the chosen context retains socially determined decisions, independently from the roles. A great majority votes against the transferring of jobs. Thereby, the ethical justifications clearly differ in their importance. Individual perspectives and opinions can only be accomplished with special roles when deciding on an ethical problem. From a rational point of view the connections between decision, justification, and social role should not be fixed but extinguished. This could be done best by a process of discussing an ethical problem based on reason. In the condition role-expectation the decisions are less standardized. The differences between role behavior and expectation give evidence for a misunderstanding between the two perspectives. People behave in a way they mean to meet the expectations linked to their roles but actually they do not meet them. Again, the uncertainty concerning the “proper behavior” and the “right decision” should be solved by the means of a discussion process which puts a stress on open-mindedness, rationality, and balanced argumentation. If decisions are not only dependent on good reasons (Janis, 1972) but also on the social roles decision makers keep, the well and woe of ethics commissions has to be reevaluated.

Further research is necessary as to the standardization of role behavior and decisions. To speak with Turner and Colomy (1993) the functional, representational, and tenable part of social roles should be determined in its influence. Not only further evidence for the mechanisms of role standardizations is needed but also the development of group procedures which are able to prevent the influence of standardizations. In addition to questionnaire studies,

field studies and experiments are desirable, which take dynamic group processes into account are desirable. Last but not least, further research should allow for different contexts because the fields in which ethical problems are discussed are ever growing. This research is only a very first step into a research about prescriptive attribution (Witte, 2001).

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Footnotes

- 1 An exception is Kohlberg (e.g. Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) who put different ethical positions in hierarchical order.
- 2 The quoted literature is written in German. We do not know about comparable literature published in English. If we are mistaken we will be thankful for information.

Ethical issues in working with suicidal clients

Theodoros Giovazolias¹

ABSTRACT

In the clinical practice of counselling psychology and psychotherapy, therapists are likely to encounter at some point in their career clients who have tried, or will try to end their own lives. A solution to this impasse requires a number of fundamental questions to be answered concerning the morality of suicide, its relation to mental illness, etc. Indeed, such an encounter is possible to evoke a variety of moral conflicts to the therapist; this paper aims to explore the ethical issues that are raised when working with suicidal clients.

KEY WORDS: *suicidal ideation, ethics, counselling, interventions*

INTRODUCTION

Suicide is a relatively common occurrence. It is stressed that in USA there are 30, 000 certified suicides each year; many other probable suicides are not classed as such, either because the exact circumstances of the death are insufficiently clear to justify a formal declaration of suicide, or in order to protect the feelings and legal interests of the surviving family members (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001).

According to the 2000 Official Final Data, suicide in the States is ranked as high as the 11th cause of death. The statistics indicate that, on average, 1 person kills him/herself in every 18 minutes. Of great interest was the finding that each suicide intimately affects at least 6 other people. Based on the over 738,000 suicides from 1976 through 2000, the estimate is that the number of survivors of suicides in the U.S. is 4.4 million (1 of every 62 Americans in 2000); this number grew over 176,000 in 2000. (Minino, Arias, Kochanek, Murphy & Smith, 2002).

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Bongar (1992) mentions that suicide is one of the major causes of death, accounting for 1% of all deaths annually. He points out that in 1990, a total of 4,485 people killed themselves in England, Wales and Scotland. That is 86 people each week, 12 people every day, or one person every two hours. This represents an increase of 6% over the figure of 1989.

The suicide rate for 1998 in the United Kingdom was 7.4 per 100,000 people, with a rate of 11.7 for males and 3.3 for females. In most countries, males commit suicide to a greater extent than females; In the United States the highest risk group for suicide is Caucasian males over the age of 35 (Gilliland & James, 1997). However, by some estimates completed suicides in the US more than tripled for persons aged 15–24 between 1950–1980, and the US suicide rate for individuals in this age group was 11.1 in 1998.

In the UK the situation regarding this age group is somewhat similar; both suicide and deliberate self-harm involve large numbers of young males, many in their late teens. In terms of numbers, three times as many young men as young women take their own lives in the United Kingdom - a total of 3,640 in 1996, up by 2% in relation to 1982. The number of women committing suicide fell by 41% during the same period (NIMHE, 2003). Some social factors which may in part underlie the recent rise in young male suicide include unfavourable trends in unemployment, divorce and substance misuse. Such factors appear to have had little influence on trends in older males and females (Charlton, Kelly & Dunnell, 1993).

In Greece, a nationwide study of suicide from 1980 through 1995 demonstrated a mean age-standardized suicide rate of 5.86/100,000 for males and 1.89/100,000 for females, an increase in suicide rates with age, and exceptionally high rates in young widowed men (Zacharakis, Madianos, Papadimitriou & Stefanis, 1998). It has been suggested that various social factors (i.e. low isolation, increased cohesion, family ties, stable national identity and cultural uniformity of the population) as well as intentional (in order to avoid the social stigma) or unintentional underreporting (inability to determine the victim's intention), may account for the low suicidal rates described in this study.

These statistical figures show explicitly that we are dealing with an issue on which particular attention needs to be placed.

In addition, there is what is known as 'attempted suicide'. The statistics show that 734,000 people in the U.S attempt to kill themselves annually (Minino et al., 2002). The prevailing view for many decades was that attempted suicide was a kind of unsuccessful suicidal act, perhaps quantitatively different, but basically displaying the same behaviour as suicide (Gibbs, 1968). Today, this term is used in referring to three different occasions: a) occasions when a person has intentionally harmed him/herself in a way that could have

led to death but was unsure whether he/she wished to die, b) occasions where an individual has aimed to create the illusion that he/she intended to die but he/she actually wanted to live, and c) occasions where an individual's brush with death was accidental (Fairbairn, 1995).

ETHICAL ISSUES IN WORKING WITH SUICIDAL CLIENTS

Is suicide a mental illness?

The way we think about self-harm and suicide are influenced by a number of factors such as the religious and cultural context in which we have been raised. For example, for a Catholic person, killing oneself would be considered a mortal sin; on the other hand, for a traditionally-raised Japanese person, self-killing is almost required in certain circumstances.

In western culture the medical profession occupies a position of considerable importance. Physicians were, and still are, regarded as authority figures by their patients. Fairbairn (1995) stresses that the influence of medicine is largely responsible for the most common belief about suicide - that anyone who kills or attempts to kill himself is psychologically disturbed, because no one who was psychologically stable could want to end his/her life. He points out that those people who have ended their lives or seem to want to do so are also assumed to be severely depressed in the sense of being mentally ill, rather than for example being severely unhappy. This idea is sufficiently well-established within the medical community to be considered the orthodox medical view. Indeed, even psychiatry, which is often expected to have a broader understanding of the variety of human acts, is dominated by this orthodox medical view so that most psychiatrists believe that suicidal behaviour is always, or almost always, the result of maladaptive attitudes which have their grounds to some type of mental illness.

However, although this view is generally accepted, there are other scientists who oppose it; for example, Mitchell (1971) considers that the commonly held assumption that everyone who shows a suicidal tendency is for that reason mentally ill, is not by definition true, because, as he thinks, suicidal behaviour can be more a measure of distress and despair than of mental disorder. In a similar way, Curran (1980) suggests that it is possible that people who commit suicide suffer from no true psychiatric illness, but may have been in chronic pain, lonely, seeing no hope for improvement of their predicament, and decide that on balance they might as well be dead. Szasz (1971) does not even accept the concept of mental illness and thinks that viewing suicide or attempted suicide as indicative of mental illness is erroneous. He argues that

suicide is a product of choice by an agent, not a symptom or a psychological disturbance of the individual, and that such a choice must be respected by all health professionals and other people who might want to intervene in suicide (e.g. police).

The Morality of Suicide

The discussion concerning the morality of suicide involves very contrasting ideas; on the one hand, there is a whole set of opposing arguments which is based on the view that suicide is an offence against society (Fairbairn, 1995). This can be explained in a variety of ways; it may mean that every individual has certain obligations to others which override any desire that he/she may have to end his/her life. It may also mean that people belong to something greater than themselves called Society, that their existence in some sense reinforces the existence of Society, and that only Society has the right to dispose of the lives of its members. In a similar way, there are those who advocate the deontological position (stemming mainly from the theological tradition); one major principle of this position is that God has reserved to himself direct dominion over life; He is thought to be the owner of its substance and he has given man only the serviceable dominion, the right of use, with the charge of protecting and preserving the substance, that is, life itself. Consequently, suicide is an attempt against the dominion and right of ownership of the Creator (Lester & Leenaars, 1996). However, this argument can possibly be seen as an arbitrary one, since some of those advocating this often do not worry about killing certain live organisms (i.e. animals) or go off to war believing that “God is on our side”.

Another strong argument against suicide is that it would cause injury to others. Indeed, the fact that people ought to consider others as well as themselves in their actions is a fundamental principle of morality. However, who these ‘others’ are, the extent of their demands on the suicidal individuals and the nature of the harm that suicide might cause to them, are all issues open to debate. Along this line of thought is Ringel’s (1980) view concerning the question of whether suicide can be an autonomous, rational intention. He argues that a desire for suicide is by definition an irrational desire and probably an indication of some sort of psychopathology because nobody who can reason rationally would choose to die.

The rationale here is that most suicidal individuals are actually ambivalent about the act and are likely to have fantasies of being rescued from the suicidal act and their intolerable living conditions. It may be difficult for some to accept that anyone who feels suicidal can be free from mental impairment,

such as hopelessness or depression, making mandatory intervention obligatory as the person would not be acting truly autonomously (Beauchamp & Childress 2001; Johnstone, 1999). Advocates who support intervention in suicide acts argue from a position based on the ethical principles of beneficence and non-maleficence (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). Beneficence refers to an action done for the benefit of others, whilst non-maleficence invokes the obligation not to harm others. Beauchamp and Childress distinguish between these two principles by suggesting that in general terms whilst we are morally prohibited from causing harm to anyone, we are not necessarily required to help or benefit those with whom we have no special relationship. However, when the relationship is between therapist and client, then, according to the authors, beneficence becomes an obligation. Pelligrino and Thomasma (1988) see beneficence as being independent of, and potentially in conflict with, clients' preferences. They substantiate this claim by presenting several circumstances, especially within the health care field, in which the patient may have made irresponsible choices and they argue that the caring professional should therefore override the patient's wishes. That is also true because, according to the authors, the professional has superior training, knowledge and insight to determine the patient's best interests; the professional here is perceived as a parent and the patient as a dependent and often naive child. The term 'paternalism' is therefore often used in analogy to the action of the intentional overriding of a person's known preferences by another person, the justification being that the action will benefit or avoid harm to the person whose will is to be overridden

In contrast to this standpoint, there is a growing appreciation that there is such a thing as rational suicide (Heyd & Bloch, 1991). Accordingly, the authors stress that we have to ask whether or not it is possible for a person to make a rational choice to end his/her life, and therefore act autonomously in his/her action.

When stating positions about rational suicide, a first assumption is that it is a calculated suicide that is well planned by a person who is rational. With this thought-out plan being assumed as rational, a position of acceptance towards rational suicide has been proposed as a reasonable and ethical one especially for health care professionals when considering the autonomous wishes of those who meet certain criteria proposed by Siegel (1986) and Werth (1995). Essential to these criteria is that: "...the person has a motivation that would be understandable to a majority of uninvolved community members, the decision is deliberated and reiterated over a period of time, [and] if at all possible, the decision-making process should involve the suicidal person's significant others" (Werth 1995, p. 71)

Fairbairn (1995) points out that the question of rationality is closely bound up with the question of understanding. He believes that a minimal awareness of what death might mean and of its irreversible nature is necessary before someone could wish and intend to achieve that state and thus be capable of suicide. It seems then that for Fairbairn it is very vital to consider the extent to which the suicidal person was aware of what he/she was doing. Windt (1981) considers the following features in defining a 'rational' suicide: "a) that death was caused by the actions of the deceased, b) that the deceased wanted or wished death, c) that the deceased intended, chose, decided or willed to die, d) that the deceased knew that death would result from his/her actions or behaviour, and e) that the deceased was responsible for his/her death" (p. 41).

COUNSELLING

The possibility of confronting a situation involving suicide is ever present in counselling (Bonner, 1990), as suicidal behaviours have become an alarming societal concern (Gilliland & James, 1997). It is estimated that over 20% of counselling psychology trainees will be exposed to clinical situations involving suicide at some point during their education (McAdams & Foster, 2000). In terms of counselling practice, Rogers, Gueulette, Abbey-Hines, Carney and Werth (2001) reported that 71% of their sample of mental health counsellors had at least one client attempt suicide, while 28% had at least one client die by suicide.

Prevention of suicidal behaviour is a major health care target for the UK Government, which in 2002 established a National Suicide Prevention Strategy for England, a set of activities that will take place over several years, the aim being to support the achievement of the target set in the White Paper *Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation*, and reinforced in the National Service Framework for Mental Health, to reduce the death rate from suicide and undetermined injury by at least a fifth by the year 2010 (NIMHE, 2003). More specifically, it aims to: a) reduce risk in key high-risk groups (e.g. young men, prisoners, high-risk occupational groups), b) promote mental well-being in the wider population (e.g. socially excluded and deprived groups, people from black and ethnic minority groups, including Asian women, people who misuse drugs and/or alcohol, victims and survivors of abuse including child sexual abuse), c) reduce the availability and lethality of suicide methods (e.g. reduce the number of suicides as a result of self-poisoning, reduce the number of suicides on the railways, reduce the number of suicides using firearms), d) improve reporting of suicidal behaviour in the media (e.g. improve population awareness of the potential benefits of help-seeking in times of crisis by pro-

moting media portrayal of suicidal people seeking help and gaining benefit) and e) to promote research on suicide and suicide prevention.

As mentioned in the beginning, the therapeutic encounter with a suicidal individual presents a variety of ethical issues for the therapist, issues which may to a great extent influence the course of action and the nature of intervention they might undertake.

Sim (1997) points out the emotional and psychological impact that suicide may have on the involved therapist, which in turn may trigger a variety of responses from his/her part: a) the therapist may feel an intense concern for the suicidal client, and undergo great distress and anguish, b) the therapist may experience a strong desire to help the individual, but may find that his/her help is not wanted or, whether desired or not, is ineffective in changing the client's predicament; this may also result in feelings of inadequacy, failure and guilt, and c) the therapist may have strong religious or moral objections to the idea of suicide and therefore find it hard to empathise with the client; in that case a sense of moral disapproval may displace empathy and understanding.

Wekstein (1979) stresses that the treatment of an individual who manifests moderate to high lethality presents a crisis situation for both the therapist and the client. He argues that every therapist must establish some guidelines in dealing with such a situation since, as he believes, inadequate evaluation or mishandling may lead to a fatal outcome. For him, the establishment of a therapeutic alliance from the beginning of therapy is imperative, since this represents a commitment from the client. He states that both the therapist and the client have to accept basic provisions of trust and agree to live up to their respective commitments. On the one hand, the client must be in a state of mind where he/she can give evidence that he/she will contact the therapist immediately if any suicidal ideation occurs. On the other hand, the therapist according to Wekstein must agree to be available to speak to the client and even to see him/her if an emergency situation arises. The same author indicates that therapists should not hesitate to make use of other available resources (e.g. the client's surrounding environment) to help themselves deal with such a situation. He suggests that when the therapist becomes aware of the suicidal intent in his/her client, he/she needs to communicate the dangers to other people who can collaborate and who are willing even to actively intervene in a suicide-preventing effort. However, he recognises that it may not be possible even for an experienced therapist to gather sufficient data in the early sessions, particularly if the client is psychotic, suffering from organic brain disease or has been misusing drugs. It should be noted here that, as Sim (1997) mentions, health professionals have to consider whom they are most concerned about very carefully. He says that it is reasonable to argue that

their priority is to further the interests of the client, and that, while the interests of the surrounding environment of the suicidal client (e.g. relatives) should also be promoted as far as possible, these must take second place.

Indeed, if we accept the argument that a person's life cannot be ended only to satisfy the wishes of others, it seems equally clear that we cannot use the wishes and desires of others to prolong the life of somebody who no longer wishes to live.

However, in thinking about how one might react in situations where one is confronted with what appears to be a suicidal behaviour, two questions arise: a) when is it morally correct to intervene in another's attempt to end his/her life and b) when is it morally correct not to intervene in another's attempt to put an end to his/her life? Fairbairn (1995) postulates that intervention in suicidal acts is most commonly justified by referring to the autonomy of the suicidal person. For example, it is believed that intervention is justified in cases where the individual is unable to act autonomously because either he/she has not developed the capacity for autonomy, or has lost it to some extent, or something is interfering with his/her ability to exercise his/her capacity for autonomous action. According to Fairbairn it is because autonomy is commonly thought to be centrally important to being a human person, that intervention may also be thought to be justifiable in cases of suicidal actions where the actor's autonomy is threatened.

