ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟ ΚΡΗΤΗΣ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΚΗ ΣΧΟΛΗ
ΤΜΗΜΑ ΦΙΛΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ ΤΟΜΕΑΣ ΚΛΑΣΙΚΩΝ ΣΠΟΥΔΩΝ

Διδακτορική διατριβή

Melos in Plato

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Επόπτρια καθηγήτρια: Λουκία Αθανασάκη
Μέλη τριμελούς επιτροπής: Αναστασία-Ερασμία Πεπονή,
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Abstract

This thesis investigates the meaning and importance of *melos* in the Platonic dialogues, a question which forms part of the broader discussion of Plato's treatment of poetry and *mousikê*. More specifically, the main purpose of the dissertation is to single out and discuss a specific slice of *mousikê* in Plato. In pursuit of the place of *melos* in the Platonic musical world, my investigation deals firstly with the meaning of the term and the association of *melos* with distinct kinds of poetry, such as *epos*, as well as with various arts and subjects, such as the art of rhetoric and the theme of love. Moreover the close association between *melos* and dance – the combination of which is the essence of *choreia* – is of vital importance for the interpretation of its meaning and significance within Plato's thought.

A key issue I am focusing on is the transition from *melos* to the various kinds (genres) of melic poetry, which are discussed by Plato in his dialogues. This issue aims at deepening our understanding of Plato's treatment of melic poetry compared with that of epic and dramatic poetry. Plato's attitude towards *melos*, basically as song, across his oeuvre, the way he (re)shapes the identity of each genre and he plays with the established traditions of song and the boundaries of the existing song culture are further important questions, the illumination of which can afford us an insight into Plato's agenda on the broader subject of *melos*.

In order to widen the perspective of my research I pass from the text to the interpretation of the context. Therefore, I explore the locations where the Platonic dialogues take place, thus the contexts of the philosophical discussions, and the "adaptation" these places – which traditionally included song and dance activities, such as symposium, festival in honor of a god, theoric travel, locus amoenus – undergo in order to "host" philosophy that unexpectedly intrudes. The final focus of the thesis ends up, though, as quite the reverse: the adaptation of *melos* in order to meet Plato's philosophical needs. Thus, the emphasis is directed towards the reformation and reintegration of *melos* in the Platonic dialogues.

The thesis argues that *melos*, inextricably connected with *mousikê*, and hence with *paideia*, is central to Plato's philosophy. His constant struggle and play with its meaning and form reveals *melos* as a major philosophical and philological challenge. Indeed, *melos* is defined, redefined, reshaped and expanded, illuminating the nature of the Platonic philosophy itself.

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Abbreviations, conventions, and Greek authors

The translations of the passages are from the Loeb Classical Library Series slightly modified unless otherwise indicated.
For the original texts of the Platonic dialogues, on epic, tragic, and comic verses and on Xenophon's *Symposium* I follow the edition of Oxford Classical Texts.
For the original text of Athenaeus' Deipnosophistae I follow Kaibel's edition (Teubner). Kaibel, G. (1887), *Athenaeus. Deipnosophistae*. Leipzig.
All quotations from Pindar and Bacchylides follow the standard editions by Snell and Maehler. Snell, B. & Maehler, H. (1987) *Pindari carmina cum fragmentis*, i. *Epinicia.* Leipzig. Maehler, H (1989) *Pindari carmina cum fragmentis*, ii. *Fragmenta, Indices.* Leipzig. iii. (2004) *Bacchylidis carmina cum fragmentis.* Cambridge.
All the quotations of Sappho follow Voigt's edition. Voigt, E-M (1971). *Sappho et Alcaeus*. Amsterdam.
I follow Winnington-Ingram's (Teubner) edition of the text of Aristoxenus' *Elementa Harmonica* (1963) and Da Rios' edition of Aristides' *De Musica* (1954).
For Augustine's *Confessions* I follow Charpentier's Edition (1841) in French.

Apoll. Perg. *Con*.	Heath, T.L. (1896) *Apollonius of Perga. Treatise on Conic Sections*.
Arist. *IA*	Ross, E. W. D. (1912) *Aristotle. De incenssu animalium*. Oxford.
Ar. *Or*.	Lenz, F. W. and Behr, C. A., eds. (1976) *Publius Aelius Aristides: The Complete Works: Orationes I-XVI*. Leiden.
A. Q., *De Mus*.	Winnington-Ingram, R. P., ed. (1963), *Aristides Quintilianus: De musica*. Leipzig).

DGRA	Smith, W. (1875), *A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities*. rev. ed. London.
DNP	Cancic, H. and Schneider (1996-2003), H., *Der Neue Pauly. Enzyklopädie der Antike. Das klassische Altertum und seine Rezeptionsgeschichte*. Stuttgart. [Brill's New Pauly is the English edition of DNP, published by Verlag J.B. Metzler since 1996].
Aristox. *El. harm*.	Da Rios, R., ed. (1954), *Aristoxenus' Elementa harmonica*. Rome.
Et. Or	F. J. Sturz, ed. (1820), *Orionis Thebani Etymologikon*. Leipzig.
Eucl. *Op. Omn*.	Heiberg, J. L. and Menge, H., eds. (1883-1916) *Euclidis Opera Omnia I-VIII and supplement, in Greek*. Leipzig.
FGrH	Jacoby, F. (1923-), *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*. Berlin-Leiden.
GEW	Frisk, H. (1960-1972), *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, 3 vols. Heidelberg.
Hero *Stereom*.	Schmidt, W. and Heiberg, J. L. (1914), *Heronis Quae Feruntur Stereometrica et de Mensuris*. Leipzig.
KlPauly	Ziegler et al., eds. (1964–1975), *Der kleine Pauly: Lexikon der Antike. München.*
LSJ	Liddell, H. G. and Scott, R. (1996), *Greek-English Lexicon*, with a revised supplement. Oxford.
OCD[3]	Hornblower, S. and Spawforth, A. (1963), *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*. 3rd ed. Oxford.

OCCL	Howatson, M. C., ed. (1989), *The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature*. 2nd ed. Oxford.
PCG	Austin, C. and Kassel, R. (1983-), *Poetae Comici Graeci*. Berlin.
Phot. *Biblioth*.	Henry, R., ed. (2008), *Photius Bibliotheca*. 8 vols. Paris.
Plut. *De Mus*.	Einarson, B. and De Lacy B. H. (1967) Plutarch: *De Musica*. Text and translation in Plutarch's *Moralia* 14. London.
Porph. De *Abst*.	Bouffartigue, J., Patillon, M., and Segonds, A-P, eds. (1979-1995) *De Abstinentia ab Esu Animalium*. 3 vols., Paris.
RE	Pauly, A. Fr., rev. Wissowa, G. et al. (1894-1980) *Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*. Stuttgart.

INTRODUCTION

καὶ δὴ καὶ λοιδορήσεις γε ἐπῆλθον ποιηταῖς,
τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας κυσὶ ματαίαις ἀπεικάζοντας
χρωμέναισιν ὑλακαῖς
[Pl. Laws 697c-d]

ταῦτα δή, ἔφην, ἀπολελογήσθω ἡμῖν ἀναμνησθεῖσιν περὶ ποιήσεως,
ὅτι εἰκότως ἄρα τότε αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀπεστέλλομεν
τοιαύτην οὖσαν· ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ᾕρει. προσείπωμεν δὲ αὐτῇ,
μὴ καί τινα σκληρότητα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀγροικίαν καταγνῷ,
ὅτι παλαιὰ μέν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ ποιητικῇ·
[Pl. Rep. 607b]

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν μελῶν ποίησιν;
[Pl. Gorg. 449d]

Plato's influential discussions on poetry and *mousikê* have set the agenda for the subsequent tradition of Western poetics and aesthetics.[1] It is widely accepted that the Platonic tradition, including Plato's philosophy and later schools such as Neoplatonism, influenced medieval philosophy.[2] Moreover, Platonic ideas and theories on the immortality of the Souls, the astrology, and Love reemerged during the Renaissance[3] and Plato's theory of art as imitation had a great influence on art during this period. As Vasari states in the *Lives of the Painters*,

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[1] For a detailed analysis of Plato's influence of medieval thought, see Gilson (1957); Beardsley (1966); Eco (1986), (2004). On Plato's significant impact on Renaissance philosophy, see Hankins (1990) and (2003-4). On Plato's influence on Romantic and Symbolist poetry and the literary criticism of the 20th century, see Sutton W. and Sutton V. (1984). However, Petrović (2009) 1-17 argues that Plato's influence is indirect. For an extensive discussion of Plato's influence on English literature, see Baldwin and Hutton, eds. (1994).

[2] For example, St. Augustine in the *Confessions* discusses the notion of *mimesis* as the main goal of art, which is a well-known Platonic doctrine. In the same study, Augustine analyses his theory of Beauty, which seems to emanate from the Neoplatonic philosophers, especially Plotinus' theory of Beauty. Moreover, his theory of rhythm in *De Musica* echoes Plato's theory of recollection. See Spicher http://www.iep.utm.edu/m-aesthe/.

[3] For example, the Florentine philosopher Marsilio Ficino, who translated and wrote commentaries on several Platonic dialogues, was mainly responsible for the revival of Platonism in the Renaissance. See Allen (1998); Allen and Rees, eds. (2002).

> I know that our art (i.e. sculpture and painting) is all imitation, of nature for the most part and then, because a man cannot by himself rise so high, of those works that are executed by those whom he judges to be better masters than himself.[4]

Plato's idealism and his theory of metaphysics influenced Romantic and Symbolist poetics as well as modern literary criticism.[5]

As we shall see, despite extensive discussions on poetry and *mousikê*, no one has yet offered a comprehensive examination of the significance and place of *melos* in the entire Platonic corpus. The frequent use of this term in Plato shows his undoubtedly interest in it. But, what is *melos* in Plato? Should it be defined as 'poetry' or 'song'? As I will try to show in the first chapter, *melos* is on some occasions defined in an abstract way as a musical mode, while on others it clearly denotes melic poetry and choral song and it is thus linked with specific poetic forms and genres.

In his time (end of fifth/mid fourth century BC), Plato watches the 'New Music' revolution and the strong influence it exerts mostly on drama, dithyramb and nome.[6] The building of large theaters, the increase of theatrical festivals and the growing professionalization in Athenian cultural life resulted in a new style of music with "unprecedented power and complexity".[7] The main features of the 'New Music,' such as the 'theatricality,' the experimentation and pluralism regarding diction, content and musical modes, the release from conventional structures, its excessively public character and its popularity provoked many attacks. Plato's musical theory, strongly influenced by Damonian theory, and his own political philosophy, intended, at least in the *Republic*, for an educated elite, cannot be compatible with the principles of 'New Music'. This is why Plato cannot ignore or simply eliminate *melos*. He strives to find an appropriate position for it in his dialogues and make it less powerful and hence less dangerous.

In order to diminish the power of *melos*, Plato adopts specific strategies, as we shall see. The focus on the contexts of the Platonic dialogues offers a path to elucidate this issue. So far there has been no systematic exploration of the contexts of the Platonic dialogues, where philosophy intrudes displacing *melos*. This study aspires to

[4] Vasari ((1550-1568), 1912) xliii.
[5] On this subject, see the bibliographical refrences in Footnote 1.
[6] Csapo (2004) 208-209.
[7] Ibid. 245.

fill this gap in Platonic scholarship. In this introduction, however, I will briefly examine the key scholarly approaches on Plato's views on poetry and *mousikê*.

In order to understand Plato's hostility to poetry, most scholars draw attention to his notions of *mimêsis* and inspiration.[8] As Murray has shown, Plato uses the term *mimêsis* in order to indicate not only the vocal, kinetic imitation and visual representation encountered in different arts, but also "the relationship between language and reality" and "between the material world and its eternal paradigm."[9] It is generally agreed that Plato sees poetry, which is based on *mimêsis* and not on reality, as a danger to the individual soul and hence to the entire community, because it stimulates the lower part of the soul. It is therefore a misleading means by which to achieve true knowledge. Poetry's great influence and popularity, which had a formative role in Greek culture, makes it extremely dangerous. As Peponi states, "it is precisely this socially dominant and influential function of mousike that drove Plato to agonise to most of his dialogues (above all, in the Republic) about diminishing or even eliminating its role in the city-state."[10]

However, Burnyeat departs from the commonly accepted opinion that Plato rejected poetry. He argues that Plato banished poetry and poets from his ideal city because "they produced the wrong sort of poetry."[11] An additional challenge emerges within the framework of Burnyeats' interpretation, namely, to explore the contradiction between Plato's apparent disapproval of poetry and its clear, although not thematized, presence in his philosophical dialogues. The fact that Plato's philosophical language is replete with poetic words and motifs shows the contribution of poetry to the formation of his philosophy.[12]

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[8] On Plato's attack on poetry and on the problem of *mimêsis,* see: Greene (1918) 1-75; Partee (1970) 209-222; Else (1986); Nehamas (1999a) 251-278, (1999b) 279-302; Ferrari (1989) 92-148; Gould (1990); Murray (1997); Peponi (2013a). On the concept of *mimêsis* in Plato, see also: Belfiore (1984); Ferrari (1989); Janaway (1995). Murray (1992) 27-46, (1996) examines Plato's ambiguous attitude towards poetry by examining the concepts of poetic inspiration and *mimêsis*, particularly as they are expressed in the *Ion* and in the *Republic*. For Plato's inconsistent treatment of poetry, see also Halliwell (2000), (2002), (2011), who argues that the poetic vocabulary constitutes an important part of Plato's thought and underlines Plato's inconsistent engagement with poetry and poets. On the one hand, Plato rejects the ecstatic, irrational state of poetic creation, but, on the other hand, his dialogues reveal a deep and complex appreciation of the poetic imagination.

[9] Murray (1996) 3.

[10] Peponi (2013) 3.

[11] Burnyeat (1997) 255.

[12] On the issue of the formation of philosophical language, see Havelock (1963), (1966), (1976), (1982) and (1988); Vegetti (1999) 271-289 and Morgan (2000) 39-45. On the

Nightingale argues that the extensive use of poetic motifs and tools, the quotation of poets' verses, the naming of poets or allusions to them, and the adaptation of poetic practices describe Plato's effort to define his philosophy. In her book *Genres in Dialogue,* she explores the incorporation of the traditional genres of poetry and rhetoric into Platonic philosophy. Nightingale argues clearly that the intertextuality between the Platonic dialogues and the traditional genres of discourse reveals Plato's effort to reinvent and mark the boundaries of philosophy as a socio-political practice in the intellectual development of his culture.[13]

There is an extensive scholarly discussion on the naming of poets and the quotations of poetic verses in the Platonic dialogues. Scholars seek to demonstrate how Plato is influenced by and also how he appropriates epic, melic, and dramatic poetry for the construction of his philosophy.[14]

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language problem in Plato and his stance towards language, see Gaiser (1963) and (1980) 5-37; Krämer (1959); Szlezak (1999). But, compare Sayre (1983). In addition, see Cornford (1950); Gadamer (1980) 124-156; and Petraki (2011). I owe the references to Petraki (2011) 6-7.

[13] Nightingale (1995) 195. On Plato's divergent views on poetry and poets, see Annas (1982) 1-28. On the incorporation of poetry in Plato, see also Gadamer (1980) 39-72, who describes Plato as a poet creating his own exceptional work with a good sense of irony. In addition, Elias (1984) offers a re-interpretation of myths and their use in the Platonic dialogues. He demonstrates that poetry is truly valuable for Plato's philosophy because it embodies the axioms of his philosophical system, rendering his philosophical arguments accessible to everyone and also persuasive. Similarly, Naddaff (2002) argues that Plato rewrites the poetic canon in order to establish the identity of his philosophy. Giuliano (1991) 105-190 discusses philosophy's multifunctional and useful role for Plato. He considers poetry as the trigger for Plato's discussions on moral issues and sees it as the vehicle he uses to transmit knowledge of the imperfect human world. A detailed discussion on Plato's association with the poets can be found in Destrée and Herrmann, eds. (2011). This book includes nineteen essays that illuminate the quarrel between poetry and philosophy, the use of poetry in the Platonic dialogues, the controversial issue of the criticism of poetry in the *Republic,* as well as the association of poetry with *mimêsis* and the treatment of music and poetry in the *Laws*.

[14] On Plato's naming of the poets and on the use of poetic quotations in his dialogues, see Tarrant (1951) 59-67, who discusses the quotations from epic and dramatic poetry. She concludes that Plato's use of quotations serves two distinct purposes: "Plato uses quotations sometimes as integral to his argument sometimes as mere embellishment" (p. 59). On Plato's use of poetry for the protection of the *polis*, see Mouze (2005). Thayer (1975) 3-26 turns to melic poetry and discusses the quotation of Simonides' ode in the *Protagoras,* explaining the fusion of the roles of poet and philosopher. On important aspects of Plato's attitude towards melic poetry and poets, see Demos (1999), who examines three well-known melic quotations in three Platonic dialogues: the Simonides' poem in the *Protagoras*, Callicle's quotation of Pindar in the *Gorgias,* and Stesichorus' Palinode in the *Phaedrus*. Pender (2007a) 21-57 and (2007b) 1-57 also demonstrates the great influence of melic poetry on Plato. Focusing broadly on the subjects of 'love' and 'creation,' she states that Plato uses the language and imagery of the melic poetry for three reasons: in order to rewrite the melic tradition, to correct the poets' mistakes, and to offer alternative accounts of the poets' stories through his own philosophy.

Over the last two decades scholars have turned their attention to what is probably Plato's last dialogue, the *Laws*. The shift to this work has shed light on largely unexplored issues in previous scholarship that concern and complete the all-encompasing nature of Plato's philosophy.[15] More specifically, the musical world that Plato creates in the *Laws* reveals the great significance that song and dance culture have in his thought. The role of *mousikê*,[16] including that of poetry and particularly melic poetry, is crucial in the *Laws*. *Mousikê* is associated with *paideia* and participates into the formation of both individuals and the entire society.[17] Moutsopoulos' treatise also focuses on the subject of *mousikê* in many Platonic dialogues. He discusses the technical matters that facilitate the systematization of musical categories, such as singing and dancing, and examines *mousikê* from a pedagogic, aesthetical, socio-political, moral, and metaphysical perspective.[18]

Koller[19] briefly examines the meaning of *melos* in the Platonic dialogues. Starting with this discussion, I will take into account the scholarly trends mentioned here in order to understand Plato's treatment of *melos* in his dialogues.

More specifically, as will become clear below, this study focuses on the following dialogues: *Ion, Lysis, Charmides, Euthydemus, Symposium, Gorgias, Protagoras, Republic, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Laws*. These are the most representative dialogues for the study of *melos* because they include many textual references to *melos* as well as extensive discussions on it. These discussions are illuminating for the interpretation of its meaning and the position is has in Plato's works.

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[15] Peponi (2013) 2.

[16] On the moral value of musical education in the *Laws,* see Moutsopoulos (1959); Mouze (2005); Rocconi (2010); Wiese (2013/4). For the aesthetic value of music in the *Laws,* see Rocconi (2012). On the question of the education of the soul through music (in the narrow sense of melodies and rhythms) in Plato's *Republic* and in the *Laws,* see Woerther (2008) 89-103. For a fresh reading of the general musical experience in various Platonic dialogues, including the role of music in the learning process and its influence on body and soul, see Pelosi (2010).

[17] For an extensive discussion of Plato's preoccupation with *mousikê* for the establishment of a well-balanced cultural collective identity in the *Laws,* see Peponi's (2013) collective volume. The essays in this book highlight different aspects of musical culture in Plato's *Laws,* converging on the importance of *choreia* in the new city.
For a discussion of the central role of music in the Greek world, see Barker (1984), (1989), who brings together important allusions to music in Plato's dialogues. After examining the role of music in moral education and social policy, he emphasizes the musical structures in Plato, which are based on harmonics and mathematics.
On musical education in Plato's *Laws,* see Wiese (2013/4).
On the moral and aesthetic value of music for Plato, see Rocconi (2010) and (2012) 113-132.

[18] Moutsopoulos (1959).

[19] Koller (1965) 24-38.

Unlike Koller, who examines only the semantics of *melos*, in Chapter 1, I focus on the passages that highlight melic composition (*melopoiia*) and choral performance, which is the case in the *Laws*.[20] This chapter attempts to answer questions that concern the internal context,[21] that is, the textual statements about *melos* and *melopoiia* in each dialogue. It seeks to understand the relation of *melos* to other poetic genres, arts, and kinds of knowledge.

More specifically, in considering the *Ion*, I discuss the description of *melopoiia* in detail. Furthermore, the examination of the role of divine inspiration in the context of *melopoiia* might be helpful in understanding Plato's attitude towards *melos* in the dialogue. In discussing the *Lysis*, however, I try to understand why and under which conditions Hippothales composes and performs *melos.* I examine how Plato's view of *melos* in the *Lysis* is similar to or different from that in the *Ion*.

My discussion of the *Symposium* takes place in the general context of the prose *encômium* that the interlocutors compose for *Erôs*. I examine how Eryximachus defines *mousikê* and *melopoiia* and how he describes the association of *melopoiia* with *paideia* in his speech. Similarly, in the case of the *Gorgias,* I discuss Socrates' definition of *mousikê* and explore how *melopoiia* and the art of rhetoric relate to each other.

In discussing the *Protagoras*, I focus on both the melic poets' compositions and on their position and role in *paideia* by examining their association with epic poets, as presented in Protagoras' speech. In addition, the naming and characterization of the melic poets will be part of my discussion.

My analysis of the *Republic* revolves around the definition of *melos*. Within the framework of the discussion of the musical *paideia* in the ideal city of the *Republic,* I examine the composition of *melos* (*melopoiia*) and its presentation – through *mimêsis*.

Finally, in discussing the *Laws*, I examine how *melos* is related to choral education, which is based on the concept of *mimêsis*, by analyzing the musical model that Plato propounds for the new Cretan colony. More specifically, I seek to interpret

[20] On the choral performances in the *Laws,* see Anderson (1994). For a thorough, basically historical, approach to the *Laws* that includes extensive discussion of the choral performances, their historic models, and their social-political function, see Morrow's monumental book (1960). For a perceptive account of choral experience in Plato's *Laws,* see Peponi (2013a) 212-239, who demonstrates that, despite the untheatrical and de-aestheticiced choric models, there are implications of pleasure (and, hence, of aesthetic contemplation).

[21] The distinction between external (conditions under which a poem is performed) and internal context (what is provided by the text itself) is taken from Most (1994).

the web of relations between the musical elements that constitute *mousikê* and *choreia* in the new city, with a particular focus on the place and function of *melos* in the musical world of the *Laws*.

Chapter 2 focuses on the melic genres[22] that appear in the Platonic dialogues. It doesn't seem to me that Plato really reflects on the role of melic song and dance in either tragedy or comedy, which is rather puzzling, considering the weight he puts on choral *mimêsis*, particularly in the educational theory sections of the *Laws*. I, therefore, explore Plato's treatment of hymn, paean, dithyramb, *thrênos*, *encômium*, and *kitharôidikos nomos*. For reasons of completeness, I begin with a brief overview of Plato's treatment of *epos* and drama, a subject that has been however extensively discussed.[23] My discussion of every kind of poetry and of the different poetic genres covers the entire Platonic corpus and is based on explicit Platonic references to poetic genres rather than on poetic quotations or allusions.

The first section of the chapter (II.1) focuses on Plato's views of *epos*,[24] tragedy,[25] comedy,[26] and satyr play.[27] The second section of the chapter (II.2) investigates Plato's treatment of specific melic genres.

In II.2, I first discuss the melic genres that Plato criticizes, such as *thrênos* and dithyramb, and then proceed to consider those that Plato generally accepts, such as *encômium*, paean, hymn, and the genre that Plato calls *kitharôidikos nomos*. In analyzing the melic genres, I focus on Plato's classification of melic poetry and on the identity of each melic genre in the Platonic dialogues.

Thrênos[28] is mentioned in the *Republic*, in the *Philebus,* and in the *Laws*. The dithyramb is discussed in the *Apology*, the *Hippias Minor*, the *Gorgias*, the *Cratylus*,

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[22] Calame (1974) 113-128 discusses the problem of the classification of archaic lyric poetry and uses the term "genre" to denote the specific lyric categories of hymn, paean, dithyramb, *thrênos*, and hymenaeus/hymenaios.
Following Calame, I use the term "genre" to denote the specific melic genres that Plato discusses.

[23] On the relation between Plato and epic poetry see, for example, Boys-Stones and Haubold (2010) and Hunter (2012). On Plato and dramatic poetry, see Nightingale (1995), Jones (2005), and Charalabopoulos (2012). For a more extensive bibliography, see Chapter 2, n. 1.

[24] On Plato's treatment of Homer and his rhapsodic art in the *Laws,* see Martin (2013) 313-338.

[25] On the problem of tragedy in the *Laws,* see Murray (2013) 294-312.

[26] On Plato and comedy, see Nightingale (2005). On Plato's treatment of tragedy and comedy, see Patterson (1982) 76-93.

[27] On satyr play in Plato, see Usher (2002) 205-228; Shaw (2014).

[28] Folch (2013) 339-367 offers an insightful discussion of Plato's treatment of 'problematic' genres, such as comedy and threnody.

the *Hippias Major*, the *Phaedrus,* and the *Republic*. The *encômium* is briefly mentioned in the *Lysis*, in the *Symposium,* and in the *Laws*. References to the paean can be found in the *Ion*, the *Symposium*, the *Critias*, and the *Laws*. Plato refers to hymns in the *Republic*, the *Symposium*, the *Phaedrus,* and the *Laws*. The discussion of *kitharôidikoi nomoi* is limited to the *Laws*, where the interplay between political and musical νόμος[29] deserves special attention.

Chapter 3 broadens the scope of the research by examining the contexts of *melos*. Despite the fact that many scholars have discussed the use of types of song in the song-culture and the poetic diction, motifs, and techniques in Plato's dialogues, mainly in the *Republic* and in the *Phaedrus*,[30] there is no extensive examination of the use of *melos* (song) in the private residences, the *palaistrai*, the *gymnasia*, and the countryside. What is missing is a discussion of the specific locations where many of the Platonic dialogues take place.

This chapter is divided into three sections: the private residences, the *palaistrai* and *gymnasia,* and the natural, sacred places. In the first section of this chapter (III.1), the analysis begins with the extraordinary description of a *symposium* without music in Plato's *Symposium*. In Callias' *synedrion* in the *Protagoras*, Simonides' ode becomes a text lacking a potential performance context.[31] In discussing the *Republic*, I attempt to interpret the absence of song and to show how it is shrewdly replaced by philosophy. The main question that I seek to answer in this section is how the transformation of the *sympotic* framework[32] influences and marks out the space that is intended for *melos*, and creates the conditions for the establishment of philosophy.

In the second section (III.2), I discuss the banishment of *melos* from the *palaistra* of Miccus in the *Lysis* and from the *palaistra* of Taureas in the *Charmides*. I also examine the treatment of *melos* in the *Euthydemus*, in the discussion that takes place in the *Lyceum*. As will become evident, in all these dialogues by emphasizing the

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[29] On this semantic play, see Mouze (2005).

[30] For example, on the use of the poetic language in the *Republic,* see Halliwell (2000) 94-112; Petraki (2011) and (2013) 71-94. On Plato's adaptation of lyric love poetry in the *Timaeus* and the *Phaedrus,* see Pender (2007a) 21-57 and (2007b) 1-57. On the strong affinities between the presentation of Eros in Plato's *Phaedrus* and that in Sappho's songs, see Foley (1998) 39-70.

[31] On the function of literary criticism in Plato's *Protagoras,* see Ford (2011) 1-31.

[32] On Plato's thoughts about sympotic practices and subjects in the *Symposium* and in the *Laws,* see Murray (2013). On Plato's reformulation of the traditional sympotic ethics, see Rinella (2011).

importance of his philosophy Plato undermines and displaces *melos*. In other words, philosophy takes over the cultural authority of song.

In the third section (III.3), I study the *locus amoenus* in the *Phaedrus* and in the *Laws*. I argue that philosophy intrudes into these places where one usually encounters song and dance.

After studying the works in which Plato exiles or displaces *melos*, in Chapter 4, I discuss the terms and conditions under which *melos* is accepted and reintegrated. The analysis in this chapter begins with the *Phaedo*, where Socrates' composition of a *prooimion* for Apollo comprises the main subject. The cosmic *choreia* of Sirens, presented in the framework of the myth of Er[33] at the end of the *Republic,* is then examined in detail. The discussion proceeds by investigating the centrality of *choreia* in the new city of the *Laws*.

The last section of the fourth chapter is devoted to the *Axiochus*, a spurious dialogue that may have been written by a Platonist in a later period.[34] The reason for including this dialogue in my study is that the reception of the Platonic contexts by an author who imitates Plato's style will throw more light on Plato's treatment of *melos* and on the relation between *melos* and his philosophy.

It is important to explain here the prominent position of dance in this work. Dance is of course relevant to *melos*. They are both at the core of *choreia*, thus of *mousikê*, forming the quintessence of Plato's musical/cultural model. The focus on dance and *choreia*, especially in the *Laws*, illuminates Plato's privileging of melic genres, but highlights a fundamental divergence between Plato's proposed musical model and the traditional cultural models in Greek cities.[35]

The structure of the thesis might give someone the impression of repetition, because the same dialogues re-appear in every chapter in order to be discussed in relation to different aspects of *melos*, depending on the topic of each chapter. Due to the variety of themes and aspects concerning the problem of *melos*, as well as Plato's versatile and multi-faceted thought, I chose to work thematically and discuss every different aspect of the problem dialogue by dialogue. Therefore, I do not follow a chronological order. This choice enabled me to cover the variables relevant to each

[33] On Plato and mythology, see Detienne (1981), who sees Plato as a creator of myths. He argues that myths are "beautiful useful lies" that Plato uses in order to foster virtue in the citizens of his ideal city in the *Republic*.
[34] See Hutchinson (1997) 1735.
[35] See Calame (2013) 87-108.

topic and provide a more meticulous and clear organization of the issues discussed, avoiding the danger of getting lost in the intricate network of interrelationships between the different elements that permeat the Platonic texts.

It is nevertheless anticipated that the systematic examination of all the Platonic dialogues will illuminate Plato's engagement with *melos* by providing new lines of inquiry, new findings, and fresh perspectives.

Each chapter starts with a brief introduction and ends with concluding remarks, but the general conclusions can be found at the end of the thesis. In Appendix I, one may find many Platonic passages – referred to the thesis – and their translations. In Appendix II, there is a brief, but hopefully, clear outline of the organization of musical education suggested in the *Laws*. The focus on the Platonic diction, the vivid depiction of the settings and the need to stress Plato's use of intertextuality mandated the inclusion of many passages.

CHAPTER I

Μέλος: μελοποιία and representation

Literature moves beyond madness and
realism in a leap that maintains
'delirium' and 'logic'.
[Kristeva, *Rev*. 128]

Introduction

As already mentioned, Koller has briefly examined the origin and the semantics of *melos* by focusing mainly on Plato's *Republic*, the *Ion*, and the *Laws*. He concludes that in Plato *melos* denotes a) song and dance, b) choral song, c) melody/tunes, d) musical mode (*harmonia*). He also examines the words πολυμελής, ἡδυμελής, ἐμμελής, πλημμελής, παραμελεῖν, and λυσιμελής, which recur in epic tradition, archaic poetry, Plato, Aristotle, Thucydides, and Xenophon in order to see their etymological relation to *melos*.[36]

More recently, Calame discussed the semantics of *melos* in Alcman and in Plato's *Republic*. In Alcman *melos* seems to be synonymous with song, melic poem or simply melody. In Plato's *Republic melos* means musical mode (harmonia), song and song-dance. He concludes that in archaic and classical Greece the term *melos* covered the

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[36] Koller (1965) 24-38; For the meaning of *melos,* see also Färber (1936); Frisk (1972) s.v. Kirkwood (1974) 209 examines the progression of the meaning of *melos*: "The earliest meaning of *melos* is "limb," and how it came to designate a kind of poetry is not clear. Perhaps there is a connection between the meaning "limb" and the articulation of lyric poems, which are divided into clearly defined metrical "parts" such as cola and stanzas. But the verses of hexameter, elegiac, and iambic poetry are no less limb-like." Koller, however, believes and argues persuasively that *melos* as a musical term is not etymologically related to *melos* as limb, member. They are two independent words with different linguistic evolution.

various forms of poetry that were sung and danced and it did not place great emphasis on the poet's emotions.[37]

Richardson argues that earlier classical writers use the term *melos* to describe "poetry in metres now called 'lyric' (as opposed to hexameter, elegiac, iambic, or trochaic)."[38] He adds that the "'lyric poet' was called μελοποιός, but in Homer and Hesiod the word *melos* is not used in a musical context. Instead, the words *molpē* and *melpesthai* are used there to denote various kinds of singing, "often as an accompaniment to dancing" or celebrating with singing and dancing activities.[39]

Thus, it can be stated that in archaic and classical Greece the term *melos* denotes song and song-dance, but it can also include instrumental performances, melodies, and even abstract 'modes' (*harmoniai*) out of which musical compositions are generated. As a general category (almost a phylum) it contains many smaller overlapping categories, which themselves are overlapping 'families' of basically similar performance-types. Does Plato follow this linguistic path of his ancestors regarding the term *melos* in all his works?

My analysis broaches this question within the frame of the composition and the (re)presentation of *melos* in Plato. The most important dialogues for the study of *melos* are the *Ion*, the *Lysis*, the *Symposium*, the *Gorgias*, the *Protagoras*, the *Republic*, and the *Laws*. My discussion broaches questions about the relation between *melos* and the musical forms of singing and dancing, and its relation to other kinds of poetry or arts. I draw attention to explicit textual references to *melos* rather than to indirect allusions to it, which are discussed in the third chapter of this thesis. As expected, the discussion digresses from *melos* to musical terms that are closely

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[37] Calame (2006) esp. pp. 15-17.

[38] Richardson (2011) 15

[39] Ibid. 15-16. The possible connection of *melos* with *molpē* and *melpesthai*, which is found in many literary texts, could be helpful but Plato does not use these terms: see Frisk (1972) s.v. *μέλπω*. According to Frisk, the association between *melpō* and *melos* is doubtful and can be only verified for the first meaning of *melos*, namely limb ("Glied"). For the semantics of *melpō*, *molpē,* see also: Nagy (1990) 94; Calame (1997) 86-8. Richardson ((2011) 15-16), who examines the meaning of the terms in epic poetry, concludes: "In the Homeric and Hesiodic poems, the words *μέλπω* and *μολπή* are commonly used on various types of singing, often as an accompaniment to dancing. *μολπή* is coupled with ὀ*ρχηθμός* at Il. 13.637, Od. 1.152, 23.145. Elsewhere it is not always clear whether it refers to song, or song and dance combined, or simply 'play': cf. Il. 1.472, 474, 18.606, Od. 4.19, 6.101, etc. The Alexandrian scholars debated about the range of meaning (cf. Janko (1992) 125, on Il. 13.636-39, S. West (1988) 95-96, on Od. 1.152)."

associated with it. These terms are ᾠδή (*ōidē*), ἁρμονία (*harmonia*), ῥυθμός (*rhythmos*), and σχῆμα (*schēma*).

As it has been already noted in the general introduction of this dissertation, I do not follow a strict chronological order of Plato's dialogues[40] for the study of *melos*. Apart from the key passages for which I provide translations, I do not give translations of all the original passages that I briefly mention. One can, however, find all the texts with their translations in Appendix I. The numbers in parenthesis correspond to the relevant passages in the Appendix I.

I.1. *Ion*

The composition of *melos* and the close association between *melos*[41] and *epos.*

In Plato's *Ion,* Socrates engages Ion, a rhapsode,[42] in a discussion about the nature of the rhapsode's skills. As Socrates says, the rhapsode's *technê* requires a fine appearance, a serious study of the poets, and also reciting and interpretative skills.[43] Socrates attributes both Ion's rhapsodic skills and the poet's *technê* to divine inspiration. According to the well-known passage of the metaphor of the magnetic stone, the Muses inspire the poets, who compose their songs in a state of ἐνθουσιασμός.[44] The poets, or the Muses' agents, in turn transmit their inspiration to

[40] On the problems of the chronological order of Plato's dialogues, see Irwin's recent article (2008) esp. pp. 77-81.