Nevertheless, it should be mentioned here that the criteria in defining what constitutes a 'threatened autonomy' are quite debatable, since they may be influenced by one's personal values and moral systems.

Szasz (1971) adopts an even more liberal position on this matter; in an effort to explain the profound antisuicidal attitude of the vast majority of health professionals, he argues that the therapists seem to perceive suicide as a threat, not just to the suicidal person's well-being but also to their own value system. He sees the interaction between therapist and client as a struggle for power and stresses that the suicide preventing therapist claims that he/she only wants to help his/her client, while he/she actually wants to gain control over the client's life in order to save him/herself from having to confront his/her doubts about the value of his/her own life. It would seem that this view, although radical in its conception, may also explain the personal frustration that therapists often experience, when they are confronted with a successful suicidal act of their clients.

This thought is commonly accepted within Existential Theory, where the approach of death is in general seen as a developmental and existential issue that must be faced (Yalom, 1980). In that sense, a person who is considering suicide and a professional who allows for the discussion of suicide as a ration-

al option, are together focusing on this issue and, as a result, facing their death anxiety. On the other hand, the professional who forces his or her value about the sanctity of life on another person is perhaps forcing the individual to live, or at least not discuss his or her concerns openly, because of the professional's inability to deal with his/her own death anxiety. However, other theoretical schools would take a different view on the matter; for example, Cognitive-Behavioural Theory holds that suicidal ideation is a result of rigid, extreme, dysfunctional and counterproductive assumptions that need to be tackled and modified. Suicide then is perceived as a response to thinking that one's situation is intolerable, and that nothing can be done to change it (Fennell, 1998). It is clear that the therapeutic approach within this model would be characterized by a directive intervention which would involve the fundamental change of distorted cognitions and the consideration of alternative solutions in the form of constructive problem-solving.

Along these lines, another important question raised at this point is when confidentiality should be breached? Siegel (1976) feels very strongly that confidentiality should not be breached under any conditions. He believes that therapists cannot make judgements on when it is proper to violate an individual's revelations or confessions. Moreover, he does not consider the role of the suicidal client's family to be important in preventing him/her from his/her lethal behaviour. It seems though that this view undervalues the utilisation of significant others and the fact that very often their attitude towards the attempter may determine his/her future suicidal behaviour.

However, the current Codes of Ethics of different boards take a different view on this matter; for example, principle 4.3 of British Psychological Society (BPS) now reads:

"...therapists should, in exceptional circumstances, where there is sufficient evidence to raise serious concern about the safety or interests of recipients of services, or about others who may be threatened by the recipient's behaviour, take such steps as are judged necessary to inform appropriate third parties without prior consent..." (BPS, 1998, p. 3).

Many professionals are discussing the controversial instances of suicide under the category of rational suicide. Allowing any suicide seems contradictory to good practice, when mental health professionals are accustomed to intervening when a person acts in a way that poses a danger to self. Beauchamp and Childress (2001) charge that where suicide is concerned, failure to intervene (and thus breach confidentiality) seems to "symbolically communicate to the potential suicide a lack of communal concern, and works to diminish our sense of communal responsibility" (p.286). Werth and Cobia (1995) in a study concerning psychotherapists' attitudes toward suicide found that eighty-one

per cent of the respondents ($n=146$) believed in the concept of rational suicide, and, when asked to define rational suicide, many of these respondents included making the decision in concert with friends and family so that the suicide does not lead to guilt feelings in significant others. In addition, suicidal ideation prompted by a painful terminal illness was viewed as significantly more acceptable and thus requiring significantly less intervention than suicidal ideation prompted by chronic physical pain, chronic endogenous depression, or bankruptcy.

These results seem to validate the idea that there can be a continuum of “intensity of suicide intervention”. The basic premise of this position is that the conditions that cause suicidal ideation to arise should be taken into account when a therapist is deciding on the amount of intervention that is necessary and appropriate. The results of the above survey suggest that a continuum can be drawn, with a person facing a terminal illness occupying the end delineated by high acceptance and little preventive action and someone who has declared bankruptcy at the end delineated by low acceptance and a great deal of preventive action. Physical and psychological pain can be placed along the continuum. Fairbairn (1995) seems to agree with this notion when he states that: “an instance in which it is difficult to justify intervention in a suicidal act by reference to the harm that will be experienced by oneself or others as a result of the death, would be where that harm is likely to be small relative to the suffering the person will undergo if he/she is prevented from killing oneself” (p. 199). He uses the example of dreadful pain caused by suffering terminal cancer. Werth (1995) considers the case of people suffering from AIDS. He notes that for a person with AIDS, death is an issue that needs to be confronted. He believes that allowing a person (especially in symptomatic HIV disease) to decide whether to continue living may provide the ultimate form of empowerment – a condition that is thought to be vital to persons with AIDS.

In a similar vein, several questions arise at this point; how does the competent therapist assess the severity of suicidal ideation? How does he/she accurately assess the risk of impending physical or psychological damage to other parties, given that successful suicide may lead to the infliction of damage or death to others, either by intent or by accident? At this point we need to highlight the issue of a therapist’s competency to treat a suicidal client. One of the critical tasks of the psychologist who is called to treat the suicidal client is to have to evaluate a priori the strengths and limitations of his or her own training, education, and experience (i.e., technical knowledge and emotional tolerance level) in the treatment of specific client populations in certain clinical settings.

According to Shea (1999) and Rogers (2001), suicide-risk assessment

should specifically focus on the collection of data related to suicide-risk factors including suicidal ideation and level of planning. This data collection or assessment phase is ideally carried out via a combination of a clinical interview, information from formal assessment measures, and by gathering relevant collateral information from third-party sources (Rogers, 2001). There are several important characteristics to consider when assessing suicidality. For example, Shneidman (1987) suggests that the assessment phase should focus on relevant situational factors (e.g. an inability to endure frustrated psychological needs), cognitive factors (e.g. thoughts about the cessation of suffering), affective factors (e.g. helplessness in the here-and-now, hopelessness about the future), and relational factors (e.g. communication of the intention to relieve oneself of life burdens). When clients display suicide-related characteristics in these areas, it is important for counselling psychologists not to discount the potential to commit a suicidal act.

Research studies have identified certain immediate signals that are important for counselling psychologists to assess in a potentially suicidal client (Battle, Battle, & Tolley, 1993; Hazell & Lewin, 1993). As the number of these signals increases, so does the likelihood that a particular client may be suicidal. These signals include: a history of previous suicide attempts, having a specific plan to harm oneself physically, recently cutting off communication with friends and/or family, giving away prized possessions or putting personal affairs in order, and a preoccupation with death.

CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to address some of the ethical issues in working with suicidal clients. In concluding, it is important to note that the issue of suicide illustrates vividly the ethical difficulties that may arise, even for the most experienced practitioner. Dealing with a suicidal client may be an emotionally stressful experience, one in which therapists have to reconsider their value systems, one in which they often find themselves being caught up in two minds about the course of action they should undertake. Indeed, in any situation in which one person encounters another person who wants to end his/her life, it is very difficult to make accurate predictions about the likely after effects both of the suicide attempt - if it is allowed to proceed - and of interventions in it.

Currently, the prevailing directive when confronted with a suicidal person is to change his/her mind through any means possible to ensure that he/she cannot follow through with his/her plans. However, as Werth (1995) has stressed, provided certain criteria are met, it should be acceptable for professionals to be open to exploring suicide as a viable alternative. The intensity of suicide in-

tervention would be more appropriate if it were variable and dependent on the suicidal ideator's life circumstances. Professionals would then be obliged to learn how to distinguish between those who meet the criteria for rationality from those who don't. One interesting result of this need for increased suicide knowledge and interviewing skills may be a decrease of the fears that make working with suicidal individuals such an anxiety-provoking endeavour.

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Psychology and Ethics: the double face of Janus

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ABSTRACT

This article attempts to explore the relation between psychology and ethics, by studying the epistemo-logical status of psychology. Emphasis is placed on examining the views of positivism, humanism and social constructionism, as regards the relation between psychology and ethics. According to the positivist approach, psychology is an objective, experimental science that should be free of any moral values and of any attempts to determine what is morally right. Proponents of the humanistic orientation have been critical of the “value neutrality” view of psychology and attempted to highlight the moral dimensions of psychological knowledge. Social constructionists have critiqued individual humanism and proposed a relational humanism that would make the relationship networks encompassing individuals explicit.

In conclusion, we established that in examining the relation between psychology and ethics some epistemological contradictions occur, which should be more thoroughly researched.

KEY WORDS: *ethics, positivism, humanism, social constructionism, epistemological contradictions*

Introduction

In recent years there has been an increasing interest in the moral dimensions of psychologists’ work, as regards the scope and limitations of their ethical code of practice (American Psychological Association, 1992; Kitchener, 1996; Brown, 1997; Rossiter, Walsh-Bowers & Prilletlensky, 2002). In our view, examining the moral dimensions of psychologists’ work depends, to a large extent, on an understanding of psychology’s epistemological status.

Psychology resembles the Roman two-faced god Janus, who was the god of beginnings and transitions such as doors, gates and bridges. The one “face” of

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Psychology is turned towards the natural sciences, whereas the other “face” is turned towards the humanities (Kvale, 2003). Advocates of different trends within psychology have often one-sidedly opted for either one or the other “face” of psychology.

THE POSITIVIST VIEW ON PSYCHOLOGY'S VALUE NEUTRALITY

According to the positivist approach, psychology is an objective, experimental science, which should be modelled on the natural sciences. “Psychologists, assuming that physics was the best science, tried to apply the methods and aims of physics to their subject matter –and felt inadequate when they did not succeed. Physics envy is a hallmark of twentieth– century psychology, especially in America. Psychologists engage in a Newtonian fantasy. One day, their faith says, a Newton will arise among psychologists and propound a rigorous theory of behavior, delivering psychology unto the promised land of science” (Leahey, 1997, p. 25). “This approach can be labelled “scientism”: the borrowing of methods and a characteristic vocabulary from the natural sciences in order to discover causal mechanisms that explain psychological phenomena” (Langenhove, 1995, p. 14).

Philosopher La Mettrie's (1749) view on the machine man became very popular in the era of industrialization and had a significant impact on psychology's development as an experimental science (Kvale, 2003). Taylor's attempt to establish a modern scientific method for workers' management in the American factories is also worth noting. The behavioural view on objective control and prediction of human behaviour follows along the same lines as the human engineering approach, as laid down by Taylor (Kvale, 2003). According to Watson, “Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior” (Watson, 1914, p. 1).

Positivism served as the philosophical justification of behaviourism and contributed to a new definition of psychology as a science of behaviour and not of consciousness (Leahey, 1991). The view of psychology as a science that aims to describe, predict and control behaviour is, according to Smith (2002), an expression of the technological ideal of science.

In accordance with the positivist approach, the requirements of psychological research are the “exact” description of facts, the empirical verification and the control of assumptions, the use of standard measuring tools, mainly on the basis of quantitative methods, and the generalization (extrapolation of some general rules) based on the research of a representative sample. Danziger has justifiably compared the positivist view of science with the tale of Sleeping

Beauty: “The objects with which psychological science deals are all present in nature fully formed, and all that the prince-investigator has to do is to find them and awaken them with the magic kiss of his research” (Danzinger, 1990, p. 2).

One of the most prominent features of positivism in psychology is objectivism. “As psychology evolved in the 20th century, its practitioners manifested an almost neurotic need to be seen as scientific, by which they meant, just like the physicists, and this led them to reject the subjective world (i.e., the person) precisely because this was not in the physical domain” (Baker, 1991, p. 13). One of the consequences of positivism is the reduction of psychology into a study of individual organisms and not of persons in interaction (Kugiumutzakakis, 1994, p. 50). An extreme expression of positivist objectivism is the view that since all things are physically determined –there is no choice and therefore no personal responsibility (Blakemore, 1988). “From the perspective of naturalism, human thoughts, feeling, needs, interests and values are approached scientifically by reducing them to what are taken to be more basic physical, chemical and biological (i.e. natural) processes” (Sugarman, 2005, p. 795).

Many scientists argue that the causal determinism involved in the scientific account of human action is incompatible with the account of autonomy and self-determination that legal, political, and ethical arguments require (Ringer, 1996, 356). Skinner clearly realized the incompatibility of a scientific determinism and morality: “In what we may call the prescientific view (and the world is not necessarily pejorative) a person’s behaviour is at least to some extent his own achievement. He is free to deliberate, decide, and act, possibly in original ways, and he is to be given credit for his successes and blamed for his failures. In the scientific view (and the world is not necessarily honorific) a person’s behavior is determined by a genetic endowment traceable to evolutionary history of the species and by the environmental circumstances to which he has been exposed as an individual he has been exposed. Neither view can be proved, but it is in the nature of scientific inquiry that the evidence should shift in favour of the second.” (Skinner, 1971, p. 101).

This incompatibility is held not only by radical behaviorists but also by other radical psychological determinists. Many researchers criticize the tacit radical psychological materialist reduction of mental to brain behavior and the consequent “elimination” of ethical categories from “scientific” discourse (Webel & Stigliano, 2004, p. 81).

According to the positivist view, psychology should be free from any moral values or any attempts to determine what is morally right (Kendler, 2002). Positivistic psychologists reproduce dominant bourgeois conceptions of aca-

demic knowledge as in principle separate from the world and as independent of moral-political activity (Parker, 2002, p. 71). The positivist view of psychology's "value neutrality" was even reflected in the Ethics Code of the American Psychological Association (APA, 1992): "implicit in the code was a steadfast faith in the ethical neutrality and objective vision of scientifically trained psychologists who are unaffected by human interests, values, ideologies and social locations" (Brown, 1997; Rossiter, Walsh-Bowers & Prilletlensky, 2002).

Led by the "science for science" principle, positivists have examined the scientific research as the sphere of "pure", "objective" knowledge, which reflects the "is" as opposed to the "ought". Many researchers consider the relation between science and ethics by means of juxtaposing "facts" and "moral values". The attempt to derive values from facts, "ought from is", is usually referred to as "Naturalistic Fallacy" (Moore, 1903; Teehan, 2004). This fallacy states that one cannot define ethical terms such as "good" or "what ought to be done" in terms that are purely factual, descriptive, and non-evaluative (Kitchener, 1996, p. 377). It was David Hume, who famously observed that an "ought" cannot be logically derived from an "is" (Brinkmann, 2005, p. 750). For empiricist philosophers and scientists, the important and answerable questions are matters of "what is the case". Concern about "what ought to be" is beyond answer –mere metaphysics or worse (Gergen, 1994, p. 99).

The split between facts and values forms one of the manifestations of epistemological dualism, the two poles representing naturalistic objectivism and mentalistic subjectivism. The epistemological dualism of psychological knowledge reproduces the two known poles of natural sciences and mental sciences (Naturwissenschaften, Geisteswissenschaften), the Neo-Kantian conflict between "explanatory" and "understanding" Psychology, and between "nomothetic" and "ideographic" research methods (Cahan & White, 1992; Hill, 1996; Vygotsky, 1997; Dafermos, 2002).

THE HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE IN PSYCHOLOGY

Humanistic psychology made its appearance as the "third power in Psychology", as an alternative to behaviourism and psychoanalysis approach. The proponents of humanistic psychology have criticized positivism in that it idealized natural sciences' research techniques by means of which people have been examined solely as objects and not as subjects. The proponents of humanistic psychology differentiated themselves from the singleone-dimensional examination of individual psychological functions, which was typical of functional psychology, and attempted to explore the human being as a whole person. Humanists have an image of the human being which is holistic, and so as

a result they want to respect and protect the integrity of a person's experience against the attempts to break it down and explain it away. In place of "explanation", then, humanists tend to favour understanding of experience, and so thus they will take peoples accounts very seriously (Parker, 2005, p. 50).

The origins of humanistic psychology can be found in "understanding", "descriptive" Psychology, the advocates of which have tried to illustrate the living connection between the component elements of a person's mental life in its entirety (Dilthey, 1997). The proponents of humanistic psychology have questioned the nomothetic method and the deterministic interpretation of psychological processes and have proposed adopting the ideographic method for examining psychological states (ideographic psychology) (May, 1969).