[41] In the *Ion* the word *melos* is used nine times as either a simple (*melos*, *melê*, *melôn*) or compound noun (*melopoioi*, *melopoiôn*).

[42] The term rhapsode is used here with the meaning of a professional reciter (esp. of Homer's poetry). However, rhapsode denotes both the performer of one's own poetry and the reciter of the poetry of others, see Murray (1996) 96-97.

[43] Pl. *Ion* 530b-c: τὸ γὰρ ἅμα μὲν τὸ σῶμα κεκοσμῆσθαι … ὡς καλλίστοις φαίνεσθαι … ἔν τε ἄλλοις ποιηταῖς διατρίβειν πολλοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ἐν Ὁμήρῳ … καὶ τὴν τούτου διάνοιαν ἐκμανθάνειν, μὴ μόνον τὰ ἔπη … τὸν γὰρ ῥαψῳδὸν ἑρμηνέα δεῖ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῆς διανοίας γίγνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι· […]

[44] This idea can be found elsewhere in Plato's dialogues. In the *Apology* 22b-c the poets – particularly the tragic and dithyrambic ones – are said to compose their poems thanks to a combination of natural talent and *enthousiasmos*, as the prophets and the soothsayers do: ἔγνων οὖν αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖεν ἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμῳδοί· […]

the performance agents: the rhapsodes, actors, singers and dancers, chorus trainers, and assistant trainers.[45] The last recipients of the poetic inspiration, who are naturally last in the magnetic row, are the members of the audience.[46] Within this context, Socrates compares the good epic poets with the good melic ones (Pl. *Ion* 533e-534a):

Epic poets	Melic poets (*melopoioi*)
πάντες γὰρ οἵ τε τῶν ἐπῶν ποιηταὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ	*καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ*
οὐκ ἐκ τέχνης	
ἀλλ' ἔνθεοι ὄντες	*ὡσαύτως ...*
καὶ κατεχόμενοι πάντα ταῦτα	*ούκ ἔμφρονες ὄντες*
τὰ καλὰ λέγουσι ποιήματα	*τὰ καλὰ μέλη ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν*

Immediately after this comparison, Socrates offers an extensive and vivid description of melic composition and, by association, of epic composition. Thus there is a shift from *epos*, particularly from Homeric poetry, to *melos*. More precisely, there is a stylized slippage of language. In 534a-534b of the *Ion*, he shows how the inspired melic poets compose their songs through the use of three similes (Pl. *Ion* 534a):

In the *Phaedrus* 245a, Socrates lists the Muses' inspiration as the third form of frenzy (μανία) and offers a vivid description of the process through which the soft and pure poet's soul becomes inspired and frenzied in order to compose poetry: τρίτη δὲ ἀπὸ Μουσῶν κατοκωχή τε καὶ μανία, λαβοῦσα ἁπαλὴν καὶ ἄβατον ψυχήν, ἐγείρουσα καὶ ἐκβακχεύουσα κατά τε ᾠδὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ποίησιν, μυρία τῶν παλαιῶν ἔργα κοσμοῦσα τοὺς ἐπιγιγνομένους παιδεύει: ὃς δ' ἂν ἄνευ μανίας Μουσῶν ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας ἀφίκηται, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα ἐκ τέχνης ἱκανὸς ποιητὴς ἐσόμενος, ἀτελὴς αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ ποίησις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν μαινομένων ἡ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος ἠφανίσθη.
In the *Laws* 719c, the motif of poetic composition under divine frenzy is commonplace: παλαιὸς μῦθος, ὦ νομοθέτα, ὑπό τε αὐτῶν ἡμῶν ἀεὶ λεγόμενός ἐστιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν συνδεδογμένος, ὅτι ποιητής, ὁπόταν ἐν τῷ τρίποδι τῆς Μούσης καθίζηται, τότε οὐκ ἔμφρων ἐστίν, οἷον δὲ κρήνη τις τὸ ἐπιὸν ῥεῖν ἑτοίμως ἐᾷ […]

[45] Pl. *Ion* 535e-536a: ὁ δὲ μέσος σὺ ὁ ῥαψῳδὸς καὶ ὑποκριτής, ὁ δὲ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητής· ὁ δὲ θεὸς διὰ πάντων τούτων ἕλκει τὴν ψυχὴν ὅποι ἂν βούληται τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀνακρεμαννὺς ἐξ ἀλλήλων τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς λίθου ἐκείνης ὁρμαθὸς πάμπολυς ἐξήρτηται χορευτῶν τε καὶ διδασκάλων καὶ ὑποδιδασκάλων, ἐκ πλαγίου ἐξηρτημένων τῶν τῆς Μούσης ἐκκρεμαμένων δακτυλίων. For the different types of performance agents, see also *Rep*. 373b: πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ περὶ μουσικήν, ποιηταί τε καὶ τούτων ὑπηρέται, ῥαψῳδοί, ὑποκριταί, χορευταί […]

[46] Pl. *Ion* 535e: οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ θεατὴς τῶν δακτυλίων ὁ ἔσχατος, ὧν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον ὑπὸ τῆς Ἡρακλειώτιδος λίθου ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὴν δύναμιν λαμβάνειν;

{ΣΩ} […] καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὡσαύτως, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες οὐκ ἔμφρονες ὄντες ὀρχοῦνται, οὕτω καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ οὐκ ἔμφρονες ὄντες τὰ καλὰ μέλη ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν […]

{SO} […] and the good melic poets likewise; just as the Corybantian worshippers do not dance when in their senses, so the lyric poets do not indite those fine songs in their senses […][47]

Firstly, melic poets are compared to the Corybantian dancers.[48] The link between the melic composers and the Corybants and the Bacchants is music.[49] In this instance, *melos* denotes song and is used as a generic term. In addition, there seems to be a slippage here between the role of composers and that of performers, which in Plato's time were already quite separate. *Melos* is, paradoxically, a beautiful or fine (καλόν) result of an irrational process, since melic poets compose their songs in state of frenzy (οὐκ ἔμφρονες). The Corybantian worshippers dance in a similar mental or psychological state. Therefore, by association, *melos* also points to dance. Song and dance appear in the context of divine inspiration.

It seems, however, that the corybantic analogy is not limited to melic composers/performers. It also applies to song in general. And since Corybantian ritual, which included orgiastic dancing, was considered therapeutic in the treatment of madness, as Murray states, Plato may suggest the enchantment and the healing power of song/dance. But, when Plato talks about this enchantment of song he turns to choral models, such as the group of Corybantian dancers. Plato's emphasis on choral singing and dancing might be interpreted as a kind of recognition of its significant position in most Greek cities in the fifth and fourth century BC. This analogy provides him the opportunity to downgrade the role of the poets by depriving them of the control of their mind and body and also speak of other kinds of enchantment in terms of song.

[47] The translation is that of Lamb (1925).
[48] See Murray (1996) 115 ad loc, including the references: "the Corybantes were mythical attendants of the Phrygian mother-goddess, Cybele, whose cult involved wild orgiastic dancing to the music of pipes and drums. In classical Athens Corybantic ritual was believed to be therapeutic in the treatment of madness. Like their mythical counterpants, participants in the rites danced in frenzy, their hearts pounding, their eyes filled with tears."
[49] Ibid.

The second simile broadens the scope of frenzy, passing, as Murray remarks, from Corybantic to Bacchic frenzy.[50] Melic poets are likened to Bacchants, or Dionysus' worshippers (Pl. *Ion* 534a):

> {ΣΩ} […] ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὰν ἐμβῶσιν εἰς τὴν ἁρμονίαν καὶ εἰς τὸν ῥυθμόν, βακχεύουσι καὶ κατεχόμενοι, ὥσπερ αἱ βάκχαι ἀρύονται ἐκ τῶν ποταμῶν μέλι καὶ γάλα κατεχόμεναι, ἔμφρονες δὲ οὖσαι οὔ, καὶ τῶν μελοποιῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦτο ἐργάζεται, ὅπερ αὐτοὶ λέγουσι.
>
> {SO} […] but when they have started on the melody and rhythm they begin to be frantic, and it is under possession – as the bacchants are possessed, and not in their senses, when they draw honey and milk from the rivers – that the soul of the melic poets does the same thing, by their own report.

The basic requirement for the composition of *melos* is immersion in the world of harmony and rhythm. As soon as the poets step into harmony and rhythm (ἐμβῶσιν), they start to act like Bacchants (βακχεύουσι) under divine possession (κατεχόμενοι). The poet's soul, then, is compared with that of the Bacchants, who, in a frenzied ecstasy, draw honey and milk from the rivers. The *melic* poets compose their songs under similar circumstances. Thus, *melos*, as it has been already stated above, is the fruit of an irrational mental process during which the poet's soul enters the realm of harmony and rhythm and composes its song under the possession of the divine power. Stewart argues that "such utterances pass through the speaker by means of an external force."[51] He does not however explicate where this external force comes from. Is it, perhaps, represented by the Muses, who offer inspiration and knowledge to the poet?[52] If this is the case here, it is possible that Plato displaces the poets' authority. Poets are only the mouthpieces of the divinities.

The motifs of honey and milk are not a Platonic innovation. There is no doubt that Plato was aware of the important role of milk and honey in the literary tradition. Euripides gives a similar description of the Bacchic chorus in state of ecstasy in the *Bacchae* (708-711):

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[50] Ibid.
[51] See Stewart's (2002) 112 psychoanalytical explanation of the poet's possession by the god.
[52] Calame (1995) 17-20

ὅσαις δὲ λευκοῦ πώματος πόθος παρῆν,
ἄκροισι δακτύλοισι διαμῶσαι χθόνα
γάλακτος ἑσμοὺς εἶχον· ἐκ δὲ κισσίνων
θύρσων γλυκεῖαι μέλιτος ἔσταζον ῥοαί

All who desired the white drink
scratched the earth with the tips of their fingers
and obtained streams of milk;
and a sweet flow of honey dripped from their ivy thyrsoi;

Furthermore, Pindar uses the motifs of honey and milk as a metaphor for song[53] (Pi. *N.* 3.76-9):

ἐγὼ τόδε τοι
πέμπω μεμιγμένον μέλι λευκῷ
σὺν γάλακτι, κιρναμένα δ᾽ ἔερσ᾽ ἀμφέπει,
πόμ᾽ ἀοίδιμον Αἰολῇσιν ἐν πνοαῖσιν αὐλῶν

I am
sending this to you, honey mixed with white
milk, crested with foam from mixing,
a draught of song accompanied by the Aeolian breathings of flutes

Plato's use of the motifs of honey and milk seems to echo both Euripidean and Pindaric descriptions. As Murray argues, in the *Ion* Plato "brings together two different types of experience, Bacchic ecstasy and poetic inspiration."[54]

In the third simile, Plato completes the description of melic composition by comparing the poets to bees. Plato uses a number of literary *topoi* to portray the poets' inspiration and the creation of the songs (Pl. *Ion* 534a-b):

{ΣΩ} […] λέγουσι γὰρ δήπουθεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς οἱ ποιηταὶ ὅτι ἀπὸ κρηνῶν μελιρρύτων ἐκ Μουσῶν κήπων τινῶν καὶ ναπῶν δρεπόμενοι τὰ μέλη ἡμῖν φέρουσιν ὥσπερ αἱ μέλιτται, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτω πετόμενοι· καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγουσι.

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[53] See Murray (1996) 116, who considers Pindar's *N.* 3.76-79 a metaphor for poetry in general.
[54] Ibid.

κοῦφον γὰρ χρῆμα ποιητής ἐστιν καὶ πτηνὸν καὶ ἱερόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον οἷός τε ποιεῖν πρὶν ἂν ἔνθεός τε γένηται καὶ ἔκφρων καὶ ὁ νοῦς μηκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνῇ· ἕως δ' ἂν τουτὶ ἔχῃ τὸ κτῆμα, ἀδύνατος πᾶς ποιεῖν ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν καὶ χρησμῳδεῖν. […]

{SO} […] For the poets tell us, I believe, that the songs they bring us are the sweets they cull from honey-dropping founts in certain gardens and glades of the Muses – <u>like the bees</u>, and winging the air as these do. And what they tell is true. For a poet is a light and winged and sacred thing, and is unable ever to indite until he has been inspired and put out of his senses, and his mind is no longer in him: every man, whilst he retains possession of that, is powerless to indite a verse or chant an oracle. […]

Plato's appropriation of the poets' imagery is evident. He uses the poets' descriptions of *utopia* to embody the poetic inspiration and plays cunningly with the words *melos-meli-melitta*, the motifs, and the images of 'honey' μέλι (μελιρρύτων), 'song' μέλος (μέλη), and 'bees' μέλιτται.[55] The rivers of the Bacchants that bring honey and milk in the second simile are turned into honey-dropping founts situated in the Muses' gardens in the third simile. The presence of the divine Muses enhances the previous image of Bacchic ecstasy. The god of inspiration in this instance is Muses, not Dionysus.

Melic poets are likened to bees and characterized as κοῦφον χρῆμα, πτηνόν, and ἱερόν.[56] Plato's use of the bee-poet simile is not original. In Simonides' Fr. 88, 593 PMG,[57] the poet uses the image of the bee that flies from flower to flower in order to make honey:

[ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθεσιν ὁμιλεῖν ὁ Σιμωνίδης φησὶ]
<u>τὴν μέλιτταν ξανθὸν μέλι μηδομέναν</u>

[For as Simonides says] <u>the bee</u> [visits flowers],
<u>skillfully making the yellow honey</u>

[55] For a number of parallels from ancient Greek poetry on the various aspects of poetic imagery that is echoed in the Platonic passage, see Murray (1996) 116-7.
[56] For parallels in Homeric and Archaic poetry, see Murray (1996) 118.
[57] Cited in Plut. *Quomodo quis suos in virt. sent. prof.* 1.8.

In *Anecdota Graeca*, the anonymous writer explains Simonides' verses by characterizing the poet as 'bee of the Muse,' whose care is the making of the honey-song.[58] Pindar, possibly after Simonides,[59] compares the poet's imagination with *melittai* 'bees' (Pi.*P*.10.53-54):

> ἐγκωμίων γὰρ ἄωτος ὕμνων
> ἐπ' ἄλλοτ' ἄλλον ὥτε μέλισσα θύνει λόγον.
>
> for the finest of victory hymns
> flit like a bee from one theme to another.

In addition, Pindar uses the image of the bee-poet in the sixth Pythian (Pi.*P*.6.52-4):

> γλυκεῖα δὲ φρὴν
> καὶ συμπόταισιν ὁμιλεῖν
> μελισσᾶν ἀμείβεται τρητὸν πόνον.
>
> And his sweet spirit,
> in company with his drinking companions,
> surpasses the perforated labor of bees.

In the Platonic metaphor, Plato describes a process. The bee-poet, filled with god (ἔνθεος) and out of his senses (ἔκφρων), flies in the sacred places of the Muses in order to collect the elements required to produce his songs, exactly as the bees fly from one flower to another in order to collect food and make honey. So Plato is clearly, then, reworking tropes taken from older songs, weaving them into his own argument, perhaps even twisting them a little.

The vocabulary of all these similes indicates that the poet is active: ποιοῦσιν (534a), ἐργάζεται (534a), and δρεπόμενοι (534b). However, the poet is unable to compose his poems on his own without being possessed by the god.[60] Furthermore,

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[58] Cramer (1836) 173 X.12-15: Καλῶ δε σε … καὶ <u>μέλιτταν Μούσης</u>· 'οὐκ ἀπὸ τινων θύμων καὶ δριμυτάτων ἀνθέων ξανθόν μέλι μηδομένην' ὡς φασὶν ὁ Σιμωνίδης ...

[59] Henderson (1999) 98.

[60] For a psychoanalytic approach to Plato's *Ion* based on the distinction between the irrational process of the poetic composition and the rational interpretation of the poetry delivered, see Konstan (2005) 1-7.

the close association between poetry and prophecy (ἀδύνατος πᾶς ποιεῖν ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν καὶ χρησμῳδεῖν) at the end of passage 534b underlines the poet's lack of creative power. The role of the poet is evidently downgraded.

Plato strengthens his argument by citing the living example of Tynnichos of Chalcis. According to Plato, he was a minor melic poet who nevertheless composed the most beautiful song[61] thanks to the divine inspiration he received. Plato mentions his name and stresses the excellence of his poem (Pl. *Ion* 534d-535a):

> {ΣΩ} […] μέγιστον δὲ τεκμήριον τῷ λόγῳ Τύννιχος ὁ Χαλκιδεύς, ὃς ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν πώποτε ἐποίησε ποίημα ὅτου τις ἂν ἀξιώσειεν μνησθῆναι, τὸν δὲ παίωνα ὃν πάντες ᾄδουσι, σχεδόν τι πάντων μελῶν κάλλιστον, ἀτεχνῶς, ὅπερ αὐτὸς λέγει, 'εὕρημά τι Μοισᾶν.' [...] ταῦτα ἐνδεικνύμενος ὁ θεὸς ἐξεπίτηδες διὰ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου ποιητοῦ τὸ κάλλιστον μέλος ᾖσεν […]

> {SO} […] A convincing proof of what I say is the case of Tynnichus, the Chalcidian, who had never composed a single poem in his life that could deserve any mention, and then produced the paean which is in everyone's mouth, almost the finest song we have, simply or without art (?) – as he says himself – "an invention of the Muses." For the god [...] of set purpose sang the finest of songs through the meanest of poets […]

The choice of Τύννιχος is not random: he is a "little, unimportant (τυννός)" melic poet,[62] who composed the best song simply or without art (ἀτεχνώς).[63] Tynnichos' verse εὕρημά τι Μοισᾶν, which is added as a comment of the poet's own paean, and the affirmation that the god intentionally sang through the poet's voice present the god as the absolute and unique source of poetic creativity. Moreover, they show Plato's playful and ironic attitude towards the melic poets who he sees as devoid of any creative ability. Concerning the meaning of *melos* here, as the paean is performed by a chorus, at least in the classical period, *melos* is by analogy a choral song.[64]

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[61] The story is also narrated by Porphyri *De Abst.* 2.18: Τὸν γοῦν Αἰσχύλον φασί, τῶν Δελφῶν ἀξιούντων εἰς τὸν θεὸν γράψαι παιᾶνα, εἰπεῖν ὅτι βέλτιστα Τυννίχῳ πεποίηται· […]

[62] Yossi (1998) 123.

[63] The use of the adverb ἀτεχνῶς is ambiguous here.

[64] For a thorough survey of the melic form of paean, see Käppel (1992) and Rutherford (2001).

Within this context, Socrates cites some distinct poetic forms (categories of poetry) and genres (sub-categories of poetic forms), such as dithyrambs, *encômia*, hyporchemes, epic, and iambic poems. He emphasizes that each poet must specialize in only one genre, as Tynnichos did (Pl. *Ion* 534c):

> {ΣΩ} […] τοῦτο μόνον οἷός τε ἕκαστος ποιεῖν καλῶς ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἡ Μοῦσα αὐτὸν ὥρμησεν, ὁ μὲν διθυράμβους, ὁ δὲ ἐγκώμια, ὁ δὲ ὑπορχήματα, ὁ δ᾽ ἔπη, ὁ δ᾽ ἰάμβους· τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα φαῦλος αὐτῶν ἕκαστός ἐστιν. […]

> {SO} […] each is able only to compose that to which the Muse has stirred him, this man dithyrambs, another laudatory odes, another dance-songs, another epic or else iambic verse; but each is at fault in any other kind. […]

Socrates insists that each poet should compose one kind of poetry. But the great masters of melic poetry, such as Simonides, Pindar, and Bacchylides, wrote in more than one melic genre or kind of poetry. Does this indicate an indirect disapproval of these poets? Certainly one can say that melic poets normally did not compose epic poems or *iamboi* – though Simonides' elegies are an interesting borderline case, and some sacred choral compositions seem in practice to have been ascribed to Archilochos, although the texts have not survived.

Why does Socrates spend so much time on melic poets here, and not on epic poets? Perhaps, it is because *melos* (the *melos* Plato knew) was extremely rich in poetological statements of all kinds, and he is obviously pillaging the texts and using them, though in a brutally literal and therefore unjust, but also very productive and creative kind of misreading, to make the silly point he wants to make about song not being a form of knowledge. It should be noted here that the one kind of expertise Socrates does not mention in the *Ion* is musical/poetic expertise, in other words expertise in the art of poetry itself. In addition, there is something very specific about the power of *choreia* that Socrates cannot neglect – an argument that can be reinforced by the importance of the *choreia* in the *Laws*, as we shall see later in our discussion. One could also add to the above arguments that he is himself engaging in a bit of myth-making and falls back on the most powerful mythical *paradeigmata*, just as for Homer and Hesiod the archetypal performances are the divine performances of song.

Socrates proceeds to describe the rhapsode's soul during the recitation of the Homeric poems. Socrates asks Ion what his state of mind is while reciting the Homeric verses and Ion admits the influence that the different subjects have on him[65] (Pl. *Ion* 535b-c):

> {ΣΩ} […] ὅταν εὖ εἴπῃς ἔπη καὶ ἐκπλήξῃς μάλιστα τοὺς θεωμένους, ἢ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα ὅταν ἐπὶ τὸν οὐδὸν ἐφαλλόμενον ᾄδῃς […] τότε πότερον ἔμφρων εἶ ἢ ἔξω σαυτοῦ γίγνῃ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πράγμασιν οἴεταί σου εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴ οἷς λέγεις ἐνθουσιάζουσα, ἢ ἐν Ἰθάκῃ οὖσιν ἢ ἐν Τροίᾳ ἢ ὅπως ἂν καὶ τὰ ἔπη ἔχῃ; {ΙΩΝ} ὡς ἐναργές μοι τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ τεκμήριον εἶπες· οὐ γάρ σε ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐρῶ. ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅταν ἐλεινόν τι λέγω, δακρύων ἐμπίμπλανταί μου οἱ ὀφθαλμοί· ὅταν τε φοβερὸν ἢ δεινόν, ὀρθαὶ αἱ τρίχες ἵστανται ὑπὸ φόβου καὶ ἡ καρδία πηδᾷ.
>
> {SO} […] when you give a good recitation and specially thrill your audience, either with the lay of Odysseus leaping forth on to the threshold … are you then in your senses, or are you carried out of yourself, and does your soul in an ecstasy suppose herself to be among the scenes you are describing, whether they be in Ithaca, or in Troy, or as the poems may chance to place them? {ION} How vivid to me, Socrates, is this part of your proof! For I will tell you without reserve: when I relate a tale of woe, my eyes are filled with tears; and when it is of fear or awe, my hair stands on end with terror, and my heart leaps.

Despite the fact that the rhapsodes recited and did not sing hexameter poetry,[66] Plato's interchangeable use of λέγω (εἴπῃς, to say) and ᾄδω (ᾄδῃς, to sing)[67] for the rhapsode's performance shows the close association between *melos* and *epos* in this dialogue. Moreover, the Platonic diction (ἔμφρων, ἐνθουσιάζουσα) used for the state of the frenzied, ecstatic rhapsode's soul at the recital of the Homeric poetry recalls the description of the inspired and possessed poet's soul during the melic composition.

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[65] Such identification of the performer with that which he describes presupposes *mimêsis*, as Plato argues in the *Republic* 393c: οὐκοῦν τό γε ὁμοιοῦν ἑαυτὸν ἄλλῳ ἢ κατὰ φωνὴν ἢ κατὰ σχῆμα μιμεῖσθαί ἐστιν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἄν τις ὁμοιοῖ;
The danger of the performer identifying too much with the role or subject can be found in Lucian (*De Salt.* 83-84), who demonstrates how an actor enacting the role of the insane Ajax drove himself mad through extreme *mimêsis*.

[66] See Nagy (1990) 20-24, who discusses the Homeric and Hesiodic performances in the Archaic period. For the rhapsodic performances in Plato's time, see Nagy (2009).

[67] Murray (1996) 110, 121. We also see this in Pl. *Ion* 532d, 535b, c, e, 537a.

Thus Plato establishes a connection between the rhapsode's soul and the soul of the melic poet. The interchangeability of 'song' and 'speech/recitation' might also imply the interchangeability of *melos* and *epos* as cultural or poetic categories. One could – and in later sources like Dionysius of Halicarnassus one does – speak of the 'melodic' qualities of speech; and in any case 'poetry' in almost all its forms self-identifies as 'song' even in Plato's time. There is an analogy, certainly, between the poet and the rhapsode, but Plato clearly says that the latter does not *compose* song.

The leap of Ion's heart at the recital of a fearful scene is similar to the leap of Alcibiades' heart in the Platonic *Symposium*, and reveals the strong influence that Socrates' words exert over him. In the *Symposium*, the leap of the heart is compared with the dance of *Corybantes*, which creates strong links with the *Ion* (Pl. *Symp*. 215e):

> {ΑΛ} ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούω, πολύ μοι μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν κορυβαντιώντων ἥ τε καρδία πηδᾷ καὶ δάκρυα ἐκχεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων τῶν τούτου, ὁρῶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλους παμπόλλους τὰ αὐτὰ πάσχοντας.
>
> {AL} The moment I hear him, I am worse than the Corybantes, my heart starts leaping, and my tears come streaming down my face to the sound of his speech, and I see very many other people having the same experience.

The metaphor of the heart dancing due to fear is found in Aeschylus' *Choēphoroi*, when the chorus addressing Electra admits his fear, A. *Ch*. 166: λέγοις ἄν· ὀρχεῖται δὲ καρδία φόβῳ ('Speak – but my heart is dancing with fear').[68] Since Alcibiades' reactions at the sight of Socrates in the *Symposium* are compared to the reactions of the Corybantian dancers, the verb πηδάω ('to jump') might be interpreted as a synonym of ὀρχέομαι ('to dance'). Alcibiades – or the other victims of Socrates' charm – does not compose songs, despite the strong impact of Socrates' words on him, but undergoes an emotionally strong, "Corybantic" experience, which is, unlike to the descriptions in the *Ion*, not of divine origin.

The analogy between song-dance and philosophy in the *Symposium* raises many questions: for example, what does the 'Corybantic' power of Socrates' speaking over Alcibiades tell us about the nature of Socrates' philosophy and is there a point where

[68] I owe this reference to Murray (1996) 122.

melos and philosophy eventually meet? It seems to me that Plato underscores through this comparison the enchantment, the powerful emotional reactions that Socrates' philosophy causes to its listeners. As we have already seen, the song-dance influences their composers and performers in a similar way. However, in the *Ion*, we do not have any information about the responses of the audience to the compositions/performances (the roles of composer/performer/listener are blended), whereas in the *Symposium* the focus is exactly on that, namely on the spontaneous reactions of (a member of) the audience (clearly distinguished from the composer/performer), given as a sort of responsive performance.

A second metaphor of the soul's dance at the hearing of Homeric poetry completes the first one. While the rhapsode listens to the Homeric verses, his soul is awakened and starts to dance. Here, I attempt to understand why Plato uses the term *melos*[69] instead of *epos* in order to talk about the Homeric poem (Pl. *Ion* 536b-c):

> {ΣΩ} […] ὧν σύ, ὦ Ἴων, εἷς εἶ καὶ κατέχῃ ἐξ Ὁμήρου, καὶ ἐπειδὰν μέν τις ἄλλου του ποιητοῦ ᾄδῃ, καθεύδεις τε καὶ ἀπορεῖς ὅτι λέγῃς, ἐπειδὰν δὲ τούτου τοῦ ποιητοῦ <u>φθέγξηταί τις μέλος</u>, εὐθὺς ἐγρήγορας καὶ <u>ὀρχεῖταί</u> σου <u>ἡ ψυχὴ</u> καὶ εὐπορεῖς ὅτι λέγῃς· οὐ γὰρ τέχνῃ οὐδ' ἐπιστήμῃ περὶ Ὁμήρου λέγεις ἃ λέγεις, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ καὶ κατοκωχῇ, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες ἐκείνου μόνου αἰσθάνονται τοῦ μέλους ὀξέως ὃ ἂν ᾖ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξ ὅτου ἂν κατέχωνται, καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέλος καὶ σχημάτων καὶ ῥημάτων εὐποροῦσι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐ φροντίζουσιν· οὕτω καὶ σύ, ὦ Ἴων, περὶ μὲν Ὁμήρου ὅταν τις μνησθῇ, εὐπορεῖς, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπορεῖς· […]
>
> {SO} […] Of whom you, Ion, are one, and are possessed by Homer; and so, when anyone recites the work of another poet, you go to sleep and are at a loss what to say; but when some one <u>utters a song</u> of this poet, you wake up at once, and your <u>soul dances</u>, and you have plenty to say: for it is not by art or knowledge about Homer that you say what you say, but by divine dispensation and possession; just as the Corybantian worshippers are keenly sensible of that strain alone which belongs to the god whose possession is on them, and have plenty of gestures and phrases for that tune, but do not heed any other. And so

[69] Of course, we should not forget the melodiousness of the Homeric poems composed in the dactylic hexameter.

> you, Ion, when the subject of Homer is mentioned, have plenty to say, but nothing on any of the others. […]

The reaction of Ion's soul is the same as a performer and as a spectator. As seen in passage 536b-c, the Platonic language reveals the association between epic and melic poetry. The expression φθέγξηταί τις μέλος[70] used for the recitation of the Homeric lines and the fact that *epos*, designated as *melos*, makes the rhapsode's soul dance (ὀρχεῖταί σου ἡ ψυχὴ) implies the shift from the one kind of poetry to the other.

However, Nagy argues that in Plato's *Ion* 536b-c *melos* is a marked term and, hence, denotes the inherent / internal melody of the Homeric poetry:

> the actual presence of melody in Homeric verses is not a metaphor but a reality. The meter known as the dactylic hexameter, which was the one single rhythmical frame for the composition of epic verses attributed to Homer, was simultaneously a melodic frame for these verses. To state it more technically, each hexameter had its own distinctive melodic contour.[71]

Despite Nagy's persuasive explanation of the use of the term *melos* for Homeric poetry, nevertheless throughout Plato's *Ion* we are encouraged to associate *melos* – as dance song, whether solo or choral[72] – with *epos*. One may wonder, however, if it could also be a matter of the dialogue itself imposing on Socrates a slightly 'metaphorical' use of the word, since he is pointing back to the magical power of *melos* as described earlier in the dialogue. It might also be argued that Plato has, perhaps, in mind a notion of 'song' that cuts across poetic/performance genres, and that it is the power of this 'song' that he is interested in exploring.

The ironic and negative treatment of Homeric poetry[73] based particularly on the slippage of language between *epos* and *melos* forms part of his argument to show that even *epos* is the result of unconscious impulses. The focus however falls on the passivity and madness of the poets, when composing their poems/songs, rather than the songs themselves.

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[70] Similarly, in Pl. *Ion* 534d: ἀλλ᾽ ὁ θεὸς αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ λέγων, διὰ τούτων δὲ φθέγγεται πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

[71] Nagy (2010) 382.

[72] See also Koller's (1965) 27 conclusions on the meaning of *melos* in Plato.

[73] See esp. Pl. *Ion* 535b, where Socrates recalls Homeric stories that provoke feelings of pity and fear.

We cannot be sure if we should take Plato's views of the poet's ἐνθουσιασμός and divine inspiration seriously. It is however certain that, despite the irrational poetic process he provides, the end products, are indeed beautiful (καλά). As Murray persuasively notes "the more irrational the poetic process, the less can the poet claim knowledge either of how he makes his poetry or of what his poetry says."[74] By accusing the poets for saying things they do not really know or understand Plato questions their natural talent as well as their professional skills.

I.2. *Lysis*

The composition and performance of *melos*, an erotic *encômium*

The main subject of the discussion in the *Lysis* is the nature of friendship (φιλία).[75] The whole conversation is presented as Socrates' attempt to teach Hippothales the most appropriate way to approach his beloved. Socrates is aware of Hippothales' passion for the young and beautiful Lysis. Hippothales does not admit it at first, but the blush in his face betrays his true feelings towards the boy (Pl. *Lys*. 204b-c):

> {ΣΩ} σοὶ δὲ δὴ τίς, ὦ Ἱππόθαλες; τοῦτό μοι εἰπέ. καὶ ὃς ἐρωτηθεὶς ἠρυθρίασεν. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὦ παῖ Ἱερωνύμου Ἱππόθαλες, τοῦτο μὲν μηκέτι εἴπῃς, εἴτε ἐρᾷς του εἴτε μή· οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐρᾷς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πόρρω ἤδη εἶ πορευόμενος τοῦ ἔρωτος. […] καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας πολὺ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἠρυθρίασεν. […]
>
> {SO} Well, and which is yours, Hippothales? Tell me that. At this question he blushed; so I said: Ah, Hippothales, son of Hieronymus, you need not trouble to tell me whether you are in love with somebody or not: for I know you are not only in love, but also far advanced already in your passion. […] When he heard this, he blushed much more than ever. […][76]

[74] Murray (1997) 6-12.
[75] On the subject of friendship in Plato's *Lysis,* see Bolotin (1979); Haden (1983) 327-356; and Nichols (2006) 1-19.
[76] The translation is that of Lamb (1955).

Ctesippus, possibly a friend of Hippothales, reveals a little later in 204d[77] how Hippothales expresses his love for the young man: he speaks about him in prose (καταλογάδην), he inundates his listeners with poems (τὰ ποιήματα ... καταντλεῖν) and prose compositions (συγγράμματα), and he also sings for him (ᾄδει εἰς τὰ παιδικά). Hippothales is a composer and a performer at the same time of both poetic~musical and prose compositions.

Although Hippothales denies that he has created poems and prose compositions for Lysis,[78] Ctesippus considers his behavior foolish and mad (Pl. *Lys*. 205a):

> {ΚΤΗ} οὐχ ὑγιαίνει, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, ἀλλὰ ληρεῖ τε καὶ μαίνεται.
>
> {CTE} He is not well in the mind, said Ctesippus, but he behaves foolishly and like a mad person.

Socrates appears to take Ctessipus' words seriously and ignores Hippothales' denials. Thus, we are possibly being encouraged to do the same (Pl. *Lys*. 205a-b):

> {ΣΩ} ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, οὔ τι τῶν μέτρων δέομαι ἀκοῦσαι οὐδὲ μέλος εἴ τι πεποίηκας εἰς τὸν νεανίσκον, ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας, ἵνα εἰδῶ τίνα τρόπον προσφέρῃ πρὸς τὰ παιδικά.
>
> {SO} Hippothales, I do not want to hear your verses, or any song that you may have composed to the youth, but their meaning, in order to see the way you engage with your favorite.

Hippothales, driven by erotic 'madness' (μαίνεται < μανία), creates his compositions, which bring to mind the description of the ecstatic state of the melic composer in the *Ion*. In the *Lysis* the composer is under the possession of the daimon *Eros*. The source of his inspiration and creativity is the *mania* of *Eros*, presented as intense passion, for the young boy. Although Plato's language is metaphorical here, it

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[77] Pl. *Lys*. 204d: καὶ ἃ μὲν καταλογάδην διηγεῖται, δεινὰ ὄντα, οὐ πάνυ τι δεινά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὰν τὰ ποιήματα ἡμῶν ἐπιχειρήσῃ καταντλεῖν καὶ συγγράμματα.

[78] Pl. *Lys*. 205a: οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἔφη, ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιεῖν εἰς τὰ παιδικὰ μηδὲ συγγράφειν. Plato uses the verb ποιεῖν for verse composition and the verb συγγράφειν for prose composition.
See the whole passage (205a-b) in Appendix I: 5.

highlights the necessity of the composer's irrational state, which is again originated by a divinity, in the process of composing.