According to Hergenhahn (2001, p. 506), humanistic psychology combines romanticism (particularly the ideas of Rousseau about humans being inherently "good") and existentialism. The advocates of existential psychology have mostly emphasized the moral dilemmas presented before human beings, the conflict between the individual subject and the moral law, the awareness of their responsibility, loneliness, etc. (May, 1969). If the person is free to choose, as the advocates of existential psychology claim, then he or she is morally responsible for his/her actions.

In contrast to the view of the "value neutrality" of science, Maslow (1970) adopted the argument that science is based on human values. The aesthetic, cognitive and emotional needs are the source of science development, and the satisfaction of such needs constitutes a "value". Dewey's views (Dewey, 1930, p. 296) are of great interest: he argued that all sciences from physics to history "are a part of disciplined moral knowledge so far as they enable us to understand the conditions and agencies through which man lives... Moral sciences areis not something with a separate province".

Many researchers have adopted the view that the human world has moral dimensions and that psychology must change its epistemological "paradigm" and take moral values into account. Brinkmann (2004) by reflecting on the views of Aristotle, Dewey and Heidegger, has attempted to create the framework for a peculiar Moral Ecology. "Psychology cannot even begin to investigate human action without presupposing that there are better and worse ways of doing things (i.e., without presupposing objective value judgments). Second, I argue that understanding human action involves what have been called "thick ethical concepts" (Brinkmann, 2005, p. 757). According to Taylor, to be a fully human person is to become a self-interpreting agent, and a necessary condition to understand ourselves in this way is to exist in a moral space defined by distinctions of worth (Taylor, 1985; Sugarman, 2005).

In contrast to the positivist view of value- neutral knowledge, the advocates

of the humanistic approach give priority to the moral conscience of the concrete subject. The exponents of the humanistic approach have criticized the mechanistic materialism, which examines the human being as a mere physical object that is passively subjected to the laws of physical reality and determinism. According to Maslow (1968), the principle of causality does not apply to psychology, because human beings are not passive participants in events and external influences, but active subjects that interact in complicated ways with the environment and exercise certain influences upon it. The above argument shows that for Maslow causality coincides with the mechanistic approach of causality that prevailed in Physics during the 16th and 17th centuries.

The advocates of humanistic psychology argue that human beings have free will and are responsible for their actions. This is exactly why they think that humans cannot be effectively studied using traditional scientific methodology (Hergenhahn, 2001, p. 528). Some supporters of the humanistic and existential psychology ended up rejecting causality and focused on the description of a person's peak - experiences, such as ecstasy, and psychological elevation (religious experiences, creative experiences, nirvana, etc.) (Maslow, 1968). This trend is particularly evident in Transpersonal Psychology, the advocates of which moved towards examining the borderline and ecstatic states of consciousness, meditation, and the mystic experience. Transpersonal Psychology is "the most recent American representative of a visionary tradition with roots that extend back to the shadow culture of Western rational thought –from the Greek mystery schools, neo-Platonism, and the hermetic tradition, to the Kaballah, Sufism, and on to the 18th century English and German mystics" (Taylor, 1999, p. 16). In this way the abstract anthropologism, the questioning of conceptual, scientific thought and the fetishisation of the immediate experience opens up the way to irrationalism and mysticism.

Humanistic psychology in some respects close to a consumer ideology with its promotion of spontaneity, of living out fantasies and desires, and with individual self-actualization as the goal of life...To the client-centred therapists, the client was the ultimate authority –"the customer is always right"(Kvale, 2003, 591). Some researchers have pointed out that the new middle class offers the social grounds for the flourishing of humanistic psychology, by adopting new forms of consumer behaviour and seeking new, qualitative and "humanistic" standards for moral values and classifications (Alexiou, 2002, p. 374).

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM'S CHALLENGES

During the 1980s ideas related to social constructionism became particularly popular (Gergen, 1991; 1994; 1997a; 1997b; Shotter, 1992; 1995). Social

constructionism has been one of the most ardent opponents of positivistic approaches to the study of human behavior (Brinkmann, 2006, p. 93). According to social constructionists, subjects can neither represent the outer world objectively and accurately, nor produce universal truths. Contrary to the view that knowledge is the reflection of an objective reality, advocates of social constructionist theory view knowledge as constructed within social interaction.

Drawing on social constructionism, K. Gergen has critiqued traditional humanism, which is based on a theory that views the person as being isolated in his/her subjective experience, making decisions in an imaginary and ideal space, free from the outside influence of public opinion. K. Gergen (1997a) questions the “romantic” humanistic view that people have free will and independence. Lovlie (1992) point out that the postmodern “death of the subject” eliminates a basic presupposition of psychology –the idea of an autonomous and intentional agent.

According to social constructionists, within the postmodern cultural context the focus is shifted from self to relationship (Gergen, 1991). The private sphere no longer provides the stage on which the subject’s drama is played out, a subject in conflict with its image and its targets, while people are portrayed as the terminals of multiple networks (Baudrillard, 1987, p. 10). The postmodern self is a multiphrenia saturated and populated with the presence of others (Gergen, 1991). In the place of traditional Individual Humanism, social constructionists propose a new Relational Humanism. From examining individual consciousness, social constructionists have shifted their attention towards exploring the relations between subjects, and analyzing the context of their interaction. We come to moral decisions through dialogue and negotiation with others, not through autonomous self-reflection (Gergen, 1991). Modern morality capitulates to pluralism, tolerant of a multiplicity of moral choices made through negotiation and dialogue (Hill, 1996). Contrary to traditional humanism’s, the proponents of which place an emphasis on the person’s freedom and moral responsibility regarding his/her actions, social constructionists focus on understanding the network of relations in which individuals participate. Therefore, social constructionists attempt to disempower the trend for incriminating individuals for their actions, and to highlight cultural relations, which lead individuals to conflicts and wrong actions (Gergen, 1997b). According to K. Gergen, social constructionism may contribute to the examination of the moral and political context within which psychologists incorporate their theoretical activity and, therefore, to identifying alternative strategies for understanding and acting (Gergen, 1997a).

Social constructionists criticise the traditional attempt to establish a universal system of moral values that determine the behaviour of individual per-

sons. "Principles of the good do not and cannot dictate concrete actions, and any action at any time may be constructed as good or evil from some vantage point" (Gergen, 1994, p. 111). Social constructionists reject the attempts to create a common code of ethics at a psychological and philosophical level, and try to stress out the heterogeneity of the human world. According to K. Gergen, constructionist relativism replaces absolutist claims of universal ethics with a collaborative search for meaning, and disquisitions on transcendental goods with communal considerations of consequence (Gergen, 1994, p. 109).

Smith sees Gergen's antifoundationalism as the abandonment of hope to find a secure foundation for beliefs and values (Smith, 1994). Moral relativism, on which social constructionism is based, may lead to the deconstruction of the moral grounds on which the action of concrete individuals is based, may produce moral vacuity and strengthen a sense that there is no meaning in life.

Social constructionists have adopted the postmodern view that any moral and, more generally, any social ideal constitutes a "grand narrative" and must be rejected. Dismissing any social plans "claiming to be universal or radical" Foucault has argued that the attempt to escape the system of contemporary reality and produce total projects of another society, another way of thinking, another culture and another way to view the world, has only resulted in bringing back the most dangerous of traditions (Foucault, 1988, p. 37). However, to fully deny any moral or social ideal in general, deprives individuals of the possibility to seek out other prospects and get consciously involved in social transformation processes, making them prone to resignation and accepting the dominant status quo.

In postmodernism, the distinction between "moral" and "immoral", as well as the one between "truth" and "lie" becomes uncertain and indeterminable. The examination of moral decisions becomes a matter of point of view and perspective, within the context of the multiple relations in which individuals are embedded. What is seen as immoral by the dominant cultural system, is presented as moral if seen under the light of the person's own sub-culture (Gergen, 1991). Accepting this approach can lead us to a complete relativisation and subjectivisation of morality, which becomes dependent on the various networks of relations that individuals are engaged in. Cultural and moral relativism that forms the core of postmodern thought may legitimize the ethnic, religious and fundamentalist movements, and strengthen the most dangerous forms of "cultural totalitarianism" (Eagleton, 2003, p. 139).

The relativism in postmodern approaches has often been treated by its critics as equivalent to amoralism. Once the grounds for distinguishing between good and evil have been eaten away, then there is no reason why one should not opt for one or the other (Parker, 2002, p. 41). Shotter thus accepts an epis-

temic relativity, where all beliefs are socially produced, but he rejects moral relativity where all beliefs are equally valid, taking the postmodern standpoint that in the forum of scientific judgement questions of justice take an equal place with those of truth (Shotter, 1992; Kvale, 1992).

Brinkmann argues that contemporary consumer societies already work according to the logic of social construction and that constructionism has already become many people's philosophy. Some points of conversion between constructionism and consumerism are pointed out, including a shared focus on identity morphing, aesthetization of life, and a denial of life's tragic dimensions (Brinkmann, 2006, p. 92).

CONCLUSIONS

In examining positivism, humanism and social constructionism, we established a series of epistemo-logical contradictions, which present an epistemo-logical dualism in the field of psychology. The first one of these contradictions concerns the epistemological status of psychology, its place within the science complex. We have concluded that positivist psychologists have attempted to found psychology upon the epistemological "paradigm" of the "physical" sciences. Positivists adopt the tenets of scientism with regard to the "morally neutral" knowledge, the role of which is being reduced to describing empirical facts. The theoretical project of positivism in psychology has been substantiated in the radical behaviourism of Watson (1914) and Skinner (1971, 1975), who proposed that the internal, subjective aspects of experience must be rejected as causes in the scientific study of human behavior.

Humanistic psychologists present psychology as a humanistic science and give priority to its moral aspects. Humanistic psychologists attempt to explore human personality as a whole and point out the subjective experience of human beings (Maslow, 1954; 1968; May, 1969). The advocates of humanistic psychology focus on the experiences, values, meanings and generally the attitude of the subjects towards the world, on the basis of a subjective philosophy of life. Considering the moral values as something completely distinct from the natural world of experience and as product of actions and subjective will, may lead to the creation of a pre-scientific, metaphysical moral philosophy or even to pure religious irrationalism. Some researchers qualify this paradox as the subjective versus objective Schism (Staats, 1983, p. 114). Kvale argues that the apparent opposites of behaviourist objectivism and humanistic subjectivism are both sides of the same modern coin (Kvale, 1992, p. 14).

The proponents of radical behaviourism examine people as machines that respond to stimuli from the environment, and attempt to process the technol-

ogy of their behaviour. If, however, human behaviour is determined mechanistically by stimuli the organism receives, then the question of the person's responsibility for their actions is being abolished. Many humanist psychologists question causality and uphold peoples' free will. However, should moral choice be detached from the wider context of causal relations within which the person is situated, it then appears as an expression of their subjective arbitrariness. Some researchers qualify this paradox as the freedom versus determination Schism (Staats, 1983, p. 121).

We have also established the occurrence of various approaches to the subject within psychology. Humanist psychologists assume that people have free will and independence. On the contrary, social constructionists critique the romantic view of the free self and attempt to examine the network of relations individuals are nested in. The following question becomes the topic of many scientific discussions and debates: can we speak of individuals with free will or should we accede to the postmodern views on the "death of the subject"?

Conflictual views on the character of human nature and the origins of moral behaviour seem to emerge. Watson and Skinner assume that people are neither good nor bad, but rather neutral. The behaviourists maintain that experience makes a person good or bad or whatever. On the contrary, humanist psychologists, such as Maslow and Rogers, adopt Rousseau's view that people are good by nature (Hergenhahn, 2001, p. 528).

The above mentioned contradictions are not the product of some subjective fallacies or of the arbitrariness by the proponents of different orientations, but rather the product of real difficulties that appear in reflecting on the epistemological status of psychology and its relation to ethics. The proponents of various theoretical orientations overstate and absolutise this or that facet of the epistemological contradictions, highlight one or the other "face" of psychology's Janus, thus eliminating the prospect of understanding the deeper nature of contradiction. Nevertheless, the research into the social and epistemological reasons that contribute to the formation of these contradictions, as well as the bringing forth of the prospect of transgressing these contradictions, should be the topic of a separate study.

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Evolution of Medical Ethics and Bioethics in Greece: "Ancient-Christian-Contemporary Greece"

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ABSTRACT

Although its authenticity has been questioned, the text that has been known as Hippocrates' Oath has played a crucial role to the evolution of medical ethics in Greek settings. The Oath has greatly influenced Greek ethical thinking not only during antiquity, but also during early Christian times and Byzantine era. During the period of Turkish occupation the Oath recurs in Greece, in the texts of the Greek Enlighteners. In modern times we trace it as the Oath taken by graduate students of Medicine, while it still serves as a basis for debates concerning the modern challenges of Bioethics and Medicine.

KEY WORDS: *Medical ethics, Bioethics, professional ethics, Hippocratic Oath, doctor – patient relationship, benefit for the patient, Christian anthropology.*

GENERAL

The appearance of medical ethics is almost coincident with the beginnings of medical science. In antiquity many societies obliged physicians to bind themselves to practise their profession in a proper and ethical manner, frequently by taking an oath. Every culture and every social system can show a framework for defining health, illness, therapeutic methods and doctors' be-

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havior, and understandably these commitments acquired an ethical aspect from the prevailing morality. In ancient Greece, and especially from the classical period onwards, it seems that the Greeks associated this most important science or calling with those ethical rules that would enable them to serve their fellow man in the best possible way (Jones, 1924).

After the Nuremberg trials, which led to a resurgence of interest in medical ethics in response to the atrocities perpetrated supposedly in the name of science, there was no noticeable rise in wider interest in the field. The appearance of bioethics in recent years has, however, rekindled interest in medical ethics.

Before proceeding with our review of the evolution and history of medical ethics and bioethics in Greece, the main concern of this paper, it may be useful to consider the distinction between medical ethics and bioethics.

Medical ethics is that branch of ethics which deals with the ethical problems arising from the practice of the medical profession. In other words it delimits the sphere of activity of the doctor, so he will not misuse or exploit the power he possesses by reason of his profession to the detriment of his patients. Thus medical ethics particularly focuses on the doctor-patient relationship.

Bioethics, on the other hand, is a modern interdisciplinary field dealing with the ethical problems arising from the use of modern biomedical techniques. In brief, the basic bioethical issues are euthanasia, transplants, assisted reproduction, genetic modification, prenatal screening, genetic screening of adults and cloning. Bioethics is concerned with the very mechanisms of life, in the sense that humankind can now meddle with life in ways which until recently were inconceivable, and thus change the natural development of living things. Hence the field of bioethics includes interventions in the phenomenon of life, in psychosomatics, and in the environment. Perhaps at first glance one could say that bioethics examines practice rather than the practitioners, whereas medical ethics does the opposite. However, it cannot be denied that in bioethics too a role is played by the human factor, which is not always the doctor; it may be a geneticist or a biomedical technician.

Nevertheless, biomedical techniques are mostly used in clinical medical practice, so we inevitably return, though in a more complex way, to the doctor-patient relationship. In this case bioethics overlaps medical ethics to such an extent that almost all the concerns of the latter are subsumed under the former. For example, major questions of medical ethics, like doctors' paternalism, patients' rights, access to medical care and experiments on patients, are now examined within the framework of bioethics, to the extent that they are often referred to as purely bioethical issues.

Perhaps the best example of this is the question of informed patient consent. At bottom, informed consent can be seen as a question of medical ethics, of professional ethics and as a legal matter. With informed consent, an effort is made to fully acquaint the patient with the risks, the chances of success or failure, the moral issues and anything else that may interest him in connection with whatever medical or biomedical procedure he is about to undergo. The doctor or whoever else is to perform the procedure draws up a document, which the patient reads and after expressing his views or reservations signs if he accepts the proposed treatment. This description of informed consent would place it more readily in the field of medical ethics. However, because it is used universally in biomedical applications, it is classified and studied as a matter for bioethics.

From the above it can be seen that today the dividing line between bioethics and medical ethics is in practice blurred, and will in the future become even more so as biomedical techniques are used more widely in medical clinical practice. If, however, we wish to review the history of medical ethics and bioethics, we must begin by stating that historically they are two distinct fields. Medical ethics, as mentioned earlier, has existed since the birth of medical science in antiquity, whereas bioethics is the child of the last few decades of modern Western society. The roots of the former lie in the very beginnings of scientific and philosophical thought; those of the latter in the spirit and philosophy of Western modernism and postmodernism.

Examining the historical development of these two cultural phenomena in Greece, we can say that medical ethics, as it has come down to us, provided the foundation for bioethics. It is thus of great importance to examine the historical development of medical ethics in Greek civilization. Through the study of 'old and familiar' medical ethics, it will be easier to understand how modern Greek society confronts and incorporates 'modern and imported' bioethics. For this reason we have chosen to study the history of these two branches in Greek society separately.