Socrates accuses Hippothales of composing and singing an *encômium* for himself.[79] As Socrates explains, Hippothales' *encômia* for his favorite will only give him glory if he conquers his heart and not otherwise. Only in this case will the *encômium* for the young boy be a veritable *encômium*[80] for his victory (Pl. *Lys*. 205e):

> {ΣΩ} πάντων μάλιστα, εἶπον, εἰς σὲ τείνουσιν αὗται αἱ ᾠδαί. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἕλῃς τὰ παιδικὰ τοιαῦτα ὄντα, κόσμος σοι ἔσται τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ ᾀσθέντα καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἐγκώμια ὥσπερ νενικηκότι, ὅτι τοιούτων παιδικῶν ἔτυχες· ἐὰν δέ σε διαφύγῃ, ὅσῳ ἂν μείζω σοι εἰρημένα ᾖ ἐγκώμια περὶ τῶν παιδικῶν, τοσούτῳ μειζόνων δόξεις καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐστερημένος […]

> {SO} Most certainly, I replied, it is you to whom these songs refer. For if you prevail on your favorite, and he is such as you describe, all that you have spoken and sung will be so much glory to you, and a veritable praise upon your triumph in having secured such a favorite as that: whereas if he eludes your grasp, the higher the terms of your praise of your favorite, the greater will seem to be the charms and virtues you have lost, and you will be ridiculed accordingly. […]

It seems that Hippothales' *melos* is a 'song' (ᾠδαί) and, more precisely, an erotic *encômium*. Until this point, Hippothales has been described as a composer of poems, songs, and prose stories, but Socrates now focuses more on his melic compositions, exactly as he does in the *Ion*. He sings his *melos* in front of his friends, but not in front of Socrates or Lysis,[81] to whom his song is addressed. Unlike Lysis' *melos*, Socrates' philosophy succeeds in reaching Lysis' ears, as we shall see in Chapter 3. The use of poetry and *melos* in love matters before the conquest of the lover is considered

[79] Hippothales, however, keeps denying it. See Pl. *Lys*. 205d: καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας εἶπον· ὦ καταγέλαστε Ἱππόθαλες, πρὶν νενικηκέναι ποιεῖς τε καὶ ᾄδεις εἰς σαυτὸν ἐγκώμιον; ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς ἐμαυτόν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔτε ποιῶ οὔτε ᾄδω.
For a discussion on Hippothales' encômium, see chapter III.2.1.
[80] The word *encômia* in 205e is not used as a generic term, but denotes the praise and the approval of the lover's victory.
[81] According to Ctesippus' comments, Hippothales' performance is really bad, see Pl. *Lys*. 204d; 205b-d.

unwise.[82] Therefore, the road to the practice of philosophy is now open. Here too we have an attitude towards poetic composition/performance that Socrates sees it as something inferior or even untrue.

I.3. *Symposium*

Melos as the encômium for Erôs. Melopoiia and *paideia.*

In the *Symposium*, various guests express their views on the subject of *erôs* (love, sexual desire) through a series of speeches. The discussion takes place at Agathon's house on the occasion of his first victory in a dramatic contest. In the *Lysis*, *encômium* seems to be used in two senses, 1) of an epinician song; 2) of a praise-song/speech for a lover. In the *Symposium*, however, the speakers agree to compose an *encômium* for the god Erôs.[83] So, in the *Symposium*, we have a clear case of the second sense of 'prose *enkomia'* or 'epideictic speeches.'

Eryximachus, a professional doctor, develops his ideas on the subject by linking medicine with *mousikê* in his discussion of Love (Pl. *Symp*. 187c):

> {EP} τὴν δὲ ὁμολογίαν πᾶσι τούτοις, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἡ ἰατρική, ἐνταῦθα ἡ μουσικὴ ἐντίθησιν, ἔρωτα καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ἀλλήλων ἐμποιήσασα· καὶ ἔστιν αὖ μουσικὴ περὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἐρωτικῶν ἐπιστήμη.
>
> {ER} In all these cases the agreement is brought about by music, which, like medicine in the former instance, introduces a mutual love and unanimity. Hence in its turn mousikê is found to be a knowledge of love-matters relating to harmony and rhythm.[84]

In the *Symposium, mousikê* is defined as a sort of 'knowledge of love-matters concerning harmony and rhythm.' Harmony and rhythm in *mousikê* are equivalent to health in medicine: they provide concord between different elements. However, we

[82] Pl. *Lys*. 206a: ὅστις οὖν τὰ ἐρωτικά, ὦ φίλε, σοφός, οὐκ ἐπαινεῖ τὸν ἐρώμενον πρὶν ἂν ἕλῃ, δεδιὼς τὸ μέλλον ὅπῃ ἀποβήσεται.

[83] Pl. *Symp*. 177a-d. On this subject, see Chapter 3.1.1.

[84] The translation is that of Fowler (1925).

watch the progressive composition of an *encômium* in prose[85] rather than a melic composition. *Melos* is not allowed in the room where the philosophical dialogue takes place.[86] Despite their differences, the space left for *melos* is extremely limited in both the *Lysis* and the *Symposium*.[87]

In this dialogue, Plato broadens the use of *melos*, which has a significant social role. As Eryximachus says, the application and use of rhythm in society is twofold: *melopoiia* uses rhythm and harmony in order to compose *melê* and *paideia* correctly uses the already composed tunes and verses (Pl. *Symp*. 187c-d):

> {EP} […] καὶ ἐν μέν γε αὐτῇ τῇ συστάσει ἁρμονίας τε καὶ ῥυθμοῦ οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν τὰ ἐρωτικὰ διαγιγνώσκειν, οὐδὲ ὁ διπλοῦς ἔρως ἐνταῦθά πω ἔστιν· ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὰν δέῃ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καταχρῆσθαι ῥυθμῷ τε καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ ἢ ποιοῦντα, ὃ δὴ μελοποιίαν καλοῦσιν, ἢ χρώμενον ὀρθῶς τοῖς πεποιημένοις μέλεσί τε καὶ μέτροις, ὃ δὴ παιδεία ἐκλήθη, ἐνταῦθα δὴ καὶ χαλεπὸν καὶ ἀγαθοῦ δημιουργοῦ δεῖ.
>
> {ER} In the actual system of harmony or rhythm we can easily distinguish these love-matters; as yet the double Love is absent: but when we come to the application of rhythm and harmony to social life, whether we construct what are called 'melodies' or use correctly, by what is known as *paideia* tunes and measures already composed, we find here a certain difficulty and require a good craftsman.

The correctness (ὀρθῶς) of *melê* in education is discussed in detail by analyzing the concept of *mimêsis,* mainly in the second book of the *Laws.*[88] It is reasonable to assume that the central position of correct *melê* in *paideia* requires their correct representation during the teaching process. Thus, in the *Symposium* the attention shifts from the composition of *melê* to their representation in the process of education. *Melos* is at the core of *paideia* and therefore has moral and social connotations.

The role of *mousikos* either as composer or as performer is to balance all the different elements and principles of *mousikê* in order to instill a better sense of

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[85] Hunter (2004) 34-7 argues that it is an epideictic *encômium*. See also my discussion in Chapter 3.1.1.
[86] See Pl. *Symp*. 176e, where the flute-girl is expelled from the party.
[87] So far, the word *melos* has not been used.
[88] See my discussion in this chapter, pp. 34-42.

propriety in people. The love for good *mousikê* felt by good people is the love produced by Urania, the heavenly Muse. Therefore, the music of Urania, the Muse of philosophy, as presented in the *Phaedrus* (254d) along with Calliope, is credited with moral benefits. *Melos* seems to 'meet' philosophy here.

Undoubtedly, the fact that we have an *encômium* and that the references to *melos* end with the praise of philosophy (through the praise of the philosophical Muse) betray Plato's genuine intention to undermine and marginalize it.

I.4. *Gorgias*

Melopoiia and the art of rhetoric

In Plato's *Gorgias,* Socrates debates with the famous sophist Gorgias, his student Polus, and Gorgias' host on the subject of rhetoric, Callicles. Socrates tries to define rhetoric and understand its nature. In his attempt to pinpoint the core of rhetoric, he seeks to define other arts, such as weaving and *mousikê*. As he states, the composition of *melê* is the main object of *mousikê* (Pl. *Gorg*. 449d):

{ΣΩ} οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν μελῶν ποίησιν;

{SO} then *mousikê* is not concerned with the composition of *melê*?[89]

Similarly, the knowledge of *melê* is the core of *mousikê* as Aristides Quintilianus says (A. Q. *De Mus*. 6 Mb-R.P.W. 1.4):

Μουσική ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη μέλους καὶ τῶν περὶ μέλος συμβαινόντων […]

Mousikê is scientific knowledge about *melos* and whatever is associated with it […]

According to Plato's definition, *mousikê* – equally treated here with the art of rhetoric and the weaving – is a kind of *technê* concerned with the composition of

[89] The translation is that of Lamb (1967).

melodies or songs. Certainly, this brief and somehow raw definition of *mousikê* is given simplistically and without further explanation on the process of poetic composition that requires both skill and knowledge.[90] By contrast, in Aristides Quintilianus' definition *mousikê* is described only as ἐπιστήμη ('science' or 'knowledge'). One must be aware of all the elements that constitute an art or craft, such as the art's purpose, principles, and rules, in order to become ἐπιστήμων τέχνης[91] and, thus, capable of transmitting this knowledge. Good knowledge of something presupposes deep understanding and the transmission of knowledge requires certain skills. Gorgias fails to distinguish composition from knowledge, as Plochmann and Robinson underline, which "will return later to haunt" him.[92] Later in the dialogue, Socrates will return to the subject of *mousikê* and complete its definition. According to Socrates, as we shall see, *mousikê* serves the same purposes as the craft of rhetoric.

In 462c Socrates argues that rhetoric is not an art, but a craft (ἐμπειρία) that aims to produce gratification and pleasure (χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας). In 501d-502c, during the discussion of different aspects of *mousikê* in the broader sense of instrumental, vocal, and kinetic activity, such as flute-playing, harp-playing, choral performances, dithyrambic poetry, and tragic poetry, he repeats that the primary aim of all these occupations (ἐπιτηδεύσεις) is to gratify and please the spectators. Therefore, *mousikê* is a craft or occupation that is intended merely to give satisfaction and pleasure to the audience. In this way, he indirectly criticizes *melos* as the main object of *mousikê.*

The public performance in front of a large audience is the biggest problem that *mousikê*, understood here in the narrower sense of poetry, shares with the craft of rhetoric. *Melos* is mentioned again in the definition of poetry, which consists of four elements. Socrates says (Pl. *Gorg*. 502c-d):

> {ΣΩ} φέρε δή, εἴ τις περιέλοι τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό τε μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον, ἄλλο τι ἢ λόγοι γίγνονται τὸ λειπόμενον; {ΚΑ} ἀνάγκη. {ΣΩ} οὐκοῦν πρὸς πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ δῆμον οὗτοι λέγονται οἱ λόγοι; {ΚΑ} φημί. {ΣΩ} δημηγορία ἄρα τίς ἐστιν ἡ ποιητική. {ΚΑ} φαίνεται. {ΣΩ} οὐκοῦν ῥητορικὴ δημηγορία ἂν εἴη· ἢ οὐ ῥητορεύειν δοκοῦσί σοι οἱ ποιηταὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις;

[90] However, the terms craft (*technê*) and knowledge (*epistêmê*) seem interchangeable in the *Gorgias*. For example, rhetoric is considered both (*technê*) and knowledge (*epistêmê*), 449d.
[91] Pl. *Lys*. 449c.
[92] Plochman and Robinson (1988) 24.

> {ΚΑ} ἔμοιγε. {ΣΩ} νῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς ηὑρήκαμεν ῥητορικήν τινα πρὸς δῆμον τοιοῦτον οἷον παίδων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων, ἣν οὐ πάνυ ἀγάμεθα· κολακικὴν γὰρ αὐτήν φαμεν εἶναι.
>
> {SO} Pray then, if we strip any kind of poetry of its melody, its rhythm and its meter, we get mere speeches as the residue, do we not? {CA} That must be so. {SO} And those speeches are spoken to a great crowd of people? {CA} Yes. {SO} Hence poetry is a kind of public speaking. {CA} Apparently. {SO} Then it must be a rhetorical public speaking or do you not think that the poets use rhetoric in the theaters? {CA} Yes, I do. {SO} So now we have found a kind of rhetoric addressed to such a public as is compounded of children and women and men, and slaves as well as free; an art that we do not quite approve of, since we call it a flattering one.

Melos, as the non-verbal component of kitharôidia, dithyrambic and tragic poetry – since these poetic genres are listed in this passage –, denotes melody. If *melos*, metre, and rhythm are displaced from poetry, one is left with prose. These words in prose are seen as a kind of rhetorical public speaking (ῥητορικὴ δημηγορία) that flatters the audience (κολακικήν).

Socrates, who "delves into meanings of ideas and concepts much more deeply than does Gorgias,"[93] appears a master of dialectic and manages through his method to downgrade the art of rhetoric. At the same time, given the classification of the above genres of poetry as kinds of rhetoric, he downgrades the art of poetry, and hence, *mousikê*, too. The fact that 'poetry' or 'music' becomes a sub-species of rhetoric is a striking position and in fact unimaginable before the final decades of the 5th century BC.

[93] Erickson (2004) 3.

I.5. *Protagoras*

The close association between *melos* end *epos* in *paideia*
and their connection with sophistic art

The main theme treated in the discussion of the *Protagoras* is the unity and teachability of virtue. In answering Socrates' question of whether virtue can be taught, Protagoras narrates a myth and then tells a story (λόγον).[94] During his speech he describes the three stages of education. In the first stage there is education at home, from the parents, the nurse, and the tutor (παιδαγωγός).[95] The second stage involves education at school, where the child is taught letters in order to read and to learn the good poets by heart (Pl. *Prot*. 325e: ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα). In the third stage the child is taught cithara-playing and the songs of melic poets, as we shall see.

Who are these good poets? It is possible that Protagoras refers to the epic poets and particularly to Homer, whose leading role in Greek culture and education[96] is a commonplace in ancient literature.[97] In this way, the moral education of the youths continues with the narratives and the praises of the noble men of the past, encouraging the young people to imitate them.[98] As Nagy states, "that this memorisation is for the explicit purpose of performing and interpreting this poetry is made clear in Protagoras' description of the third stage of schooling."[99]

In the third stage of education the teachers seek to familiarize the children with musical compositions in order to make their souls more balanced (Pl. *Prot*. 326a-b):

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[94] Pl. *Prot*. 324d
[95] Pl. *Prot*. 325c
[96] See Jaeger (1945) 35: "The Greeks always felt that a poet was in the broadest and deepest sense the educator of his people. Homer was only the noblest example, as it were the classic instance, of that general conception." Verdenius (1970) 205-231 questions this view and examines the educative influence of Homeric poetry on Greek thought.
[97] See Xen. *Symp*. III.5: ἀλλὰ σὺ αὖ, ἔφη, λέγε, ὦ Νικήρατε, ἐπὶ ποίᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ μέγα φρονεῖς. καὶ ὃς εἶπεν· ὁ πατὴρ ὁ ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γενοίμην ἠνάγκασέ με πάντα τὰ Ὁμήρου ἔπη μαθεῖν· καὶ νῦν δυναίμην ἂν Ἰλιάδα ὅλην καὶ Ὀδύσσειαν ἀπὸ στόματος εἰπεῖν. Plut. Alc. 7.1.: τὴν δὲ παιδικὴν ἡλικίαν παραλλάσσων ἐπέστη γραμματοδιδασκάλῳ καὶ βιβλίον ᾔτησεν Ὁμηρικόν. εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ διδασκάλου μηδὲν ἔχειν Ὁμήρου, κονδύλῳ καθικόμενος αὐτοῦ παρῆλθεν. ἑτέρου δὲ φήσαντος ἔχειν Ὅμηρον ὑφ' αὑτοῦ διωρθωμένον, 'εἶτ',' ἔφη, 'γράμματα διδάσκεις, Ὅμηρον ἐπανορθοῦν ἱκανὸς ὤν; οὐχὶ τοὺς νέους παιδεύεις;' I owe the references to Mistriotis (1906) 141 n. 2.
[98] Pl. *Prot*. ἐν οἷς πολλαὶ μὲν νουθετήσεις ἔνεισιν πολλαὶ δὲ διέξοδοι καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ἐγκώμια παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἵνα ὁ παῖς ζηλῶν μιμῆται καὶ ὀρέγηται τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι
[99] Nagy (1990) 74.

> {ΠΡΩ} […] ἐπειδὰν κιθαρίζειν μάθωσιν, ἄλλων αὖ ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα διδάσκουσι μελοποιῶν, εἰς τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνοντες, καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς τε καὶ τὰς ἁρμονίας ἀναγκάζουσιν οἰκειοῦσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν παίδων, ἵνα ἡμερώτεροί τε ὦσιν, καὶ εὐρυθμότεροι καὶ εὐαρμοστότεροι γιγνόμενοι χρήσιμοι ὦσιν εἰς τὸ λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν· πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται.

> {PRO} [...] when they learn to play the cithara, they are taught the works of another set of good poets, the melic poets, while the master accompanies them on the harp; and they insist on familiarizing the boys' souls with the rhythms and scales, that they may gain in gentleness, and by advancing in rhythmic and harmonic grace may be efficient in speech and action; for the whole of man's life requires the graces of rhythm and harmony.[100]

The epic poets are associated with the melic ones in the framework of *paideia*, as we saw in the *Ion*. The knowledge of rhythm and harmony has specific psychological and ethical effects on the soul. The initial use of the nouns ῥυθμός and ἁρμονία as musical terms is followed by the use of the coumpound adjectives εὐρυθμότεροι and εὐαρμοστότεροι that have, as Taylor argues,[101] a primarily psychological meaning. At the end of passage 326a-b (p.20) the compound nouns εὐρυθμία and εὐαρμοστία clearly have an ethical meaning. Plato's playful attitude and flexibility in the use of language is evident.[102]

At the end of the learning process the young souls will be perfectly balanced in every detail. The memorisation of epic poetry and the performance of *melos* will

[100] The translation is that of Lamb (1967).
[101] See Taylor (1976) 97.
[102] For Plato's moral use of musical terms, see also: Pl. *Lach*. 188d1-5: καὶ κομιδῇ μοι δοκεῖ μουσικὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι, ἁρμονίαν καλλίστην ἡρμοσμένος οὐ λύραν οὐδὲ παιδιᾶς ὄργανα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ζῆν ἡρμοσμένος οὗ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τὸν βίον σύμφωνον τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, ἀτεχνῶς δωριστὶ ἀλλ' οὐκ ἰαστί, οἴομαι δὲ οὐδὲ φρυγιστὶ οὐδὲ λυδιστί, ἀλλ' ἥπερ μόνη Ἑλληνική ἐστιν ἁρμονία. Pl. *Rep*. 413e2-5: εἰ δυσγοήτευτος καὶ εὐσχήμων ἐν πᾶσι φαίνεται, φύλαξ αὑτοῦ ὢν ἀγαθὸς καὶ μουσικῆς ἧς ἐμάνθανεν, εὔρυθμόν τε καὶ εὐάρμοστον ἑαυτὸν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις παρέχων, οἷος δὴ ἂν ὢν καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ πόλει χρησιμώτατος εἴη Pl. *Rep*. 400d1-5: Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ εὔρυθμόν γε καὶ τὸ ἄρρυθμον τὸ μὲν τῇ καλῇ λέξει ἕπεται ὁμοιούμενον, τὸ δὲ τῇ ἐναντίᾳ, καὶ τὸ εὐάρμοστον καὶ ἀνάρμοστον ὡσαύτως, εἴπερ ῥυθμός γε καὶ ἁρμονία λόγῳ, ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο, ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγος τούτοις. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ταῦτά γε λόγῳ ἀκολουθητέον. Pl. *Def*. 411e: εὐαρμοστία καὶ εὐταξία ψυχῆς πρὸς τὰς κατὰ φύσιν ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας.

make the youths balanced persons and good citizens (χρήσιμος). Of course, we should not forget that it is Protagoras, rather than Socrates, who speaks in favor of melic poetry here, although Socrates does not raise any objections.

However, the association between *epos* and *melos* appears again in the passage 316d-3, where the names of the epic and melic poets are listed together. Socrates maintains that these poets are actually sophists: Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides 'disguised sophistry in the dress of poetry,'[103] the mythical musicians Orpheus and Musaios 'disguised sophistry in mystic rites,'[104] the musician Agathocles[105] is described as 'a great sophist,' and Pythocleides[106] is also 'involved in mystic rites' (Pl. *Prot*. 316d-e):

> {ΣΩ} [...] ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην φημὶ μὲν εἶναι παλαιάν, τοὺς δὲ μεταχειριζομένους αὐτὴν τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν, φοβουμένους τὸ ἐπαχθὲς αὐτῆς, πρόσχημα ποιεῖσθαι καὶ προκαλύπτεσθαι, τοὺς μὲν ποίησιν, οἷον Ὅμηρόν τε καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ Σιμωνίδην, τοὺς δὲ αὖ τελετάς τε καὶ χρησμῳδίας, τοὺς ἀμφί τε Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον· ἐνίους δέ τινας ᾔσθημαι καὶ γυμναστικήν, οἷον Ἴκκος τε ὁ Ταραντῖνος καὶ ὁ νῦν ἔτι ὢν οὐδενὸς ἥττων σοφιστὴς Ἡρόδικος ὁ Σηλυμβριανός, τὸ δὲ ἀρχαῖον Μεγαρεύς· μουσικὴν δὲ Ἀγαθοκλῆς τε ὁ ὑμέτερος πρόσχημα ἐποιήσατο, μέγας ὢν σοφιστής, καὶ Πυθοκλείδης ὁ Κεῖος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί.

[103] Simonides was also an epigrammatic poet. However, in the *Protagoras* Plato is interested in his role as a *melic* poet, since the first part of the discussion is devoted to his ode to Scopas.

[104] In almost all the Platonic dialogues the name of Mousaios can be seen along with that of Orpheus. In spite the fact that Mousaios is given a position in the group of *palaioi andres,* the focus on his role as a musician is weak in comparison with that of Orpheus. Therefore the Platonic works confirm the aptly worded opinion that Mousaios is nothing more than a discolored copy of Orpheus. See E. Maas Orpheus (München 1895) 138: "Musaios ist sozusagen dessen (= Orpheus') abgeblasste Kopie, eine Art attischer Orpheus"; W.K.C. Guthrie Orpheus and Greek Religion (1952) 191, n.2: "He seems to have been little more than an indistinct double of Orpheus."

In the *Republic* (364e2-365a2) Plato informs us about the vast bibliography of his era that associates Orpheus with Mousaios. He also reveals that their books were used in rituals, which concerned the purification of the souls and death. Their names can therefore be seen together in the *Protagoras* and the *Republic* and are connected to the religious element.

[105] In the *Laches* (180d1) Agathocles is seen as the teacher of the famous musician Damon.

[106] Pythocleides is thought to be the inventor of the mixolydian harmony. In the Alcibiades I (118c3-6) Pericles' wisdom is ascribed to his apprenticeship with the musicians Pythocleides and Damon and with the natural philosopher Anaxagoras. See. *Sch. in Platonem* (scholia vetera) *Alc. I* 118c: Πυθοκλείδης μουσικὸς ἦν, τῆς σεμνῆς μουσικῆς διδάσκαλος, καὶ Πυθαγόρειος, οὗ μαθητὴς Ἀγαθοκλῆς, οὗ Λαμπροκλῆς, οὗ Δάμων.

> {SO} […] Now I tell you that sophistry is an ancient art, and those men of ancient times who practised it, fearing the odium it involved, disguised it in a decent dress, sometimes of poetry, as in the case of Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides sometimes of mystic rites and soothsayings, as did Orpheus, Musaeus and their sects; and sometimes too, I have observed, of athletics, as with Iccus of Tarentum and another still living – as great a sophist as any – Herodicus of Selymbria, originally of Megara; and music was the disguise employed by your own Agathocles, a great sophist, Pythocleides of Ceos, and many more.

Both epic (Homer/Hesiod) and melic poets are characterized as *agathoi poetai*; Orpheus and Mousaios arguably cross that boundary. Here too we find the same tendency of Socrates to lump together traditional and more modern forms of cultural expression. *Mousikê* seems to include a wide range of arts and practices, but Plato avoids talking about philosophy as a form of *mousikê*.

The most popular epic poets, melic poets, and musicians are in fact sophists. The close association between *epos*, *melos,* and sophistic art indicates that Plato treats them, essentially, and despite Protagoras' statements, in a subtly negative way. It is, however, only through this association – and not directly as in the *Gorgias* – that *melos* and *mousikê* are negatively treated in this dialogue.

I.5. *Republic*

The composition and representation of *melos* in *paideia*

The discussion in the *Republic* revolves around the definition of justice. The references to *mousikê* and *melos* are extensive in this dialogue. *Melos* is considered an integral part of *mousikê* and hence of *paideia*.[107]

Towards the end of the second book Socrates suggests that the interlocutors must create a city in theory in order to understand how justice and injustice are born.[108]

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[107] The modern term that Barker (1984) 127 uses describes *mousikê* as "cultural" education, which, as he explains, means "primarily exposure to poetry and to the music that is its vehicle."

After a brief discussion on the origin and the development of the sound city (Pl. *Rep*. 372e: ὑγιής), Socrates realizes that the discussion of justice would benefit more from the development of a fevered city. The size of such city would be larger in order to meet the growing needs of the society and would require the presence of the practitioners of *mousikê* (Pl. *Rep*. 373b):

> {ΣΩ} […] οἷον οἵ τε θηρευταὶ πάντες οἵ τε μιμηταί, πολλοὶ μὲν οἱ περὶ τὰ σχήματά τε καὶ χρώματα, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ περὶ μουσικήν, ποιηταί τε καὶ τούτων ὑπηρέται, ῥαψῳδοί, ὑποκριταί, χορευταί, ἐργολάβοι […]
>
> {SO} […] for example, the entire class of huntsmen, and the imitators, many of them occupied with figures and colors and many with music – the poets and their assistants, rhapsodists, actors, chorus-dancers, contractors […][109]

The poets along with their performance agents (rhapsodes, actors, chorus-dancers) are preoccupied with *mousikê* and, thus, belong to the broader category of imitators (μιμηταί). The distinction between composers and performance agents, and their characterization as imitators, reveal Plato's desire to downgrade them.

The dangers that emerge from the large size of this city are unquestionable. As a consequence, there is great need for a guardian class to defend the city against its enemies. This statement signals the beginning of the discussion on the type of musical and physical education that ought to be provided to the guardians. Plato's aim is to purge the city of all its defects in order to make it a fair city (Pl. *Rep*. 527c: *καλλιπόλει*).

Plato accepts the traditional division of education into *mousikê* and *gymnastikê* (Pl. *Rep*. 376e: τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; ἢ χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν βελτίω τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου ηὑρημένης; ἔστιν δέ που ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική.) and proceeds with an extensive discussion on each aspect of *paideia*. *Mousikê*, as the training of the soul that includes tales (Pl. *Rep*. 376e: μουσικῆς δ', εἶπον, τιθεῖς λόγους, ἢ οὔ; ἔγωγε), is interpreted by means of its content, form, and style. At the end of the second book the practitioners of *mousikê*, namely the poets, and especially Homer, are harshly criticized because of the form

[108] Pl. *Rep*. 369a: ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτῆς ἴδοιμεν ἂν γιγνομένην καὶ τὴν ἀδικίαν;

[109] The translation is that of Shorey (1969).

(mimetic/narrative/mixed) and content of their stories. A little later (394c) after criticizing tragedy and comedy as wholly imitative types of poetry and after treating dithyramb – the only representative of melic poetry in this tripartite division – in an obscure way[110] – without however rejecting it in this instance, Plato "purges" *melos* and establishes the rules for the proper form and style of melic composition, as we shall see.

Socrates is concerned with the content of *mousikê*. In his analysis he explains what poets should avoid when creating myths about deities. Socrates' proposals are equally applicable to every kind of poetry, namely to epic, melic, and tragic poetry (Pl. *Rep*. 379a):

> {ΣΩ} […] οἷος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὤν, ἀεὶ δήπου ἀποδοτέον, ἐάντέ τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἔπεσιν ποιῇ ἐάντε ἐν <u>μέλεσιν</u> ἐάντε ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ […]
>
> {SO} […] we must always present the divinity the way it is whether we compose in epic, <u>melic</u>, or tragic verse. […]

The word *melos* (in plural form) in this passage is used as a generic term to differentiate *melic* from epic and tragic poetry. The tripartite division of poetry in this instance anticipates the tripartite division of poetry later in the third book (Pl. *Rep*. 394c), although they are not completely identical. After rejecting the myths of the poets by giving specific examples from Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus, and Pindar (Pl. *Rep*. 377e-383c), Socrates eliminates Homeric lines and vocabulary that cause fear, gets rid of the dirges, and criticizes the portrayal of gods and heroes as laughing excessively (Pl. *Rep*. 386c-389b), because he sees this as harmful to the citizens' souls. Only the guardians have the right to use such lies for the sake of the city.

Thus, the question of what poets should say and how they should say it is now raised (Pl. *Rep*. 392c: τὰ μὲν δὴ λόγων πέρι ἐχέτω τέλος· τὸ δὲ λέξεως, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, καὶ ἡμῖν ἅ τε λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον παντελῶς ἐσκέψεται).[111] The most important occurrences of *melos* appear in Socrates' attempt to answer these questions. The word λόγος concerns the content of the compositions, whereas λέξις

[110] On the interpretation of the term ἀπαγγελία not as simple narrative, but as oral delivery of a narrative, see Peponi (2013a) 355-357.
[111] The same question is also raised in Pl. *Rep*. 398b: ἅ τε γὰρ λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον εἴρηται

indicates their manifestation, the form or style of poetry that communicates *logos.* Ast's definition of *leksis* as *dictio*, and *oratio (verba),* fails in this instance to point out the opposition between *logos* and *leksis*.[112]

It is in the style of poetry here – but generally in the content, too – that Plato sees *mimêsis* as a misleading impersonation (Pl. *Rep*. 392d-394c). Yet, in the discussion of the appropriate education of the guardians, Socrates argues that they are allowed to immitate a good person under certain conditions (Pl. *Rep*. 396c-d). The *mimêsis* of a bad person is also allowed if it is just for fun (Pl. *Rep*. 396e: παιδιᾶς χάριν). In Book 10, all poetic forms belong to the category of *mimêsis*, which is seen as childish play as opposed to serious engagement (Pl. *Rep*. 602b: ἀλλ᾽ εἶναι παιδιάν τινα καὶ οὐ σπουδὴν τὴν μίμησιν). *Mimêsis* deceives and leads people away from truth and must therefore be exiled from the city (Pl. *Rep*. 602b-608b).[113]

After discussing *epos*, tragedy, and dithyrambic poetry, Socrates decides to proceed with the discussion of odes and *melê* (Pl. *Rep*. 398c: τὸ περὶ ᾠδῆς τρόπου καὶ μελῶν λοιπόν).[114] In this primary opposition between μέλος and ᾠδή, μέλος can be defined as the unmarked and inclusive member (melody), while ᾠδή is the marked and exclusive member (song).[115] Of course, μέλος may also be an explanation of ᾠδή, particularly in the light of what happens a few lines later, in 398d, where Socrates gives the definition of μέλος, which, in this instance, is certainly a synonym of ᾠδή (Pl. *Rep*. 398d)[116]:

{ΣΩ} τὸ <u>μέλος</u> ἐκ τριῶν ἐστιν συγκείμενον, λόγου τε καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ.

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[112] See also Gastaldi's (1998) 362-3 interpretation as a mode of expression: "Il punto di partenza è constituito dalla delineazione di uno schema che articola il denominatore comune della diegesis, termine che si sostituisce qui a quello di lexis a indicare la modalità espositiva."

[113] For the beautiful analogy between mimesis and a hetaira see Peponi (2012) 129-135.

[114] The first opposition mentioned by Plato is that between the sung and the unsung words (398d: οὐδὲν δήπου διαφέρει τοῦ μὴ ᾀδομένου λόγου πρὸς τὸ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δεῖν τύποις λέγεσθαι οἷς ἄρτι προείπομεν). According to Plato, the point of differentiating between poetry (esp. that of Hesiod and Homer) and song is the activity of singing (ᾄδω).

[115] See Jakobson's (1957) 47 distinction between marked (subcategory of the unmarked) and unmarked (general) category: "The general meaning of a marked category states the presence of a certain general meaning of a certain (whether positive or negative) property A; the general meaning of the corresponding unmarked category states nothing about the presence of A and is used chiefly but not exclusively to indicate the absence of A."

[116] See passage iii. 398c-399e (p. 10-12) in Appendix I.

{SO} *melos* is composed of three things, the words, the harmony and the rhythm.

Λόγος denotes the verses, ἁρμονία denotes the 'organization of pitches,' and ῥυθμός[117] denotes the 'rhythmic organization' of the composition. Barker gives an accurate definition of harmony and rhythm:

> The word here has its wider musical sense 'organization of pitches'. It is not therefore simply 'melody': Plato's usage points to the fact that the existence of melody depends on the prior existence of an organized scheme of pitches standing to one another in determinate relations, on the basis of whose relations the selection that generates a melody is made. "Rhythm", correspondingly, means the element of rhythmic organization that any composition must possess, an individual rhythm being the formal rhythmic structure underlying an individual piece or type of piece, its overall pattern of movement. This in its turn is variously instantiated in the particular rhythmic nuances of a particular piece, just as a *harmonia* may be instantiated in any of a number of melodies.[118]

After stating that harmony and rhythm should follow the words (Pl. *Rep*. 398d: καὶ μὴν τήν γε ἁρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖ τῷ λόγῳ), Socrates discusses all the appropriate musical modes in detail and selects those that need to be taught to the guardians in order to form their character in virtue (Pl. *Rep*. 398e-399c). He censures dirges and lamentations and therefore also slack and convivial modes (Lydian, mixed Lydian, and Ionian). In contrast to this, he approves the musical modes that imitate 'the utterances of a brave man' (Dorian and Phrygian).[119] The rejection of the former musical modes is closely associated with the notion of *mimêsis*, which, as Skouteropoulos argues, "never ceases to undermine the ethical goals that [Plato] sets

[117] According to Stenzel (1961) 130, rhythm in ancient Greek thought is not limited to music, but also denotes dancing moves. On the meaning of rhythm in Plato's *Republic,* see Aviram (2002) 162, who suggests that 'rhythm may provide us with an opportunity newly to understand the relation between language and the body.' On the meaning of "rhythm" in Plato's *Laws,* see Kowalzig (2013) 171-211.
[118] Barker 1984, 130 (n. 18).
[119] As Barker (1984) 128 explains: "That is, in a direct sense, changes in characterization. But it is assumed that different characters require for their representation different musical forms, both harmonic and rhythmic; and hence in these formal respects too, the approved kind of diction demands little change in the course of a composition, while the other kind demands much. Here and in similar passages Plato has a critical eye on the "new" music of Timotheus and his like, in which rhythmic and melodic modulation was a prominent feature. Note that in rejecting it Plato was rejecting a "modernism" that was by now some eighty or more years old."

for the guardians of the city."[120] As regards the instruments, the 'many-stringed' (πολύχορδα) and the 'many-toned' (πολυαρμόνια) instruments are forbidden, such as τρίγωνον, πηκτίς, αὐλός, whereas the lyre, the kithara, and the syrinx are permitted.[121] All these rules are equally applicable to odes and tunes (Pl. *Rep*. 399c):

> {ΣΩ} οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πολυχορδίας γε οὐδὲ παναρμονίου ἡμῖν δεήσει ἐν ταῖς ᾠδαῖς τε καὶ μέλεσιν […]
>
> {SO} then, I said, we shall not need in our songs and tunes instruments of many strings or those that include all the harmonies. […]

Socrates condemns *polychordia* and musical complexity, which are the main features of 'New Music.' The main reason for rejecting all the many-stringed and many-toned instruments is that they produce many sounds causing noise, but his criticism is also based on ideological reasons. *Poikilia* in music alludes to political, social and moral multiplicity that Plato considers dangerous for the individual soul.