MEDICAL ETHICS AMONG THE ANCIENT GREEKS - HIPPOCRATIC OATH

When considering medical ethics⁴ in Classical Greece, and later on in Hellenistic and Roman-Greek society, we must stress certain points:

⁴ It is wrong to use the term "bioethics" instead of the term medical ethics, especially for antiquity. Bioethics is a product of modern society, having arisen from the use of biotechnology and the ethical problems the latter has created. For further information see (Korff, 1998, p. 7).

1. Never in the Classical world was there a system of medical licensing. Anyone who undertook to treat patients could call himself a physician.
2. There were no professional rules whatsoever with sanctions against physicians who violated professional ethics.
3. It is misleading even to speak of professional ethics. At no time were physicians asked to take any oath, nor were they obliged to observe any code of ethics, formal or informal.
4. However, ethical standards do appear in literature. But those that are more appealing to us, either because they can be regarded as timeless ideals of medicine or because they comply with modern medical ethics, could perhaps not always be applied by the majority of physicians.
5. Even when certain ethical precepts are identified as ideals, at least for us, although not necessarily typical for that time, it should be noted that from Homer to Constantine the Great (9th century B.C. – 4th century A.D.) or, for that matter, from Hippocrates to Galen (5th century B.C.-2nd century A.D.), there was not one period when they were constant.
6. Medicine was certainly practised in the Hellenic world long before the time of Hippocrates, but due to the influence on the Western medical tradition of the "Father of Medicine" and the Oath that bears his name, the parts of the Hippocratic Corpus relating to medical ethics will serve as a central reference point in this article (Ammudsen & Ferngren, Gary B, 1983, pp. 1-46).

Many students of the Hippocratic Corpus, Hippocratists as they are usually known, have put forward a variety of theories concerning the authorship of the texts. The historico-literary method has disclosed elements and influences that according to these researchers do not echo the spirit of the age of Hippocrates, nor the philosophical school to which he belonged, as revealed by the majority of the works that have been confirmed as his. Doubt has even been cast on his authorship of the Oath itself, the earliest Greek statement of medical ethics.

The basis for doubting - partially at least - the authorship of the Hippocratic Oath, is the discovery by the leading Hippocratist Ludwig Edelstein that many parts of the Oath reflect Pythagorean rather than Hippocratic philosophy (Edelstein, 1943). The two major medical schools of antiquity, those of Cos and Cnidus, partook of the all-pervading philosophical climate of Plato and Aristotle. Nicomachos, doctor and father of Aristotle, was a student of the Cnidus school (Marketos, 2002, p. 81). The Platonic and Aristotelian writings take positions that differ considerably from those of the Oath, for example on abortion. Both Plato and Aristotle permit abortion under certain circumstances; only the Pythagoreans forbade it absolutely. The same holds true for medically assisted suicide, a widespread practice in antiquity, and one op-

posed only by the Pythagoreans. Edelstein was led to the conclusion that the Oath is considerably influenced by Pythagorean ideas and teaching (Lypourlis, 2001, pp. 61-63), and indeed believed it to have been written by a doctor in Pythagorean circles. This explains in part why the Oath promotes a stricter medical ethic than that prevailing until then in ancient Greece, in Platonic and Aristotelian ethics, and also in daily medical practice. Doubts about authorship notwithstanding, the Hippocratic Oath was for centuries unquestionably the fundamental benchmark of medical ethics.

The Oath consists of two parts. The first defines the teacher-pupil relationship and the second is the code of ethics. In antiquity the teacher-pupil relationship possessed a marked ethical element. The closeness of the relationship and the deep understanding of the pupil's personality built up during the long apprenticeship discouraged the entry of unworthy persons into this most important profession (Veatch, 1978, pp. 172-180).

The present paper is of course chiefly concerned with the second part - medicine's code of ethics. The oaths that the new physician swears by Apollo are the following:

1. He shall use his judgment to administer the best medical and medicinal treatment, only for the benefit for the patient *επ' ωφελείη*.
2. He shall not, even if asked, give any deadly medicine nor advice to this end (of suicide).
3. He shall not induce an abortion.
4. He shall keep his life and his art pure and clean.
5. He shall not operate for a kidney stone (meaning he must not use techniques he does not know).
6. He shall refrain from knowingly causing injustice or harm.
7. He shall not have sexual relations with his patients.
8. He shall observe medical confidentiality (Konold, 1978, pp. 162-172).

A comparison with the relevant international bibliography is very revealing of the extent to which the Hippocratic Oath has influenced medical ethics throughout the ages. It is noteworthy that two of the four principles of bioethics, those of non-maleficence and beneficence⁵, which are considered to derive from Mill's utilitarianism, are specifically mentioned in the Oath. (*επ' ωφελείη...εκτός πάσης αδικίας και φθοράς*).

The emphasis laid on these principles implies an awareness that medicine can harm instead of heal, and that there may be physicians who would use their skill to harm rather than help.

5 The other two are autonomy and justice (Beauchamp, 1993).

The prevailing tradition in classical times promoted the image of a physician who looked healthy and had the right body weight, because, as Hippocrates quotes in his 'Physician and Decorum', the public believe that unfit physicians must be incapable of taking care of others.

Although the Hippocratic Corpus and more specifically the Oath is taken to reflect the standards of professional ethics of everyday Hellenic medical practice, some of its provisions are in sharp contrast to those standards. For instance, Hellenic medical practice allowed physicians to assist suicide and infanticide and to perform surgery, including lithotomy, all practices incompatible with the ethics of the Hippocratic Oath. Again, the Oath set high standards for the equal treatment of all social classes, standards not commonly attained in Greek society.

These precepts, representing the ideas of only a small group of medical practitioners, have outweighed all others in shaping the development of medical ethics in the modern world. But for centuries following the appearance of the Hippocratic Oath the medical profession showed no real respect for its provisions.

HIPPOCRATIC ETHICS & CHRISTIANITY

The major figure in ancient medicine after Hippocrates was Galen, a Greek from Pergamum. He lived in the second century A.D. and for most of his life in Rome as physician to the emperor and Stoic philosopher Marcus Aurelius. He himself left no writings on medical ethics. Despite his differences with his predecessor Hippocrates regarding his scientific methods, he is considered to have kept to the Hippocratic medical spirit. Given his reputed modesty and integrity and the fact that his medical techniques were not contrary to the Church's views at that time (for example, he did not dissect dead bodies), he was especially liked in Christian circles and in a way acted as a bridge between Hippocratic medical ethics and the Christian attitude to medicine (Marketos, 2002, pp. 123-127).

The rise of Christianity produced a new idealism that was in general agreement with Hippocratic ethics. The increased attention paid to the Oath led to modifications that harmonized it with Christian ideological concepts and practices. The earliest of these revisions modifies the Hippocratic oath so that a Christian may take it (Leake, 1927), by replacing the references to Greek deities in the original oath with a Christian statement of worship of God. In addition it replaces the contract with a statement of the responsibilities that should be taught in a spirit of Christian brotherhood, which bind the physician to teach his art to whoever wants to learn it.

Christian anthropology (meaning here the study of man in his relation to God), which has given rise to the idea of human life having value and to ethics in general, is largely grounded in Jewish anthropology. It is thus noteworthy that manuscripts describing ancient Hebrew medical practices reveal Hippocratic influences in their prohibitions against administering poisons, committing adultery and disclosing professional secrets.

A later development of the above were the medieval Christian oaths, which instructed physicians to give special consideration to the poor and needy.

The Hippocratic Oath also appeared in medieval Muslim literature, where the only significant changes replaced references to Greek gods with statements complying with Islamic theology. It is believed that the Hippocratic Oath was taken by physicians practicing in both Christian and Muslim societies in the Middle Ages (Harakas, 1978, pp. 347-356).

With the establishment of the Eastern Roman Empire and the development of Byzantine civilization, the dominant trend in medicine became the so-called 'Hippocratic Galenism' (Marketos, 2002, p. 131). As a result the ethical rules of the Hippocratic Oath continued in force. No particular system of medical ethics appeared. However, historical references show that matters like the doctor-patient relationship, doctors' social behavior and professional ethics concerned the Christian communities (Eutychiades, 1983, p. 7). Christian teaching seems to have infused the whole spectrum of medical treatment, going beyond even the moral rules of the Hippocratic Oath by taking charity as its guiding light. The first hospitals and almshouses appeared, under the auspices of important political and church leaders such as St Helen and Basil the Great. Hence Byzantium's major contribution to medicine and nursing was the institution of the hospital and hospital care. This may be attributable to Christ's command to love one's neighbour (Marketos, 2002, 135), which together with love of God is considered the fundamental rule of Christian ethics (Mt. 22, 40. Mantzarides, 2004, p. 105). Thus Byzantium continued the ancient Greek tradition of developments in medicine following those in ethics.

It is important to stress the new meaning that Christianity gave to the human body through its anthropology, which derives from Christology. The prospect of salvation through participation in the Cross and the Resurrection reverses the approach to man as a solely biological unit. This inevitably reflects on the view taken of medicine. Christ's voluntary death and Resurrection inspired the martyrs of the church and later ascetics to copy Him. Both kinds of saints have this in common, that they hold biological existence to be of less account than their love of Christ and hope of the resurrection. While not devaluing the body, they give it the opportunity to transcend the finite limits of this life. This leads the Church on the one hand to honour medicine as a

science and the doctor's role in relieving human suffering, but on the other to put it in perspective: Basil the Great states in his 55th rule that medicine should be used without its becoming an end in itself. Having himself studied medicine he knows its worth, but he points to the danger that man will forget his true vocation, which is eternal life, if he uses medicine to care for his body as an end in itself. This position is a rule that reflects the whole spirit of Byzantine civilization, a spirit that despite very great difficulties continued to be associated with the Greek world even after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 (Harakas, 1990, 9f).

THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH IN THE MODERN ERA

The Hippocratic Oath continued to influence medical ethics in the West even after the Middle Ages gave way to modern Western society. Medical schools, seeking to commit their students to the pursuit of high ethical ideals, continued a tradition begun in the Middle Ages of incorporating Hippocratic concepts into oaths for their graduates, especially the covenant's requirement for the physician to instruct his teacher's children and the ethical strictures on confidentiality and the administration of harmful drugs.

From the 18th century onwards, and especially during the 19th century, many Greeks travelled to Western Europe to study medicine. There were medical-philosophical schools (e.g. at Padua) where in the spirit of the Enlightenment and the preceding Renaissance there circulated new ideas and attitudes to science in general and medicine in particular. These attitudes were brought to Turkish-occupied Greece and later into the newly-established modern Greek state by Greeks who had studied medicine abroad, among them important political figures such as Ioannes Capodistrias, Ioannes Kolettis and Alexandros Mavrokordatos, and also by men of letters like Adamantios Korais (Marketos, 2002, p. 397, p. 411, p. 413). Thus scientific thought in modern Greek society began to follow, and still follows, though slowly, Western scientific thought. Medical ethics is, of course, no exception to this development.

In Greece the Oath continues to be taken in its ancient form even today. However much it may be regarded as purely ceremonial, it cannot be entirely disassociated from the molding of a general ethic in relation to the medical profession. This is shown by the numerous references to the Hippocratic Oath in scientific congresses or studies whenever a question of medical ethics arises.

A significant revision of the Hippocratic Oath appeared in 1948, when the newly organized World Medical Association (WMA) adopted the Geneva Declaration, a secular oath with no reference to religious tenets which attempts

to make the original Hippocratic Oath fully applicable to modern conditions of medical practice and to diverse cultures⁶.

However, the Declaration separates from the Hippocratic Oath the notions of gratitude to teachers and professional solidarity, extending them to embrace the profession on an international scale. In contrast, its statement of the physician's responsibility regarding suicide, mercy killing and abortion is carefully obscured in generalities, concealing modern controversy on these matters. It does, however, emphasise respect for human life from the moment of conception.

Recent biomedical advances and changing social demands have raised a number of new moral questions and dilemmas, for which the traditional ethical guidelines laid down in the Hippocratic Corpus are no longer adequate.

The Hippocratic Corpus, reflecting more or less the mores and ethos of classical Hellenic society, promoted a paternalistic attitude which made the physician the dominant party in deciding what was best for the patient. However, the other ethical values and principles established by the Hippocratic Corpus and its supporters in later centuries are still respected. In modern times society has challenged the paternalism of the Hippocratic Oath. This challenge, however, does not refute its historical and ethical value. On the contrary, it shows that there are timeless values that evolve in line with social changes.

THE HIPPOCRATIC TRADITION IN MODERN GREECE

The Hippocratic tradition has deeply influenced medical ethics and prevails even today in Greece (Hippocrates's native land). This explains the frequently paternalistic attitude of Greek doctors; an attitude, moreover, that is accepted almost without question by patients, who often consider it perfectly normal. In fact, doctors in Greece care more for the well-being of their patients than for their rights. They are guided by the principles of beneficence, non-maleficence and paternalistic idea that physicians have the right to decide for their patients. Thus physicians do not usually inform patients and sometimes even take major decisions for them without their informed consent.

The concept of confidentiality is as highly valued in modern as in ancient Greece. The Hellenic Penal Code (section 371) punishes breach of medical confidentiality and exempts physicians from testifying in Court about what has been confided to them during the practice of their profession⁷.

6 Declaration of Geneva, Declaration of Helsinki, Declaration of Sydney, Declaration of Oslo, New York: W.M.A.

7 Greek Penal Code, 11/ 17-8-1950.

The Hippocratic tradition, in conjunction with the Greek Orthodox tradition, have deeply influenced Greek ethics and law. Euthanasia in any form, active or passive, is morally condemned and legally punished. However, recent medical advances have led modern Greek society to seriously question the ethics of keeping a terminally ill patient alive indefinitely. Therefore, "letting the patient die" as a form of passive euthanasia is under public discussion with a view to being accepted, under conditions, of course.

The issue of abortion in Greece raises several questions. Considering the religious and cultural background of Greece, there is an irony in the way Greek women contemplate abortion, since it is estimated that in the years before the legalization of abortion on request in Greece in 1986, 300,000 - 400,000 illegal abortions were performed annually. We believe that socio-economic reasons, the feminist movement, lack of support for working mothers and large families led the state to legalize abortions. Artificial fertilisation has become to a great extent ethically acceptable even though it has only recently been subject to legislation⁸. The matter of transplants has been anticipated in a very similar way⁹.

BIOETHICS IN GREECE

In recent decades a new discipline has made its appearance, initially in the USA: bioethics, which we have already mentioned at the beginning of this paper. Bioethics is a child of the rapid advances in biomedical research and applications and especially genetic technology, and chiefly concerns societies that have been pioneers in this field. Greek society, despite its distinguished scientific community, is a consumer of biomedical technology rather than a participant in research and production. As a result the bioethical problems are imported along with the technology. This creates a somewhat complicated situation. Bioethical problems, apart from biomedical applications, have their origin in what is defined as spirit in Western culture. The factors that comprise the prevailing moral attitude in Greek society derive on the one hand from Western culture and on the other from the Eastern Orthodox Christian Tradition. The latter, however, differs fundamentally at many points from the Western spirit. This means that bioethics, which reflects the moral outlook of another, though not completely alien, culture, cannot be called upon to solve the bioethical problems that arise in Greek society in exactly the same way it would in the culture that gave birth to it.

⁸ Law N.3305.2005

⁹ Law N. 2737.1999

Bioethical issues began cautiously to be raised in Greece in the 1980's¹⁰. The academic community's interest in the subject showed itself first sporadically in university lectures and more rarely in papers. The public learnt about it only through a few articles in the press. The situation changed considerably, however, in the following decade. It could be argued that interest in bioethics increased as the project to decode the human genome neared completion. Newspaper articles multiplied, academics began to take positions by publishing papers, and congresses, workshops and lectures on bioethical issues were organised. These congresses and the interdisciplinary cooperation they encouraged laid the groundwork for the creation of bioethics committees. Finally at the turn of the century the first official bioethics committees were set up in Greece, although they are only of an educational and advisory character. The most important of these are the National Bioethics Committee (under the auspices of the Prime Minister)¹¹, the Bioethics Committee of the General Secretariat of Research and Technology of the Ministry of Development¹² and the Ethics and Deontology Committee of the Ministry of Health.

At the academic level, bioethics has begun to be taught as an elective subject in the relevant university schools, such as those of medicine, biology, philosophy, theology and law. Postgraduate and doctoral theses have been written on the subject and in the last two years the University of Crete has established an interdepartmental program of postgraduate studies in bioethics¹³.

The Church of Greece has also made a significant contribution by setting up a special bioethics committee of the Holy Synod¹⁴. Another important initiative is the foundation of the first Center of Biomedical Ethics and Deontology¹⁵ by the then archimandrite and now metropolitan of Mesogaia and Lavreotiki Nikolaos Hadjinikolaou.

BIOETHICS AND ORTHODOX TRADITION

In the Eastern Orthodox tradition, ethical practices are those that conform to the ethics of the Orthodox faith. There is nothing in Christian Orthodox teaching that overtly or covertly opposes or even expresses reservations about

10 When one of the first doctoral theses on bioethics was submitted. (Veloyanni – Moutsopoulou, 1984.)

11 For further information see www.bioethics.gr

12 For further information see www.gsrt.gr

13 For further information see www.bioethics.fks.uoc.gr

14 For further information see www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/committees/bioethics

15 For further information see www.bioethics.org.gr

the art of medicine. Even when it is canonical in character it is not stated in a rigid, legalistic or absolute manner. Dispensation (in theological terms “*economia*” - a form of conditional concession) authorizes an exception to the rule, without, however, treating it as a precedent or as abrogating the rule. The justification for a dispensation is the avoidance of the greater harm that would result from strict application of the rule (Kalliakmanis, 2000, p. 73).

The doctrinal teachings of Orthodoxy are directly applicable to medical ethics and bioethics. Of particular importance is Orthodox anthropological teaching, which derives from the creation of man ‘in the image and likeness’ of God, as a unity of body and soul and from Christological doctrine. Eastern Orthodox ethics are based on honor and respect for each individual life from the moment of conception. This can be clearly seen in the church calendar, which honors the great feasts of the Annunciation (the conception of Christ), the conception of the Virgin and the conception of John the Baptist. Thus the birth of every single human being, who is created in the image of God, should be treated as a great event, as a feast. Hence Orthodox theology regards life as a gift from God and demands that it be treated with proper respect and solicitude.

Any form of disrespect to human life, from abortion to euthanasia and from cloning and eugenic gene intervention to mercy killing or failure to give proper treatment to a needy patient, constitutes a violation of the main principle of orthodox bioethics, that of the Person-Hypostase (Koios, 2003, p. 256, p. 351). However, our religious tradition is not completely inflexible in these matters.

Dispensations are always granted under the guidance of a spiritual father, never arbitrarily. The dispensation has above all a spiritual purpose. It is not an exemption from the articles of faith, but a considered, temporary deviation from the strict implementation of the commandments, to prevent the wayward Christian from leaving the Church. The purpose of this concession is to overcome a particular difficult situation with the least possible cost. In this spirit, abortion has sometimes been permitted when the mother’s life is in danger. Even in this case, however, the main operative value is the protection of life and the balancing of numerous factors.

Sexuality and productivity are issues of great concern for Orthodox bioethicists. The Orthodox Church teaches that human sexuality is a divinely given dimension of human life that finds its fulfilment in conjugal relations. Hence artificial insemination techniques are acceptable provided the sperm donor is the husband. Even this case, however, raises ethical questions. The mechanisation of the mystery of life that results from removing the reproductive process from the warm environment of the womb to the cold surround-

ings of the laboratory and its consequences for family unity are major issues for Orthodox ethics.

CONCLUSION

After a brief flashback in history we can conclude to the following remarks:

1. Although the oath itself is not part of a certain ethical theory, it has been widely accepted in Greece as a basic text of Medical Ethics
2. The principles of beneficence and non-maleficence and the protection of the life of the embryo has been the common ground of the oath and the Christian Ethics. This common ground has resulted in the incorporation of the oath to the Christian teachings regarding Medical Ethics. The oath together with Christian anthropology have ever since been the bases of the East Orthodox Church, for the ethical evaluation and approach of every question regarding Medical Ethics and Bioethics.
3. The work of Galen has further reinforced the spirit of the Hippocratican Medicine in Greece regarding both Medicine and Medical Ethics.
4. The transport of the humanitarian ideas of the Enlightenment with the Hippocratican Ideas and the Christian principles have formed the framework of the modern ethical perception of Medical Ethics and Bioethics in Greece.
5. The Hippocratican Ethics have formed the two basic principles of Bioethics mentioned above. In Greece its influences can be found to the Medical Paternalism that still survives even today.

EPILOGUE

After the second world war, Greek society to a great degree followed the social, political, economic and scientific developments in the West. Most of the scientists at the forefront of medical progress in Greece studied in Western Europe or the USA, and thus brought a western outlook to questions of medical ethics and deontology. These are laid down in international treaties and conventions such as those of Geneva, Helsinki and Oviedo, in national legislation and by the academic community in each individual medical school.

However, medical ethics in the West is based on the Western ethic: Western humanism and all it involves. The modern, dominant attitude to ethics is expressed in everyday medical practice though the promotion of the rights of the individual, in this case the patient. Although Greek society has not remained untouched by these developments, it cannot yet claim to be moving steadily towards a less paternalistic approach to medicine. The reasons are many and chiefly have to do with the attitude of the Greek community to the

medical profession, but also with our cultural background, which differs from that of the West. This is a major issue of medical ethics and education, which will have a considerable influence on the doctor-patient relationship, as has already happened in other societies.

Although it is argued that Greek patients lack sophistication and cohesiveness in the doctor-patient relationship, additional studies are needed to assess the sensitivities and needs of the Greek population to issues related to health and its social aspects.

As we look ahead, we are optimistic about our culture's abilities to guide the practice of medicine in ethically acceptable ways. It is especially encouraging that bioethics committees have been established by various bodies, such as ministries, scientific institutes and the Church. Greek culture, grounded as it is in ancient Greek thought on the one hand and the Orthodox Christian tradition on the other, clearly possesses both dynamism and flexibility, and also timeless ethical values. Experience has shown that in Greece ethics have always been both a matter of debate and in a state of evolution.

Adjustment to the new European and also global reality can take place through constructive dialogue between institutions and society. It is essential that the public is well informed, so that it is in a position to debate the ethical challenges posed by scientific advances rather than to passively accept them. The fact that Western societies, despite their considerable differences, have to a great extent the same cultural roots as Greek society, the ancient Greek world and Christianity means that it will be possible to find points of agreement and a common approach to the ethical problems raised by the practice of – especially modern – medicine.

Such an approach to the understanding of ethical problems associated with medical practice may provide, after in-depth analysis of the inevitable cultural differences, a precedent for ethical problem-solving within each nation (Veloyanni – Moutsopoulou & Bartsocas, 1989, pp. 209-234).

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***Oral and Moral Expression in Language Settings -
Implied Dilemmas in Literacy Acquisition:
An empirical phenomenological study of 7- to 9-
Year-Old Greek Children's Ethical Reflection on
Creative Storytelling.***

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines ethical concepts in verbal expression of children through narrative. The subject group of 82 participants (39 girls and 43 boys), were asked to tell their own story about the 'sun' as a story character.

They were all 7-9 years old children from Greece interviewed in school settings and the assembled material was a product of individual interviews in transcribed narration. The method used for the analysis of our data was the Empirical Psychological Phenomenological method. The results consisted of thirteen qualitative different categories of ethical meaning, which were decided by judges providing an image-analysis of the ethical traits and deeds of the heroes involved in children's stories. Implications for the influence of the educational practice of storytelling on the development of children's moral criteria as reflected in their oral language are discussed.

KEY WORDS: *children, ethics, phenomenology, creative storytelling, oral language, teaching.*

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A. INTRODUCTION

I. Aspects of ethical constructs in narrative construct - theoretical approach of our study

Stories as “narrative identities” give options to comprehend our selves in a different context and in that endeavor to find a different perspective on our lives and our former inner experience. The starting point in psychology regarding the study of children and morals is connected with Piaget’s studies on moral judgements conducted during the 1930s (1969, p.32, Atkinson et al., 1996). In his studies Piaget observed and questioned children about the rules of playing marbles. Patterns for judgements on human meaning-making were worked through the presentation of moral dilemmas in story language settings. Subjects such as descriptions of world images were instructed to give solutions to or main subjects for discussion of these story dilemmas. Moreover, specialists gave another option of improvement in universal cognitive issues by which moral development was supposed and expected to develop. Kohlberg explained the development of moral reasoning in a theory of six stages. Kohlberg’s six stages were grouped into three levels: pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional level of moral reasoning. He suggested that children of ten years were only capable of the lowest level (preconventional) of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1976 and 1981). The pre-conventional level of moral reasoning, which is especially common in children, consists of the first and second stages of moral development, and is concerned with the self (ego-centric). Research that resulted from Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s work influenced the study of morals and ethics but was criticised from different sides. Giorgi (1992) suggested that the method had weak points invalidity. The whole method could be considered as an artificial one and absolutely out of how individuals may act in real-life moral situations that are rather difficult. In the case of our study, for example, we could expect children to give different action roles to imaginative heroes, than these that they as story makers would play in real life. He also noticed that “moral life is not to be confused with tests meant to measure certain kinds of abstract (moral) thinking, or with tests that give people a chance to offer hypothetical responses to made-up plots. We never quite know what will happen in this life; nor do we know an event we will connect with ourselves” (Giorgi, 1992:52). His method, though, aims to uncover the meaning of a phenomenon as experienced by a human through the identification of essential themes. A story always involves an event concerning human actions. The human penchant for not being able to relate a story without some manner of reference (explicit or implicit) to one’s earlier

experiences, but creating without retelling them bears some relation to the study. In these terms, which are also the terms of our study, the description of a person is actually of a first-order experiential character. Our challenge as phenomenological researchers is two-fold: To explicate these language dimensions such that the lived world – the real-life world – is reflected upon and to connect the linguistic components with the objects around us, as we perceive them in our experience of our self and our relationships.

The difficulty, when we deal with young children such as those of the age of our subject group is that their language is that of a child, which may pose a dilemma of validity in picking the right words to describe their moral reflections concerning the plot of their stories. Thus, the problem of validity in language forms was a matter that we had to overcome with a concrete study of the author's speech from judges, as we'll illustrate in the following part of this paper.

Psychological research on contemporary aspects of children and storytelling has dealt with how children develop stories as personal images from a sociocultural perspective (Mistry, 1993) and how children's narratives implicate ethics (Pramling et al., 2001). Children's thoughts about morals in relation to their oral language constitute the perspective of our orientation in terms of pedagogical view in this theoretical sequence.

II. Approaches on story-making and teaching about story characters in language settings

An author-oriented approach, which can be labelled ideological, needs to also be mentioned, since it has resulted in considerably more solid theoretical stances. Its foremost proponent is Bakhtin (1990), who, in his essay "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity" introduces some major notions about literacy heroes serving as the author's ethical organ. For Bakhtin heroes and stories are deliberately constructed to express views, and therefore may have little to do with human nature or psychology. Bakhtin, who by no means was a Marxist, views story characters in a different manner from the Marxist ideological and social origin of characters. This seems to have no relation to children's literature and teaching, but it is important to explain the parallels with critics and teacher specialists who view children's books exclusively as educational and ideological vehicles, and consequently their characters as bearers of "right" and "wrong" values.

In traditional children's literature the stories that adults provide young readers with have clear-cut morals and characters that function as mouth-pieces for the author's didactic views. One of the best examples is the cricket

in Pinocchio (Collodi, 1988), treated in criticism as the voice of conscience (see Zipes, 1997).

Dealing with teaching situations places time demands, the course of which may be described and expressed through a story-telling language. This language can be met in different contexts in class, especially in a class of language acquisition with young children (Kemp, 1991) Heroes in children's realistic fiction can be approached in relation to the theoretical model.

The first dilemma in teaching language at school is to consider the teacher as a class coordinator who presents text heroes as mere agents in the plot or as complete psychological beings. This central involvement of theory in discussing literacy heroes is not a new one (Chatman, 1978). Should persons in language textbooks be perceived and analyzed as real, living people or as purely textual constructions? In harmony with each country's curriculum, each educational system either gives guidelines for teachers in teaching language through moral interpretations, just as what takes place in the Norway, or states obligations for a neutral language teaching approach, far away from any moral aims, just as what takes place in England (Stephens, Tonessen & Kyriakou, 2004).

In spite of ethnological and political differences in curriculum approaches, we need to approach global and objective human attitudes towards ethics and childhood in terms of a contemporary need.

Ethics in Education should rather be neutral regarding the components such as the school and the teacher. Certain models of ethical behaviour and action are not encouraged, but there should be presentations of the total picture of optional behaviour and their consequences for particular problems, so that the free choice of students is accomplished in secure criteria. Thus, as far as logic presents the panel of alternative ethical attitudes depending on the conditions, reasons, interest and consequences, the individual must empower his/her ethical status (Karafyllis, 1999, pp.152-154).

The globalization and objectivity of criteria apparent in an ethical theory in terms of educational ethics projects through the work of Wilson (1969), who suggests that the idea of ethical independency for every system on ethics, rules, values or restrictions is also relevant to the feelings and interests of others.

It is rather more complex, if we consider that its connotations are oscillating between imitation and creation whereby "the imitation may be creative, and the creativity imitative" (Melberg, 1996:16). Semiotics as a theory of sign or using signs, including words, gestures, sounds and pictures gives teaching another vehicle to think and communicate in class.

A semiotic approach mandates that if the text offers nothing about Peter Pan's grandparents, for example, we have no reason to speculate about his re-

lationship with them (Scholes & Kellogg, 1966). The mimetic version is more applicable to younger children in terms of Piaget's stages of child development. However, older children can make more complicated semiotic applications of characters to ethical elements in a story plot (see Piaget, 1969).

The issue here is whether teachers are always aware of the approach which has been adopted in texts that they bring in class and moreover how children interpret their readings making comments and build-ing an ethical picture for their favourite or less favourite heroes from their readings. In other words, is it possible for insightful teachers, equipped with sufficient instructional strategies to guide language explorations, so that they develop better readers and more ethical people through the same procedure? The dilemma could be classified as a rhetoric one.

There are also differences between readers of ethical interpretations across time and space, or, in Jauss's terms, a shift in the horizon of expectations. Mark Twain's contemporaries understood their characters in a different sense than children do today (Jauss, 1982, p.34). There have been changes in expectations and values and there have also been revaluations of gender and race (Fish, 1982).

Historical and social context is emphasized in Hochman's (1985) understanding of ethical storytelling view. Young readers in a language class may not be aware of the change in values over time. A child abandonment and abuse, for example, were once acceptable acts in children's literature, but today readers judge this behaviour for a contemporary father by different measures. The societal norms encoded in such adjectives as desirable virtues and beautiful differ considerably both over time and from culture to culture.

As Scholes and Kellogg (1966) suggest: "Characters are concepts in anthropoid form or fragments of the human psyche masquerading as whole human beings. Thus, we are not called upon to understand their motivation as if they were whole human beings but to understand the principles they illustrate through their actions in a narrative framework"(p.88).

Stock characters and round characters are two versions of another dilemma in working on ethics through storytelling. Stock characters are predictable and conventionalized types of human behaviour. Round characters are not typical. They are memorable, unpredictable and more complicated in a psychological study of their appearance and actions. Narration and illustration of contemporary children's books deftly depicts the body language and **the facial expressions** to create a character with a distinct personality and, ultimately, a decidedly un-wolf-like attitude towards others (Temple et al, 2002).

Description, settings of the story and relationship of the characters with other characters in the plot also reveal ethical components in contemporary

narrations (Martinez & Roser, 2003).

Tappan (1992), as a researcher who turned the study focus on morals to different contexts such as moral language, gender, racial, socioeconomic class or cultural components has built **an hermeneutic perspective on studies** of ethical human development. Tappan's point of view is that moralist voices and language are reflected in the inner self so that the child using the silent dialogue of thinking and creating polyphone voices becomes able to 'talk itself' in problem solving (e.g. Tappan, 1992, p.96).

B. THE STUDY

I. Purpose of our Study

The purpose of our study was to examine how ethical outlooks (such as notions of good and bad) are expressed in children's creative storytelling in school settings (age 7-9 years old: second and third grade). We investigate how children perceive notions of bad and good efforts in their story plots, as verbal actions, in terms of their experience of themselves and others.