He prefers Apollo's *technê* to Marsyas' *aulêtikê technê*. As Vegetti stresses, in contrast to the *Phaedrus*,[122] in the *Republic* Plato highlights the association between simple melody (that follows relevant words) and simple soul.[123] The correspondence between *melos* and the soul is achieved through the notion of *harmonia*, which preserves their structural unity although this is not clearly thematized.[124]

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[120] Skouteropoulos (2002) 814.

[121] Barker (1984) 132-3 n. 28-32 discusses these musical instruments.

[122] Pl. *Phdr*. 277c1-3: οὕτω τιθῇ καὶ διακοσμῇ τὸν λόγον, ποικίλῃ μὲν ποικίλους ψυχῇ καὶ παναρμονίους διδοὺς λόγους, ἁπλοῦς δὲ ἁπλῇ […]

[123] Vegetti (1998) 113 n.88: "Lo aulos è uno strumento a fiato, che solo metaforicamente può venir definito polychordos per la sua capacità di produrre molti toni (è infatti definito pamphonos da Pi. O. 7.12.) È interessante notare che Platone sostiene nel Fedro (277c) che la retorica debba convincere le anime complesse usando discorsi poikilous e appunto panarmonious; ma nella polis della Repubblica deve prevalere il tipo d'anima "semplice" (haple)."

[124] It is important to pay attention to the use of the verbal forms συναρμόσαντα and ἡρμοσμένον for the structure of the soul, see Pl. *Rep*. 443c-e: τὸ δέ γε ἀληθές, τοιοῦτόν τι ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀλλ᾽ οὐ περὶ τὴν ἔξω πρᾶξιν τῶν αὑτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐντός, ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, μὴ ἐάσαντα τἀλλότρια πράττειν ἕκαστον ἐν αὑτῷ μηδὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὰ οἰκεῖα εὖ θέμενον καὶ ἄρξαντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ καὶ κοσμήσαντα καὶ φίλον γενόμενον ἑαυτῷ καὶ συναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα, ὥσπερ ὅρους τρεῖς ἁρμονίας ἀτεχνῶς, νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ μέσης, καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἄττα μεταξὺ τυγχάνει ὄντα, πάντα ταῦτα συνδήσαντα καὶ παντάπασιν ἕνα γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σώφρονα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον […]

Socrates also lists the rhythms (Pl *Rep*. 399e-401a) that should be embodied in the education of the guardians in order to produce orderly and brave characters. Rhythms, exactly like harmonies, are closely associated with *mimêsis*. Socrates argues that the metrical foot (πούς) and *melos* should conform to the words and not the opposite (Pl. *Rep*. 399e-400a: τὸν πόδα τῷ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγῳ ἀναγκάζειν ἕπεσθαι καὶ τὸ *μέλος*, ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγον ποδί τε καὶ *μέλει*). The term πούς ('rhythmic/metrical foot') is used synecdochically for rhythm. It recalls Socrates' statement in Pl. *Rep*. 398d that 'harmony and rhythm should follow the words.'[125] Rhythm is replaced by *pous* and harmony is replaced by *melos*.[126] However, he leaves any further details to the famous musician Damon of Oa and proceeds to shift his attention to moral issues (Pl. *Rep*. 400c-d):

> {ΣΩ} […] ὅτι τὸ τῆς εὐσχημοσύνης τε καὶ ἀσχημοσύνης τῷ εὐρύθμῳ τε καὶ ἀρρύθμῳ ἀκολουθεῖ […] ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ εὔρυθμόν γε καὶ τὸ ἄρρυθμον τὸ μὲν τῇ καλῇ λέξει ἕπεται ὁμοιούμενον, τὸ δὲ τῇ ἐναντίᾳ, καὶ τὸ εὐάρμοστον καὶ ἀνάρμοστον ὡσαύτως, εἴπερ ῥυθμός γε καὶ ἁρμονία λόγῳ.
>
> {SO} […] that gracefulness and ungracefulness follow the good and the bad rhythm. And, further, good rhythm and bad rhythm accompany, the one fair diction, assimilating itself thereto, and the other the opposite, and so of the harmonious and the out of tune, if, as we were just now saying, the rhythm and harmony follow the words and not the words these.

Socrates goes beyond 'the style of the diction' (ὁ τρόπος τῆς λέξεως) and 'the content of speech' (ὁ λόγος) to 'the disposition of the soul' (τῆς ψυχῆς ἤθει).[127] By 'style of diction' Socrates probably means rhythm and harmony and by 'content of speech' he means words. If this is true, then rhythm, harmony, and words will form *êthos*. Since, rhythm, harmony, and words are the components of *melos*, then the association between *melos* and *êthos* is established.

As Socrates verifies in 400d, if the style of the diction and the content follow the nature of the soul, then good speech, good harmony, gracefulness, and good rhythm

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[125] The passage has been discussed on p. 34.

[126] So far, *melos* denotes "melody / tunes, song, harmony".

[127] Pl. *Rep*. 400d: τί δ' ὁ τρόπος τῆς λέξεως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ὁ λόγος; οὐ τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἤθει ἕπεται;

will be associated with good character (Pl. *Rep*. 400d: εὐλογία ἄρα καὶ εὐαρμοστία καὶ εὐσχημοσύνη καὶ εὐρυθμία εὐηθείᾳ ἀκολουθεῖ). In the opposite case, gracelessness, and bad speech ~ harmony ~ rhythm will lead to bad character (Pl. *Rep*. 401a: καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀσχημοσύνη καὶ ἀρρυθμία καὶ ἀναρμοστία κακολογίας καὶ κακοηθείας ἀδελφά). In interpreting Socrates' argument, it is useful to understand the meaning of the words *euschêmosunê* and *aschêmosunê*. As Barker says, *euschêmosunê* (gracefulness) is a general term for the beauty of shape or form;[128] as a musical term, it denotes the 'figure' or 'posture in the dance.' Therefore, in this context *melos* accompanied by *schêma* points to a song destined for dance. If one takes Socrates' definition of *melos* in 398d seriously, one would argue that the combination of *eulogia* (good words), *euarmostia* (good harmony), and *euruthmia* (good rhythm) will constitute *eu/emmeleia* (good *melos*).[129] Similarly, the bad combination of these elements would form bad *melos*.[130] However, Socrates does not use the term *melos* or any of its compounds here but prefers to create a link between the components of *melos* and *êthos*.[131] Socrates uses all these elements and principles of poetry, and in a broader sense of *mousikê*, to cover every art or craft of his era (Pl. *Rep*. 401a). He is intent on making a poetic-musical model that, as Gastaldi states, will eventually function as an ethical model for every aspect of human activity.[132]

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[128] Barker (1984) 134 (n.39).

[129] *Emmeleia* is a kind of dance and will be discussed later in the discussion of the *Laws* in IV.3

[130] A possible term would be a-*meleia* (not existing) or *πλημμέλεια* (not used by Plato).

[131] As a marked term (denoting the musicality of the verses), *melos* belongs to the category of the style of the diction (λέξις), which should follow the appropriate content (λόγος) in order to form a good character (ἦθος). However, as a broader, unmarked term that includes both the style of diction (words, harmony, rhythm) and the content, it would be in an unmediated connection with *êthos*.

[132] Gastaldi (1998) 385-6: "Nella nuova citta, la sorveglianza che si esercita nei confronti della pratica poetico-musicale defe estendersi a tutte le arti della correttezza etica, messo finora alla prova in quel solo ambito, vale allo stesso modo in rapporto alle altre *technai*, poiche posseggono anch'esse un carattere imitativo. Tra le varie forme di produzione artistica, ma anche tra queste e l'attivita artigianale, se delinea infatti una stretta continuita, dal momento che tutte si configurano come modalita di poiesis attuata in conformita a un modello, del quale occorre saggiare la rispondenza ai medesimi canoni di positivita. Rinviando al libro X la discussione sui valori ontologici ed epistemologici nel suo approccio etico-educativo, ed individua pertanto nell' elegante armoniosita, l'euschemosyne, la cratteristica che deve inerire a ogni realizzazione.

Tutta l' atmosfera cittadina risulta cosi contrassegnata dalla bellezza e dalla gradevolezza, estromettendo ogni forma di bruttezza, che immediatamente si associa all'imperfezione etica."

In 401b-e Socrates again raises the question of how rhythm and harmony contribute to the beauty and disposition of the soul. The term *melos* does not appear here, but Socrates describes precisely how rhythm and harmony plunge into the soul and grasp it very strongly, imparting *euschêmosunê* to it. Stated differently, the beauty of the soul (ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς... εὐσχημοσύνην) responds to the good character (Pl. ἀγαθόν ἦθος) (Pl. *Rep*. 401b-e). But where is *melos*?

This silence on *melos* occurs again in the tenth book of the *Republic* (Pl. *Rep*. 601a-b), where Socrates explains the reasons for the exile of poetry from the fair city. The danger of poetry lurks in its power, and the enchantment that it exerts on the human soul through its representation. One wonders what the specific characteristics of poetry are that cause this enchantment.[133] As Naddaff argues, "visually deceived, spectators are also aurally deceived, by the "charm," the musicality of poetic language, its meter, rhythm and harmony."[134] The representation of the poetic words combined with their musical coloring and, often, with musical accompaniment is charming. But the term *melos* is absent in this description.

Socrates is afraid of the emotions of pleasure and pain, which are caused by the 'honeyed Muse,' as he sees them as having a bad influence on every poetic genre (Pl. *Rep*. 607a):[135]

> {ΣΩ} εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην μοῦσαν παραδέξῃ ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεσιν, ἡδονή σοι καὶ λύπη ἐν τῇ πόλει βασιλεύσετον ἀντὶ νόμου τε καὶ τοῦ κοινῇ ἀεὶ δόξαντος εἶναι βελτίστου λόγου.
>
> {SO} But, if you admit the sweetened muse in melic or epic poetry, pleasure and pain will reign your city instead of law and that which always has been commonly accepted to be the best, the reason.

Socrates criticizes pleasurable poetry (sweetened Muse). But how does someone 'sweeten' a Muse? What is hidden behind 'seasoning'? I believe that Socrates'

[133] To appreciate the charm of poetry it is important to see the use of the verb κηλέω, Pl. *Rep*. 607c-607d: ἄσμενοι ἂν καταδεχοίμεθα, ὡς σύνισμέν γε ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς κηλουμένοις ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς οὐχ ὅσιον προδιδόναι. ἦ γάρ, ὦ φίλε, οὐ κηλῇ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς καὶ σύ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν δι᾽ Ὁμήρου θεωρῇς αὐτήν;

[134] Naddaff (2002) 86.

[135] See passage vii. 607a-608b in Appendix I.

statement implies the basic knowledge of the poets, i.e. diction, metre, rhythm, melody/tunes.[136] The characterization There is no reference in this passage to dramatic poetry, which strengthens the relation between *melos* and *epos*, echoing the *Ion* and the *Protagoras*.

Despite his fears, Socrates gives the poets the opportunity to return from exile through an apology in favor of the *mimēsis.* But this must be composed either in the meters of melic poetry, or in other poetic meters, or even in prose (Pl. *Rep*. 607d[137]):

> {ΣΩ} ἀπολογησαμένη ἐν μέλει ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ μέτρῳ[138] […] ὅσοι μὴ ποιητικοί, φιλοποιηταὶ δέ, ἄνευ μέτρου λόγον ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν […]
>
> {SO} Then may she not justly return from this exile after she has pleaded her defence, whether in melic or other measure? And we would allow her advocates who are not poets but lovers of poetry to plead her cause in prose without metre […]

This is the last time that the term *melos*[139] appears in the *Republic.* However, the importance of *melos* is shown by the fact that the composition in melic verse is singled out in the passage 607d and opens the road for the return of specific poetic and prose compositions in the city.

The eschatological myth of Er at the end of the *Republic*, which vividly describes a cosmic divine performance, makes me wonder if this is an example of prose apology – full of poetic and particularly melic motifs – for the return of poetry.

As already seen, *melos* is associated in the *Republic* with rhythm, harmony, and meter, and plays a central role in poetry and in *mousikê*. Because of its association with rhythm, it is plausible to assume that *melos* denotes a dance-song. In this dialogue, Plato's main interest is to delineate the web of relations between the different parts of *mousikê* and to describe how each part corresponds to human morality. Plato therefore discusses *melos* in his description of the pluralistic practice of the art of *mousikê* in his era, but he is not concerned with displaying its

[136] Murray (1996) 229
[137] Ibid.
[138] As Nagy (2010) 374 deduces from Plato's *Laws*: "... we have seen that the ancient *poiêtês* can practice the art of *mousikê* by composing either in the medium of poetry or in the medium of music."
[139] *Melos* means melic poetry here.

performative aspect. That is why he does not discuss any sort of performance, as he will do in the *Laws*. The only exception is the peculiar *choreia* of Necessity, Sirens, and Fates in the myth of Er, where the term *melos* is, surprisingly, not found.

The semantic range of *melos* is evident in the *Republic*: *melos* denotes song, tunes or melody, or harmony, or else it is used as a generic term. Plato places great emphasis on the elements that shape *melos*, on its composition and, eventually, on its moral value. As already pointed out, *melos* is inextricably associated with poetry, and is therefore similarly problematic for Plato's philosophical purposes. Hollander's[140] humorous description highlights the perfect fusion of poetry and song that exceeds the bounds of philosopher's perception:

> Suppose that every expository use of the phrase "for example" were sung to some tune or other... and suppose the philosopher invoking the example were unaware of this, or if conscious of his unavoidable singing insisted, "Don't pay attention to anything but words."
> POET: Don't sing, then.
> PHILOSOPHER:(a) I'm not singing.
> or (b) I'm not really singing.
> or (c) I can't help it.
> or (d) Go away, don't bother me. [141]

I.5. *Laws*

Melos and *Choreia* or *Paideia*

In Plato's *Laws*, which is possibly the last dialogue he wrote, there are three interlocutors: an unnamed Athenian stranger, who leads the conversation, the Spartan Megillos, and the Cretan Clinias. At the end of the third book, Clinias reveals that he is entitled by the city of Cnossus to participate in the foundation and, more specifically, in the legislation of the new Cretan colony named Magnesia.

The discussion on *melos* and melic composition begins in the second book and is already associated with *choreia*. The population of the city is divided into three choral groups and there is also a fourth group of old men that are not able to sing or dance, so its role is to narrate myths of paideutic value. There is a complex hierarchy or roles

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[140] Hollander (1997) 6-7.
[141] Naddaff (2002) 1 uses this passage as a motto in the introduction to her book.

between musical performers. The discussion is situated within a broader discussion of *paideia* and the question of which is the appropriate path in order to achieve the main goal of laws, namely the virtue of the citizenry. The paideutic and psychagogic value of *melos*, an issue that has been also discussed in the *Symposium*, in the *Protagoras*, and more extensively in the *Republic*, is central in the *Laws*, as will be seen below. In Book 2 (653a-657b), the Athenian tries to define the 'correct education.' He therefore pinpoints the natural origin of rhythm and harmony and the divine origin of *choreia*, which is identified with *paideia* (Pl. *Laws* 654a-b)[142]:

> {ΑΘ} οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν ἀπαίδευτος ἀχόρευτος ἡμῖν ἔσται, τὸν δὲ πεπαιδευμένον ἱκανῶς κεχορευκότα θετέον;
>
> {ATH} Shall we assume that the uneducated man is not trained in the chorus, and that the educated man is well-trained in the chorus?[143]

Choreia consists of ὄρχησίς and ᾠδή (Pl. *Laws* 654b: χορεία γε μὴν ὄρχησίς τε καὶ ᾠδὴ τὸ σύνολόν ἐστιν). Generally, the term *choreia* denotes in the *Laws* the organized choral performance and is a synonym of *paideia*. We have also seen that in some instances *melos* denotes choral song. In the *Laws*, we see Plato using *choreia* as a general category and *melos* as a subcategory.[144] He also uses the term with the meaning of choral dance as distinct to melody or song.[145] The fundamental difference – if we are allowed to say so – between *choreia* and *melos* is that – at least in a modern reader's mind – the former gives special prominence to kinetic activity, whereas the latter to vocal activity. However, as vocal and kinetic activities are inextricably connected in choral performances, they cannot be treated separately, but "as part of the same unified expressive mechanism."[146]

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[142] See passage i. 654a-e in Appendix I.
[143] The translation is that of Bury (1967-8).
[144] Pl. *Laws* 804b: τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ χορείας πέρι μελῶν τε καὶ ὀρχήσεως ἐρρήθη. The term *choreia* is used in many Platonic passages of the *Laws* as an organized choral song and dance performance and synonym of *paideia*. In the *Euthydemus*, *choreia* is linked with παιδιά (fun, amusement) and denotes the choral dance occurring on the occasion of initiation of a person in the Corybantic mysteries.
[145] Pl. *Laws* 790e: ταύτῃ τῇ τῆς κινήσεως ἅμα χορείᾳ καὶ μούσῃ χρώμεναι.
[146] Peponi (2009) 39.

The Athenian repeats that the good singing and dancing, or alternatively, the ability to dance good dances and sing good songs (καλά), requires correct education. The Athenian's thoughts can be arranged in the following scheme:

(Pl. *Laws* 654b): ὁ καλῶς ἄρα πεπαιδευμένος ᾄδειν τε καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι δυνατὸς ἂν εἴη καλῶς

i. (Pl. *Laws* 654c): εἰ καὶ καλὰ ᾄδει καὶ καλὰ ὀρχεῖται

ii. (Pl. *Laws* 654c-d): βέλτιον ὁ τοιοῦτος πεπαιδευμένος ἡμῖν ἔσται τὴν χορείαν τε καὶ μουσικὴν ἢ ὃς ἂν τῷ μὲν σώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ τὸ διανοηθὲν εἶναι καλὸν ἱκανῶς ὑπηρετεῖν δυνηθῇ ἑκάστοτε, χαίρῃ δὲ μὴ τοῖς καλοῖς μηδὲ μισῇ τὰ μὴ καλά; ἢ 'κεῖνος ὃς ἂν τῇ μὲν φωνῇ καὶ τῷ σώματι μὴ πάνυ δυνατὸς ᾖ κατορθοῦν, ἢ διανοεῖσθαι, τῇ δὲ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ κατορθοῖ, τὰ μὲν ἀσπαζόμενος, ὅσα καλά, τὰ δὲ δυσχεραίνων, ὁπόσα μὴ καλά;

iii. (Pl. *Laws* 654d) […] Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν τὸ καλὸν ᾠδῆς τε καὶ ὀρχήσεως πέρι γιγνώσκομεν τρεῖς ὄντες, ἴσμεν καὶ τὸν πεπαιδευμένον τε καὶ ἀπαίδευτον ὀρθῶς

Good or correct education means good singing and dancing, namely, singing good songs and dancing good dances. It means being able to represent the good adequately, or to feel joy for the good and hatred for the bad. In other words, *paideia* requires training in *choreia* and *mousikê*, and more specifically, the training of its vehicles, the body and the voice. The body is connected to *choreia* – namely to dancing – and the voice to *mousikê* – namely to singing. Therefore, in this instance, the meaning of *choreia* and *mousikê* seems to be limited to the kinetic and vocal activity, as already mentioned. However, the boundaries between *choreia* – defined as dancing and singing in passage 654b – and *mousikê* – words and tunes with harmony and rhythm – are blurred. Right training in *choreia* and in *mousikê* enables one to perceive the notion of 'good' so that one is consequently able to represent one's conception of 'good' in song and dance, or to feel pleasure in response to the good and pain in response to the bad. Thus, a correct education requires the training of both the performers and the audience. The use of two adverbs of manner in this passage is important: (654c) ἱκανῶς, (654d) ὀρθῶς. The first refers to the ability to adequately represent the *kalon* through singing and dancing, while the second refers to the correct education that is needed in order to do this. Therefore, the correct training directs the

hearts, minds, and bodies of the students to the *kalon*, the meaning of which is not restricted to the beautiful, but it also contains the morally good.

In the following passage, the good σχῆμα and μέλος are joined together with ᾠδήν and ὄρχησιν (Pl. *Laws* 654e):

> {ΑΘ.} Ταῦτ' ἄρα μετὰ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν αὖ καθάπερ κυσὶν ἰχνευούσαις διερευνητέον, σχῆμά τε καλὸν καὶ μέλος καὶ ᾠδὴν καὶ ὄρχησιν· εἰ δὲ ταῦθ' ἡμᾶς διαφυγόντα οἰχήσεται, μάταιος ὁ μετὰ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν περὶ παιδείας ὀρθῆς εἴθ' Ἑλληνικῆς εἴτε βαρβαρικῆς λόγος ἂν εἴη. {ΚΛ.} Ναί.

> {ATH} What we have next to track down, like hounds on the trail, is goodness of posture and tunes in relation to song and dance; if this eludes our pursuit, it will be in vain for us to discourse further concerning right education, whether of Greeks or of barbarians. {CL} Yes.

The verbal phrase 'to sing and dance well' is replaced by the nominal phrase 'kalon *schêma* and *melos.*'[147] The phrase σχῆμά τε καλὸν καὶ μέλος καὶ ᾠδὴν καὶ ὄρχησιν, or the correction suggested by Ritter and England and also accepted by Bury, σχῆμά τε καλὸν καὶ μέλος κατ᾽ ᾠδὴν καὶ ὄρχησιν, or Badham and Schanz's acceptance of ᾗ διανοεῖσθαι of the manuscripts points to a chiastic structure: σχῆμά ~ ὄρχησιν, μέλος ~ ᾠδὴν. Thus, *schêma,* which is performed by dancer(s), and *melos,* which is performed by singer(s), are constitutional parts of *choreia*. The questions of what constitutes a *melos* or 'song', how the different parts of *melos* relate to each other and how *melos* contributes to the analysis of choral performance seem to be relevant to the intricate arrangement of roles between various musical practitioners in the city. So also is the relationship of μέλος and chorality: the city of *Laws* is par excellence a city of choruses – an idea rooted in Plato's speaker's conservative ideas about the role of music in traditional Greek polis-culture. Thus, it seems that the two are particularly closely identified here.

However, it is helpful to understand what Plato means by σχῆμά τε καλὸν καὶ μέλος. In the passage 655a-b, the Athenian discusses the appropriate language that the

[147] See Schöpsdau (1994) [*schêma* = Körperhaltung, *melos* = Melodie, ode = Gesang, *orchēsis* =Tanz].

chorus trainers must use for *melos* and *schêma* during the education process (Pl. *Laws* 654e-655a):

> {ΑΘ.} Εἶεν· τί δὲ δὴ τὸ καλὸν χρὴ φάναι σχῆμα ἢ μέλος[148] εἶναί ποτε; φέρε, ἀνδρικῆς ψυχῆς ἐν πόνοις ἐχομένης καὶ δειλῆς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τε καὶ ἴσοις ἆρ' ὅμοια τά τε σχήματα καὶ τὰ φθέγματα συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι; {ΚΛ.} Καὶ πῶς, ὅτε γε μηδὲ τὰ χρώματα; {ΑΘ.} Καλῶς γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε. ἀλλ' ἐν γὰρ μουσικῇ καὶ σχήματα μὲν καὶ μέλη ἔνεστιν, περὶ ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἁρμονίαν οὔσης τῆς μουσικῆς, ὥστε εὔρυθμον μὲν καὶ εὐάρμοστον, εὔχρων δὲ μέλος ἢ σχῆμα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπεικάσαντα, ὥσπερ οἱ χοροδιδάσκαλοι ἀπεικάζουσιν, ὀρθῶς φθέγγεσθαι· […]
>
> {ATH} Well then, however shall we define the good posture or tune? Come, consider: when a manly soul is beset by troubles, and a cowardly soul by troubles identical and equal, are the postures and utterances that result in the two cases similar? {CL} How could they be, when even their complexions differ in color? {ATH} Well said, my friend. But in, fact, while postures and tunes do exist in music, which deals with rhythm and harmony, so that one can rightly speak of a tune or posture being "rhythmical" or "harmonious," one cannot rightly apply the metaphor "well-colored" to tune and posture, as chorus trainers do; […]

The good posture or melody is associated with the sound of a brave soul's voice (φθέγμα). In this passage, the term φθέγμα is used instead of μέλος.[149] In addition, the verbal phrase *συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι*, which may be translated as 'turn out to be (produced)' or 'result in,' suggests that both *schêma* and *melos* delineate a process. Postures and melodies belong to the broader categories of rhythm and harmony that

[148] The term *melos* is translated as "Melodie" in this passage by Schöpsdau.

[149] In 812d-e of the *Laws*, φθέγμα and μέλος seem to be synonyms. If this is correct, term *phthegma* denotes the musical note and the term *melê* denotes the sound of the strings (Pl. *Laws* 812d-e): τούτων τοίνυν δεῖ χάριν τοῖς φθόγγοις τῆς λύρας προσχρῆσθαι, σαφηνείας ἕνεκα τῶν χορδῶν, τόν τε κιθαριστὴν καὶ τὸν παιδευόμενον, ἀποδιδόντας πρόσχορδα τὰ φθέγματα τοῖς φθέγμασι· τὴν δ' ἑτεροφωνίαν καὶ ποικιλίαν τῆς λύρας, ἄλλα μὲν μέλη τῶν χορδῶν ἱεισῶν, ἄλλα δὲ τοῦ τὴν μελῳδίαν συνθέντος ποιητοῦ, […] ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὕτω περὶ τῆς μουσικῆς ἡμῖν ὁ παιδευτὴς ἐπιμελείσθω· τὰ δὲ μελῶν αὐτῶν αὖ καὶ ῥημάτων, οἷα τοὺς χοροδιδασκάλους καὶ ἃ δεῖ διδάσκειν […]. Here, however, the term ῥημάτων (penultimate line) also corresponds to φθέγματα, something that makes the interpretation of the latter extremely complicated and the argument, that it is a synonym of μέλος in this instance, questionable.

make them 'rhythmical' (εὔρυθμον) and 'harmonious' (εὐάρμοστον). As we have already seen in the *Republic*,[150] the use of the adjectives is primarily ethical.

An interpretation of the term *schêma* is offered in a later source, in the last of Plutarch's *Table Talks* (747c-d), where Ammonius says that dance has three parts: *phora*, *schêma* and deixis. Then he compares 'dancing' (ὄρχησις) to 'song' (μέλος): the first consists of 'movements' (*κινήσεις*) and 'manners/postures' (σχέσεις)*,* while the second consists of 'sounds' (φθόγγοι) and 'intervals' (διαστήματα). The *kinêseis* are called *phorai* and the postures and poses are called *schêmata.* Lawler argues that the word *schêmata* are "really brief, distinctive movements or patterns of movement that were visible in the course of the dance."[151]

The Athenian criticizes the use of the language of painting for describing *choreia* (εὔχρων δὲ μέλος ἢ σχῆμα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπεικάσαντα). The use of the adjective εὔχρων,[152] which is a Platonic creation, is not suitable for melody and dance postures.[153] Plato seeks to purge his era's musical vocabulary of words that originate

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[150] See, for example, Pl. *Rep*. 400c-d.
[151] Lawler (1954) 155
[152] The adjective εὔχρων is a gloss. Philochorus (FGrHist 328F23.6-23.7) – cited by Athenaeus in 14.42 – uses the adjective εὔχρους as a technical musical term in order to describe the innovations of the citharist Lysander of Sicyon, who χρώματά τε εὔχροα πρῶτος ἐκιθάρισε. Its meaning, however, is not clear. The comic poet Antiphanes uses the noun χρῶμα in plural to describe Philoxenos' poetic composition, as Athenaeus (14.50) quotes: πολὺ γ' ἐστὶ πάντων τῶν ποιητῶν διάφορος / ὁ Φιλόξενος, πρώτιστα μὲν γὰρ ὀνόμασιν / ἰδίοισι καὶ καινοῖσι χρῆται πανταχοῦ. / ἔπειτα τὰ μέλη μεταβολαῖς καὶ χρώμασιν / ὡς εὖ κέκραται (Fr 207, Kassel-Austin). The noun χρῶμα used by Aristoxenus (*El. harm*. 2.44 Da Rios) denotes one of the three Genera/genē – a kind of intervallic structure of the tetrachord – that Greeks made use of: Τρία γένη τῶν μελῳδουμένων ἐστίν· διάτονον χρῶμα ἁρμονία. The *Introduction of Harmonics* belongs in the same tradition of Cleonides [see Der Neue Pauly s.v. Kleoneides] (Introd. Harm.3 = Eucl. *Op. Omn*., vol. 8.188.17, Heiberg-Menge), where χρῶμα comprises the *genus*, along with διάτονον and ἁρμονία: <Γένη> δέ ἐστι τρία, διάτονον, χρῶμα, ἁρμονία. For a similar, technical use of χρῶμα, χρωματικός in music, see A. Q. *De Mus*. (1. 9, 18, 19 Winnington-Ingram). I owe the aforementioned references to Schöpsdau (1994) 268-9. For the use of χρῶμα as an established metaphor in musical language during the classical period, see Rocconi (2004) 29-34.
[153] The association between the language of painting and *mousikê* appears in the passage 669a-669b of the *Laws*, where Plato uses the two basic components of painting (χρώματα and σχήματα) as a bridge by which to pass to their counterparts in music in a delicate way (i.e. words, harmonies/tunes, rhythms): {ΑΘ} ὀρθότατα λέγεις. ἆρ' οὖν οὐ περὶ ἑκάστην εἰκόνα, καὶ ἐν γραφικῇ καὶ ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ πάντῃ, τὸν μέλλοντα ἔμφρονα κριτὴν ἔσεσθαι δεῖ ταῦτα τρία ἔχειν, ὅ τέ ἐστι πρῶτον γιγνώσκειν, ἔπειτα ὡς ὀρθῶς, ἔπειθ' ὡς εὖ, τὸ τρίτον, εἴργασται τῶν εἰκόνων ἡτισοῦν [ῥήμασί τε καὶ μέλεσι καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς]; The final phrase of the passage is bracketed by England, but it certainly contributes to the coherence of the passage, as Schöpsdau (1994) 326-327 persuasively argues: "Englands Tilgung von rhmasi... ruthmois (gebilligt von G. Muller 1935, 60) hat zwar die strenge Logik für sich (da es in 669a-b um Nachahmung generell, nicht um die Musik speziell geht), berücksichtigt aber zu wenig die Funktion dieser Worte für den Gang des Dialogs: sie schaffen einen (logisch gewiß

in other artistic fields, as for example ‘color’ and ‘colored’ that come from the art of painting.[154] Plato aims for a pure, original, musical language, freed from elements that do not come from the musical sphere, and which constitute typical examples of the *poikilia* of New Music.[155] So Plato is interested not only in purifying music of extraneous elements, but also purifying the language of music criticism.

Plato’s focus on the ‘purity’ of musical vocabulary is part of his broader interest in *êthos*. In the passage that follows, the Athenian attributes the adjective καλά to the dance poses and melodies of the brave men (ἀνδρείων), and the adjective αἰσχρά to the poses and melodies of the cowards (δειλῶν) (Pl. *Laws* 655a):

> {ΑΘ} […] τὸ δὲ τοῦ δειλοῦ τε καὶ ἀνδρείου σχῆμα ἢ μέλος ἔστιν τε, καὶ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύειν ἔχει τὰ μὲν τῶν ἀνδρείων καλά, τὰ τῶν δειλῶν δὲ αἰσχρά. καὶ ἵνα δὴ μὴ μακρολογία πολλή τις γίγνηται περὶ ταῦθ’ ἡμῖν ἅπαντα, ἁπλῶς ἔστω τὰ μὲν ἀρετῆς ἐχόμενα ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος, εἴτε αὐτῆς εἴτε τινὸς εἰκόνος, σύμπαντα σχήματά τε καὶ μέλη καλά, τὰ δὲ κακίας αὖ, τοὐναντίον ἅπαν.

> {ATH} […] but one can use this language about the posture and melody of the brave man and the coward, and one is right in calling those of the brave man good, and those of the coward bad. To avoid a tediously long disquisition, let us sum up the whole matter by saying that the postures and tunes which attach to goodness of soul or body, or to some image thereof, are universally good, while those which attach to badness are exactly the reverse.

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anfechtbaren) Übergang von der als Exempel herangezogenen Malerei zur Musik, die das eigentliche Thema ist, und stellen zugleich den Formen (schemata) und Farben (xrwmata) der Malerei Text, Melodie und Rhythmus als die spezifischen Mittel der Musik gegenüber, von deren richtiger Kombination, wie 669b5ff. zeigt, die Qualität der Musik entscheidend abhängt. Ritters Versuch, die drei Begriffe auch auf die Malerei und Plastik anzudehnen, geht von der Prämisse aus, dass für Platon mousike bzw paideia auch die bildende Kunst einschließe.”

[154] The songs are perceived as inherently colored, something that can be described in modern terms as a specific type of *synesthesia*.
For painting (ζωγραφία) and poetry (ποίησις), there is the famous aphorism ascribed by Plutarch (*De glor. Athen*. 346f; *Table Talk* 748a-b) and some other late authors to Simonides: πλὴν ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν μὲν ζωγραφίαν ποίησιν σιωπῶσαν προσαγορεύει, τὴν δὲ ποίησιν ζωγραφίαν λαλοῦσαν.

[155] On the different use of ποικιλία and ποικίλος in the archaic and in the late classical period, see LeVen (2013) 229-242.

In the passage 654e-655a, Plato offers 'an artistic representation of the virtue through song and dance.'[156] In this way, σχῆμα and μέλος represent and convey virtue of body and soul; the good figures and melodies (καλά) communicate physical and spiritual bravery. By contrast, the bad postures and melodies (αἰσχρά) express bodily and spiritual cowardice. Hence, it is clear that dance, too, expresses and inculcates *ethos* in the *Laws*, and not just (as Damon and earlier theorists wrote) melody and mode.

It has already been noted that, apart from the moral impact of postures and tunes on the soul, Plato also introduces certain emotions into the discussion of musical goodness and badness (Pl. *Laws* 654c-d). These include the joy, pleasure, hate, and pain that must be felt towards good and bad representations. The emotions that the audience experiences from the representations of song and dance emerge from the ability to judge what constitutes the good and bad in song and dance. The management of emotions and natural tendencies is associated with the musical correctness, which is interwoven with the whole *paideia*, as the Athenian has explicitly stated in Book 1 of the *Laws* (Pl. *Laws* 642a):

> {ΑΘ} […] σκοπῶ δὴ μὴ δόξαν ὑμῖν παράσχωμαι περὶ σμικροῦ πολλὰ λέγειν, μέθης πέρι, σμικροῦ πράγματος, παμμήκη λόγον ἀνακαθαιρόμενος. τὸ δὲ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῦ διόρθωσις οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο ἄνευ μουσικῆς ὀρθότητός ποτε σαφὲς οὐδὲ ἱκανὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπολαβεῖν, μουσικὴ δὲ ἄνευ παιδείας τῆς πάσης οὐκ ἂν αὖ ποτε δύναιτο· ταῦτα δὲ παμπόλλων ἐστὶν λόγων.
>
> {ATH} […] so I am afraid of making you think that I am a great talker about a small matter, if I spin out a discourse of prodigious length about the small matter of drunkenness. But the fact is that the right treatment of this could never be treated adequately and clearly in our discourse apart from correctness in music, nor could music, apart from education as a whole; and these require lengthy discussions.

The right treatment of drunkenness and, consequently, the control of the pleasure that wine brings to the soul, requires a correct musical education, or more

[156] Schöpsdau (1994) 265.

appropriately, a correct choral education that is based on rigid and long-established structures. This will be elaborated on below.