II. Method- Procedure

In phenomenological approaches we take as a starting point each individual's own experience of the particular phenomenon under study as regards what and how these phenomena occur (Georgi, 1997). There are different methods for phenomenological research regarding the psychological perspectives (Lemon & Taylor, 1998). These have similarities in terms of following a thematic process of analysis so that theoretical implementations can be obtained. Karlsson's (1993, p. 97) **Empirical Phenomenological Psychological Method** (EPP) offers from our point of view a more concrete and descriptive analysis that presents the results in a more authentic form of qualitatively distinct categories (Norlander et al., 2003). In our study we had to follow five steps. These steps were adapted to the particular phenomenon under study (ethical concepts of the children about a hero) and the condition of the material (storytelling and literacy expression). The Sun as an issue of children's narration in the pragmatics of a language approach was in agreement with the environment of the summer camp, where they were asked to construct their stories.

The analysis of this method was used in five steps to treat the material assembled. Since the purpose of the study was to provide information about conceptualizations of ethical meaning in creative storytelling, a phenomenological approach and methodology was deemed the appropriate one.

Procedure in EPP Study:

STEP 1: The researcher selects the material with children's narrations and listens to the stories again and again, keeping notes upon the written transformation of children's speech into text without any changes or omissions from the first narration of the individuals who were involved in the procedure. This reading of the storytelling is performed with focus upon relevant phenomena.

STEP 2: Units of meaning (UM) are distinguished from the material. The stories get divided into smaller linguistic units whereby these units of meaning are identified every time some 'switch in meaning' concerning the ethical study as a phenomenon in children's speech occurs. We should also add here that the meaning units are not considered as elements individually studied but are rather treated as integral parts of the whole language context of the story told.

STEP3: Meaning Units are interpreted with regard to their psychological and pedagogical meaning making. According to Gadamer (1997) we assume the explicit functions of linguistic expression out of the implicit horizons of the story. At this point language of the narratorchild is reformulated to a scientifically applicable language that depends on special psycholinguistic theoretical study.

STEP 4: Meaning Units are combined to make a synopsis. These situated structures may look quite different to the subject of our investigation. This description though brings together "what" and "how" things happen, in other words noesis and noema of the phenomenon in the study procedure. Noesis from the greek word νοῦς, (νόησις) refers to the mind functions of human thought. The word noema which can be translated from the Greek word νόημα as meaning refers to the product of human thinking capacity. The researcher seeks to describe both what the phenomenon is and how it expresses itself.

STEP 5: The meaning units (MUs) turn to general structures of the study, in terms of keeping the meaningful verbal component of the storyteller and thinker in a literacy context. At this stage, the researcher puts the empirical material aside in order to reflect on a more general or abstract demand. The 'situated structures' are shaped to 'typological structures'. This is the stage that Karlsson implies as the researcher's separation from his/her empirical data. . At this stage of data analysis the subjects' daily language is altered by the researcher's language. This alteration is not theory associated (i.e. is not language defined through a certain theory and is not too vague for the needs of the experiment).

In our study, each child was asked to think and create a narrative and tell his/her own story about the sun. They were assigned the task of narrating

about this subject without any other objective than to give a starting point for telling a story. Sun, as a theme, is neutral in terms of cultural characteristics or human traits and was something that we wanted children to know from their life experience. Parents, teachers and books were not involved in the storytelling procedure, as we wanted children to give their ethical connections to the characters of the story and unfold their imaginative plot.

Moreover, children were encouraged to fantasize as much as they wanted to and make their own decision about the duration of the story and about when to stop. They were asked to create a story and not to retell one they had already heard, because the authenticity of the ethical concepts would thus be better accomplished. To make sure that they wouldn't influence each other by hearing each other, they were interviewed individually. They were allowed five minutes to consider their narration. In some cases children asked for more time and they were allowed to think a little more before starting the narration.

Children were interviewed in school settings. Age, name and the story were tape-recorded. As we already mentioned, each child was interviewed individually. This is why the duration of storytelling varied from five to thirty minutes. There were no other adults than the experimenters to observe the procedure or other group storytelling before the experiment; thus, we kept close personal contact with children's ethical concepts.

The children derived from large middle-class areas in Greece. In total there were 82 participants, of whom 39 were girls and 43 were boys. The research took place during the summer of 2002 (summer school camp in Chalkidiki, Northern Greece). The interviews were terminated by allowing each child to listen to a portion of their own recorded material. The interviews were transcribed verbatim.

In order to verify the results of the study, two co-judges were assigned to help the process of categorization from the random collection of 64 MUs. This is not a big number of meaning units considering the method's average in this process. The number, though, ought not to be considered low as the meaning units depend upon the phenomenon of each particular study and ethical categories in children's stories at this age can hardly be obtained for a number of meaning units that are able to correspond in validity of the results. The co-judges obtained 73 percent agreement with the initial categorization, and following three more meetings co-operation was accomplished in order to verify agreement in the communication and definition of each category.

As Kvale (1997) suggests, the validity of studies like this depends upon the degree to which the results are communicated and motivated. The researcher's perspectives and the comparison with other observers' viewpoints

form the validity of the percentage of their agreement. The one reviewer gave a concordance rate of 68 percent with the obtained categorization whereas the other reviewers gave a concordance rate of 76 percent. Following discussions with the reviewers it was found that in fact a consensus of 87 percent regarding the categorization was achieved. Therefore the necessity to obtain context meaning was verified in terms of communicative validity.

C. RESULTS

I. Traits of children's heroes related to ethical characteristics

Children seem to have their own definition for ethical capacity of their story characters to the law and the social obligations. To give a comparative picture, though, it would be useful to present scientific categories of ethical traits, before we pass on to the description that we derived in our study from children's narrations. Kohlberg's (1976) categories of ethical traits focus on:

Pre-conventional level

1-Obedience in order to avoid punishment

2-stage of shared own good and the law of return when you give (self-interest orientation)

Conventional level

3-acceptance of superiority and admiration-interpersonal accord and conformity (the good boy/girl attitude)

4-Authority and social-order maintaining orientation (Law)

Post-conventional level

5-social contract orientation (the greatest good for the greatest number of people)

6-Humanistic values-universal ethical principles (one acts because it is right, not because it is instrumental, legal or expected)

In our study we derived fourteen (13) final categories, with seven subcategories for one of them (about ethics and the relation of a person with others); The subcategorization arose from the nature of the linguistic samples that stories of the children involved in relative and interdependent units of meaning (UM).

Ethical traits in the categories are described above accompanied with examples in relation to gender and frequency of traits in the study's Units of Meaning. As mentioned before, "Thinking of stories about a character related

with the Sun” was the first demand which led to the children’s narrative responses.

II. Presentation of the Categories and examples

1-Hyperbatic action in terms of **logical control** and **ethical decision** of the heroes

They dare to do when others are afraid. They put themselves in danger and have crazy adventures and do not do ordinary and logical things. They are helpful.

(Category: **Good heroes related to: transcendental behaviour / words, extraordinary, nerve, being risky**)

52 MU, 27 boys and 25 girls

Example:

“Anny the Sunny had to give her last ray as she promised coastguard. She didn’t think of herself. But afterwards she got very sick and the whole world felt cold and lonely. She thought that if she did nothing she would die and the earth would die with her. So Anny, the Sunny, came up with an idea. She visited the land of fire, her place of birth where all the suns live and her friends gave her new rays...”

2-The heroes (The Sun in our case and in various forms depending on each child’s perception of the hero) do the right thing because:

They know what and how to do better than anyone else

(Category: **Knowledge, capability and ethical behaviour**)

36 MU, 23 from boys and 13 from girls

Example

Sun Antonio, the handsome prince of wherever knows everything. You have to go and tell your problem There, said the little cat to the mouse. The sun is the most wise man in the universe...

3-They feel free to do something, although others are obstacles for his decision-independent personality-They don’t always obey to rules, when rules are not fair, and they fight for survival

(Category: **Virtue and independence, offence and reasoning, deviation, obedience**)

41 MU, 25 girls and 16 boys

Example

“What will your Sun parent say, when he finds out the light is stolen from his treasure tree box and he learns you gave it to save some blind stars of another

country?”, I am a grown up sun, little bird, I know what the right thing is and I am not afraid of anyone. Let’s go, said the sun to the bird.

4-Ethical persons are strong and fight to provide justice

(Category: **Physical strength, spiritual power, fair-minded, right, justice**)

59 MU, 30 boys 29 girls

Example

“I can’t fight the Sun. He has won every race as far as I know. He is burning, I can not even look at his streams, his muscles are shining ready to punch my nose.”, Said the noisy nose of the hurricane Katrina.

“Katrina is a bad Hurricane. She brings disaster to the house of the poor. Rich people don’t need her help. Only the sun can judge her crimes. And the trial will be held right here.

5-Ethical persons are smart and have brilliant ideas

(Category: **Intelligence-creativity and virtue**)

29 MU, 16 boys and 13 girls

Example

One day the sun went to the riverside. There he found that the air had drunk all the water and the poor fish were almost dying. ‘Show me that you can blow strong enough so as to move the lake’s water back into the river, said the clever sun. The wind was ready to show up; everybody knew him to. Ok, said the wind and blew. So the sun left happy. His idea had saved the fish and he didn’t do anything more than play with the wind.

6-Ethical persons do the right thing mostly for other people’s shake, for global good-their altruistic behaviour is uncommon

(Category: **Virtue and being helpful for humanity, altruism**)

38 MU, 17 boys and 21 girls

Example

It’s not fair said the Sun. The Moon didn’t understand why. Then the sun explained: “Look at me; I am not expecting anyone to give me his light. I am different than the other stars. I give all the light I have. And I don’t ask for anything. It’s not fair to hide for such a long time. You must understand we are important in the sky. I have to save the world, because the dark and the cold will make animals die. And the ships will never find their way, if I don’t help. You have to help, too. Please”, the sun said. The moon said ok and they became friends forever. Since then the sun gives light in the morning, the moon at night.

7-Ethical persons and other - attitudes towards others: There are seven more subcategories

(Category: **Attitude towards others**)

52 MU, 28 boys, 24 girls

* *Examples for each subcategory:*

7a-they are **generous**

...the spider was ready to go without saying goodbye. She was ashamed because she pretended to be the sun and lied to the little flies. But the sun stopped her. He took the spider in his arms and made her web shine like himself. ...You see, said to the flies. The spider's web looks like the sun, now. I'll stay with her, Spider, I give you light presents. Just let the flies go, and ...I'll be your friend forever, whenever you need me, ok?

7b-They **forgive**

You didn't know that the wolf is coming and you went out to play on the hill. I'll tell the farmer to for-give you, because you are good kids. Go and tell him you are sorry. In the evening they went to the farmer. But the sun wasn't there. They were afraid. But they did it. They said "We are sorry" and left. The wolf didn't show up ever again. The sun was right.

7c-They **share**

On the way to school, Apollo lost his breakfast. He was hungry. And he didn't know what to tell the teacher. He didn't want to go without meal. The Sun from the sky saw him without his bag: I'll give you half of mine. We don't have to tell the others about it, he said to his friend. That's how Sun and Apollo are friends and share the light and everything.

7d-They are not **jealous, they don't hate , no envy**

I don't know how to play this game, but this is not a reason to take it from you and break it. I like watching. "Do you want to play with us? The girl said.

7e-They feel **superior**

I am the king of the stars; I give my light to the dark sides of your ground. I won't wonder around like this any more. I could have more complains, but I don't like complaining. Let's go out and play again.

7f-They have a sense of **humour**

Then he got an idea. He told them one of the jokes he knew and everybody stopped crying. And the rain stopped.

8-They **punish**, to treat situations in justice, not for revenge without reason.

(Category: **Punishment and reward**)

Found in 19 MU, 10 boys and 9 girls

Example

We made a deal said the crocodile, the son of Sun. Now you have to do as we said. The punishment is to stay out of the jungle.

... The little elephant told the truth. And came when we said the elephant will become the king of the jungle.

9-They are honest, and keep their promise

(Category: **Credible- reliability**)

In 28 MU 13 boys and 15 girls

Example

Well, if he said he will help, he will come. Don't be afraid, said the eagle to the tree. "The sun is a good friend. You can count on him. Just wait..."

10-They feel love and care for others, especially the weak heroes

(Category: *Caring, protective*)

41 MU, 21 Boys 20 girls

Example

The tiger wanted to eat the little frog. But the sun sent a strong ray of his sword lights and the tiger became blind for a while. The frog jumped in the river and saved himself. But it was the sun, the frog's friend that saved his life for one more time. Then he showed all the way back home to the lost tiger.

11-Good heroes don't cheat, they always tell the truth. When they do, their purpose is not to harm, but to help and give justice.

(Category: **Honesty and truth**)

31 MU, 17 boys and 14 girls

Example

We have to give the money back, they don't belong to us. ...The court decided to call the Sun and ask about the little cat. "It was night, I wasn't there, said the sun. But I know this cat. She is a good cat". The sun smiled to the cat and asked for forgiveness. I can't tell I saw you, I wasn't there. But don't worry, I have an idea...

12-People admire ethical heroes and they are popular, they have friends. At the end, their real friends prove to be rather rare. But they have good friends, even though they don't know at first. Ethical heroes need friends and sometimes they are vulnerable. From time to time, they feel abandoned but they don't trust others easily without reasoning.

(Category: **Friendship**)

48 MU, 24 boys and 24 girls

Examples

-The sun has an open eye, like the Cyclops. But he has only friends. Not like Odysseus. The sun is my friend, too. Once I almost fell in a hole with water near

my home. But The Sun sparkled in the water of the hole. And I didn't fall. Thanks, Sun...er.. ..

-...The sun is everywhere at the same time, that's why everybody knows him, he is like god. Everybody wants to be his friend. In Greece we are better friends with the sun. He is here most of the time. But in other places, no. Africa is a close friend of sun, too.

13-The end of an ethical hero is mostly good for all.

(Category: **Circular solution –Happily ending stories**) Motives of stories: **Circular- Home /safe environment for a start –safe ending through interrupting dangerous episodes of an adventure**)

59 MU, 28 boys, 31 girls

Examples

-The sun lived at this side...He is alive now. East is the name of his home. But he doesn't stay at home. He has so many friends. He visits all of them every day... At night, he goes back home to sleep on the other side. He is tired every night, and sleeps well. I Think he turns down the west path up in the sky, you see? .Up there. And he lived well...

-And it was a very hot and strong sun. It tore at it, the other star... "The sun is really stupid even the sea can turn his light down. But the sun put a bomb to the bad stars and relieved the good planets from threats. They lived happily ever after.

III. Discussion

Children in tasks of literacy acquisition such as narration and storytelling demonstrate a multitude of ethical expressions. Even the children of eight and nine years that took part in the experiment in school settings, remain at a level in which their knowledge about ethical behavior is multifaceted. It is apparent that some categories in our study are related.

Children's language is not free of moral comments and ethics of characters in their storytelling reflect their concepts about human behavior. From the children's point of view, to be an ethical person consists mostly of helping others or behaving altruistically, as the opposite of selfish behavior. Contemporary ethics of children seem to have changed in comparison with findings of similar researches on children's concepts of ethics (e.g. Kohlberg, 1981). They don't prefer, as we will see, "obedience" and the fear of "punishment" as a reason for being good any more. They mostly project "independence" and taking "risks" as more preferable components than 'obedience' to an ethical behavior.

The last category involving the circular exploration of the character from

home out to the world and all the way back home may be compared or related to the psychological content of Bowlby's attachment theory (Bowlby, 1995). This theory suggests that the child's starting point in narration is from a person with whom he or she is in regular interplay with in discovering the world. The assigned or attachment figure provides the secure settings of the base from which the unknown environment may be searched and end in the experience of a good life.

Further research on the ethical reflection of children ought to examine other linguistic settings such as story-writing instead of storytelling and other literacy approaches in class at different school or family environments, in verbal context with younger and older children.

Children's judgments about the good and the bad, their reasoning in relation to the characters of the story involve their previous experience of ethical dilemmas (such as stories told to them with moral judgments, comments of adults, especially parents, in a familiar environment). Experiences are structured through children's formulations of the ethical traits with the aid of primary qualities such as altruism, generosity, strength, potentiality. There were no prominent differences between Greek boys and girls.

In the children's narratives the first category of behavior of the main character of the story moves from uniformity to being special. We found fifty-two units of meaning concerning this certain dilemma of endeavors where heroes put themselves in danger in order to feel special. This certain category can be related to the last one which also has many units of ethical meaning concerning adventure and effort from safe to risky episodes with the aim of obtaining safety in terms of ethical action. Ethical action as a component of moving from boring usual life to risky and extraordinary choices and adventures of the hero seems to be the most profound category in our study.

Risky persons and right persons are met in one character. Special heroes do the right thing with actions that cause the surprise to others. A lot can be said on this finding and a more concrete search of children's experiences from television, readings and close discussions on stereotypes could avoid pitfalls and dangers of oversimplifying or reinforcing stereotypes on ethical shapes.

Another interesting category to be discussed has to do with the ideal viewpoint of children's preference (36 MU) to heroes who know how to do things and find solutions to difficult situations (2nd category). The number of units concerning knowledge was important, but not as much as the physical power and muscular strength involved in traits (59), as we can assume, for example, from the study results of the 4th category.

Children correlate power to ethical traits more than intelligence alone. In other words, they choose their heroes to be strong and smart rather than to be

just smart. They also refer to physical strength in more units of meaning which can be explained through the picture that they have for themselves at this age. Young children wish to become big and strong as soon as possible. This tension can be projected in their ideal pictures of characters as highly valued in storytelling. Other components such as the cultural shaping of cognitive abilities and attitudes toward ethical behavior need further investigation.

The third category of independent traits and the dilemma between doing the right thing to avoid punishment and doing the right thing even though the hero risks to be punished because of his/her fair behavior, is also interesting and needs to be compared to the eighth category (punishment and reward).

On the basis of this study we assume that children prefer the independent person than the obedient person in more units (41 versus 19). Thus, in most cases the storytellers imply that independence is a sequence of reasonable choices of persons involved in the episodes of the story.

Justice and altruism are prevalent and valued on a frequent basis in children's narratives. This is profound in the fourth category (59 MUs) and the sixth one (38) where young children express the good motives of the hero in good actions for global use. Even half of the units studied mentioned the good for others or the world as a total form, as more important than the good for individual profit. However, this finding (52 MUs) may be false because the sun as a starting point for a story telling involves general rather than particular schemas in action.

A more secure finding can be illustrated from the next category, the seventh (7th), which gives the opportunity for discussion on particular components in children's language through a process of clarification and refinement with subcategories. Generosity, forgiveness, sharing, superiority, mental flexibility as human traits are clear in children's preferences for this category. The sense of humor (MUs: 17) is portrayed as a substantial element of a 'good' hero's traits (Subcategory 7f). This can be considered as a cluster of great value, which is involved in the solution of the story's ending (see also the last category, 13th). It may be considered as a typical trait that children adjust to the ideal picture of a person.

To a degree the same suggestion can be adjusted to the preference of children to have their good heroes taking good care of weak and non-main characters of the story. Protection of weak people is mentioned in 41 units, which is a secure portion of validity in the study.

A certainly important virtue discussed in the stories is the dilemma of choosing between truths and lies. Although truth is involved in straight preference, lies can be involved in good traits for the hero's achievement and the good result at the end of the story (something must be accomplished to attain

the desired effect, which is the right and pleasant ending of the plot).

The issue of friendship seems to be involved in “good” values for the created hero’s behavior. (48 MUs). This category can be discussed with regard to the last category, which we have already mentioned as the most interesting and common in our study. A lot can be said about this category from a cultural point of view. The culture observed and the particular social influences to children’s concepts of the right behavior places great value on praising and rewarding children for their participation and accomplishment both in school and in society. It would be a sad irony or an incomplete study of the research project we present here, if we didn’t take into account social, cultural and psychological integral parts of children’s emotional and mental exposure to this linguistic study.

The most important factor in the critique of the development of the study is to keep aware of how linguistic functions and storytelling can shape and reflect children’s values from childhood to adulthood as a cognitive filter for ethical dilemmas with methods that teachers encourage when teaching oral language. When we ask or listen to children’s stories about their heroes, we make decisions on moral components through ethical reflection. Interruption of speech in storytelling and guided storytelling through asking questions may change the determination of children’s meaning making. Teaching linguistic approaches in terms of intellectual styles imply ethical styles, since narration is involved in language communication and language social or cultural dynamics. Children’s and adult’s storytelling is always part of this consideration.

Finally, once alerted to the possibilities of self-directed speech as an intellectual style, it becomes possible to see this study in terms of proceeding validity of the children’s literacy. Teachers of language classes should be aware of the intellectual styles (Zhang & Sternberg, 2005) in educational settings involving ethical approaches and learning contexts. This sort of studies raises fewer ethical and political dilemmas for the researcher because of their theoretical nature, since theory is dealing with textual analysis of speech. In contrast to scientific study, practice in literacy education is a more complicated task as it is a contemporaneous incidence with school life. Therefore, investigation on ethical units of meaning is constructed and occurs every minute that language is used from practitioners in school settings.

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“Towards an Ethic without Dogma” and “Moral Forces” Two perennial works by Argentinian psychiatrist, philosopher, and ardent champion of reason José Ingenieros

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ABSTRACT

Argentinian psychiatrist José Ingenieros (1877-1925), Professor of Experimental Psychology at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Buenos Aires, is the author of one of the earliest works in biological psychology (1910). Physician, philosopher, and political activist, Ingenieros was the first psychologist in South America who tried to establish a comprehensive system based on developmental, evolutionary and sociogenetic biopsychology and on positivist philosophy. The impressive list of his publications includes 47 books and 484 articles, generally divided into two chronological periods: studies in mental pathology and criminology (1897-1908) and studies in philosophy, psychology and sociology (1908-1925). The present article presents a synopsis of his works Towards an Ethic without Dogma, and Moral Forces, two of his fundamental contributions to the field of Ethics.

KEY WORDS: *Ethics; Positivism; Biopsychology; History of science*

“Es giebt gar keine moralischen Phänomene, sondern nur eine moralische Ausdeutung von Phänomenen”²

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2 [There are no moral phenomena at all, just a moral interpretation of phenomena]. F. Nietzsche, (1886). *Jenseits von Gut und Böse. Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft*. Leipzig: C. G. Naumann.

INTRODUCTION

José Ingenieros (Fig. 1), one of Argentina's most estimable intellectuals, continues to be a highlyread author in Latin America and a luminary for generations. His writings touch on politics, philosophy, neurology, psychiatry, psychology, criminology, history, critical essay, morals and sociology (Editorial, 1925; P. Ingegnieros, 1927; Taiana, 2005; Triarhou & del Cerro, 2006).

Ingenieros is credited with the first attempt in South America to establish a biological psychology almost a century ago (Ingegnieros, 1910). His synthetic scheme of psychology was weaved from positivist philosophy, with a heavy emphasis on the science of experience, and the principles of physical chemistry, indicting psychic phenomena at ontogenetic, evolutionary and sociogenetic levels (Ingegnieros, 1911; Ingenieros, 1913).

"Giuseppe Ingegnieros" was born on 24 April 1877 in Palermo, Sicily. (The name was "castillianized" to José Ingenieros for his European publications from 1912 onwards.) The family moved to Montevideo, Uruguay, some time after 1880 and settled in Buenos Aires in September 1885. A child prodigy at age 7, Ingenieros completed his primary education at "Catedral al Norte" and



Fig. 1. Dr. José Ingenieros (1877-1925).

in 1888 was enrolled in the “Colegio Nacional Central de Buenos Aires”, obtaining the baccalaureate in 1892. His father, a journalist, had a book-shop, and urged José from early on to read, write, and translate English, Italian and French texts.

In 1897 Ingenieros earned a degree in Pharmacy from the University of Buenos Aires and in 1900 he graduated from Medical School.

PROFESSIONAL LIFE

In 1904 the National Academy of Medicine of Buenos Aires awarded Ingenieros the gold medal (Premio de la Academia de Medicina) for best medical work published nationwide, for his book *Simulation in the Struggle for Life*, his doctoral thesis – where he affirmed that the struggle of the classes is one of the manifestations of the struggle for life – and *Simulation of Madness*. Those two works, combined into a single 500-page long book (Ingenieros, 1903), are probably the first South American book on feigned insanity. A Greek translation of the first of these works was published in Athens (Ingenieros, 1923).

Ingenieros began his professional career in nervous and mental pathology. He became Head of the Clinic of Nervous Diseases (Clínica de Enfermedades Nerviosas) of the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Buenos Aires and Chief of the Service of Observation of the Mentally Ill at Argentina’s Federal Police (Servicio de Observación de Alienados de la Policía Federal Argentina).

In 1904 Ingenieros substituted as Professor of Psychology at the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the University of Buenos Aires. In 1908 he was appointed to the Chair of Experimental Psychology in the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters. That same year he founded the *Sociedad de Psicología*; its first President was the eminent researcher Horacio G. Piqero, who in 1900 had established the first Psychological Laboratory in the University of Buenos Aires. Ingenieros was elected President of the Argentina Medical Association in 1909 and President of the Society of Psychology in 1910.

In May 1911 the Council of the Faculty of Medicine nominated him unanimously for the Chair of Legal Medicine. However, the President of Argentina at the time (Sáenz-Peña) vetoed the nomination and instead appointed the second runnerup. That episode caused Ingenieros to openly express his anger against the President in a public letter, considering such an act as government immorality. He distributed his books among friends and institutions, and went on a selfimposed exile to Europe from 1911-1914, returning to Buenos Aires only after Peña’s death.

During the University reform that took place in Argentina after World War I, Ingenieros became Vice Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters, but soon resigned from all his teaching and administrative posts at the University of Buenos Aires in 1919. In the same year Ingenieros accepted an interview with President Hipólito Yrigoyen – who had won the elections with his Radical Party when the secret ballot was introduced in 1916, beginning a 14-year period in government – for exchanging opinions on the social and political crisis that the country was experiencing. An account of the encounter was written by his daughter Delia Ingenieros de Rothschild, under the pseudonym Delia Kamia (1957).

In 1920 Ingenieros adhered to the progressive group *Claridad*, which Anatole France and other intellectuals had founded in France. In his 1921 work *Los Tiempos Nuevos* he defended the Bolshevik Revolution and was critical of the intervention policy of the United States in Latin America. In 1922 he proposed the foundation of the Latin American Union (Editorial, 1923), and three years later he co-authored, with Alfredo L. Palacios, the founding act of *Unión Latinoamericana*.

PHILOSOPHICAL NATURALISM AND EVOLUTIONARY POSITIVISM

“Positivism” was a philosophical stance comprising scientific, deterministic, psychological, evolutionary, biological and sociological topics. Positivists admired Darwin and prized Comte and Spencer as their philosophical heroes. Preference for one or the other gave rise to evolutionary or social positivist accounts, respectively. Positivists rejected a priori intuitive methodologies and praised science as providing the most reliable knowledge about humans and the universe, and tried to produce syntheses of scientific findings in which they elucidated the nature of physical, biological, psychological and social phenomena (Rabossi, 2003).

The number of Latin American positivist thinkers is large, and their extraction and importance diverse; it is generally agreed that Ingenieros, along with Venezuelan-Chilean Andrés Bello (1781-1865) and Cuban Enrique José Varona (1849-1933) were among the most original and influential ones. Other important positivists in Latin America were Gabino Barreda (1820-1881) and Luis Villoro (b. 1922) of México and Carlos Vas Verreira (1871-1958) of Uruguay (Gracia & Millán, 1995).

The list of original pieces produced during the positivist period by Latin American philosophers includes Ingenieros’s *Psicología Genética* (Ingenieros, 1911) and *Psicología Biológica* (Ingenieros, 1913). Ingenieros helped introduce to Argentina Auguste Comte’s positivism (Corsini, 2002). Evolu-

tionary positivism gained particular popularity among several scientists at the University of Buenos Aires, including Ramos-Mejía, palaeontologist Florentino Ameghino, sociologist Carlos Octavio Bunge, and Ingenieros, who exercised considerable influence although they did not formally found a school (Martí, 1998).

In his *Genetic Psychology*, Ingenieros begins as a committed evolutionist, but admits the need for improvement, feeling that inductivism neglects the speculative aspect of science. As a solution, in his book *Propositions on the Future of Philosophy*, a programme to define philosophy along scientific positivist lines), he proposes an experiential metaphysics that could generate future scientific hypotheses (Ingenieros, 1918). *Propositions* is one of his most original works; in it, Ingenieros exposes a version of positivism that made metaphysics possible. He maintains that it is possible to recognize, in all form of experience, an “experiential remainder” (*residuo experiencial*) that is not unknowable, although it does not have a transcendental character.

TOWARDS AN ETHIC WITHOUT DOGMA

In 1917 Ingenieros occupied, due to a temporary absence of Dr. Rodolfo Rivarola, the Chair in the Department of Ethics, and worked towards developing the definitive form of his book *Hacia una Moral sin Dogmas* (Ingenieros, 1917), which he revised two years later (Ingenieros, 1919a, 1962a). In that work he made an attempt to ground ethics on idealism and evolutionary theory and pursued an idealism that can be only justified in evolutionary terms. At the time of the second publication, he also wrote a brief essay on the moral of Ulysses (Ingenieros, 1919b). *Hacia una Moral* was posthumously translated into Portuguese (Ingenieros, 1957a), while it is still in print in Argentina to date (Ingenieros, 2002).

From an ethical viewpoint, *Hacia una Moral* is a strong and contagious affirmation of optimism (Van Der Karr & Basile, 1977). Fagg (1969) calls Ingenieros “a skeptic”, but this can be misleading, if not false, as irony and materialism can be confounded with skepticism and pessimism. Nevertheless, Ingenieros does have a dogma that at times appears fanatic: this particular work of his is a hymn to work, civilized life, and progress (Blanco, 1925).

In his 1917 Preface, Ingenieros wrote: “These lessons on Emerson and ethicism were given in June of 1917 in the Chair of Ethics of Professor Rodolfo Rivarola. The Philosophy and Letters Student Center has had the kindness of providing me with a tachygraphic version, expressing the desire for me to publish them; such a happy circumstance allows me to save this part of the invisible work in which all we professors consume our activity. To correspond

better to the benevolent, which is also my desire, because I have never spoken to my students on topics that do not interest me, I have revised the text, partially rewriting it, festinantis calami, and intercalating in it certain fragments, which I could only allude to by the measure of time. Some reader may notice frequent parenthetical remarks on incidental themes; as long as we speak without having that happy memory which constitutes the secret of good improvisers, we are condemned to such unexpected hilarities. And when we see in writing that which we speak, we are surprised at our incapacity to speak the way we write. If the reader is a friend, his affection will dispense of such slips during the reading and will pass from height the certain imperfection of style, which is only clear.”

In the revised second edition of 1919, he indicated that “Friendly suggestions have induced me to slightly rearrange the contents of this volume; several fragments of the text appear reunited in a first chapter or lesson, with the intention of clarifying the main ideas, facilitating the reading of the set.”

The following is an outline of the subject matter of *Hacia una Moral sin Dogmas*.

Dogmatism and experience – I. What is dogma? II. The revealed dogmas. III. The rational dogmas. IV. The social character of moral experience. V. The relativity of knowing excludes dogmatism. VI. The general results of moral experience

Emerson and his medium – I. A moralist. II. The puritan surroundings. III. Channing and Emerson. IV. Deception of the philosophical mode. V. Transcendentalism. VI. Moral geography of the United States. VII. Sarmiento and Horacio Mann. VIII. Life in Concord. IX. Emerson and Sarmiento

Moral orientations – I. An ethic without metaphysics. II. The critique of customs. III. Necessity of firm characters. IV. Non-conformism and obedience. V. Pantheism. VI. Naturalist ethic. VII. Optimism and perfectibility. VIII. Confidence. IX. The beautiful nonsense. X. Social function of non-conformism.

Social ethic – I. Integration of Emersonian thought. II. The autonomy of moral experience. III. Idealism and perfectibility. IV. Theological dogmatism precludes perfectibility. V. Social value of heresy. VI. Social ethic in the North American Churches. VII. Its influence on immigradas Churches. VIII. Solidarism.

Towards an ethic without dogma – I. The independence of morality. II. A free religious association. III. Societies of moral culture in the United States. IV. Some antecedents of English ethicism. V. The ethical churches. VI. The religious cult of morality. VII. Spontaneity and evolution of morality. VIII. Synthesis of ethicist thought. IX. The future of ethicism.

Ingenieros emphasizes the following main points: “I believe that from contemporary ethics four general conclusions can be inferred, independent of all dogmatism. They are not antecedent, but resulting from experience.

1. *The naturalness of ethics* – Moral experience develops naturally in human societies, as a necessary condition of the relationships between the individual and society.
2. *The autonomy of ethics* – Moral experience is not conditioned by revealed dogma neither by rational dogma, tending to emancipate itself of them in the future.
3. *The perfectibility of ethics* – Moral experience is not limited by revelation neither by reason, it is perfected as a function of social experience, tending to adapt to its incessantly variable and renewing conditions without ceasing the value judgments on which obligation and sanction are based.
4. *The sovereignty of ethics* – Life in society demands social obligation and the collective fulfillment of justice as a social sanction.