In the *Republic*, Plato provides a detailed description of the musical elements during his discussion of the development of the theory of the soul. In the *Laws*, however, he focuses on the essential elements of *choreia* during the presentation of his political theory for the Cretan city. This city was constructed within a rigid religious structure. In this framework the musical principles and practices should be regulated and controlled by the law. The inextricable connection between religion and *choreia* is vigorously expressed through the division of the whole population of the new city into three choruses, that of Muses, Apollo and Dionysus, where mortals and immortals join together and rejoice in the festivals. In this context, Plato refers once more to the notion of musical correctness and rejects the most popular criterion for its judgment, namely, the amount of pleasure that it affords (Pl. *Laws* 655c-d):

> {ΑΘ} οὐ γάρ που ἐρεῖ γέ τις ὥς ποτε τὰ τῆς κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς καλλίονα χορεύματα, οὐδ᾽ ὡς αὐτὸς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς τῆς μοχθηρίας σχήμασιν, οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι ἐναντίᾳ ταύτης Μούσῃ τινί· καίτοι λέγουσίν γε οἱ πλεῖστοι μουσικῆς ὀρθότητα εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πορίζουσαν δύναμιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὔτε ἀνεκτὸν οὔτε ὅσιον τὸ παράπαν φθέγγεσθαι, τόδε δὲ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς πλανᾶν ἡμᾶς.

> {ATH} For surely no one will maintain that the choral performance of vice are better than those of virtue, or that he himself enjoys the postures of turpitude, while all others delight in music of the opposite kind. Most people, however, assert that the correctness in music consists in its power of affording pleasure to the soul. But such an assertion is quite intolerable, and it is blasphemy even to utter it.

Choral dances represent both vice and virtue (κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς καλλίονα χορεύματα). People need to appreciate that the value of the choral dances of virtue is higher than the value of the choral dances of vice. The question of which criterion is the most appropriate for the musical judgment is raised and the Athenian does not give an answer. However, by portraying *choreia* as the enactment of characters and underlining the contradictions that the performers experience, he demonstrates

through an argument of *reductio ad absurdum* how inappropriate the criterion of pleasure is (Pl. *Laws* 655d-656a):

> {ΑΘ} ἐπειδὴ μιμήματα τρόπων ἐστὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς χορείας, ἐν πράξεσί τε παντοδαπαῖς γιγνόμενα καὶ τύχαις, καὶ ἤθεσι καὶ μιμήσεσι διεξιόντων ἑκάστων, οἷς μὲν ἂν πρὸς τρόπου τὰ ῥηθέντα ἢ μελῳδηθέντα ἢ καὶ ὁπωσοῦν χορευθέντα, ἢ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ κατὰ ἔθος ἢ κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα, τούτους μὲν καὶ τούτοις χαίρειν τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν αὐτὰ καὶ προσαγορεύειν καλὰ ἀναγκαῖον, οἷς δ᾽ ἂν παρὰ φύσιν ἢ τρόπον ἤ τινα συνήθειαν, οὔτε χαίρειν δυνατὸν οὔτε ἐπαινεῖν αἰσχρά τε προσαγορεύειν. οἷς δ᾽ ἂν τὰ μὲν τῆς φύσεως ὀρθὰ συμβαίνῃ, τὰ δὲ τῆς συνηθείας ἐναντία, ἢ τὰ μὲν τῆς συνηθείας ὀρθά, τὰ δὲ τῆς φύσεως ἐναντία, οὗτοι δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐναντίους προσαγορεύουσιν· ἡδέα γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστα εἶναί φασι, πονηρὰ δέ, καὶ ἐναντίον ἄλλων οὓς οἴονται φρονεῖν αἰσχύνονται μὲν κινεῖσθαι τῷ σώματι τὰ τοιαῦτα, αἰσχύνονται δὲ ᾄδειν ὡς ἀποφαινόμενοι καλὰ μετὰ σπουδῆς, χαίρουσιν δὲ παρ᾽ αὑτοῖς.
>
> {ATH} Inasmuch as choral performances are representations of character, exhibited in actions and circumstances of every kind, in which, the several performers enact their parts by habit and capacity to imitate, those whose characters are congenial to what is said or sung or in any way danced (whether from natural bent or from habit, or from all these causes combined), then these performers invariably delight in such, performances and extol them as excellent; whereas those who find them repugnant to their nature, disposition or habits cannot possibly delight in them or praise them, but call them bad. And when men are right in their natural tastes but wrong in those acquired by habituation, or right in the latter but wrong in the former, then by their expressions of praise they convey the opposite of their real sentiments.

The Athenian is fully aware of the mimetic function of *choreia* and, thus, of its obvious dangers. The agents of *choreia*, whether motivated by character or habit, represent the various actions of everyday life through speaking or reciting, singing, and dancing. The emotion of pleasure informs their judgment of what is good or bad and, as the Athenian says, it is this emotion that leads them to internal conflicts.[157] In

[157] On the identity of the performers in the passage 655d-656a and "the reversed image of the spectators perceived from the point of view of the choral performer as affecting the terms of his own pleasure," see Peponi (2013) 212-239.

656c, the Athenian criticizes the poets' right to choose the acts to perform in their musical education by relying on their personal pleasure and taste (Pl. *Laws* 656c):

> {ΑΘ} ὅπου δὴ νόμοι καλῶς εἰσι κείμενοι ἢ καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ἔσονται τὴν περὶ τὰς μούσας παιδείαν τε καὶ παιδιάν, οἰόμεθα ἐξέσεσθαι τοῖς ποιητικοῖς, ὅτιπερ ἂν αὐτὸν τὸν ποιητὴν ἐν τῇ ποιήσει τέρπῃ ῥυθμοῦ ἢ μέλους ἢ ῥήματος ἐχόμενον, τοῦτο διδάσκοντα καὶ τοὺς τῶν εὐνόμων παῖδας καὶ νέους ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς, ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ ἀπεργάζεσθαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ μοχθηρίαν;

> {ATH} Now where laws are, or will be in the future, rightly laid down regarding musical education and recreation, do we imagine that poets will be granted such license that they may teach whatever form of rhythm or melody they best like themselves to the children of law-abiding citizens and the young men in the choruses, no matter what the result may be in the way of virtue or depravity?

In this passage the Athenian broaches the subject of emotions in education. He accepts joy and innocent pleasure (παιδιάν), which are closely associated with one another or are even inherent in *paideia* (παιδείαν).[158] However, he rejects the subjective and harmful emotion of pleasure (τέρπῃ) as the criterion – or at least as the unique criterion – for the correct musical education. The poets' authoritative power must be controlled by the legislators' objective principles and rules. The Athenian returns to the discussion on the criterion of pleasure a little later, in 658e-659a, where he argues that it is important to make use of it in musical contests in order to judge the best music (Μοῦσαν καλλίστην). He concludes that the criterion of music should be the pleasure it accords to the best and most highly educated men.[159]

All three components of poetry that appear in passage 656c, namely *rhythmos*, *melos*, and *rhêma*, form the necessary base for *choreia*, and consequently for *paideia.* They indicate distinct performed acts: *rhythmos* is the essential part of dancing, *melos* has a central role in singing, and *rhêma* is the core of reciting. They are therefore

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[158] In Pl. *Laws* 654a joy is inherent in chorus: χορούς τε ὠνομακέναι παρὰ τὸ τῆς χαρᾶς ἔμφυτον ὄνομα. By association, since παιδιά (fun, enjoyment) is a synonym of χαρά (joy) and παιδεία is identified with χορεία, enjoyment is also inherent in *paideia*.

[159] Pl. *Laws* 658e: δεῖν τὴν μουσικὴν ἡδονῇ κρίνεσθαι, μὴ μέντοι τῶν γε ἐπιτυχόντων, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἐκείνην εἶναι Μοῦσαν καλλίστην ἥτις τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένους τέρπει […]

associated with the notions of enjoyment (παιδιά) and of musical correctness (μουσική ὀρθότης). As educational instruments, they have the power to lead people's souls to virtue, which is the main purpose of *paideia*. After a lengthy digression, in 667b-c the Athenian eventually lists all the criteria that need to be combined in order to evaluate what *kalon* is in music (μοῦσαν): χάρις or else ἡδονή (pleasure), ὀρθότης (correctness), and ὠφελία (moral benefit). It appears that Plato mixes pleasure with the ethical principles of musical correctness and moral benefit.[160]

In 656d the Athenian expresses his admiration for the old Egyptian laws that supervised and safeguarded a musical model,[161] by preserving tradition and banning innovative practices (Pl. *Laws* 656d-e):

> {ΑΘ.} Νῦν δέ γε αὐτὸ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔξεστι δρᾶν, πλὴν κατ' Αἴγυπτον. {ΚΛ.} Ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ δὲ δὴ πῶς τὸ τοιοῦτον φῂς νενομοθετῆσθαι; {ΑΘ.} Θαῦμα καὶ ἀκοῦσαι. πάλαι γὰρ δή ποτε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγνώσθη παρ' αὐτοῖς οὗτος ὁ λόγος ὃν τὰ νῦν λέγομεν ἡμεῖς, ὅτι καλὰ μὲν σχήματα, καλὰ δὲ μέλη δεῖ μεταχειρίζεσθαι ταῖς συνηθείαις τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν νέους· ταξάμενοι δὲ ταῦτα, ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖ' (ὁμοῖ') ἅττα ἀπέφηναν ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτ' οὐκ ἐξῆν οὔτε ζωγράφοις, οὔτ' ἄλλοις ὅσοι σχήματα καὶ ὁποῖ' ἅττα ἀπεργάζονται, καινοτομεῖν οὐδ' ἐπινοεῖν ἄλλ' ἅττα ἢ τὰ πάτρια, οὐδὲ νῦν ἔξεστιν, οὔτε ἐν τούτοις οὔτε ἐν μουσικῇ συμπάσῃ. σκοπῶν δὲ εὑρήσεις αὐτόθι τὰ μυριοστὸν ἔτος γεγραμμένα ἢ τετυπωμένα – οὐχ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν μυριοστὸν ἀλλ' ὄντως – τῶν νῦν δεδημιουργημένων οὔτε τι καλλίονα οὔτ' αἰσχίω, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ τέχνην ἀπειργασμένα.
>
> {ATH} But at present this license is allowed in practically every State, with the exception of Egypt. {CL} How, then, does the law stand in Egypt? {ATH} It is marvelous, even in the telling. It appears that long ago they determined on the rule of which we are now speaking, that the youth of a State should practice in their rehearsals good postures and good melodies: these they prescribed in detail and posted up in the temples, and outside this official list it was, and still is, forbidden to painters and all other producers of postures and representations to introduce any innovation or invention, whether in such productions or in any other branch of music, over and above the traditional forms. And if you look

[160] For a discussion of these three criteria of musical judgement, see Rocconi (2012) particularly pp 121-127.
[161] The whole passage can be seen in Appendix I. iii. 656d-657b (pp. 23-24).

> there, you will find that the things depicted or graven there 10,000 years ago (I mean what I say, not loosely but literally 10,000) are no whit better or worse than the productions of today, but wrought with the same art.

The Athenian claims that in Egypt the good postures and tunes are officially settled (ταξάμενοι) and have been displayed (ἀπέφηναν) on their temples for ten thousand years. The youths practice the traditional forms of postures and melodies and no one is allowed to innovate (καινοτομεῖν) or invent (ἐπινοεῖν) new ones. The consecration of the good postures and tunes that is enacted by law is crucial for their survival. The shift from postures in dance to postures (σχήματα) in painting – if by *schêmata* in painting Plato understands poses of human beings while singing and dancing[162]– shows the close association between these two artistic fields. If this is the case here, then Plato attributes an educative function to painting, too. This is a familiar connection at least in later authors; for example in Plutarch's *Table Talk* 747c Ammonius brings the example of the representations of Apollo, Pan and a Bacchant in order to define the word *schêmata:* σχήματα δὲ σχέσεις καὶ διαθέσεις, εἰς ἃς φερόμεναι τελευτῶσιν αἱ κινήσεις, ὅταν Ἀπόλλωνος ἢ Πανὸς ἤ τινος Βάκχης σχῆμα διαθέντες ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος γραφικῶς τοῖς εἴδεσιν ἐπιμένωσι. Therefore, one may argue that visual art belongs along with singing and dancing to the broad category of *mousikê*, which can be defined as a representative artistic whole.

What the Athenian really wishes for the Cretan city is the enactment of similar legislation in order to create fixed gestures and melodies / songs that will not undergo any changes in the years to come, exactly as occurred in Egypt. Similarly, in Book 3 (700a-b), Plato recalls nostalgically the strict division of *mousikê* in the old times.[163] He refers to the hymns, the dirges, the paeans, the dithyramb and the *kitharōidikoi*

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[162] On the meaning of *schêmata* in this passage, see Rutherford (2013) 72-74 who gives three alternatives. The first possibility, which he finds problematic, is that the Egyptians recorded *schêmata* and tunes and displayed them in their temple. The objection to this view, as Rutherfore notes, is that we are not aware of any musical notation in Egypt – the Egyptians adopted the Greek notation in the Hellenistic period. The second alternative is that the term means pictures of dance postures, a common theme in Egyptian art. The third is that *schêmata* denote the hieroglyphic symbols of Egyptian writing that would have looked like painting to a Greek eye. In my opinion, the second possibility seems most likely.

[163] Nagy (1990) 109: "These genres ... are the structurally distinct aspects of *mousikê* 'music' (that is, for all practical purposes, lyric poetry), parallel to the structurally distinct aspects of *aristokratia* in Plato's good old Athenian society."

nomoi.[164] The list of the melic genres ends with the conclusion that in those days the distinction between the melic genres was clear and fixed and that it was forbidden to set one kind of figure to a different kind of song (μέλους εἶδος).

In Book 2 the Athenian describes the main task of the right legislator, which is to persuade the poet to compose figures and tunes correctly in order to represent the virtuous men (Pl. *Laws* 660a: τὰ τῶν σωφρόνων τε καὶ ἀνδρείων καὶ πάντως ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔν τε ῥυθμοῖς σχήματα καὶ ἐν ἁρμονίαισιν <u>μέλη ποιοῦντα</u> ὀρθῶς ποιεῖν).[165] The notion of musical correctness is described here as the correctness of the musical composition, which includes the correct composition of rhythms and gestures (σχήματα), tunes, and songs (μέλη).

Essentially, Plato wants to protect the moral norms through the protection of the musical forms.[166] In passage 657a-b, the Athenian, who continues his discussion of Egyptian culture, insists on the subject of musical correctness (Pl. *Laws* 657a-b):

> {ΑΘ} […] δυνατὸν ἄρ᾽ ἦν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων νομοθετεῖσθαι βεβαίως θαρροῦντα <u>μέλη</u> τὰ τὴν <u>ὀρθότητα</u> φύσει παρεχόμενα. […] εἰ δύναιτό τις ἑλεῖν αὐτῶν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν τὴν <u>ὀρθότητα</u>, θαρροῦντα χρὴ εἰς νόμον ἄγειν καὶ τάξιν αὐτά· ὡς ἡ τῆς <u>ἡδονῆς</u> καὶ <u>λύπης</u> ζήτησις τοῦ <u>καινῇ</u> ζητεῖν ἀεὶ <u>μουσικῇ</u> χρῆσθαι σχεδὸν οὐ μεγάλην τινὰ δύναμιν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ <u>διαφθεῖραι τὴν καθιερωθεῖσαν χορείαν</u> ἐπικαλοῦσα ἀρχαιότητα. τὴν γοῦν ἐκεῖ οὐδαμῶς ἔοικε δυνατὴ γεγονέναι <u>διαφθεῖραι</u>, πᾶν δὲ τοὐναντίον.
>
> {ATH} […] it has proved possible for the <u>melodies</u> which possess a natural <u>correctness</u> to be enacted by law and permanently consecrated. […] Hence, as I said, if one could by any means succeed in grasping a rough idea of <u>correctness</u> in tune, one might then with confidence reduce them to legal form and prescription, since the tendency of <u>pleasure</u> and <u>pain</u> to indulge constantly in <u>fresh music</u> has, after all, no very great power to <u>corrupt choral forms that are consecrated</u>, by merely scoffing at them as antiquated. In Egypt, at any rate, it seems to have had no such power of <u>corrupting</u>, in fact, quite the reverse.

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[164] See Pl. *Laws* 700a-b. The passage will be discussed in the second chapter of this thesis (II.2).

[165] See passage iv. 659d-660a in Appendix I.

[166] See Rutherford (2013) 67-83 on the role of Egyptian education in Plato's *Laws*.

Official consecration and legislation are required in order to preserve the naturally, inherently, and correct *melê* and to weaken the power of pleasure and pain that is usually typical of novel music. Their ultimate purpose is to prevent the corruption of the choral enactments. As we have seen in previous passages, in the Egyptian model *melos* and the whole *choreia* is placed in a rigid ritual structure that guarantees its survival. Strongly influenced by the Egyptian system, the Athenian situates the musical model of the new city within the cultural process of *paideia* and in the broader framework of an established and well-organized religious system, where choral performances (Pl. *Laws* 665a-b) and feasts in honor of all the major and lesser gods will take place throughout the year. The sacralization of every kind of dancing and singing is described in detail in Book 7.[167] With the help of Law-wardens, the priests will ensure that the public songs and the whole *choreia* are compliant with the relevant laws[168] (Pl. *Laws* 800a: παρὰ τὰ δημόσια μέλη τε καὶ ἱερὰ καὶ τὴν τῶν νέων σύμπασαν χορείαν μηδεὶς μᾶλλον ἢ παρ᾽ ὁντινοῦν ἄλλον τῶν νόμων φθεγγέσθω μηδ᾽ ἐν ὀρχήσει κινείσθω). The performance of correct music, an essential part of the moral *paideia* in the *Laws*, appears also in Pindar's fragment 32[169]:

> {ΑΘ} [...] κἀν τοῖς ὕμνοις δεξιὼν περὶ τῶν ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ συμβαινόντων παθημάτων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς τὸν Κάδμον φησὶν ἀκοῦσαι τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος 'μουσικὰν ὀρθὰν ἐπιδεικνυμένου' [...]

> {ATH} […] but even in the Hymns when Pindar narrates the sufferings and change befalling men throughout time, he says that Cadmus heard Apollo 'performing correct music' […]

[167] The Athenian discusses the feasts that should be ordained annually in honor of the gods, their children, and the daemons (Pl. *Laws* 799a-b): {ΑΘ} τοῦ καθιερῶσαι πᾶσαν μὲν ὄρχησιν, πάντα δὲ μέλη, τάξαντας πρῶτον μὲν τὰς ἑορτάς, … μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν θεῶν θύμασιν ἑκάστοις ἣν ᾠδὴν δεῖ ἐφυμνεῖσθαι, καὶ χορείαις ποίαισιν γεραίρειν τὴν τότε θυσίαν … σπένδοντας καθιεροῦν ἑκάστας τὰς ᾠδὰς ἑκάστοις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἂν δὲ παρ᾽ αὐτά τίς τῳ θεῶν ἄλλους ὕμνους ἢ χορείας προσάγῃ, τοὺς ἱερέας τε καὶ τὰς ἱερείας μετὰ νομοφυλάκων ἐξείργοντας ὁσίως ἐξείργειν καὶ κατὰ νόμον, τὸν δὲ ἐξειργόμενον, ἂν μὴ ἑκὼν ἐξείργηται, δίκας ἀσεβείας διὰ βίου παντὸς τῷ ἐθελήσαντι παρέχειν.
[168] See also Koller's translation as 'Chorlieder' in Koller (1965) 26.
[169] Aristid. *Or*. 3.620 Lenz-Behr.

After analyzing musical goodness and correctness, the Athenian examines the defects of the melic compositions or of what bad μέλη are.[170] The Athenian explains that the poets are inferior to the Muses as composers (Pl. *Laws* 669c: τοὺς ποιητὰς φαυλοτέρους εἶναι ποιητὰς αὐτῶν τῶν Μουσῶν) and that they therefore make two basic mistakes: they merge diverse elements (Pl. *Laws* 669c-d)[171] and they divide elements that are inextricable (Pl. *Laws* 669d-e).[172] It is possible that the reference to 'the compositions of the Muses' at 669c implies that there is something like 'absolute' or 'perfect music' concealed behind the mask of actually-existing human music.

Each *melos*,[173] is accompanied by a suitable *schêma* and set to suitable verses. For example, feminine *melos* is expressed through feminine gestures and feminine words, while the tunes and figures of a free man and those of a slave are expressed by words suitable for each of them. Likewise, the musical elements intended for humans should not be mixed with those for animals. Moreover, *melos*, rhythm, and words should not be separated.[174]

A little later, the Athenian resumes the discussion of the correctness of *melos.* In 670b he wonders one can know whether a *melos* is correct (Pl. *Laws* 670b: πῶς τις τὴν ὀρθότητα γνώσεται τῶν μελῶν) and resumes his discussion on the qualities of a sensible judge that he had previously summarized in 669a-b: τὸν μέλλοντα ἔμφρονα

[170] See passage viii. 669b-670a in Appendix I.

[171] Pl. *Laws* 669c-d: ὥστε ῥήματα ἀνδρῶν ποιήσασαι τὸ σχῆμα (χρῶμα) γυναικῶν καὶ μέλος ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ μέλος ἐλευθέρων αὖ καὶ σχήματα συνθεῖσαι ῥυθμοὺς δούλων καὶ ἀνελευθέρων προσαρμόττειν, οὐδ' αὖ ῥυθμοὺς καὶ σχῆμα ἐλευθέριον ὑποθεῖσαι μέλος ἢ λόγον ἐναντίον ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς, ἔτι δὲ θηρίων φωνὰς καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὀργάνων καὶ πάντας ψόφους εἰς ταὐτὸν οὐκ ἄν ποτε συνθεῖεν, ὡς ἕν τι μιμούμεναι […]
The whole passage can be found in Appendix I viii. 669b-670a (p. 27-28).

[172] Pl. *Laws* 669d-e: καὶ ἔτι διασπῶσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ ῥυθμὸν μὲν καὶ σχήματα μέλους χωρίς, λόγους ψιλοὺς εἰς μέτρα τιθέντες, μέλος δ' αὖ καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἄνευ ῥημάτων, ψιλῇ κιθαρίσει τε καὶ αὐλήσει προσχρώμενοι, ἐν οἷς δὴ παγχάλεπον ἄνευ λόγου γιγνόμενον ῥυθμόν τε καὶ ἁρμονίαν γιγνώσκειν ὅτι τε βούλεται καὶ ὅτῳ ἔοικε τῶν ἀξιολόγων μιμημάτων […]

[173] For the meaning of *melos* here, see Nagy (2010) 374, who states that "*melos* actually refers only to an unmarked kind of melody, which is the melody that is sung and danced in song. But there is also a marked kind of melody: … this marked kind of melody is the melodic contour that frames the verses of poetry. Those aspects of melody that are needed only for song and dance can be taken out of the words that are the building blocks of poetry. But there are other aspects, as represented by what I call the melodic contour, that cannot be taken out of the words. These aspects are irreducible and inherent in the words of *mousikê*. And these irreducible aspects of melody … correspond to a phenomenon that can best be described as melodic accentuation in the Ancient Greek language." For a similar approach to the interpretation of the term *melos,* the inauthentic Platonic work *Definitions* might be helpful: Pl. *Def.* 414d3: διάλεκτος συνθετὴ ἐξ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων ἄνευ μέλους.; Pl. *Def.* 414d8: Διάλεκτος φωνὴ ἀνθρώπου ἐγγράμματος· καὶ σημεῖόν τι κοινὸν ἑρμηνευτικὸν ἄνευ μέλους.

[174] See also Pl. *Phdr* 278c: καὶ Ὁμήρῳ καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος αὖ ποίησιν ψιλὴν ἢ ἐν ᾠδῇ συντέθηκε

κριτὴν ἔσεσθαι δεῖ ταῦτα τρία ἔχειν, ὅ τέ ἐστι πρῶτον γιγνώσκειν, ἔπειτα ὡς ὀρθῶς, ἔπειθ᾽ ὡς εὖ, τὸ τρίτον, εἴργασται τῶν εἰκόνων ἡτισοῦν [...] Here again Plato quotes Pindar: as in the less exact and looser citations of *Ion*, we see him taking a piece of archaic song-text out of context and twisting it to his own purposes.

In the passage 670a-d the Athenian repeats the qualification that the musical judges – in this instance, the elders – should possess:[175] firstly, they must perceive and understand the rhythms and the harmonies; secondly, they must understand the correctness of *melos*; and thirdly, they must be able to understand whether a *mimêsis* is good or not. Correctness of *melos* depends on the appropriate elements used for its composition, which will also appear in the representation of *melos* by the Dionysus' singers. It is Chorus of Dionysus will decide whether or not a poet's work is performable. Acting as "an Academy of Music" the Dionysiac chorus will "maintain a correct standard of taste" [176] in what concerns musical performances. The first two criteria of musical judgment, which are related to the technical aspects of *melos*, must also be possessed by the poets. The third criterion, namely the evaluation of the representation, differentiates the poets from the older singers. It is not necessary for the poets to have this qualification, but it is necessary for the older singers of the city to possess all these abilities.

As already pointed out, the Athenian's disapproval of the poet's criterion of pleasure and the emphasis on these qualities make the legislators, together with the eldest and most highly educated men, the major human musical authorities in the city. In 659d the Athenian had defined *paideia* by underlining the importance of the cooperation between the legislators and the old, fair men in order to help the child's soul to manage its emotions.[177]

In this context, he had drawn attention to the enchanting power of *melos*, *ôidê,* and *choreia*. The Athenian plays with the words ᾠδή (song) and ἐπῳδή (incantation) (Pl. *Laws* 659e[178]: τούτων ἕνεκα, ἃς ᾠδὰς καλοῦμεν, ὄντως μὲν ἐπῳδαὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς

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[175] For a detailed analysis of the three qualifications of musical judges, see Barker (2013) 392-416. The original text can be found in Appendix I. xiii. 840b-c.

[176] Bury (1926) viii

[177] Pl. *Laws* 659d: ὡς ἄρα παιδεία μέν ἐσθ᾽ ἡ παίδων ὁλκή τε καὶ ἀγωγὴ πρὸς τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου λόγον ὀρθὸν εἰρημένον, καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικεστάτοις καὶ πρεσβυτάτοις δι᾽ ἐμπειρίαν συνδεδογμένον ὡς ὄντως ὀρθός ἐστιν· ἵν᾽ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ παιδὸς μὴ ἐναντία χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐθίζηται τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου πεπεισμένοις, ἀλλὰ συνέπηται χαίρουσά τε καὶ λυπουμένη τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις οἷσπερ ὁ γέρων [...]

[178] See passage iv. 659d-660a in Appendix I.

αὗται νῦν γεγονέναι). He also uses the verb ἐπᾴδω (sing to, sing as an incantation) for the songs of the choruses (Pl. *Laws* 664b[179]: φημὶ γὰρ ἅπαντας δεῖν ἐπᾴδειν τρεῖς ὄντας τοὺς χοροὺς ἔτι νέαις οὔσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ ἁπαλαῖς τῶν παίδων). The charming quality of songs performed in the process of choral education strengthens the Athenian's argument that musical (choral) education will manage to discipline the emotions of pain and pleasure in the young souls.

The enchanting power of the song recurs in Book 7 with the description of the children's motherly treatment. The movements, combined with the lullabies, heal the sleepless children's souls (Pl. *Laws* 790d-e):

> {ΑΘ} τεκμαίρεσθαι δὲ χρὴ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶνδε, ὡς ἐξ ἐμπειρίας αὐτὸ εἰλήφασι καὶ ἐγνώκασιν ὂν χρήσιμον αἵ τε τροφοὶ τῶν σμικρῶν καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ τῶν Κορυβάντων ἰάματα τελοῦσαι· ἡνίκα γὰρ ἄν που βουληθῶσιν κατακοιμίζειν τὰ δυσυπνοῦντα τῶν παιδίων αἱ μητέρες, οὐχ ἡσυχίαν αὐτοῖς προσφέρουσιν ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον κίνησιν, ἐν ταῖς ἀγκάλαις ἀεὶ σείουσαι, καὶ οὐ σιγὴν ἀλλά τινα μελῳδίαν, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς οἷον καταυλοῦσι τῶν παιδίων, καθαπερεί (καθάπερ ἡ/ αἱ) τῶν ἐκφρόνων Βακχείων ἰάσει [βακχειῶν ἰάσεις], ταύτῃ τῇ τῆς κινήσεως ἅμα χορείᾳ καὶ μούσῃ χρώμεναι.

> {ATH} Further evidence of this may be seen in the fact that this course is adopted and its usefulness recognized both by those who nurse small children and by those who administer remedies in cases of Corybantism. Thus when mothers have children suffering from sleeplessness, and want to lull them to rest, the treatment they apply is to give them, not quiet, but motion, for they rock them constantly in their arms; and instead of silence, they use a kind of lullaby; and thus they simply charm the children by flute-playing, just as the victims of Bacchic frenzy do, by employing the movements of dance and song as remedy/remedies.

The nursing of children that includes movement and song is compared to the Corybantes' remedies. Plato appears to imagine mothers as a group of Bacchae; in their attempt to lull the children to sleep, they combine motion (κίνησιν) with a kind of song (τινα μελῳδίαν) that charms them like the sound of the flute and is a remedy (ἰάσει / ἰάσεις) for their souls. One would expect a solo dance here – each baby has

[179] For the translation of the passage, see v. 664a-b in Appendix I.

one mother – but the comparison between the mothers and a Bacchic chorus,[180] and the mothers' lullabies and movements with the Bacchic choral performance, shows how deeply rooted *choreia* is in his mind.

The enchanting and healing power of song can be also seen in the description of the Dionysus' singers, who are able to select good musical representations and consequently charm the souls of the youths[181] (Pl. *Laws* 812b-c)[182]:

> {ΑΘ} ἔφαμεν, οἶμαι, τοὺς τοῦ Διονύσου τοὺς ἑξηκοντούτας ᾠδοὺς διαφερόντως εὐαισθήτους δεῖν γεγονέναι περί τε τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς καὶ τὰς τῶν ἁρμονιῶν συστάσεις, ἵνα τὴν τῶν <u>μελῶν</u> μίμησιν τὴν εὖ καὶ τὴν κακῶς μεμιμημένην, ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν ὅταν ψυχὴ γίγνηται, τά τε τῆς ἀγαθῆς ὁμοιώματα καὶ τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας ἐκλέξασθαι δυνατὸς ὤν τις, τὰ μὲν ἀποβάλλῃ, τὰ δὲ προφέρων εἰς μέσον ὑμνῇ καὶ <u>ἐπᾴδῃ</u> ταῖς τῶν νέων ψυχαῖς, προκαλούμενος ἑκάστους εἰς ἀρετῆς ἕπεσθαι κτῆσιν συνακολουθοῦντας διὰ τῶν μιμήσεων.
>
> {ATH} We said, I fancy, that the sixty-year-old singers of hymns to Dionysus ought to be exceptionally keen of perception regarding rhythms and harmonic compositions, in order that when dealing with <u>musical representations</u> of a good kind or a bad, by which the soul is emotionally affected, they may be able to pick out the reproductions of the good kind and of the bad, and having rejected the latter, may produce the other in public, and <u>charm</u> the souls of the children by singing them, and so challenge them all to accompany them in acquiring virtue by means of these representations.

In the *Laws*, the concept of *mimêsis* as a musical as well as an ethical representation that has certain emotional and moral effects on the human soul is the only way to understand the value of song. As already mentioned, the value of the whole *choreia* is judged by its power to instill virtue in people. It has been noted that in the *Republic mimêsis* is restricted under conditions to the class of the guardians and, especially at the end (Book 10), is treated as deceptive and harmful for the

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[180] The comparison is far-fetched, but Plato wants to reinforce his argument on the healing power of song with the addition of a probably humorous description.

[181] For the characterization of the songs of the older singers of Dionysus as incantations, see Pl. *Laws* 666c: ᾄδειν τε καὶ ὃ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν ἐπᾴδειν;

[182] See passage xii. 812b-c in Appendix I.

individual soul of every citizen because it promotes the lower appetitive impulses. However, in the *Laws,* the notion of *mimêsis* is not only positively treated, but is presented as the essential quality of *choreia.* As such, it is seen as necessary for the whole city, both children and adults, who will sing and dance in honor of the gods.[183] There is no doubt that *mimêsis* is seen as the educational process that will lead a young person, in particular, to virtue through the vehicles of song and dance.

In Book 8, the Athenian argues that the first and most valuable knowledge that must be imparted to children is the victory over pleasures that will lead them to full happiness (εὐδαιμονία). This is the noblest of all victories and can be achieved through enchanting of their souls by the recitation of myths and speeches and by the singing of songs (Pl. *Laws* 840b-c[184]: ἡμεῖς καλλίστην ἐκ παίδων πρὸς αὐτοὺς λέγοντες ἐν μύθοις τε καὶ ἐν ῥήμασιν καὶ ἐν μέλεσιν ᾄδοντες, ὡς εἰκός, κηλήσομεν). The use of the verb κηλέω (to charm by incantation) creates a link between *melos* and incantation.

The charming and healing power of *melos* is definitely not a Platonic invention. As Blakely says, 'the first appearance of *epōidai* in Greek literature relates these songs to healing'.[185] Plato adds the enchanting quality of the incantations to the value of the songs in a playful manner in order to bestow harmony (συμφωνίαν) upon the young souls, as he has already stated in Book 2 (Pl. *Laws* 659e: ἃς ᾠδὰς καλοῦμεν, ὄντως μὲν ἐπῳδαὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὗται νῦν γεγονέναι, πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἣν λέγομεν συμφωνίαν ἐσπουδασμέναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ σπουδὴν μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχάς, παιδιαί τε καὶ ᾠδαὶ καλεῖσθαι καὶ πράττεσθαι). The inherent joy of song and of *paideia* as a whole has led him in this semantic play between songs and incantations, as the latter appears to have been used as a joyful means of persuading the youths to imitate the virtuous men in real life.

Plato attributes the main constituents of *choral* education, *melos,* and *schêma* to the natural tendency of the young to cry out and jump.[186] *Melos* is usually paired with *schêma*; they both have rhythm in common. But *melos* is in fact the most essential part of *choreia*. Dancing originates from *melos* and, as a result, the whole of *choreia*

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[183] Pl. *Laws* 665c

[184] For the translation of the passage, see xiii. 840b-c in Appendix I.

[185] Blakely (2006) 140. See Pl. *Rep.* 664b, Pl. *Euthyd.* 290a.; Hom. *Od.* 19.457, where the sons of Autolycus take care of Odysseus' wound and sing a charm song in order to stanch the flow of blood from his wound: ἐπαοιδῇ δ' αἷμα κελαινόν ἔσχεθον.

[186] Pl. *Laws* 673c-d.

and *paideia* comes from it. In the following scheme, I sought to arrange the intricate network of relations that Plato establishes between the musical elements in order to show the position of *melos* in this system. Of course, due to the semantic range of many Platonic musical terms, the scheme is only a broad, but hopefully useful, outline of the significance and position of *melos*.

Choreia = *mousikê* + *gymnastikê* = **the whole education**	672e: Ὅλη μέν που χορεία ὅλη παίδευσις ἦν ἡμῖν, τούτου δ’ αὖ τὸ μὲν ῥυθμοί τε καὶ ἁρμονίαι, τὸ κατὰ τὴν φωνήν.	In our view, *choreia* as a whole is identical with education as a whole; and the part of this concerned with the voice consists of rhythms and harmonies.
Bodily motion = rhythm + *schêma* (figure)	672e: Τὸ δέ γε κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος κίνησιν ῥυθμὸν μὲν κοινὸν τῇ τῆς φωνῆς εἶχε κινήσει, σχῆμα δὲ ἴδιον.	And the part concerned with bodily motion possesses rhythm, in common with vocal motion; besides which it possesses gesture as its own peculiar attribute.
Vocal motion = rhythm + ***melos*** (harmony/melody)	673a: ἐκεῖ δὲ **μέλος** ἡ τῆς φωνῆς κίνησις.	just as *melos* is the vocal activity.
Mousikê → spiritual excellence	673a: τὰ μὲν τοίνυν τῆς φωνῆς μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς ἀρετὴν παιδείας οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅντινα τρόπον ὠνομάσαμεν μουσικήν.	Now the vocal actions which pertain to the training of the soul in virtue we somehow dare to name *mousikê*.
Gymnastikê → bodily excellence	673a: τὰ δέ γε τοῦ σώματος, ἃ παιζόντων ὄρχησιν εἴπομεν, ἐὰν μέχρι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῆς ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις γίγνηται, τὴν ἔντεχνον ἀγωγὴν ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον αὐτοῦ γυμναστικὴν προσείπωμεν.	As regards the bodily actions which we called playful dancing, – if such action attains to bodily excellence, we may term the technical guidance of the body to this end *gymnastikê*.

[Tendency to cry out in play] → ***Melos*** (=harmony/song) → Tendency to leap → Rhythm → dancing → *Choreia* and joy/play	673c-d: οὐκοῦν αὖ ταύτης ἀρχὴ μὲν τῆς παιδιᾶς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν πηδᾶν εἰθίσθαι πᾶν ζῷον, τὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπινον, ὡς ἔφαμεν, αἴσθησιν λαβὸν τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ ἐγέννησέν τε ὄρχησιν καὶ ἔτεκεν, τοῦ δὲ μέλους ὑπομιμνῄσκοντος καὶ ἐγείροντος τὸν ῥυθμόν, κοινωθέντ᾽ ἀλλήλοις χορείαν καὶ παιδιὰν ἐτεκέτην.	The origin of the play we are speaking of is to be found in the habitual tendency of every living creature to leap; and the human creature, by acquiring, as we said, a sense of rhythm, generated and brought forth dancing; and since the rhythm is suggested and awakened by *melos*, the union of these two brought forth choreia and joy.

The overall importance of *melos* in the musical world of the *Laws* is evident. *Melos* is the primary source and the most important part of *choreia*. Joined together with *schêma,* it represents *êthos* and plays a decisive role in the training of the soul in virtue. As Rocconi has observed,

> […] if, in the *Republic*, Plato's concern appeared more generically to be that of discussing the psychagogic power of organized schemes of durations or pitches which are in determinate relations to one another (that is, *rhythmoi* and *harmoniai*), in the *Laws* he is more explicit in referring to 'figures' (of dance) and 'paths' (of notes) as concrete elements of the musical performance".[187]

Choral performance is welcomed in the *Laws* within the framework of *mousikê,* but, it is to be judged according to specific criteria. It has a religious orientation and is generally regulated by strict laws in order to protect its paideutic value; *mousikê* is the vehicle of social cohesion and political order for Magnesia.

The *Laws* is the richest of the texts I discuss, but it is also in a way the furthest from everyday language in the sense that the definition of *melos* it employs exclusively concerns what we call 'choral lyric.' One might argue that that kind of singing is the most 'melic'/archetypal of the forms of *melos,* and indeed perhaps even of song itself; all song is a kind of avatar of the choral song-dance of the Muses and Apollo, a view already found in Hesiod and Homer.

[187] Rocconi (2010) 16.

Conclusions

In discussing the Platonic dialogues addressed in this chapter, *melos* was examined in the context of melic composition and choral performance. The description of the frenzied state of melic composers during the composition of their songs, and their association with epic poets and rhapsodic performers, is obvious in the *Ion*. Moreover, the Platonic language is marked by a constant shift from *epos* to *melos,* which suggests a clear association between these two kinds of poetry. Plato underscores the passive role of the melic poets (and by association epic poets too) and the irrational state, attributed to the divine possession, under which they compose their songs. The poets are downgraded but their songs, which are of divine origin, are beautiful.

In the *Lysis*, Hippothales, infatuated with the young Lysis, composes and performs a *melos*, and, more precisely, an erotic *encômium*. Hippothales' melic composition and possibly solo performance is described by his friend Ctesippus. Socrates, however, discourages him from using *melos* before conquering the young beloved.

In contrast to the *Lysis*, where the discussion on melic composition and performance has a more practical turn, in the *Symposium* it is agreed to compose a theoretical *encômium* for *Erôs*. *Melos*, as erotic *encômium* for a human being in the *Lysis,* is converted into an *encômium* for a god in the *Symposium* and it has a central role in *paideia*, with moral and social connotations. However, it is important to note that the *Symposium* is not a melic composition, but a prose one. Furthermore, since the flute-player is not admitted in the banquet, the melic perfomance is apparently disapproved. Plato's sincere attitude towards *melos* cannot be detected in his explicit statements about it, but should rather be seen in the strategies he adopts in order to undermine it.

In the *Gorgias*, the melic composition and the *melos* – as tunes – has a central position in the definition of *mousikê* and poetry. Both of them are however closely associated with the art of rhetoric. Therefore they share, according to Plato, the same negative features: the performance in front of a large audience and the aim of gratifying and please it. Melic composition and *mousikê* as a whole are thus rejected.

In the *Protagoras*, the sophist underlines the positive contribution of epic and melic poetry to the moral identity of children and their future useful role in society. Despite these statements the naming of famous epic and melic poets and their characterization as merely sophists betrays Plato's real feelings about *epos* and *melos*.

In the *Republic*, which is dedicated to the construction of a theory of the soul within the discussion of the correction of an ill city and the creation of a fair one, Plato focuses on the technical details of melic composition and examines the specific moral effects of *melos* on the individual soul. The great emphasis on musical technical terminology that Plato uses to describe the various elements and forms of *mousikê* shows how *melos*, as an integral part of musical education with great power of enchantment, functions in this complicated system in order to instill virtue in the soul. There is an implied analogy between the structure of *melos* and the structure of the human soul, which is suggested by the double meaning of the Platonic vocabulary, both musical and moral. Plato's hostility to *melos* is not particularly severe in the *Republic*. Although he says that *melos,* as a kind of mimetic poetry, should follow *epos* and *drama* in exile, Plato opens a small window for its return through an appropriate apology, which is applicable to every mimetic kind of poetry. Perhaps the peculiar *choreia* of the Sirens at the end of the dialogue is an example of a prose apology for the return of *melos*, despite the fact that the word *melos* or its compounds do not appear in this context. In contrast to the more theoretical discussion of *melos* in the *Republic*, in the *Laws* Plato is interested in discussing all the constitutional parts of *choreia*. *Melos*, usually combined with *schêma*, is foregrounded, since it precedes and produces dancing and bears a significant paideutic value due to its enchanting power. Plato describes the performers' and the audience's emotions during the choral enactments, as well as the moral effects of the performance on the human soul. This discussion belongs to a broader analysis of musical goodness and correctness.

The entire examination of musical education in the *Laws* is framed by the positive treatment of the concept of *mimêsis* that leads to the morally good. Plato's attitude toward *melos* and *mousikê* is positive in the *Laws,* where the whole city is engaged in choral activity in order to shape a functioning religious, social, and political system.[188]

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[188] As Kowalzig (2008) 1 stresses, "the guarantee of a functioning religious system is a working set of practices directed towards the gods."

In general, Plato' attitude to *melos*, basically as song, changes across the oeuvre, and that in particular the *Republic* and *Laws* show that music is treated as something essentially positive and necessary, but only in a form that is intensely circumscribed, regimented and limited. In other words, he preserves what is valuable to his system of media-control and repetitive re-production of the same intellectual 'home truths' from the traditions of song and public performance and makes everything else disappear. The connection between music and the soul – music as a form of education or therapy – is at the root of this peculiarly Platonic treatment of *melos*, which of course has its own roots in pre-Platonic theorising about the social value music and the so-called polemics about the 'Old' and the 'New Music' in Athens. In short, *melos*, if properly regulated, seems to provide a short-cut for the masses to the educational/therapeutic benefits of correct philosophy – without of course enlightening them: one might think about why the masses do not need to be enlightened, especially since they seem themselves to constitute a citizen elite, dependent for their livelihood on the labour power of chattel slaves. So there is a tension in Plato between rejection and acceptance of song-culture.

The origin of Plato's ideas must be traced back in Damonian theory and early musicology (the so-called '*harmonikoi*' about which not much is known; Pythagorean mathematics; Glaukos of Rhegion), in rhetorical reflection on the nature of language and in the texts of old poets (from the period of 'Old Music'), which Socrates and his other figures mis-use them in the course of making their own arguments. It seems, then, that Plato often wilfully but very productively misinterprets (or appropriates) their language to his own purposes.

CHAPTER II

Plato's explicit criticism or approval of poetry

μόνος Ἡρόδοτος Ὁμηρικώτατος ἐγένετο; Στησίχορος
ἔτι πρότερον ὅ τε Ἀρχίλοχος, πάντων δὲ τούτων μάλιστα
ὁ Πλάτων ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὁμηρικοῦ κείνου νάματος εἰς αὑτὸν
μυρίας ὅσας παρατροπὰς ἀποχετευσάμενος.
(Ps.-Long. *On the Sublime*, 13.3)

Tragedy had assimilated to itself all the older poetic genres.
In a somewhat eccentric sense the same thing can be claimed
for the Platonic dialogue, which was a mixture of all the
available styles and forms and hovered between narrative,
lyric, drama, between prose and poetry,
once again breaking through the old law of stylistic unity.
(Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, 14)

Introduction

Despite the censure of *epos* and *drama* as types of mimetic poetry in the tenth book of the *Republic*, their contribution to the construction of Platonic philosophy is significant. Plato's engagement with *epos* and *drama* in his dialogues has been discussed in many important studies. It includes the (mis-)quotations of poetic verses, the use of certain images, motifs, techniques and his transformations of epic and dramatic models.[189]

[189] On Plato's quotations and misquotations of Homer, see: Howes (1895) 153-237; Benardete (1963) 173-178; Labarbe (1949); Halliwell (2000) 94-112; Mitscherling (2005) 1-4; Lake (2011). On Plato as a testimony for Homeric performances at the Panathenaia, see Nagy (2002). On Plato's debt to Homer, see Hunter (2012). On the relationship between Plato and Hesiod, see Boys-Stones and Haubold (2010). For a broader discussion about the Platonic use of poetic quotations and other poetic motifs and models, see Tarrant (1951) 59-67; Janzsen (1996); Murray (1996); Mitscherling (2009); (Hunter) 2012. More specifically, on the use of dramatic genres in Plato and on the common points between Platonic philosophy and *drama,*

However, this chapter focuses only on Plato's explicit references to epic and dramatic poetry. It is therefore concerned with his own clearly expressed views on these types of poetry. The first sub-section (II.1.1.) of this chapter briefly presents all the passages that contain Plato's naming and characterization of the epic poets, together with his comments on the style and moral effects of epic poetry. For reasons of space, I have omitted the original passages, which can be found in the footnotes. The second sub-section (II.1.2.) similarly focuses the discussion on Plato's explicit references to dramatic poetry and more specifically to tragedy (II.1.2.1.), comedy (II.1.2.2.), and satyr drama (II.1.2.3.). This discussion summarizes the most important analysis of Nightingale,[190] Charalabopoulos,[191] and Murray[192] on the subject. The next section (II.2.) is dedicated to Plato's explicit statements on melic poetry. It focuses on the melic genres that are extensively discussed in Plato, namely the hymn, *thrênos*, the paean, the dithyramb, the *encômium,* and the *kitharōidikos nomos*. The examination of Plato's stance on *epos*, *drama*, and *melos,* as well as his approach to each melic genre, will hopefully lead to a more comprehensive view of Plato's general attitude to poetry. That is the reason for including the first section of this chapter, namely to enable the comparison between the references to *epos* and *drama*, on the one hand, and *melos*, on the other hand.

II.1. Plato's explicit references to *epos* and *drama*

II.1.1. Plato and *epos*. From the sweet-honeyed Muse to the fairest one

In the *Ion*, Socrates characterizes Homer as 'the best and the divinest poet of all'[193] and as the most influential one.[194] The quotation of multiple Homeric passages

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see: Kuhn (1941-2) 1-40; Patterson (1982) 76-93; Nightingale (1995); Charalabopoulos (2012). More specifically, on Plato and comedy, see Greene (1920) 63-123; Clay (1975); Brock (1990) 39-49; Jones (2005).

[190] Nightingale (1995) esp. pp. 60-92, 172-192.

[191] Charalabopoulos (2012) esp. pp. 51-103.

[192] Murray (2013) 294-312.

[193] Pl. *Ion* 530b: Ὁμήρῳ θείῳ ποιητῇ […].

[194] Pl. *Ion* 536b: οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐξ Ὁμήρου κατέχονταί τε καὶ ἔχονται.

that include descriptions of other arts and crafts[195] indicates Homer's extensive knowledge. However, the point of Socrates' quotation-fest in *Ion* is actually to prove that Homer does not really know what he is talking about, although he avoids stating that explicitly. The epithets 'divine,' like 'wise' and other such superlative epithets, is often the kiss of death in a Socratic *elenchos*, and Ion himself will be faced by the end of the dialogue with a choice between calling himself a liar, claiming a *techne* he does not have, or an idiot, a *theios aner*, possessed by a power he does not understand). Similarly, in the *Phaedo* (94d-95a), Socrates expresses his disagreement with Homer's views on the soul, but characterizes Homer as being a 'divine poet.'

Homer and Hesiod are regarded as good poets in the *Symposium*.[196] In the *Cratylus*, Socrates appeals to the poets' authority concerning names[197] and in the *Apology* he acknowledges Homer's popularity by quoting Homeric verses during his self-defense[198] and by placing Homer together with Orpheus, Musaeus, and Hesiod.[199] In the *Charmides*, Hesiod is considered prudent thanks to his definition of the temperate man,[200] while in the *Philebus* Socrates seems to appreciate the impressive Homeric language.[201] But do these positive characterizations of Homer and Hesiod express Plato's genuine feelings about these poets?

Despite the positive, possibly ironic, characterizations of the epic poets we cannot ignore Plato's attack on their poetry in many of his dialogues. The comparison between Acchilles and Odysseus is the main subject of the conversation between Socrates and Hippias in the *Hippias Minor*.[202] No positive or negative judgment is expressed for epic poets or their poetry, but *epos* is classified among tragic and

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[195] Such as chariot-driving, medicine, fishing, prophecy, and the rhapsodic art Pl. *Ion* 537a-539e.

[196] Pl. *Symp*. 209d: Ὅμηρον ἀποβλέψας καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητὰς τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς […]
In addition, Agathon comments positively on the Homeric representation of the divine delicacy: Pl. *Symp.* 195d (onwards): ποιητοῦ δ᾽ ἔστιν ἐνδεὴς οἷος ἦν Ὅμηρος πρὸς τὸ ἐπιδεῖξαι θεοῦ ἁπαλότητα.

[197] Pl. *Crat*. (Homer) 391c-d; 392b-e; 393a-b; 402a-b; 407a; 408a; 410c; 417c || (Hesiod) 396c; 397e; 402b; 406c; 428a. For the same view, see Proclus' commentary.

[198] Pl. *Apol*. 34d

[199] Pl. *Apol*. 41a

[200] Pl. *Charm*. 163c: ὥστε καὶ Ἡσίοδον χρὴ οἴεσθαι καὶ ἄλλον ὅστις φρόνιμος τὸν τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττοντα τοῦτον σώφρονα καλεῖν.

[201] Pl. *Phil*. 62d: μεθιῶ δὴ τὰς συμπάσας ῥεῖν εἰς τὴν τῆς Ὁμήρου καὶ μάλα ποιητικῆς μισγαγκείας ὑποδοχήν;

[202] Pl. *Hip.Min*. 363a-371e

dithyrambic poetry[203] and belongs to Hippias' range of knowledge. In the *Protagoras*, Plato considers Homer and Hesiod sophists who 'disguised' their sophistry in the 'decent dress of poetry.'[204] Later in the dialogue, Plato refers to Homeric and Hesiodic passages[205] in the literary analysis of the Simonidean ode in which he employs sophistic arguments. Thus, epic poetry seems to be considered a kind of sophistic art.

In the *Republic*, Plato characterizes Homer as wise man[206] and Hesiod as noble man.[207] However, he accepts neither the style nor the content of the Homeric and Hesiodic poems, and eventually banishes the epic poets from his ideal city. His main concern, however, is Homer's leading position in education.[208] Homer's world has so much in common with the world of tragedy that Socrates characterizes Homer as 'the best of the tragedians.'[209] Despite (ironic?) Socrates' admiration for Homer,[210] he is severely critical of his poetry since the 'sweetened Muse' predominates in epic and melic poetry (Pl. *Rep*. 607a: εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην Μοῦσαν παραδέξῃ ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεσιν). A little later, the use of the verb κηλέω (to charm) twice reveals the charming character of mimetic poetry and particularly of the Homeric poetry.[211] As Murray states, "Homer, the educator of Greece, must be banished in order to make way for a new

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[203] Pl. *Hip.Min.* 368c

[204] Pl. *Prot*. 316d: ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην φημὶ μὲν εἶναι παλαιάν […], οἷον Ὅμηρόν τε καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ Σιμωνίδην […]

[205] Pl. *Prot*. 340d; 348c

[206] Pl. *Rep*. 600a: εἰς τὰ ἔργα σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς […]

[207] Pl. *Rep*. 363c: ὁ γενναῖος Ἡσίοδός […]

[208] Pl. *Rep*. 600a: ἡγεμὼν παιδείας αὐτὸς ζῶν λέγεται Ὅμηρος γενέσθαι […] || Pl. *Rep*. 606e: τὴν Ἑλλάδα πεπαίδευκεν οὗτος ὁ ποιητὴς […]

[209] Pl. *Rep*. 545d-e: ἢ βούλει, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος, εὐχώμεθα ταῖς Μούσαις εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν "ὅπως δὴ" "πρῶτον" στάσις "ἔμπεσε", καὶ φῶμεν αὐτὰς τραγικῶς ὡς πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἐρεσχηλούσας, ὡς δὴ σπουδῇ λεγούσας, ὑψηλολογουμένας λέγειν; || Pl. *Rep*. 595c: ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἁπάντων τούτων τῶν τραγικῶν πρῶτος διδάσκαλός τε και ἡγεμὼν γενέσθαι. || Pl. *Rep*. 598d: μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον τήν τε τραγῳδίαν καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα αὐτῆς Ὅμηρον || Pl. *Rep*. 605cd: οἱ γάρ που βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν ἀκροώμενοι Ὁμήρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν μιμουμένου τινὰ τῶν ἡρώων ἐν πένθει ὄντα καὶ μακρὰν ῥῆσιν ἀποτείνοντα ἐν τοῖς ὀδυρμοῖς ἢ καὶ ᾄδοντάς τε καὶ κοπτομένους, οἶσθ' ὅτι χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἑπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ποιητήν, ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστα οὕτω διαθῇ.|| Pl. *Rep*. 607a: συγχωρεῖν Ὅμηρον ποιητικώτατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν […]

[210] Pl. *Rep*. 595b: καίτοι φιλία γέ τίς καὶ αἰδὼς ἐκ παιδὸς ἔχουσα περὶ Ὁμήρου ἀποκωλύει λέγειν […]

[211] Pl. *Rep*. 607c-e: καὶ ἡ μίμησις, ὡς χρὴ αὐτὴν εἶναι ἐν πόλει εὐνομουμένῃ, ἄσμενοι ἂν καταδεχοίμεθα, ὡς σύνισμέν γε ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς κηλουμένοις ὑπ' αὐτῆς· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς οὐχ ὅσιον προδιδόναι. ἦ γάρ, ὦ φίλε, οὐ κηλῇ ὑπ' αὐτῆς καὶ σύ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν δι' Ὁμήρου θεωρῇς αὐτήν;

system of *paideia* in which poetry will be replaced by philosophy."[212]

In the *Theaetetus*, Homer is considered the master of tragedy[213] and is placed in the circle of the Heraclitean Flux theorists,[214] who are accused of not settling anything and of intentionally concealing their thoughts.[215] In the *Theatetus*, the ideas of motion and fluidity are elsewhere correlated and Homer is identified as the source for this correlation.

The *Phaedrus* twice characterizes Homer as ignorant and opposes him to the μουσικός Stesichorus.[216] Both poets are blind and the reason for their blindness, as Socrates argues, is that they spoke ill for Helen of Troy. But while Stesichorus realized and corrected his mistake, Homer did not. If μουσικός[217] denotes the highly educated man in this instance – and not only the man who is skilled in *mousikê* – then Plato implicitly suggests that Homer is uneducated. *Mousikê* and philosophy are closely associated in the dialogue and are seen as superior to poetry. Plato presents the hierarchy of the souls in 248d-e of the *Phaedrus*. Here philosophers and *mousikoi* take the first place, whereas poets, and hence Homer, take the sixth place.[218] However, in 259d, Calliope, the Muse of tragedy, and Urania are described as the most philosophical Muses and singled out for their ability "to utter the most beautiful voice."[219] What Plato seems to do is to replace poetry and poets with philosophy and philosophers.

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[212] Murray (1996) 22.

[213] Pl. *Theaet*. 152e: καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, <u>τραγῳδίας</u> δὲ Ὅμηρος, ὃς εἰπών Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν πάντα εἴρηκεν ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως· […]

[214] Pl. *Theaet*. 160d: κατὰ μὲν Ὅμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φῦλον οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα […]

[215] Pl. *Theaet*. 180c-d: τὸ δὲ δὴ πρόβλημα ἄλλο τι παρειλήφαμεν παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων μετὰ ποιήσεως ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς πολλούς, ὡς ἡ γένεσις τῶν ἄλλων πάντων Ὠκεανός τε καὶ Τηθὺς ῥεύματα ὄντα τυγχάνει καὶ οὐδὲν ἕστηκε […]

[216] The ancient purification for sinners in mythological discourse and the reason for Stesichorus' blindness were unknown to him. See Pl. *Phaedr*. 243a: ἔστιν δὲ τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσι περὶ μυθολογίαν καθαρμὸς ἀρχαῖος, ὃν Ὅμηρος μὲν οὐκ ᾔσθετο, Στησίχορος δέ. τῶν γὰρ ὀμμάτων στερηθεὶς διὰ τὴν Ἑλένης κακηγορίαν οὐκ ἠγνόησεν ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος, ἀλλ' ἅτε μουσικὸς ὢν ἔγνω τὴν αἰτίαν […]

[217] Yunis ((2011) 124 n. 243) associates the adjective μουσικός with the knowledge of causes, which is a philosophical matter.

[218] Pl. *Phdr*. 248d-e: ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν πλεῖστα ἰδοῦσαν εἰς γονὴν ἀνδρὸς γενησομένου φιλοσόφου ἢ φιλοκάλου ἢ μουσικοῦ τινος καὶ ἐρωτικοῦ … ἕκτῃ ποιητικὸς ἢ τῶν περὶ μίμησίν τις ἄλλος ἁρμόσει […]

[219] Pl. *Phdr*. 259d: τῇ δὲ πρεσβυτάτῃ Καλλιόπῃ καὶ τῇ μετ' αὐτὴν Οὐρανίᾳ τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγοντάς τε καὶ τιμῶντας τὴν ἐκείνων μουσικὴν ἀγγέλλουσιν, αἳ δὴ μάλιστα τῶν Μουσῶν περί τε οὐρανὸν καὶ λόγους οὖσαι θείους τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνους ἱᾶσιν καλλίστην φωνήν.

All three protagonists in the *Laws* pay tribute to Homer's poetic authority. The Athenian describes the Homeric mythical setting of the dialogue, which anticipates the reason for the interlocutors' pilgrimage to Zeus' sanctuary.[220] Afterwards, he underlines the universality of epic poetry.[221] The Cretan Clinias speaks highly of Homer, although he confesses that in Crete foreign poetry is not read much.[222] By contrast, the Spartan Megillus says that in Sparta Homer is considered 'the best of the foreign poets.'[223] As Martin argues, 'Homer is not a universal poet. Panhellenization has met pockets of resistance. Homer can be used to make a debating point, but even that marks out a cultural disequilibrium. […] Homeric poetry is overtly an Athenian possession.'[224] However, there is agreement that the recitation of Homeric or Hesiodic[225] passages would provide 'the greatest amusement for the three old men in a supposing pleasure-contest.'[226] In the same passage in the *Laws* (658e) the Homeric Muse, who the *Republic* characterizes as the sweet-honeyed Muse, is characterized as Μοῦσαν καλλίστην. Later in 682a the Athenian remarks that Homeric poetry offers the audience not only poetic inspiration and thus pleasure, but also historical truth.[227] The whole poetic tribe is highly evaluated through Homer. But if this is the case, why is rhapsody not the central poetic art form in Magnesia? Martin argues persuasively that, despite being paradigmatic and central in the *Laws*, Homeric poetry is 'out of place in the new world'[228] and is therefore replaced by choral singing and dancing. In general, as Martin has observed, there are few explicit references to Homer and his art in the *Laws*. However, even when Homer is not explicitly named, he is at the same time both central and marginalized. Plato's treatment of Homer and of epic poetry is

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[220] Pl. *Laws* 624a-b: {ΑΘ} μῶν οὖν καθ' Ὅμηρον λέγεις ὡς τοῦ Μίνω φοιτῶντος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἑκάστοτε συνουσίαν δι' ἐνάτου ἔτους καὶ κατὰ τὰς παρ' ἐκείνου φήμας ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑμῖν θέντος τοὺς νόμους;

[221] Pl. *Laws* 658e: τὸ γὰρ ἔπος ἡμῖν τῶν νῦν δὴ πάμπολυ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἁπάσαις καὶ πανταχοῦ βέλτιστον γίγνεσθαι.

[222] Pl. *Laws* 680c: ἔοικέν γε ὁ ποιητὴς ὑμῖν οὗτος γεγονέναι χαρίεις. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἄλλα αὐτοῦ διεληλύθαμεν μάλ' ἀστεῖα, οὐ μὴν πολλά γε· οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα χρώμεθα οἱ Κρῆτες τοῖς ξενικοῖς ποιήμασιν.

[223] Pl. *Laws* 680c-d: ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ χρώμεθα μέν, καὶ ἔοικέν γε κρατεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ποιητῶν, οὐ μέντοι Λακωνικόν γε ἀλλά τινα μᾶλλον Ἰωνικὸν βίον διεξέρχεται ἑκάστοτε.

[224] Martin (2013) 323.

[225] Hesiod is also characterized as σοφός in Pl. *Laws* 718e.

[226] Pl. *Laws* 658a-e. Martin has also discussed this passage. See Martin (2013) 329-330.

[227] Pl. *Laws* 682a: λέγει γὰρ δὴ ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη καὶ ἐκεῖνα, ἃ περὶ τῶν Κυκλώπων εἴρηκεν, κατὰ θεόν πως εἰρημένα καὶ κατὰ φύσιν· θεῖον γὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐνθεαστικὸν ὂν γένος ὑμνῳδοῦν, πολλῶν τῶν κατ' ἀλήθειαν γιγνομένων σύν τισιν Χάρισιν καὶ Μούσαις ἐφάπτεται ἑκάστοτε.

[228] Martin (2013) 330.

not straightforward.[229]

It is difficult to distinguish when Plato's statements are sincere or when they are full of irony. Plato's explicit references to Homer and to epic poetry are inconsistent, even in the same dialogue. However, there is no doubt that in the *Laws* the sweet-honeyed Homeric Muse of the *Republic* is elevated to the fairest one.

II.1.2. Plato and drama

II. 1.2.1. Plato and tragedy.[230] The emollient Muses of tragedy

Explicit references to the tragic poets are extremely limited in the Platonic dialogues. Therefore, I focus mainly on vocabulary that is suggestive of tragedy, namely the use of the noun τραγῳδία, the adjective τραγικός, and the infinitive τραγῳδεῖν.

In the *Cratylus*, Socrates plays with the double sense of the adjective 'tragic' and at the same time narrates the myth about the birth of the tragic.[231] Socrates explains the origin of the name τραγῳδία and also its negative development and usage in life. 'Tragic' is identified with 'tales and falsehoods,' and this is verified by the use of the infinitive τραγῳδεῖν (meaning here, 'to dress up words').[232] Socrates comments sarcastically on the usual strategy of tragic poets, who 'introduce gods on machines' when confronted by a difficult situations.[233] The main target of his criticism is obviously Euripides, but he prefers to make a general statement rather than naming

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229 Martin (2013) 313-338.

230 Plato refers to tragic poetry as iambic poetry (ἰαμβεῖον), see Pl. *Rep*. 380a, 602b, Pl. *Euthyd*. 291d; Pl. *Laws* 935e. Plato does not discuss iambus as a literary genre. The only case where Plato might possibly talk about iambus as a distinct literary genre is Pl. *Ion* 534c: τοῦτο μόνον οἷός τε ἕκαστος ποιεῖν καλῶς ἐφ' ὃ ἡ Μοῦσα αὐτὸν ὥρμησεν, ὁ μὲν διθυράμβους, ὁ δὲ ἐγκώμια, ὁ δὲ ὑπορχήματα, ὁ δ' ἔπη, ὁ δ' ἰάμβους· […]
For Kantzios (2005) 6-7 the above passage seems to imply the invective aspect of iambus. However, the context is not very helpful and Kantzios does not give any arguments.

231 Pl. *Crat*. 408c-d: οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς αὐτοῦ λεῖον καὶ θεῖον καὶ ἄνω οἰκοῦν ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος κάτω ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τραχὺ καὶ τραγικόν· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ πλεῖστοι οἱ μῦθοί τε καὶ τὰ ψεύδη ἐστίν, περὶ τὸν τραγικὸν βίον. {ΕΡΜ.} πάνυ γε. {ΣΩ.} ὀρθῶς ἄρ' ἂν ὁ πᾶν μηνύων καὶ ἀεὶ πολῶν 'Πὰν αἰπόλος' εἴη, διφυὴς Ἑρμοῦ ὑός, τὰ μὲν ἄνωθεν λεῖος, τὰ δὲ κάτωθεν τραχὺς καὶ τραγοειδής […]

232 Pl. *Crat*. 414c: {ΣΩ} ὦ μακάριε, οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τεθέντα κατακέχωσται ἤδη ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τραγῳδεῖν αὐτά, περιτιθέντων γράμματα καὶ ἐξαιρούντων εὐστομίας ἕνεκα καὶ πανταχῇ στρεφόντων […]

233 Pl. *Crat*. 425d: εἰ μὴ ἄρα βούλει, ὥσπερ οἱ τραγῳδοποιοὶ ἐπειδάν τι ἀπορῶσιν ἐπὶ τὰς μηχανὰς καταφεύγουσι θεοὺς αἴροντες […]

the tragedian. Another meaning of 'tragic' is given in the *Meno*.[234] In this passage the adjective means 'stately' or 'majestic'.[235] The characterization of a Pindaric verse as highly poetic may suggest a hint of irony, but the use of 'tragic' as 'verbally impressive' is important.

Plato's *Laches* describes the usual practice of the tragic poets, who consider themselves good tragedians. They do not make tours around Athens, but they come to the city and display their show.[236]

As already stated in the previous sub-section, Plato places tragic poetry alongside epic and dithyrambic poetry in the *Hippias Minor,* and sees it as part of the sophist's knowledge. In the *Apology* the dithyrambic and the tragic poets are accused of being unable to understand their own verses.[237] How can they transmit their knowledge if they are not able to speak for their own compositions? Their skill is attributed to divine or natural inspiration, rather than to wisdom.

The problem with tragic poetry is articulated in the *Gorgias* and lies in its purpose.[238] Like flute-playing, harp-playing in contests, choral productions and dithyrambic poetry, which are named in the same list, tragic poetry, like the art of rhetoric, aims only at gratifying the audience.

In the *Republic*, Socrates disapproves of the content of specific Aeschylean passages.[239] In the same dialogue, Euripides is described as standing 'beyond other tragedians'[240] in a passage that sarcastically describes tragedy as wise. Tragic poetry is a kind of mimetic poetry, as Socrates remarks in the *Republic*.[241] The adverb τραγικῶς underlines the vague, unclear character of tragic poetry more than its impressive style.[242] At the end of the eighth book Socrates, characterizes both

[234] Pl. *Meno* 76e: τραγικὴ γάρ ἐστιν, ὦ Μένων, ἡ ἀπόκρισις […]
[235] It is translated as 'high poetic style.'
[236] Pl. *Laches* 183a-b: τοιγάρτοι ὃς ἂν οἴηται τραγῳδίαν καλῶς ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἔξωθεν κύκλῳ περὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιδεικνύμενος περιέρχεται, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς δεῦρο φέρεται καὶ τοῖσδ' ἐπιδείκνυσιν εἰκότως· […]
[237] Pl. *Apol*. 22b-c: ἔγνων οὖν αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖεν ἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμῳδοί· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἴσασιν δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι.
[238] Pl. *Gorg*. 502b-c: πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν μᾶλλον ὥρμηται καὶ τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς
[239] Pl. *Rep*. 361b; 362a; 380a; 383a.
[240] Pl. *Rep*. 568a: οὐκ ἐτός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἥ τε τραγῳδία ὅλως σοφὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ὁ Εὐριπίδης διαφέρων ἐν αὐτῇ.
[241] Pl. *Rep*. 394c: ἡ μὲν διὰ μιμήσεως ὅλη ἐστίν, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, τραγῳδία τε καὶ κωμῳδία […]
[242] Pl. *Rep*. 413b: Τραγικῶς, ἦν δ'ἐγώ, κινδυνεύω λέγειν [...]

Euripides and the whole tragedy as 'wise'.[243] The statement is ironic of course, as can easily be understood from the context. It appears that tragedy is diametrically opposed to wisdom in Plato's mind. In the same dialogue, poets are accused of mutilating the mind.[244] According to the theory of Forms, poets make copies of the images of Forms,[245] and are therefore far from the truth. Ignorance of Truth is a disease,[246] although this is only implied and not explicitly stated. Another problem is that mimetic poetry, including tragedy, addresses the lower part of the soul, since the poet wants to please the audience.[247] Consequently, tragic performances have negative effects on the spectators due to the dominance of the emotional part of the soul over the rational part. The audience does not gain lessons for life from tragic performances. For example, the strong emotions of pleasure that the spectators experience during the lamentations of the tragedians are opposed to the cultivation of virtue in addressing real life problems.[248] Tragedies on stage mirror tragedies in real life[249] and the aesthetic reaction to the performance does not offer any moral values. As a result, the lower part of the soul becomes full of useless emotions, while the best remains uncultivated (605c-606b). Tragic poetry has the power to corrupt[250] even good souls

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[243] see n. 231

[244] Pl. *Rep*. 595b: λώβη ἔοικεν εἶναι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων διανοίας, ὅσοι μὴ ἔχουσι φάρμακον τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα.

[245] Hierarchy of ontological categories: Forms-Images-Copies of the images.

[246] For the ignorant poets, see also Pl. *Rep*. 598e; for the poets as imitators, see Pl. *Rep*. 597e; 602b: it is worth noting that in this passage Socrates says that the tragic poets use the iambic and the hexameter metre.

[247] Pl. *Rep*. 605a: ὁ δὴ μιμητικὸς ποιητὴς δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον τῆς ψυχῆς πέφυκέ τε καὶ ἡ σοφία αὐτοῦ τούτῳ ἀρέσκειν πέπηγεν, εἰ μέλλει εὐδοκιμήσειν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν τε καὶ ποικίλον ἦθος διὰ τὸ εὐμίμητον εἶναι […]

[248] The mixture of pleasure and pain is always something particularly negative for Plato. In the *Theaetetus* Socrates repeats again that the spectators "enjoy weeping at tragedies", implying that this is a weird (and bad) thing 48a: καὶ μὴν καὶ τάς γε τραγικὰς θεωρήσεις, ὅταν ἅμα χαίροντες κλάωσι, μέμνησαι;

[249] For the common feelings (coexistence of pleasure and pain) between dramatic performances and the drama of life, see Pl. *Theaet*. 50b: μηνύει δὴ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν θρήνοις τε καὶ ἐν τραγῳδίαις καὶ κωμῳδίαις, μὴ τοῖς δράμασι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ τοῦ βίου συμπάσῃ τραγῳδίᾳ καὶ κωμῳδίᾳ, λύπας ἡδοναῖς ἅμα κεράννυσθαι, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὴ μυρίοις. The passage will be discussed again in the treatment of *thrênos* in the second section (II.2.1.).