To explain in which way those principles are inferred from moral experience itself, I shall depart, deliberately, from the classic and textbook methods. I shall not be occupied with discussing doctrines, neither arguing with dialectic ability, not even exhibiting the impressive erudition with which mental hollowness is often filled.

I shall study, genetically, a given cycle of the moral experience: its apostle, the society in which it is effected, its immediate influence, the distant echo of its doctrines and their relationship with other similar contemporary doctrines. Thus, step by step, we shall follow the enunciated conclusions – naturalness, autonomy, perfectibility, and sovereignty of moral experience – take shape.”

MORAL FORCES

In *Las Fuerzas Morales*, written in 1925 (Fig. 2) and published posthumously, Ingenieros (1962b) ultimately states that he hopes to spur the young people on to discover their own ideals. One hundred maxims, in groups of three under the respective headings, are analyzed in the original book in a few paragraphs each. To our knowledge, this is the first English translation to be published of the maxims from *Las Fuerzas Morales*.

MORAL FORCES

1. Humanity is incessantly transmuted

OF YOUTH

2. Young are those who do not have a complicity with the past
3. Youth is the moral ferment of the people
4. The young sound the alarm to every generation

OF WORK

- 17. The right to life is conditional upon the duty of work
- 18. Work is the emancipator of personality
- 19. The organization of work is the foundation of social harmony

OF SYMPATHY

- 20. Sympathizing is understanding
- 21. Sympathy is goodness in action
- 22. Understanding is a premise of justice

OF JUSTICE

- 23. Justice is the equilibrium between what is moral and what is right
- 24. Created interests obstruct justice
- 25. The righteous man avoids complicity in evil

OF SOLIDARITY

- 26. Solidarity is harmony that emerges from justice
- 27. Social imbalance generates violence
- 28. Solidarity grows in direct proportion to justice

OF INQUIETUDE

- 29. Intellectual pursuits reveal the seeds of renovation
- 30. Every renovation attempt leaves a favorable balance for society
- 31. The possible good is reached by looking for the better impossible

OF REBELLIOUSNESS

- 32. Rebelling is affirming a new ideal
- 33. The spirit of rebelliousness emancipates of dogmatic imperatives
- 34. Intellectual rebelliousness is eternal and creative

OF PERFECTION

- 35. In everything that exists act forces of perfection
- 36. Perfectibility is a privilege of youth
- 37. The road of perfection is living as if the ideal was reality

OF FIRMNESS

- 38. The service of an ideal must be rectilinear
- 39. Firmness is steel for the word and diamond for the conduct
- 40. The one who doubts his moral forces is won

OF DIGNITY

- 41. The young without moral path are noxious to society
- 42. It is not worth joining in the crumbs from the table of the powerful
- 43. Moral independence is the underpinning of dignity

OF DUTY

- 44. Moral forces converge in the sentiment of duty
- 45. Duty is a corollary of life in society
- 46. Passive obedience is the negation of duty

OF MERIT

- 47. Rank is only just a sanction of merit
- 48. Moral servitude is the price of the unjust rank
- 49. Merit can be measured by the resistances it causes

OF TIME

- 50. Valorizing time intensifies life
- 51. Each activity is a repose of others
- 52. Fecund action demands continuity in effort

OF STYLE

- 53. There is style in all forms that express a thought with loyalty
- 54. Mandatory correction is the negation of the original style
- 55. Originality is revealed in all forms of expression

OF GOODNESS

- 56. There is no kindness without active tension towards virtue
- 57. Goodness is no norm without action
- 58. Wherever injustice is diminished, goodness is augmented

OF MORAL

- 59. Morality renews itself as social experience
- 60. Dogmas are obstacles to moral perfection
- 61. In every renovation appear seeds of new morality

OF RELIGION

- 62. Collective beliefs are idealized in the function of culture
- 63. Morality is in reason the inverse of superstition
- 64. Faith is the passion of serving an ideal

OF TRUTH

- 65. The love for truth culminates among moral forces
- 66. Superstitions perpetuate hatred and injustice
- 67. Every moral progress is the triumph of a truth over a superstition

OF SCIENCE

- 68. The sciences are systems of truth each time less imperfect
- 69. Human knowledge unfolds as a function of experience
- 70. Scientific spirit excludes any principle of authority

OF THE IDEAL

- 71. Ethical ideals are a matter of perfection
- 72. Every idealist moral contains a prevision of the future
- 73. Perfectibility is an incessant renovation of ideals

OF EDUCATION

- 74. Education is the art of enabling man for social life
- 75. The free unfolding of vocations concurs with society
- 76. Social education must stimulate individual inequalities

OF SCHOOL

- 77. School is a bridge between home and society
- 78. School life must prepare for civic action
- 79. School does not fit in the narrow limits of the classroom

OF THE TEACHER

- 80. All human beings can teach others what they know
- 81. Educational interests must be conducted by educators themselves
- 82. Educational work implies the gravest social responsibility

OF HISTORY

- 83. Living history is a school of renovation
- 84. Each generation owes to rethink history
- 85. All future time will be better

OF PROGRESS

- 86. Social variation is the active work of thinking minorities
- 87. Social inheritance is passive resistance of the unconscious majorities
- 88. Progress is a result of the struggle between variation and inheritance

OF THE FUTURE

- 89. The present is the past of the future
- 90. The forgers of the future are fictitious
- 91. Nations without youth have no future

OF TERRAIN

- 92. Terrain is the motherland of the heart
- 93. True patriotism limits itself to the geographical horizon
- 94. Love for the terrain is a natural imperative

OF NATION

- 95. Nation is the motherland of civil life
- 96. National patriotism extends itself to the political horizon
- 97. Work and culture are the pillars of nationality

OF HUMANITY

- 98. Humanity is the motherland of the ideal
- 99. Human patriotism encompasses cultural horizon
- 100. Harmony of the people is the entelechy of humanity

POSTLUDE

During the 30 years of his exuberant productivity, between 1895 and 1925, Ingenieros cofounded with Ramos-Mejía, at the suggestion of de Veyga, and held the editorship of *Archivos de Criminología, Medicina Legal y Psiquiatria* from 1902 until 1913 (Ingenieros, 1914), founded and edited the *Revista de Filosofía* from 1915 until 1929 (Ingenieros & Ponce, 1999), and authored 47 books and 484 articles (Ingenieros, 1962c). His complete works (*Obras Completas*) were published in 1957 in 20 volumes by Elmer Editor in Buenos Aires (Ingenieros, 1957b) and in 1962 in 8 volumes by Mar Océano (Ingenieros, 1962c).

José Ingenieros succumbed to complications of meningitis on the morning of 31 October 1925 in his house in Buenos Aires. He was 48 years old. With this last act culminated his anticipated desire in *Las Fuerzas Morales*, “to have the happiness of dying before aging”.

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**DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNIVERSITY OF CRETE**

**HEAD OF DEPARTMENT
GALANIS GEORGIOS
(Since 30/6/2004)
Professor of Social Psychology**

2005-2006

ACADEMIC CALENDAR ACADEMIC STAFF 2005 - 06*Professors*

Galanis Georgios
Nestoros Ioannis
Riga Anastasia-Valentini

Associate Professors

Sideridis Georgios
Simos Panayiotis

Assistant Professors

Hatira Kalliopi
Kafetsios Konstantinos
Karademas Evaggelos
Kastellakis Andreas
Kokkinaki Theano
Marvakis Athanasios
Panagis Georgios
Triliva Sofia

Lecturers

Giovazolias Theodoros
Mascha Ekaterini
Nikolopoulos Dimitrios
Poulou Maria
Vallianatou Nionia

Specialized Laboratory and Teaching Staff (EEΔIII)

Kontoroussis-Karageorge Anna

Adjunct Professors

Leontopoulou Sofia
Economou Elias
Triantafillou Theoni

Former Academic Staff

Chantzi Alexandra (Lecturer of Social Psychology, 1992-1993)
 Kanakakis Georgios (Assistant Professor of Psychotherapy, 1992-1993)
 Kandas Aristotelis (Assistant Professor of Social Psychology, 1988-1993)
 Kougiumoutzakis Ioannis (Associate Professor of Developmental Psychology, 1994-2000)
 Mellon Robert (Assistant Professor of Experimental Psychology, 2002-2005)
 Papadopoulos Nikolaos (Professor of General Psychology, 1987-2003)
 Pourkos Marios (Assistant Professor of School Psychology, 1992-2001)
 Velli Theoni (Assistant Professor of Experimental Psychology, 1992-1997)

Specialized Technicians and Laboratory Staff

Kandilis Georgios
 Kougitaki Marianna

Departmental Secretaries

Head-Secretary
 Chronopoulou Natalia

Secretarial Staff

Kougitaki Marianna

Undergraduate Students

During the 2005-2006 academic year 426 students (74 male and 352 female) registered in the Department of Psychology, grouped in the table below according to their year of studies.

Student register grouped according to academic year and gender			
YEAR	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
A	14	104	118
B	16	81	97
Γ	22	79	101
Δ	22	88	110
TOTAL	74	352	426

Graduates

70 students graduated from the Department of Psychology during the 2005-2006 academic year.

Postgraduate students

There are currently 17 postgraduate students, specializing in: Health Psychology (10 students) and School Psychology (7 students) in the department of Psychology.

PhD Candidates

5 PhD theses are currently in progress in the Department of Psychology.

Doctoral Graduates

11 PhD theses have been successfully completed so far in the Department of Psychology. The full list of doctoral graduates is as follows:

1. Menoutis Vasileios
2. Petroulaki Kiriaki
3. Tsourtou Vasiliki
4. Zganzouri Konstantina
5. Triantafillidou Sofia
6. Kalaitzaki Argiroula
7. Triandafillou Theoni
8. Karagouni Kleoniki
9. Demonakou Sofia
10. Viki Agni
11. Platritis Kiriakos

DEPARTMENTAL ACTIVITIES 2005-06

1. Voluntary blood donation organised by the student union on 13 October 2005
2. **“Human trafficking and its contemporary dimensions”** 1-2 December 2005 Organised by the Department of Psychology of the University of Crete in collaboration with the European Centre of Public Law.
3. **2nd Panhellenic Conference of Political Psychology “Disasters and the lure of fear- the social organization of fear”**. 18-21 May 2006 Organising bodies:
 - University of Crete, Department of Psychology,
 - Greek Political Psychology Society (ΕΕΠΟΨΥ),
 - German Professional Psychologists’ Association (BDP) – Political Psychology Section,
 - “Politische Psychologie” Magazine (Hamburg University)
 - “Walter Jacobsen” Political Psychology and Political Education Society (Organiser: Giorgos Galanis)
4. **13th World “Biennial Conference of the international Association for Relationships Research IARR”**. 6-10 July 2006 (Organiser: Konstantinos Kafetsios).
5. **3rd Annual Hierarchical Multiple Regression workshop (Professor J. Nezlek), University of Crete**. July 2006. (Organisers: Konstantinos Kafetsios, in collaboration with Georgios Sideridis).

FULL LIST OF STUDENTS WHO GRADUATED IN THE ACADEMIC YEAR 2005-06

SEPTEMBER GRADUATION PERIOD

Graduation ceremony held on 30 -11-2005

Full name	Overall mean score
Apostolaki Ekaterini	7,94
Aridaki Artemisia	6,94
Georgiou Anna	6,64
Giannakou Theodosia	8,16
Zakou Maria	7,34
Zaheila Ekaterini	9,36
Iliopoulos Athanasios	7,66
Theodorou Eleni	6,78
Ioannidou Nikoleta	8,39
Kalouta Evaggelia	7,92
Konstandinou Paraskevoula	7,74
Makri Viktoria	8,09
Makris Evangelos	8,52
Malekkou Stella	7,37
Markou Pinelopi	8,22
Marou Vaia	8,57
Mavridakis Grigorios	8,16
Milonaki Kalliopi	8,31
Panagouli Panagiota	8,32
Pandazopoulos Georgios	7,47
Papagianopoulou Vasiliki	8,34
Pardalou Argiro	7,93
Perniendakis Nikolaos	7,45
Petraki Eleni	8,90
Skapeti Panagiota	8,26
Skouri Kleio	7,32
Stavroulakis Stilianos	6,73
Tsoli Theodora	7,92
Tsouvelas Georgios	8,85
Fraggogianni Maria-Efterpi	7,83
Fragous Kiriaki	7,32
Habartsoumian Ekaterini	8,15
Hatzikonstantinou Sotiria	7,55

Hatzimarkaki Irini	8,25
Helioudaki Eleftheria	8,50
Christoforaki Stavroula	8,65
Chrisoulaki Anna	8,95

FEBRUARY GRADUATION PERIOD

Graduation ceremony held on 29-03-2006

Full name	Overall mean score
Aidonopoulou Kiriaki-Vasiliki	8,79
Valianou Lemonia	7,72
Georgiou Maria	7,20
Georgiadis Efstratios	8,46
Gertsakis Nikolaos	7,88
Dionisopoulou Triandafili	7,62
Kalaitzoglou Maria	8,08
Kaloudi Aggeliki	8,25
Karamolegou Margarita	7,54
Karanika Lambrini	6,58
Kolliopoulou Maria	7,60
Koumbanaki Maria	8,55
Kratsiotis Ioannis	7,24
Lagoudaki Kalliopi	7,62
Likoudi Sapfo	7,44
Lirakos Georgios	8,05
Miligou Kleopatra	8,01
Nianiou Niki	8,66
Nikoletou Ekaterini	8,25
Orfanoudaki Maria	6,97
Panagioti Maria	9,09
Papadogianni Maria	9,15
Rabalakos Ioannis	7,63
Sfetkou Sotiria	8,06
Tzouanakis Ioannis	7,79
Tsimou Olga	7,37
Fasaraki Chrisoula	8,62
Fragioudaki Irini	8,37
Fotiadou Anastasia	8,31
Chra Eleni	8,12
Chritis Konstandinos	7,27
Psouni Stavroula	7,25

ELEFThERNA

Instructions for authors

“Eleftherna”, the Scientific Review of the Department of Psychology, publishes research and theoretical articles as well as book reviews. Manuscripts should not exceed 35 typed pages (including references, tables, images and abstracts). Book reviews should not exceed 3 typed pages. All articles are subject to a blind peer reviewing process by two experts on the respective field, and their final acceptance is ratified by the Departmental Committee.

All manuscripts must include an abstract of approximately 200 words in both Greek and English, followed by keywords or brief phrases. Authors must submit three (3) paper copies of the manuscript, typed in A4 pages, double-spaced, with margins of 2.5 cm, and a ‘Times New Roman’ font of 12 points. Prerequisites for submission are originality of content and that the paper is not being considered for publication elsewhere. After publication, the copyright of the article is transferred to the Department of Psychology, University of Crete and authors will be expected to gain permission to reproduce any copyrighted work (text, illustrations, photographs, etc.). Authors should prepare manuscripts according to the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (4th ed.).

The first sheet of the manuscript should include the title of the paper, name(s) of author(s), affiliation(s) of each author as well as the address and contact details of the principal author (i.e. phone number and e-mail address). The second sheet includes the title of the paper, the abstract and the keywords. Research papers should include the following sections: Introduction, Methodology (Participants, Measures, Data analysis), Results and Discussion. Tables should be headed, whereas Illustrations (i.e. Diagrams, Figures, Photographs) are followed by a brief description. Both Tables and Images follow separate numbering and are appropriately placed in the text.

All manuscripts should include a list of references in alphabetical order at the end of the paper on a separate sheet in the following standard form:

Articles: Torgesen, J.K., Alexander, A.W., Wagner, R.K., Rashotte, C.A., Voeller, K.K.S., & Conway, T. (2001). Intensive remedial instruction for children with severe reading disabilities. *Journal of Learning Disabilities*, 34, 33-58.

Chapters in books: Olson, R.K. & Gayan, J. (2001). Brains, genes, and environment in reading development. In S.B. Neuman & D.K. Dickinson (Eds.), *Handbook of Early Literacy Research* (pp. 81-94). New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Books: Mash, E.J. & Barkley, R.A. (1996). *Child Psychopathology*. New York: Guilford Press.

In the main body of the paper, references with up to three (3) authors should indicate the name(s) of the author(s) (i.e. Thomas, Bryant, & Manus, 1987), or the name of the first author followed by 'et al.', if there are more than three names (i.e. Smith et al., 1990)

Those who are interested are welcome to submit 3 copies of their work to the President of the Scientific Review Committee, Professor George Nik. Galanis, Department of Psychology, Gallos Campus, Rethymno 74100. Tel: +302831077577, Fax: +302831077578, e-mail: galanis@psy.soc.uoc.gr