[250] Pl. *Rep*. 605b-c, notice the use of verb φθείρῃ, and the use of the infinitive λωβᾶσθαι· καὶ οὕτως ἤδη ἂν ἐν δίκῃ οὐ παραδεχοίμεθα εἰς μέλλουσαν εὐνομεῖσθαι πόλιν, ὅτι τοῦ το ἐγείρει τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τρέφει καὶ ἰσχυρὸν ποιῶν ἀπόλλυσι τὸ λογιστικόν, ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει ὅταν τις μοχθηροὺς ἐγκρατεῖς ποιῶν παραδιδῷ τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς δὲ χαριεστέρους φθείρῃ· ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸν μιμητικὸν ποιητὴν φήσομεν κακὴν πολιτείαν ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ ἐμποιεῖν, τῷ ἀνοήτῳ αὐτῆς χαριζόμενον καὶ οὔτε τὰ μείζω οὔτε τὰ ἐλάττω διαγιγνώσκοντι, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ το τὲ μὲν μεγάλα ἡγουμένῳ, το τὲ δὲ σμικρά, εἴδωλα εἰδωλοποιοῦντα, τοῦ δὲ ἀληθοῦς πόρρω πάνυ

and there is therefore no room for it in the city of the *Republic*. It destroys the collective identity of the individual soul by encouraging the construction of 'bad cities in the soul of each person.'[251] In general, tragic poetry is repeatedly described as a mimetic kind of poetry and not as a serious engagement.[252] Of course, the problem is not merely inherent to tragedy itself, it has to do basically with the way the Athenians have chosen to institutionalise it. Certainly, it is hard to imagine a 'good' or 'purified' kind of tragedy in Plato.

Socrates suggests in the *Phaedrus* that an ignorant person who wants to know if he is capable of teaching the art of tragedy should ask Euripides and Sophocles. Aeschylus is absent in this dialogue. In passage 268c-d of the *Phaedrus*, Socrates describes the oversimplified reception of the art of tragedy by a non-expert. He lists a number of principles that concern the art of writing a tragedy.[253] Knowledge of the basic principles of tragedy (περὶ σμικροῦ πράγματος ῥήσεις παμμήκεις, περὶ μεγάλου πάνυ σμικράς, οἰκτράς, φοβερὰς, ἀπειλητικὰς) makes a non-expert think that he could teach the whole art of tragedy, but knowledge of certain features of an art does not necessarily indicate a good understanding of the whole. Sophocles would therefore answer to the ignorant man that these principles are the 'preliminaries of tragedy, not tragedy itself'.[254] By means of these principles that 'recall sophistic rhetorical techniques'[255] Plato presents tragedy as complex and problematic. This is the only reference to tragedy in the *Phaedrus*. Yunis argues that "the tacit assumption of a τέχνη τραγική is incidental and undertaken just to advance the discussion with

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ἀφεστῶτα. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐ μέντοι πω το γε μέγιστον κατηγορήκαμεν αὐτῆς. τὸ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἱκανὴν εἶναι λωβᾶσθαι, ἐκτὸς πάνυ τινῶν ὀλίγων, πάν δεινόν που.

[251] Pl. *Rep*. 605b: καὶ τὸν μιμητικὸν ποιητὴν φήσομεν κακὴν πολιτείαν ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ ἐμποιεῖν […]

[252] Pl. *Rep*. 602b: τόν τε μιμητικὸν μηδὲν εἰδέναι ἄξιον λόγου περὶ ὧν μιμεῖται, ἀλλ᾽ εἶναι παιδιάν τινα καὶ οὐ σπουδὴν τὴν μίμησιν, τούς τε τῆς τραγικῆς ποιήσεως ἁπτομένους ἐν ἰαμβείοις καὶ ἐν ἔπεσι πάντας εἶναι μιμητικοὺς ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα. || Pl. *Rep*. 608a: ᾀσόμεθα δ᾽ οὖν ὡς οὐ σπουδαστέον ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ποιήσει ὡς ἀληθείας τε ἁπτομένῃ καὶ σπουδαίᾳ […]

[253] Pl. *Phdr*. 268c-d: {ΣΩ.} τί δ᾽ εἰ Σοφοκλεῖ αὖ προσελθὼν καὶ Εὐριπίδῃ τις λέγοι ὡς ἐπίσταται περὶ σμικροῦ πράγματος ῥήσεις παμμήκεις ποιεῖν καὶ περὶ μεγάλου πάνυ σμικράς, ὅταν τε βούληται οἰκτράς, καὶ τοὐναντίον αὖ φοβερὰς καὶ ἀπειλητικὰς ὅσα τ᾽ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ διδάσκων αὐτὰ τραγῳδίας ποίησιν οἴεται παραδιδόναι; {ΦΑΙ.} καὶ οὗτοι ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι καταγελῷεν εἴ τις οἴεται τραγῳδίαν ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ τὴν τούτων σύστασιν πρέπουσαν ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ συνισταμένην.

[254] Pl. *Phdr*. 269a: οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ Σοφοκλῆς τόν σφισιν ἐπιδεικνύμενον τὰ πρὸ τραγῳδίας ἂν φαίη ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὰ τραγικά […]

[255] Yunis (2011) 205.

Phaedrus,"[256] but it seems to me that the elaborate censure of tragic poetry is intentional.

Tragedy's great popularity is stressed in the *Laws*. The Athenian Stranger admits that educated women and children, and possibly almost everyone apart from the elders, enjoy the tragic performances.[257] In 817a the Athenian wonders what should be done with tragedy in the new city: 'Now, regarding the so-called serious poets, the tragedians, if some of them came and asked over again: 'O Strangers, should we pay visits to your city and country or not and bring poetry with us? Or what do you think we should do?' What would be the correct answer for us to give to these divine men on this matter?'[258] The double characterization of the tragedians as 'so-called serious' and 'divine or inspired' seems ironic. However, during the construction of Magnesia, he and his interlocutors create 'the most beautiful and finest tragedy.' The new city 'is framed as representation of the most beautiful and finest life and this is the truest tragedy.'[259] So the new city is itself a kind of performance. In this metaphilosophical and self-referential passage, Plato seems to consider his own creation, which is indeed serious, as the 'truest tragedy.' His statement might imply that the conventional form of tragedy is not serious[260] and is therefore unnecessary for the new city. Yet, tragic choruses will be allowed in the city under strict state supervision based on the laws proposed by the Athenian.[261]

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[256] Yunis (2011) 204-5.

[257] Pl. *Laws* 658d: τραγῳδίαν δὲ αἵ τε πεπαιδευμέναι τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ τὰ νέα μειράκια καὶ σχεδὸν ἴσως τὸ πλῆθος πάντων.

[258] Pl. *Laws* 817a: τῶν δὲ σπουδαίων, ὥς φασι, τῶν περὶ τραγῳδίαν ἡμῖν ποιητῶν, ἐάν ποτέ τινες αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς ἐλθόντες ἐπανερωτήσωσιν οὑτωσί πως· 'ὦ ξένοι, πότερον φοιτῶμεν ὑμῖν εἰς τὴν πόλιν τε καὶ χώραν ἢ μή, καὶ τὴν ποίησιν φέρωμέν τε καὶ ἄγωμεν, ἢ πῶς ὑμῖν δέδοκται περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα δρᾶν;' – τί οὖν ἂν πρὸς ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἀποκριναίμεθα τοῖς θείοις ἀνδράσιν; This could also be a possible allusion to comedy, see, for example, Aristophanes' *Birds*.
For tragic poetry as a serious engagement, see also Pl. *Laws* 838c: ἐν πάσῃ τε σπουδῇ τραγικῇ λεγομένῃ […]

[259] Pl. *Laws* 817b: 'ὦ ἄριστοι,' φάναι, 'τῶν ξένων, ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν τραγῳδίας αὐτοὶ ποιηταὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι καλλίστης ἅμα καὶ ἀρίστης· πᾶσα οὖν ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία συνέστηκε μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου βίου, ὃ δή φαμεν ἡμεῖς γε ὄντως εἶναι τραγῳδίαν τὴν ἀληθεστάτην.

[260] So in Nightingale (1995) 88; for a discussion of the passage, see also Laks (2010) 216-241.

[261] Pl. *Laws* 817b-d: ποιηταὶ μὲν οὖν ὑμεῖς, ποιηταὶ δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν τῶν αὐτῶν, ὑμῖν ἀντίτεχνοί τε καὶ ἀνταγωνισταὶ τοῦ καλλίστου δράματος, ὃ δὴ νόμος ἀληθὴς μόνος ἀποτελεῖν πέφυκεν, ὡς ἡ παρ' ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἐλπίς· μὴ δὴ δόξητε ἡμᾶς ῥᾳδίως γε οὕτως ὑμᾶς ποτε παρ' ἡμῖν ἐάσειν σκηνάς τε πήξαντας κατ' ἀγορὰν καὶ καλλιφώνους ὑποκριτὰς εἰσαγαγομένους, μεῖζον φθεγγομένους ἡμῶν, ἐπιτρέψειν ὑμῖν δημηγορεῖν πρὸς παῖδάς τε καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τὸν πάντα ὄχλον, τῶν αὐτῶν λέγοντας ἐπιτηδευμάτων πέρι μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐναντία τὰ πλεῖστα. σχεδὸν γάρ τοι κἂν μαινοίμεθα τελέως ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἅπασα ἡ πόλις, ἡτισοῦν ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέποι δρᾶν τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα, πρὶν κρῖναι τὰς ἀρχὰς εἴτε ῥητὰ καὶ

One wonders why Plato associates philosophy with tragedy. “The political dimension of tragic poetry”[262] and its great popularity in the Athenian world makes it extremely dangerous and yet at the same time challenging for Plato. By constructing his particular philosophy, he may be seeking to produce a rival or an alternative to tragic poetry.[263]

In passage 817b-d Plato seeks to emphasize the superiority of philosophers and their art. He describes philosophers, who are engaged in the legislation of the new city, as poets of the fairest drama. Philosophy is presented as a marked performance.[264] It takes place in the *agora* and is contrasted to tragedy; philosophers are in conflict with tragedians (ἀντίτεχνοί τε καὶ ἀνταγωνισταὶ). If philosophy is the true tragedy, then philosophers, by analogy, are the true tragedians. The Platonic criticism culminates in the description of the poets as ‘offsprings of emollient Muses.’[265] Philosophers may not have so loud voices, but they are strong, not mild. It is plausible to ask here whether there is any need or space left for tragic choruses.

As an alternative to the Muse of tragedy, the Platonic Muse is superior in every aspect and replaces the emollient Muse of tragedy. The conclusion is the same both literally and metaphorically: the space for tragic poetry is limited in the philosophical constitution of the *Republic*. Plato obviously disagrees with every aspect of it, including its form, content, purpose, and the emotional and moral impact it has on the audience. Even in the *Laws*, tragedy is said to be dangerous and therefore no citizen of Magnesia should be involved in it. Although many scholars agree that tragic poets and their compositions will have an educational role in the new city,[266] albeit strictly

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ἐπιτήδεια πεποιήκατε λέγειν εἰς τὸ μέσον εἴτε μή. νῦν οὖν, ὦ παῖδες μαλακῶν Μουσῶν ἔκγονοι, ἐπιδείξαντες τοῖς ἄρχουσι πρῶτον τὰς ὑμετέρας παρὰ τὰς ἡμετέρας ᾠδάς, ἂν μὲν τὰ αὐτά γε ἢ καὶ βελτίω τὰ παρ᾽ ὑμῶν φαίνηται λεγόμενα, δώσομεν ὑμῖν χορόν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὦ φίλοι, οὐκ ἄν ποτε δυναίμεθα.’
On death occasions there will be ony hired mourners brought from abroad: Pl. *Laws*, 800d-e: ὁπόταν ἡμέραι μὴ καθαραί τινες ἀλλὰ ἀποφράδες ὦσιν, τόθ᾽ ἥκειν δέον ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον χορούς τινας ἔξωθεν μεμισθωμένους ᾠδούς, οἷον οἱ περὶ τοὺς τελευτήσαντας μισθούμενοι Καρικῇ τινι μούσῃ προπέμπουσι τοὺς τελευτήσαντας; τοιοῦτόν που πρέπον ἂν εἴη καὶ περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ᾠδὰς γιγνόμενον, καὶ δὴ καὶ στολή γέ που ταῖς ἐπικηδείοις ᾠδαῖς οὐ στέφανοι πρέποιεν ἂν οὐδ᾽ ἐπίχρυσοι κόσμοι, πᾶν δὲ τοὐναντίον, ἵν᾽ ὅτι τάχιστα περὶ αὐτῶν λέγων ἀπαλλάττωμαι.

[262] Laks (2010) 219.

[263] See Nightingale (1995) 92 and Charalabopoulos (2012) 64-65.

[264] Of course, the vocabulary associated with the performance agents is avoided for philosophy, but the element of performance is also attributed to it.

[265] Pl. *Laws* 817d: ὦ παῖδες μαλακῶν Μουσῶν ἔκγονοι […]

[266] Morrow (1960) 374-377; Mouze (2005) 349-353.

supervised by law, I find Murray's argument of the "displacement of tragedy"[267] in the *Laws* persuasive. As Murray remarks,

> Plato's strategy is similar to that which Martin has described as regards to Homer. Avoidance is his tactic, and yet strategy seems to have a subliminal presence in much of the discussion of *mousikê*, where the model of theatre predominates.[268]

I.1.2.2. Plato and Comedy. The discussion of the 'ridiculous'

The making of tragedy is similar to the making of comedy in the *Symposium*.[269] In the *Republic*, Socrates says that tragedy is akin to comedy. As a mimetic kind of poetry, it is equally problematic,[270] but a tragic poet or actor cannot compose a comedy or play a comic role, nor can this occur vice versa.[271]

As shall be seen below, the treatment of comedy in the *Republic* is a treatment of the 'ridiculous.' It is important to see that Aelius Aristides uses the verb κωμῳδέω to describe Plato's presentation of important political men, such as Miltiades, Themistocles, Pericles, and Cimon.[272] In the fifth book of the *Republic*, Socrates expresses the view that men and women should equally share the Guardian duties in the community and receive the same intellectual and physical training. Plato addresses comic poets, who always ridicule everything that corresponds to the rules of logic.[273]

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[267] Murray (2013) 304.

[268] Ibid. 309.

[269] Pl. *Symp*. 223d: τὸ μέντοι κεφάλαιον, ἔφη, προσαναγκάζειν τὸν Σωκράτη ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοὺς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι κωμῳδίαν καὶ τραγῳδίαν ἐπίστασθαι ποιεῖν, καὶ τὸν τέχνῃ τραγῳδοποιὸν ὄντα καὶ κωμῳδοποιὸν εἶναι.

[270] Pl. *Rep* 394c-e. However, there is a clear distinction between the tragic and the comic element, for example, a tragic poet/actor cannot write or play comedies and vice versa. See Pl. *Laws* 395a.

[271] Pl. *Rep*. 395a: ἐπεί που οὐδὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων εἶναι δύο μιμήματα δύνανται οἱ αὐτοὶ ἅμα εὖ μιμεῖσθαι, οἷον κωμῳδίαν καὶ τραγῳδίαν ποιοῦντες. ἢ οὐ μιμήματε ἄρτι τούτω ἐκάλεις; ἔγωγε· καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγεις, ὅτι οὐ δύνανται οἱ αὐτοί. οὐδὲ μὴν ῥαψῳδοί γε καὶ ὑποκριταὶ ἅμα. ἀληθῆ. ἀλλ' οὐδέ τοι ὑποκριταὶ κωμῳδοῖς τε καὶ τραγῳδοῖς οἱ αὐτοί· πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μιμήματα. ἢ οὔ; μιμήματα.

[272] 3.10 Lenz-Behr: Ael. Ar. *Or*. 46 Jebb page 117: θαυμάζω δὲ εἰ κωμῳδίαν μὲν ἔξεστι ποιεῖν, κἂν μὴ ὀνομαστὶ κωμῳδεῖν ἐξῇ, πιστοῦσθα ιδὲ οὐκ ἐνῆν τὸν λόγον, εἰ μή τινας εἶπε κακῶς ὀνομαστί. See also the discussion in Nightingale (1995) 172-180, who examines Plato's response to the ridiculous.

[273] Pl. *Rep*. 452a-d: ἴσως δή, εἶπον, παρὰ τὸ ἔθος γελοῖα ἂν φαίνοιτο πολλὰ περὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα, εἰ πράξεται ᾗ λέγεται. καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. τί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, γελοιότατον αὐτῶν ὁρᾷς; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι γυμνὰς τὰς γυναῖκας ἐν ταῖς παλαίστραις γυμναζομένας μετὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐ

The comic poet is ironically characterized as 'wit' (χαρίεις) and someone 'who tries to raise a laugh' (Pl. *Rep*. 452d: ὁ γελωτοποιεῖν ἐπιχειρῶν). Comic poetry is not a 'serious engagement' (γελοίον opp. to σπουδή). The comedians' treatment of things is conservative, since everything new that deviates from tradition is met with their jest (Pl. *Rep*. 452b: τὰ τῶν χαριέντων σκώμματα). The problem with the comic poets is that they turn serious matters into comic ones, something that can be simply solved if the comic poets stop doing such things and get serious (Pl. *Rep*. 452c: μὴ τὰ αὑτῶν πράττειν ἀλλὰ σπουδάζειν). In other words, they will be accepted if they stop being comic poets. Plato adopts a similar strategy for comedy to his strategy for tragedy. By changing the essence of comedy from the ridiculous to the serious, he "redefines the very nature of the genre."[274]

In the tenth book of the *Republic* the comic poets follow the tragedians into exile. Like tragic poetry, comic poetry has a negative effect on the best part of the soul and the criticism of comedy follows the same path as the criticism of tragedy.[275] Comedy releases instinctive, spontaneous reactions. It is addressed to the lower part of the soul and therefore prevents rational judgments. Comic poetry is based on 'buffoonery' (βωμολοχία) and departs from acceptable established standards. Described as 'base' (πονηρά), it has the power to turn spectators into buffoons at home without their realizing it. Thus, comic poetry teaches the audience how to make fun of everything

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μόνον τὰς νέας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἤδη τὰς πρεσβυτέρας, ὥσπερ τοὺς γέροντας ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις, ὅταν ῥυσοὶ καὶ μὴ ἡδεῖς τὴν ὄψιν ὅμως φιλογυμναστῶσιν; νὴ τὸν Δία, ἔφη· γελοῖον γὰρ ἄν, ὥς γε ἐν τῷ παρεστῶτι, φανείη. οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπείπερ ὡρμήσαμεν λέγειν, οὐ φοβητέον τὰ τῶν χαριέντων σκώμματα, ὅσα καὶ οἷα ἂν εἴποιεν εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην μεταβολὴν γενομένην καὶ περὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ περὶ μουσικὴν καὶ οὐκ ἐλάχιστα περὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων σχέσιν καὶ ἵππων ὀχήσεις. ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις. ἀλλ' ἐπείπερ λέγειν ἠρξάμεθα, πορευτέον πρὸς τὸ τραχὺ τοῦ νόμου, δεηθεῖσίν τε τούτων μὴ τὰ αὑτῶν πράττειν ἀλλὰ σπουδάζειν, καὶ ὑπομνήσασιν ὅτι οὐ πολὺς χρόνος ἐξ οὗ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐδόκει αἰσχρὰ εἶναι καὶ γελοῖα ἅπερ νῦν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν βαρβάρων, γυμνοὺς ἄνδρας ὁρᾶσθαι, καὶ ὅτε ἤρχοντο τῶν γυμνασίων πρῶτοι μὲν Κρῆτες, ἔπειτα Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐξῆν τοῖς τότε ἀστείοις πάντα ταῦτα κωμῳδεῖν. ἢ οὐκ οἴει; ἔγωγε. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ οἶμαι χρωμένοις ἄμεινον τὸ ἀποδύεσθαι τοῦ συγκαλύπτειν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐφάνη, καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς δὴ γελοῖον ἐξερρύη ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μηνυθέντος ἀρίστου· καὶ τοῦτο ἐνεδείξατο, ὅτι μάταιος ὃς γελοῖον ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖται ἢ τὸ κακόν, καὶ ὁ γελωτοποιεῖν ἐπιχειρῶν πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ ὄψιν ἀποβλέπων ὡς γελοίου ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἄφρονός τε καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ καλοῦ αὖ σπουδάζει πρὸς ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν στησάμενος ἢ τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.
See Nightingale's (1995) 176-177 analysis of the passage.

[274] Murray (2013) 304.

[275] Pl. *Rep*. 606c: ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ γελοίου; ὅτι, ἂν αὐτὸς αἰσχύνοιο γελωτοποιῶν, ἐν μιμήσει δὲ κωμῳδικῇ ἢ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἀκούων σφόδρα χαρῇς καὶ μὴ μισῇς ὡς πονηρά, ταὐτὸν ποιεῖς ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις; ὃ γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ αὖ κατεῖχες ἐν σαυτῷ βουλόμενον γελωτοποιεῖν, φοβούμενος δόξαν βωμολοχίας, τότ' αὖ ἀνιεῖς, καὶ ἐκεῖ νεανικὸν ποιήσας ἔλαθες πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις ἐξενεχθεὶς ὥστε κωμῳδοποιὸς γενέσθαι.

in their private life and to become ridiculous by imitating the spectacles that they see.

Like tragedy, in the *Philebus* comedy is also accused of inciting a mixture of pleasure and pain in the souls of the spectators.[276] Socrates reinforces his argument by examining the vicious 'nature of the ridiculous.'[277] He defines the ridiculous as a failure of self-knowledge and sees this as a 'bad condition.'[278] Laughing at the ridiculous qualities of our friends causes simultaneous mixed feelings and is therefore rejected. The psychology of laughter includes a mixture of pleasure, pain, and envy. The basic problem with comic performances is that a person should not be educated to behave like this in the 'comedy of life.' Plato is strongly convinced of the great influence comedy has on the human soul. He therefore places great emphasis on the application of the harmful principles of comedy, as a public spectacle, on real-life situations.[279]

In the *Laws*, Plato disparages the danger of comedy. The popularity of comic poetry is seen as limited to youths, who would give the first award to comedians in a competition of pleasure.[280] In the seventh book, the Athenian describes comedy as a ridiculous representation (Pl. *Rep*. 816d: ἐπὶ τὰ τοῦ γέλωτος κωμῳδήματα) of ugly bodies and ideas.[281] There is a clear shift in Plato's attitude to comedy in this dialogue. He sees that the knowledge of the 'ridiculous' will contribute to the appreciation of the 'serious.' Comedy is presented as an anti-paradigmatic kind of poetry that has a specific educational role in the *Laws*: it teaches one "how not to behave."[282] Despite the fact that comedy is presented as a useful spectacle, the free citizens of the Cretan city are not allowed to be involved in comic representations. Instead, this is left to

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[276] Pl. *Phil*. 48a: {ΣΩ} τὴν δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς κωμῳδίαις διάθεσιν ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἆρ᾽ οἶσθ᾽ ὡς ἔστι κἀν τούτοις μεῖξις λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς;

[277] Pl. *Phil*. 48c: ἔστιν δὴ πονηρία μέν τις τὸ κεφάλαιον, ἕξεώς τινος ἐπίκλην λεγομένη

[278] Pl. *Phil*. 49a: κακόν ... πάθος

[279] Pl. *Phil*. 50a: {ΣΩ} γελῶντας ἄρα ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων γελοίοις φησὶν ὁ λόγος, κεραννύντας ἡδονὴν αὖ φθόνῳ, λύπῃ τὴν ἡδονὴν συγκεραννύναι· τὸν γὰρ φθόνον ὡμολογῆσθαι λύπην ψυχῆς ἡμῖν πάλαι, τὸ δὲ γελᾶν ἡδονήν, ἅμα γίγνεσθαι δὲ τούτω ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις. {ΠΡΩ} ἀληθῆ. {ΣΩ} μηνύει δὴ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν θρήνοις τε καὶ ἐν τραγῳδίαις καὶ κωμῳδίαις, μὴ τοῖς δράμασι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ τοῦ βίου συμπάσῃ τραγῳδίᾳ καὶ κωμῳδίᾳ, λύπας ἡδοναῖς ἅμα κεράννυσθαι, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὴ μυρίοις.

[280] Pl. *Laws* 658d: ἐὰν δέ γ᾽ οἱ μείζους παῖδες, τὸν τὰς κωμῳδίας·

[281] Pl. *Laws* 816d-e: τὰ δὲ τῶν αἰσχρῶν σωμάτων καὶ διανοημάτων καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὰ τοῦ γέλωτος κωμῳδήματα τετραμμένων, κατὰ λέξιν τε καὶ ᾠδὴν καὶ κατὰ ὄρχησιν καὶ κατὰ τὰ τούτων πάντων μιμήματα κεκωμῳδημένα, ἀνάγκη μὲν θεάσασθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν· ἄνευ γὰρ γελοίων τὰ σπουδαῖα καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία μαθεῖν μὲν οὐ δυνατόν, εἰ μέλλει τις φρόνιμος ἔσεσθαι […]

[282] Murray (2013) 297.

slaves and hired foreigners. In addition, the comic representations must also be controlled by laws.[283] The same thing seems to apply to comedy here as *melos*: it is allowed as long as it is used in the proper way – in this way, as a means of getting people to feel superior to supposedly biologically (κατὰ φύσιν) debauched and inferior slaves and foreigners.

Plato proposes the proper way of attending such performances, which is 'not seriously' (Pl. *Laws* 816e: σπουδὴν δὲ περὶ αὐτὰ εἶναι μηδέποτε μηδ᾽ ἡντινοῦν). The spectators should not have any expectations regarding the knowledge they could gain from such performances. Another condition is that the comic choruses should represent something novel each time, an idea that echoes the *Republic*, where the comedians are accused of criticizing novelty, as already mentioned. Moreover, although abusive language is forbidden in the new Cretan city,[284] it is permitted under certain conditions.[285] When abuse is used without passion in comedies (Pl. *Laws* 935d: ἄνευ θυμοῦ), it is not dangerous because it is unserious, weak, and harmless. What is striking here is that Plato proposes a specific representation of the 'ridiculous' on stage. Since the abuses are impassionate, the spectators will not pay much attention to them and they cannot therefore be insulted or intensely influenced. Thus the 'ridiculous' is not entirely forbidden in the *Laws*, but is weakened, restricted, and carefully supervised.

Both Plato's sense of humor and the comic subtext of many of his dialogues are evident.[286] However, the 'ridiculous' element that comedy propounds is not

[283] Pl. *Laws* 816e-817a: δούλοις δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ξένοις ἐμμίσθοις προστάττειν μιμεῖσθαι, σπουδὴν δὲ περὶ αὐτὰ εἶναι μηδέποτε μηδ᾽ ἡντινοῦν, μηδέ τινα μανθάνοντα αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι φανερὸν τῶν ἐλευθέρων, μήτε γυναῖκα μήτε ἄνδρα, καινὸν δὲ ἀεί τι περὶ αὐτὰ φαίνεσθαι τῶν μιμημάτων. ὅσα μὲν οὖν περὶ γέλωτά ἐστιν παίγνια, ἃ δὴ κωμῳδίαν πάντες λέγομεν, οὕτως τῷ νόμῳ καὶ λόγῳ κείσθω· [...]

[284] Pl. *Laws* 934b; 935e.

[285] Pl. *Laws* 935c-e: λέγομεν δὴ τὰ νῦν ὡς <u>λοιδορίαις</u> συμπλεκόμενος ἄνευ τοῦ <u>γελοῖα</u> ζητεῖν λέγειν οὐ δυνατός ἐστιν χρῆσθαι, καὶ τοῦτο <u>λοιδοροῦμεν</u>, ὁπόταν θυμῷ γιγνόμενον ᾖ· τί δὲ δή; τὴν τῶν <u>κωμῳδῶν</u> προθυμίαν τοῦ <u>γελοῖα</u> εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους λέγειν ἦ παραδεχόμεθα, ἐὰν <u>ἄνευ θυμοῦ</u> τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡμῖν τοὺς πολίτας ἐπιχειρῶσιν <u>κωμῳδοῦντες</u> λέγειν; ἢ διαλάβωμεν δίχα τῷ παίζειν καὶ μή, καὶ παίζοντι μὲν ἐξέστω τινὶ περί του λέγειν <u>γελοῖον</u> ἄνευ θυμοῦ, συντεταμένῳ δὲ καὶ μετὰ θυμοῦ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, μὴ ἐξέστω μηδενί; τοῦτο μὲν οὖν οὐδαμῶς ἀναθετέον, ᾧ δ᾽ ἐξέστω καὶ μὴ δέ, τοῦτο νομοθετησώμεθα. ποιητῇ δὴ <u>κωμῳδίας</u> ἤ τινος ἰάμβων ἢ μουσῶν μελῳδίας μὴ ἐξέστω μήτε λόγῳ μήτε εἰκόνι, μήτε θυμῷ μήτε ἄνευ θυμοῦ, μηδαμῶς μηδένα τῶν πολιτῶν κωμῳδεῖν· […]

[286] Comic characters are, for example, Alcibiades in the *Symposium* and Ion in the *Ion*. Comic reactions can be seen in the introductory scene between Hippocrates and Socrates in the *Protagoras*, or in the astonishment at the view of Charmides in the dialogue that bears

acceptable. The criticism of everything new and revolutionary in comedies, the unserious engagement with situations that are in fact serious, and the mixture of pleasure with pain that influences the audience in a negative way, make this kind of poetry inappropriate for the citizens of the fair city. However, even in Magnesia, comedy remains on the margins of society, performed only by slaves or strangers, and regulated by strict rules, such as those concerning impassionate acting and loose rather than serious viewing.

II.1.2.3. Plato and Satyr Play. From the ugly satyr-like form to the beautiful content

A few references to satyr plays are used in the Platonic works in order to describe Socrates. In the *Theaetetus*, Theodorus compares the satyr-like face of the young Theaetetus, with his snub nose and protruding eyes, with that of Socrates.[287] A little later, Socrates wonders if Theaetetus has indeed the same face (πρόσωπον) as his, as Theodorus had previously described it.[288] Charalabopoulos argues that Plato plays here with the double meaning of the word πρόσωπον as both 'face' and 'mask.'[289]

In the *Symposium*, Alcibiades repeatedly calls Socrates Satyr because of his satyr-like appearance and the psychagogic power of his words that are compared to musical compositions for the flute.[290] According to Alcibiades, Socrates'

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his name. Other comic elements that can be detected in Plato's dialogues are included in the discussions of Greene, Clay, Patterson, Brock and Nighingale. See p. 1 n. 1 of this chapter.

[287] Pl. *Theaet.* 143e: {ΘΕ} καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμοί τε εἰπεῖν καὶ σοὶ ἀκοῦσαι πάνυ ἄξιον οἵῳ ὑμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν μειρακίῳ ἐντετύχηκα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν καλός, ἐφοβούμην ἂν σφόδρα λέγειν, μὴ καί τῳ δόξω ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ αὐτοῦ εἶναι. νῦν δέ – καὶ μή μοι ἄχθου – οὐκ ἔστι καλός, προσέοικε δὲ σοὶ τήν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων· ἧττον δὲ ἢ σὺ ταῦτ᾽ ἔχει.

[288] Pl. *Theaet.* 144d-e: {ΣΩ} πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἵνα κἀγὼ ἐμαυτὸν ἀνασκέψωμαι ποῖόν τι ἔχω τὸ πρόσωπον: φησὶν γὰρ Θεόδωρος ἔχειν με σοὶ ὅμοιον.

[289] Charalabopoulos (2012) 71.

[290] Pl. *Symp.* 215e: ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ τουτουῒ τοῦ Μαρσύου || Pl. *Rep.* 216c: καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν δὴ τῶν αὐλημάτων καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τοιαῦτα πεπόνθασιν ὑπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ σατύρου· || Pl. *Rep.* 221d-222a: οἷος δὲ οὑτοσὶ γέγονε τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῦ, οὐδ᾽ ἐγγὺς ἂν εὕροι τις ζητῶν, οὔτε τῶν νῦν οὔτε τῶν παλαιῶν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα εἰ οἷς ἐγὼ λέγω ἀπεικάζοι τις αὐτόν, ἀνθρώπων μὲν μηδενί, τοῖς δὲ σιληνοῖς καὶ σατύροις, αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς λόγους. καὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις παρέλιπον, ὅτι καὶ οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῦ ὁμοιότατοί εἰσι τοῖς σιληνοῖς τοῖς διοιγομένοις. εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλοι τις τῶν Σωκράτους ἀκούειν λόγων, φανεῖεν ἂν πάνυ γελοῖοι τὸ πρῶτον· τοιαῦτα καὶ ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα ἔξωθεν περιαμπέχονται, σατύρου δή τινα ὑβριστοῦ δοράν. ὄνους γὰρ κανθηλίους λέγει καὶ χαλκέας

speeches have a comic impact on his listeners; his words and phrases are compared to the skin of a licentious satyr. Socratic descriptions are taken from everyday life and are full of repetitions that cause laughter. But this is only the form of Socrates' speeches. The content of his speeches includes not only sound, but also divine wisdom and his words are replete with images of virtue.[291] Socrates, in his turn, plays on the comparison between himself and Silenus or Satyr and characterizes Alcibiades' presentation of him as a misleading satyr drama.[292] In passage 221d-222d of the *Symposium,* Plato provides a brief portrayal of the language, imagery, and comic effect of satyr plays. The description of this theatrical genre as ridiculous would make us think that Plato clearly disapproves this genre. What strikes me, however, is the transition from Socrates' ugly appearance, to the ugly appearance of his words, and finally to the beauty of their content. His satyr-like appearance is reflected in his satyr-like words, but this is contrasted to the content of his speeches, which includes 'statues of virtue.' Therefore, his relationship with the form of satyr play is more complex than one may have thought.

If Csapo and Miller are correct in considering satyrs as "the archetypal musicians and dancers" associated with the Dionysiac processions and with the origins of performance culture,[293] then Socrates and, hence, Plato might be their philosophical rival. His heterogeneous philosophical genre, exactly like the diverse genre of the satyr play, is intended to be archetypal and to initiate discussions on the creation of a whole new philosophical culture.

τινὰς καὶ σκυτοτόμους καὶ βυρσοδέψας, καὶ ἀεὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τὰ αὐτὰ φαίνεται λέγειν, ὥστε ἄπειρος καὶ ἀνόητος ἄνθρωπος πᾶς ἂν τῶν λόγων καταγελάσειεν.
On the incorporation of various satyric and silenic elements in the *Symposium,* see Usher (2002) 205-228.

[291] Pl. *Symp*. 222a: διοιγομένους δὲ ἰδὼν ἄν τις καὶ ἐντὸς αὐτῶν γιγνόμενος πρῶτον μὲν νοῦν ἔχοντας ἔνδον μόνους εὑρήσει τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα θειοτάτους καὶ πλεῖστα ἀγάλματ᾽ ἀρετῆς ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχοντας καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον τείνοντας, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὅσον προσήκει σκοπεῖν τῷ μέλλοντι καλῷ κἀγαθῷ ἔσεσθαι.

[292] Pl. *Symp*. 222d: ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔλαθες, ἀλλὰ τὸ <u>σατυρικόν</u> σου <u>δρᾶμα</u> τοῦτο καὶ σιληνικὸν κατάδηλον ἐγένετο. ἀλλ᾽, ὦ φίλε Ἀγάθων, μηδὲν πλέον αὐτῷ γένηται, ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζου ὅπως ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μηδεὶς διαβαλεῖ.

[293] Csapo and Miller (2007) 21-22.

II.2. Plato’s explicit references to *melos*

Plato refers to melic genres[294] in the *Ion* and in the *Laws*. Almost all the melic genres mentioned by Plato in these two dialogues correspond to the Alexandrian list of Pindar’s works given in the Vita Ambrosiana, which is considered the most important list of Pindar’s books of poetry.[295] The Vita Ambrosiana contains nine distinct genres:[296] *hymnoi, paianes, dithyramboi, prosodia, parthenia, hyporchêmata, encômia, thrênoi, epinikia*. Of course, as Nagy argues,[297] we cannot be sure whether the Alexandrian edition dates back to Plato’s era, but we know that Plato had a very good knowledge of Pindar’s works.[298]

In the *Ion*, Plato mentions three melic genres, together with other kinds of poems, in his description of the irrational process of the melic composition, during which the poet is divinely inspired.[299] Socrates’ argument for a poet to engage in only one kind of poetry is followed by a partial list of distinct poetic categories and genres, including dithyrambs, *encômia*, hyporchemes, epic, iambic poems, and paeans (Pl. *Ion* 534c-d: τοῦτο μόνον οἷός τε ἕκαστος ποιεῖν καλῶς ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἡ Μοῦσα αὐτὸν ὥρμησεν, ὁ μὲν διθυράμβους, ὁ δὲ ἐγκώμια, ὁ δὲ ὑπορχήματα, ὁ δ᾽ ἔπη, ὁ δ᾽ ἰάμβους· … μέγιστον δὲ τεκμήριον τῷ λόγῳ Τύννιχος ὁ Χαλκιδεύς, ὃς ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν πώποτε ἐποίησε ποίημα ὅτου τις ἂν ἀξιώσειεν μνησθῆναι, τὸν δὲ παίωνα). Among other kinds of poetry, Plato provides a partial list of melic genres and argues that all poets produce their compositions under divine inspiration, regardless of the kind of poetry they compose.

The agenda in the *Laws* is totally different from that found in the *Ion*. In the *Laws*, Plato is not interested only in the composition of the songs, but also in the organization of the whole art of *mousikê* in the Cretan colony. He therefore gives a more complete list of the melic genres in his nostalgic description of the classification of melic poetry in the old days of the Persian wars (Pl. *Laws* 700a-c):

> {ΑΘ} διῃρημένη γὰρ δὴ τότε ἦν ἡμῖν ἡ μουσικὴ κατὰ εἴδη τε ἑαυτῆς ἄττα καὶ

[294] As already stated in the introduction, I use the term genre to denote the distinct kinds of melic poetry. See Svenbro (1984) 225; Calame (1974) 113-128.
[295] Race (1987) 407-410, however, doubts it and also provides strong arguments for the value of the Vita Thomana.
[296] Nagy (1990) 110-111 talks about ten distinct genres because he subdivides parthenia into two different types.
[297] Ibid.
[298] Irigoin (1952) 16-8 reports the Pindaric passages used in Plato’s dialogues.
[299] Pl. *Ion* 533e-534c. The passage has been discussed in Chapter 1 (pp. 3-10).

σχήματα, καί τι ἦν εἶδος ᾠδῆς εὐχαὶ πρὸς θεούς, ὄνομα δὲ ὕμνοι ἐπεκαλοῦντο· καὶ τούτῳ δὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ἦν ᾠδῆς ἕτερον εἶδος – θρήνους δέ τις ἂν αὐτοὺς μάλιστα ἐκάλεσεν – καὶ παίωνες ἕτερον, καὶ ἄλλο, Διονύσου γένεσις οἶμαι, διθύραμβος λεγόμενος. νόμους τε αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἐκάλουν, ᾠδὴν ὥς τινα ἑτέραν· ἐπέλεγον δὲ κιθαρῳδικούς. τούτων δὴ διατεταγμένων καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, οὐκ ἐξῆν ἄλλο εἰς ἄλλο καταχρῆσθαι μέλους εἶδος· [...]

{ATH} Among us, at that time, music was divided into various kinds and styles; one kind of song was that of prayers to the gods, which bore the name of 'hymns'; contrasted with this was another kind, best called 'dirges'; 'paeans' formed another; and yet another was the 'dithyramb,' named, I fancy, after Dionysus. 'Nomes' also were so called as being a distinct kind of song; and these were further described as 'citharoedic nomes'. So these and other kinds being classified and fixed, it was forbidden to set one kind of words to a different kind of tune.

In the archaic period, each melic genre had a specific *εἶδος* and a specific *σχῆμα*. Therefore, Plato cannot understand and accept the mixture of genres that is typical of his era. He sees this unmusical illegality (ἄμουσος παρανομία) as a sign of the moral or cultural decadence of his era, based as it is on the blending of every kind of *mousikê* with every other[300] (Pl. *Laws* 700d-e):

{ΑΘ} [...] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, προϊόντος τοῦ χρόνου, ἄρχοντες μὲν τῆς ἀμούσου παρανομίας ποιηταὶ ἐγίγνοντο φύσει μὲν ποιητικοί, ἀγνώμονες δὲ περὶ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς Μούσης καὶ τὸ νόμιμον, βακχεύοντες καὶ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος κατεχόμενοι ὑφ' ἡδονῆς, κεραννύντες δὲ θρήνους τε ὕμνοις καὶ παίωνας διθυράμβοις, καὶ αὐλῳδίας δὴ ταῖς κιθαρῳδίαις μιμούμενοι, καὶ πάντα εἰς πάντα συνάγοντες, μουσικῆς ἄκοντες ὑπ' ἀνοίας καταψευδόμενοι ὡς ὀρθότητα μὲν οὐκ ἔχοι οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν μουσική, ἡδονῇ δὲ τῇ τοῦ χαίροντος, εἴτε βελτίων εἴτε χείρων ἂν εἴη τις, κρίνοιτο ὀρθότατα. τοιαῦτα δὴ ποιοῦντες ποιήματα, λόγους τε ἐπιλέγοντες τοιούτους, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐνέθεσαν παρανομίαν εἰς τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τόλμαν ὡς ἱκανοῖς οὖσιν κρίνειν· [...]

{ATH} [...] but later on, with the progress of time, there arose as leaders of

[300] See Harvey (1955) 165.

unmusical illegality poets who, though by nature poetical, were ignorant of what was just and lawful in music; and they, being frenzied and unduly possessed by a spirit of pleasure, mixed dirges with hymns and paeans with dithyrambs, and imitated flute-tunes with harp-tunes, and blended every kind of music with every other; and thus, through their folly, they unwittingly bore false witness against music, as a thing without any standard of correctness, of which the best criterion is the pleasure of the auditor, be he a good man or a bad. By compositions of such a character, set to similar words, they bred in the populace a spirit of lawlessness in music, and the effrontery of supposing themselves capable of passing judgment on it. […]

Plato's aetiology for the mixing (κεραννύντες) of genres is enlightening: their ignorance of the musical laws (ἀγνώμονες), their frenzied state (βακχευόμενοι), their excessive possession by pleasure[301] (κατεχόμενοι), combined with their folly regarding *mousikê* (ὑπ' ἀνοίας) lead them to every possible mixture in the composition of melic poetry. Thus, the pleasure and exaltation of *mousikê* leads inevitably, as it were, to the mixing of genres and the destruction or at least decline of *mousikê*: it seems that the only thing that can stop it becoming a socially pernicious force is the 'proper' and rigorous organisation of society itself.

This chapter discusses the melic genres of dirge (θρῆνος), dithyramb (διθύραμβος), *encômium* (ἐγκώμιον), paean (παιάν), hymn (ὕμνος), and *kitharôidikos nomos* (κιθαρῳδικὸς νόμος). I have excluded the genres of hyporcheme and skolion from my analysis because Plato does not comment on them at all.[302] The treatment of the melic genres will be based on Plato's explicit references to them and will rely on both composition and performance criteria.[303] Moreover, Plato is concerned not only with the strict division and identity of each melic genre, but also with their correct representation (*mimêsis*), as shown in the first chapter.

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[301] In the *Laws*, Plato attempts to discipline the emotion of pleasure, as already discussed throughout Chapter 1.
[302] The reference to hyporcheme (ὑπόρχημα) appears in Pl. *Ion* 534c and the reference to the *skolion* (σκόλιον) in Pl. *Gorg*. 451e.
[303] For the discussion of the two aspects of composition and performance that define oral poetry, see Nagy (1994) 11.

II.2.1. *Thrênos*

The first melic genre discussed is *thrênos*, a kind of choral song that is first seen in Homeric poetry.[304] Tsagalis defines *thrênoi* as “musical laments, set-dirges sung by non-kin professionals; they probably contain ‘a praise to the dead referring to their deeds or a lament in more general terms’ and are artistic in nature with less improvisation and spontaneity than the γόοι.”[305]

In the broader discussion of the description of death in the *Republic*, Socrates cites Homeric examples of the lamentations of gods and heroes that present death as terrible.[306] This is entirely inappropriate for the education of the Guardians in the fair city (Pl. *Rep*. 387d-388a):

> {ΣΩ} καὶ τοὺς ὀδυρμοὺς ἄρα ἐξαιρήσομεν καὶ τοὺς οἴκτους τοὺς τῶν ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν; ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, εἴπερ καὶ τὰ πρότερα. σκόπει δή, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἰ ὀρθῶς ἐξαιρήσομεν ἢ οὔ. φαμὲν δὲ δὴ ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικὴς ἀνὴρ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, οὗπερ καὶ ἑταῖρός ἐστιν, τὸ τεθνάναι οὐ δεινὸν ἡγήσεται. φαμὲν γάρ. οὐκ ἄρα ὑπέρ γ᾽ ἐκείνου ὡς δεινόν τι πεπονθότος ὀδύροιτ᾽ ἄν. οὐ δῆτα. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε λέγομεν, ὡς ὁ τοιοῦτος μάλιστα αὐτὸς αὑτῷ αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἥκιστα ἑτέρου προσδεῖται. ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. ἥκιστα ἄρ᾽ αὐτῷ δεινὸν στερηθῆναι ὑέος ἢ ἀδελφοῦ ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του τῶν τοιούτων. ἥκιστα μέντοι. ἥκιστ᾽ ἄρα καὶ ὀδύρεσθαι, φέρειν δὲ ὡς πρᾳότατα, ὅταν τις αὐτὸν τοιαύτη συμφορὰ καταλάβῃ. πολύ γε. ὀρθῶς ἄρ᾽ ἂν ἐξαιροῖμεν τοὺς θρήνους τῶν ὀνομαστῶν ἀνδρῶν, γυναιξὶ δὲ ἀποδιδοῖμεν, καὶ οὐδὲ ταύταις σπουδαίαις, καὶ ὅσοι κακοὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἵνα ἡμῖν δυσχεραίνωσιν ὅμοια τούτοις ποιεῖν οὓς δή φαμεν ἐπὶ φυλακῇ τῆς χώρας τρέφειν.
>
> {SO} “And shall we also get rid of the lamentations and pities of men of high repute?” “That necessarily follows,” he said, “from the other.” “Consider,” said I, “whether we shall be right in getting rid of them or not. What we affirm is that a good man will not think that for a good man, whose friend he also is, death is a terrible thing.” “Yes, we say that.” “Then it would not be for his friend’s sake as if he had suffered something dreadful that he would lament.” “Certainly not.”

[304] Calame (2001) 82-83. On lament in Homer’s *Iliad* – principally on the γόοι, which are considered as the only marked form of lament speech in the *Iliad* – see Tsagalis (2004).

[305] Tsagalis (2004) 5.

[306] Pl. *Rep*. 386a-387c.

> "But, we also say this, that such a one is most of all men sufficient unto himself for a good life and is distinguished from other men in having least need of anybody else." "True," he replied. "Least of all then to him is it a terrible thing to lose son or brother or his wealth or anything of the sort." "Least of all." "Then he makes the least lament and bears it most moderately when any such misfortune overtakes him." "Certainly." "Then we should be right in getting rid of the lamentations of men of note and in attributing them to women, and not to the most worthy of them either, and to inferior men, in that those whom we say we are breeding for the guardianship of the land may disdain to act like these."

Since education is based on *mimêsis*, the Guardians will resort to dirges and laments in every difficult situation that emerges in their everyday life. Therefore, *thrênos* must not be included in the *paideia* of the Guardians and must be left to less virtuous women and to bad men. In this passage *thrênos* is used in the plural as a synonym for ὀδυρμός (lamentation) and οἶκτος (pity). It is not described as a melic genre, but rather as a mode of behavior. *Thrênos* evokes sympathy for the others in the soul, and therefore emotional weakness in the face of similar problems. These feelings for someone else's misfortune, and the expression of such feelings, are harmful and must not be allowed in notable men (τῶν ὀνομαστῶν ἀνδρῶν) who must be strong and independent in life (αὐτάρκης, διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἥκιστα ἑτέρου προσδεῖται). Such behavior is allowed only in inferior women (ουδέ ... σπουδαίαις) and in bad men (ὅσοι κακοὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν).

In addition to rejecting the dirge-like content of the songs that affects the way people feel and behave, the dirge-like modes of music should likewise be exiled because they are considered useless even for women (Pl. *Rep*. 398d-e):

> {ΣΩ} […] ἀλλὰ μέντοι θρήνων γε καὶ ὀδυρμῶν ἔφαμεν ἐν λόγοις οὐδὲν προσδεῖσθαι. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. τίνες οὖν θρηνώδεις ἁρμονίαι; λέγε μοι· σὺ γὰρ μουσικός. μειξολυδιστί, ἔφη, καὶ συντονολυδιστὶ καὶ τοιαῦταί τινες. οὐκοῦν αὗται, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀφαιρετέαι; ἄχρηστοι γὰρ καὶ γυναιξὶν ἃς δεῖ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, μὴ ὅτι ἀνδράσι. πάνυ γε.

> {SO} […] "But we said we did not require dirges and lamentations in words." "We do not." "What, then, are the dirge-like modes of music? Tell me, for you are a musician." "The mixed Lydian," he said, "and the tense or higher Lydian,

and similar modes." "These, then," said I, "we must do away with. For they are useless even to women who are to make the best of themselves, let alone to men." "Assuredly."

The adjective θρηνώδης (fit for a dirge)[307] is used to characterize two main kinds of musical modes in this passage, namely, the Mixolydian and the Syntonolydian,[308] both of which are disapproved. A little later, Socrates describes the specific stages of the impact of the dirge-like harmonies on the soul in a fascinating description (Pl. *Rep*. 411a-b):

> {ΣΩ} οὐκοῦν ὅταν μέν τις μουσικῇ παρέχῃ καταυλεῖν καὶ καταχεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τῶν ὤτων ὥσπερ διὰ χώνης ἃς νυνδὴ ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν τὰς γλυκείας τε καὶ μαλακὰς καὶ θρηνώδεις ἁρμονίας, καὶ μινυρίζων τε καὶ γεγανωμένος ὑπὸ τῆς ᾠδῆς διατελῇ τὸν βίον ὅλον, οὗτος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, εἴ τι θυμοειδὲς εἶχεν, ὥσπερ σίδηρον ἐμάλαξεν καὶ χρήσιμον ἐξ ἀχρήστου καὶ σκληροῦ ἐποίησεν· ὅταν δ' ἐπέχων μὴ ἀνιῇ ἀλλὰ κηλῇ, τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη τήκει καὶ λείβει, ἕως ἂν ἐκτήξῃ τὸν θυμὸν καὶ ἐκτέμῃ ὥσπερ νεῦρα ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ποιήσῃ 'μαλθακὸν αἰχμητήν.'

> {SO} "Now when a man abandons himself to music to play upon him and pour into his soul as it were through the funnel of his ears those sweet, soft, and dirge-like airs of which we were just now speaking, and gives his entire time to the warblings and blandishments of song, the first result is that the principle of high spirit, if he had it, is softened like iron and is made useful instead of useless and brittle. But, when he continues the practice without remission and is spellbound, the effect begins to be that he melts and liquefies till he completely dissolves away his spirit, cuts out as it were the very sinews of his soul and makes of himself a 'feeble warrior.'"

The dirge-like modes characterized as 'sweet' (γλυκείας) and 'soft' (μαλακὰς) are 'poured' (καταχεῖν) into the soul and enchant it, just as'flute-playing' would do (καταυλεῖν). The exposure to such songs initially makes the spirit softer and more useful, but it eventually becomes melted and wasted. In the end, the spirit becomes a

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[307] LSJ s.v.

[308] For a technical analysis of the different harmoniai mentioned in the *Republic,* see Barker (1984) 163-168.

weak warrior. Socrates' deployment of similes is striking in the passage. The music is described as pouring into the soul through the ears 'like through a funnel' (ὥσπερ διὰ χώνης), imaging the music as a stream that flows abundantly into the soul. The second simile concerns the immediate effect of music on the soul: the spirited part of the soul, which was stiff and useless 'like iron' (ὥσπερ σίδηρον), becomes softer and more useful. The third simile describes the long-term effect of music on the soul: the spirited part wastes away as if the sinews had been cut out of the soul (ἐκτέμῃ ὥσπερ νεῦρα ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς).

Together with tragedy and comedy, *thrênos* is also disapproved of in the *Philebus,* because of its detrimental effects on peoples' souls (Pl. *Phil*. 50b):

> {ΣΩ} μηνύει δὴ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν θρήνοις τε καὶ ἐν τραγῳδίαις καὶ κωμῳδίαις, μὴ τοῖς δράμασι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ τοῦ βίου συμπάσῃ τραγῳδίᾳ καὶ κωμῳδίᾳ, λύπας ἡδοναῖς ἅμα κεράννυσθαι, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὴ μυρίοις.
>
> {SO} So now our argument shows that in *thrênoi* and tragedies and comedies, not merely as representations on the stage, but in all the tragedy and comedy of life, and in countless other ways, pain is mixed with pleasure.[309]

As Socrates argues, life imitates and hence reflects poetry. *Thrênos*, along with tragedy and comedy that characterize life itself, is condemned because it reflects the mixture of pleasure and pain in real life. As Socrates explains in the *Republic* 605b-d, these genres are not suitable for the fair city because they give off strong emotional vibes, pleasing the appetitive part of the soul and, eventually, teaching wrong ways of facing real life issues. However, the generic identity of *thrênos* is ambiguous here. It is listed together with comedy and tragedy and it seems to share the negative consequences that the dramatic genres have on the formation of character. We are certainly familiar with the flexibility with which Plato's speakers use the term; *thrênos* was also a kind of song. In the Alexandrian period there were whole books of Pindaric and Simonidean *thrênoi*.

In the list of melic genres in passage 700a-b of the *Laws* discussed earlier in this chapter (pp. 78-9), *thrênos* is a kind of song (ᾠδῆς … εἶδος) contrasted to *hymnos*. The Athenian expresses his admiration for the strict division of melic poetry, but he does

[309] The translation is that of Fowler (1925).

not offer any other comments on the melic genres. In the twelfth book of the *Laws*, however, the Athenian says that the dirges or lamentations must be replaced by choral hymns at the funeral of the highpriests.[310] Therefore, it seems that *thrênoi* and the hymns for the gods, mainly the paeans, "merge into each other, partially perverting non-dramatic civic rituals,"[311] as Prauscello argues.

As already seen, *thrênos* is attested in three Platonic dialogues. In the *Republic*, it is not used as a melic genre, but as a synonym for lamentations (ὀδυρμοί) and cries of pity (οἴκτοι) that people must avoid when handling difficult problems in life. In the *Philebus*, *thrênos* is more like a dramatic genre than a melic one and it is harshly disapproved. Finally, in the *Laws*, it is presented as a melic genre and it is not included in the choral performances of the Cretan city.

II.2.2. Dithyramb

The dithyramb is a kind of choral song that is sung for Dionysus.[312] The long history of the genre is marked by its development from a cult hymn based on a simple narrative into a highly sophisticated choral song with mimetic function.[313] With dithyramb – as to an extent with paean – we are dealing with a very complex pre-Platonic history. It is true that a very broad range of utterance is identified in earlier or later sources as dithyrambic, and there is the question of the development in Athens of a kind of 'theatrical dithyramb,' which may or may not be related to tragedy and satyr-play, that seems to be the main target of Plato's references to the 'dithyrambic poets.' As we shall see below, the shifting forms of the dithyramb in Plato's time are attested in the *Republic*.

The previous chapter drew attention to the fact that in Plato's *Ion* the contribution of the poets to the composition of the poems, including the dithyrambic ones, is entirely downgraded. The beautiful poems are attributed to divine inspiration rather than to the poets' talent or skill. The poets' role is restricted to interpreting the will of

[310] Pl. *Laws* 947b-c. The passage will be discussed in the fifth sub-section (II.2.5) entitled 'Hymns.'
[311] Prauscello (2014) 185.
[312] For the genre of dithyramb, see Calame (2001) 79-80; Kowalzig&Wilson (2013).
[313] Pseudo-Aristotle's *Problems* 918b19-21: διὸ καὶ οἱ διθύραμβοι, ἐπειδὴ μιμητικοὶ ἐγένοντο, οὐκέτι ἔχουσιν ἀντιστρόφους, πρότερον δὲ εἶχον.

the gods.[314] Later in passage 536a-c of the *Ion*, the poets are presented as the mouthpieces of the Muses and of the gods, as was discussed in the first section of Chapter 1. However, one may argue that the melic genres are warmly accepted as divine offspring.

In the *Apology*, Socrates criticizes the dithyrambic poets together with the tragedians (Pl. *Apol*. 22a: ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τούς τε τῶν τραγῳδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους). Similarly to his criticism in the *Ion*, Socrates argues that although the poets say many fine things, they ignore their meaning (Pl. *Apol*. 22c: καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἴσασιν δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι). The use of the verb λέγω (to say) for the composition or representation of dithyrambic and tragic poetry reveals Socrates' attempt to debase the poetic activity. He concludes that the poets are not inspired by wisdom (Pl. *Apol*. 22b: οὐ σοφίᾳ), but rather compose according to nature and under divine possession as is the case with prophets and soothsayers[315] (Pl. *Apol*. 22c: φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμῳδοί·). However, he focuses only on the dithyrambic and tragic poets, and not on their compositions.

As it is also the case for epic and tragic poetry, the inclusion of the dithyrambic poetry in the *Hippias Minor*[316] to the range of knowledge of Hippias, an arrogant sophist, might imply a sort of disapproval. In the *Gorgias*, dithyrambic poetry, together with the training of a chorus and with *kitharōidia*, are ἐπιτηδεύσεις (pursuits) that belong to the broader category of the art of rhetoric[317] and aim at pleasing the audience (Pl. *Gorg*. 501e-502a):

> {ΣΩ} τί δὲ ἡ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις; οὐ τοιαύτη τίς σοι καταφαίνεται; ἢ ἡγῇ τι φροντίζειν Κινησίαν τὸν Μέλητος, ὅπως ἐρεῖ τι τοιοῦτον ὅθεν ἂν οἱ ἀκούοντες βελτίους γίγνοιντο, ἢ ὅτι μέλλει χαριεῖσθαι τῷ ὄχλῳ τῶν θεατῶν; {ΚΑ}δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, Κινησίου γε πέρι.

314 Pl. *Ion* 534e: οὐκ ἀνθρώπινά ἐστιν τὰ καλὰ ταῦτα ποιήματα οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ θεῖα καὶ θεῶν, οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἑρμηνῆς εἰσιν τῶν θεῶν, κατεχόμενοι ἐξ ὅτου ἂν ἕκαστος κατέχηται. Cf. also Pindar's frg. 150 (S-M; Race), where the poet considers himself as an authoritative interpreter of the Muses' language: μαντεύεο, Μοῖσα, προφατεύσω δ' ἐγώ. On this fragment, see Ledbetter (2003). However, we cannot be sure about the authenticity of the fragment.

315 The connection between poetry and prophecy through the medium of divine inspiration can also be found in Pl. *Ion* 534a-c.

316 The passage has already been discussed in the first section of this chapter (II.1.1, II.1.2.1). Pl. *Hip.Min*. 368c-d: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ποιήματα ἔχων ἐλθεῖν, καὶ ἔπη καὶ τραγῳδίας καὶ διθυράμβους […]

317 Pl. *Gorg*. 502c-d.

{ΣΩ} τί δὲ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Μέλης; ἦ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον βλέπων ἐδόκει σοι κιθαρῳδεῖν; ἢ ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον; ἠνία γὰρ ᾄδων τοὺς θεατάς. ἀλλὰ δὴ σκόπει· οὐχὶ ἥ τε κιθαρῳδικὴ δοκεῖ σοι πᾶσα καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις ἡδονῆς χάριν ηὑρῆσθαι;

{SO} And what of choral productions and dithyrambic compositions? Are they not manifestly, in your view, of the same kind? Or do you suppose Cinesias, son of Meles, cares a jot about trying to say things of a sort that might be improving to his audience, or only what is likely to gratify the crowd of spectators? {CAL} Clearly the latter is the case, Socrates, with Cinesias. {SO} And what of his father Meles? Did he ever strike you as looking to what was best in his minstrelsy? Or did he, perhaps, not even make the pleasantest his aim? For his singing used to be a pain to the audience. But consider now: do you not think that all minstrelsy and composing of dithyrambs have been invented for the sake of pleasure?

Socrates turns his criticism to Cinesias,[318] a representative of the New Dithyramb, and to his father Meles, who Aristophanes claims is the worst *kitharōidos*.[319] He argues that heir only concern is the audience's pleasure and not their moral improvement.[320]

In the *Cratylus*[321] the use of the adjective διθυραμβώδης means 'nonsense' (Pl. *Crat*. 409c: διθυραμβῶδές γε τοῦτο τοὔνομα, ὦ Σώκρατες). As Ford states, "Plato is the only Greek author to use the adjective 'dithyrambic' (διθυραμβῶδες) giving it the connotations it still has of 'wild, vehement, and boisterous' language."[322] Similarly, the phrase διθύραμβον τοσουτονὶ ᾄσας ('you are singing such a long dithyramb') in the *Hippias Major*[323] means, 'you are speaking nonsense.'[324] Passing from the literal to the metaphorical meaning of the term as 'meaningless or foolish words', one notices that the negative use of the adjective 'dithyrambic' and of the noun

[318] DNP s.v. (Robbins).
[319] Aristoph. *Av*. 766
[320] See Peponi (2013a) 358.
[321] Pl. *Crat*. 409c: διθυραμβῶδές γε τοῦτο τοὔνομα, ὦ Σώκρατες.
[322] Ford (2013) 314.
[323] Pl. *Hip.Maj.* 292c: ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὅνπερ νυνδή, μιμούμενος ἐκεῖνον, ἵνα μὴ πρὸς σὲ λέγω ῥήματα, οἷα ἐκεῖνος εἰς ἐμὲ ἐρεῖ, χαλεπά τε καὶ ἀλλόκοτα. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, 'εἰπέ μοι,' φήσει, 'ὦ Σώκρατες, οἴει ἂν ἀδίκως πληγὰς λαβεῖν, ὅστις διθύραμβον τοσουτονὶ ᾄσας οὕτως ἀμούσως πολὺ ἀπῇσας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐρωτήματος;'
[324] Ford (2013) 314.

'dithyramb' is rooted in Platonic language and is therefore already a permanent convention in Platonic thought.

Socrates uses the word dithyramb twice in the *Phaedrus*. In the first instance, he realizes that he is possessed by the nymphs (νυμφόληπτος) and that is why he 'is uttering dithyrambs' (Pl. *Phdr*. 238c-d: τῷ ὄντι γὰρ θεῖος ἔοικεν ὁ τόπος εἶναι, ὥστε ἐὰν ἄρα πολλάκις νυμφόληπτος προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου γένωμαι, μὴ θαυμάσῃς· τὰ νῦν γὰρ οὐκέτι πόρρω διθυράμβων φθέγγομαι). The composition of the dithyramb in this dialogue is associated with divine possession by the nymphs and, consequently, with uncontrolled behavior. As in the *Cratylus* and the *Hippias Major*, the word 'dithyrambs' is used in the passage as a synonym for trivial or incomprehensible things.[325] Similarly, in the second instance, Socrates realizes that he is speaking in hexameters and not merely in the bombastic language of the dithyramb due to his possession by the nymphs (Pl. *Phaedrus* 241e: οὐκ ᾔσθου, ὦ μακάριε, ὅτι ἤδη ἔπη φθέγγομαι ἀλλ᾽ οὐκέτι διθυράμβους, καὶ ταῦτα ψέγων; ἐὰν δ᾽ ἐπαινεῖν τὸν ἕτερον ἄρξωμαι, τί με οἴει ποιήσειν; ἆρ᾽ οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν Νυμφῶν, αἷς με σὺ προύβαλες ἐκ προνοίας, σαφῶς ἐνθουσιάσω;). The word διθυράμβους is used literally in the passage. The Homeric poetry is much more highly regarded than the dithyrambs, but it is equally inappropriate for the portrayal of *erôs*.[326]

In the third book of the *Republic*, the dithyramb is described as monodic and non-mimetic, in contrast to the mimetic genres of tragedy and comedy (Pl. *Rep*. 394c: ἡ μὲν διὰ μιμήσεως ὅλη ἐστίν, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, τραγῳδία τε καὶ κωμῳδία, ἡ δὲ δι᾽ ἀπαγγελίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ – εὕροις δ᾽ ἂν αὐτὴν μάλιστά που ἐν διθυράμβοις – ἡ δ᾽ αὖ δι᾽ ἀμφοτέρων ἔν τε τῇ τῶν ἐπῶν ποιήσει). The presentation of dithyramb as a wholly narrative melic genre is fascinating. How could melic poetry – at least as we moderns understand it – ever be 'non-mimetic'? This is one of the points where one really does feel just how alien Plato is from our own literary reality. Peponi, however, clarifies this puzzling statement by discussing the term ἀπαγγελία. She argues that in the entire Platonic corpus the words ἀπαγγελία and ἀπαγγέλλειν "denote oral delivery of a narrative and they are therefore used often in contexts involving performance."[327] She also points out that what is absent in Plato's tripartite analysis of poetry is the performer of the

[325] Yunis (2011) 115: "As the cult song in honor of Dionysus, dithyramb suits the atmosphere of divinely inspired ecstasy (228b6-c1; Zimmermann 1992). Because from the late fifth century on dithyramb began to incorporate ostentatious sound play and novel word formations (Ar. *Av*. 1372-1409; Csapo 2004), Socrates self-mockingly suggests a bombastic quality in his own rhetorical composition."
[326] Yunis (2011) 121.
[327] Peponi (2013a) 356.

dithyramb, namely the dithyrambic chorus.[328]

In the following passage, Socrates' description of the dithyramb is confusing. Peponi examines the contradictory identity of dithyramb in Plato and reports that, although the dithyramb is considered a narrative genre, it also includes many mimetic elements. Socrates describes the mimetic gestures and sounds that probably delineate the New Music of the dithyramb[329] (Pl. *Rep*. 397a-b):

> οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὁ μὴ τοιοῦτος αὖ, ὅσῳ ἂν φαυλότερος ᾖ, πάντα τε μᾶλλον διηγήσεται καὶ οὐδὲν ἑαυτοῦ ἀνάξιον οἰήσεται εἶναι, ὥστε πάντα ἐπιχειρήσει μιμεῖσθαι σπουδῇ τε καὶ ἐναντίον πολλῶν, καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, βροντάς τε καὶ ψόφους ἀνέμων τε καὶ χαλαζῶν καὶ ἀξόνων τε καὶ τροχιλιῶν, καὶ σαλπίγγων καὶ αὐλῶν καὶ συρίγγων καὶ πάντων ὀργάνων φωνάς, καὶ ἔτι κυνῶν καὶ προβάτων καὶ ὀρνέων φθόγγους· καὶ ἔσται δὴ ἡ τούτου λέξις ἅπασα διὰ μιμήσεως φωναῖς τε καὶ σχήμασιν, ἢ σμικρόν τι διηγήσεως ἔχουσα;

> "the other kind of speaker, the more debased he is the more he will tend to narrate everything and he will think nothing unworthy of himself, so that he will imitate everything seriously and in the presence of many, to imitate all things, including those we just now mentioned – claps of thunder, and the noise of wind and hail and axles and pulleys, and the notes of trumpets and flutes and pan-pipes, and the sounds of all instruments, and the cries of dogs, sheep, and birds; and, therefore, his style will consist of imitation in voice and gesture, or will contain but a little of pure narration."

Imitating the sounds of birds, animals, and inferior musical instruments, with only a small narrative part, is explicitly condemned. Although Socrates explicitly criticizes tragic and epic poetry, when it comes to dithyramb he avoids naming the poetic genre against which he speaks. Plato seems to refer to the new form of dithyramb, which flourished at the end of the fifth century in Athens.[330]

In the *Laws*, the Athenian says that dithyrambs are songs celebrating the birth of

[328] Ibid. 357
[329] Peponi (2013a) 358-362.
[330] For a thorough analysis of the contexts and the various forms of the dithyramb, see Kowalzig and Wilson (2013).

Dionysus (Pl. *Laws* 700b: Διονύσου γένεσις οἶμαι, διθύραμβος λεγόμενος).[331] Here he seems to refer to a much more archaic type of dithyramb: perhaps even to form that existed only in his imagination. The third chorus of seniors in the city of the *Laws* is to give a performance in honor of Dionysus. If the passage suggests the choral execution of the dithyramb, then in the *Laws* Plato "turns the performance of the dithyramb into an essentially mimetic act."[332] The centrality ascribed to this dithyrambic performance shows that Plato's attitude towards the dithyramb has changed. Peponi argues that,

> […] the difference between what Plato chose to say and what he chose to pass over in silence is not just a matter of quantity, that is fifty mouths singing (as, for instance, in the attested fifth-century Athenian practice) instead of one reciting. It is rather a matter of quality. By performing the dithyrambic poem vocally and kinetically, the chorus is in fact turned into an active dramatic agent.[333]

In the presentation of melic poetry in the Archaic period, the dithyramb and the *kitharôidikos nomos* are treated as parallel melic genres.[334] One might wonder if there is something wrong with Plato's ideas of 'music history,' because such parallelism would, one supposes, only be typical of the post-Melanippides 'New Dithyramb.'

Plato's sharp criticism of the mixing of melic genres and of the false musical criteria of the poets may in fact delineate the principles and methods of the composers and practitioners of the New Dithyramb.[335] The performance of dithyramb by the chorus of older men is to be regulated by strict musical laws and the mimetic character of the chorus is to be balanced by embracing musical correctness instead of pleasure (Pl. *Laws* 668b: {ΑΘ} καὶ τούτοις δὴ τοῖς τὴν καλλίστην ᾠδήν τε ζητοῦσι καὶ μοῦσαν ζητητέον, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐχ ἥτις ἡδεῖα ἀλλ' ἥτις ὀρθή). Plato desires a clear and distinct melic genre and he is therefore against *poikilia* and *polyeideia*, the main characteristics of the late-Classical dithyramb.[336] The Dionysiac cult loses its highly

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[331] Some editors assumed that the identification with dithyramb and 'the birth of Dionysus' assumed was an intruded later gloss.
[332] Peponi (2013a) 359.
[333] Ibid.
[334] Nagy (1990) 87-88. The passage of the *Laws* is 700a-b.
[335] The passage 700d-e portrays the probable identity of the New Dithyramb cf. Pl. *Rep*. 397a-b that we have already seen.
[336] See LeVen (2008) on the innovations that the New Music brought to melic poetry, especially pp. 137-202 and 202-249.

ecstatic character, which was inextricably associated with the loss of self-control – although controlled wine drinking is allowed,[337] drunkenness is not – but partly keeps its private character. The Dionysiac chorus participates in convivial gatherings consisting of a small number of friends.[338] As Morrow remarks, the sympotic context, where the performance of the dithyramb will take place, serves two main purposes for the elders' soul, namely, recreation and moral education.[339]

However, Plato does not determine on the age limits of this chorus, nor its capacity to dance, nor the exact song that it will sing.[340] The Athenian's statement on the Dionysus' chorus is ambiguous. He claims that these men comprise the best and the most influential element in the city and that by singing they will accomplish the best things, since they are capable of singing the most beautiful and useful songs (Pl. *Laws* 665d: {ΑΘ} ποῦ δὴ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν τὸ ἄριστον τῆς πόλεως, ἡλικίαις τε καὶ ἅμα φρονήσεσιν πιθανώτατον ὂν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ᾆδον τὰ κάλλιστα μέγιστ' ἂν ἐξεργάζοιτο ἀγαθά; ἢ τοῦτο ἀνοήτως οὕτως ἀφήσομεν, ὃ κυριώτατον ἂν εἴη τῶν καλλίστων τε καὶ ὠφελιμωτάτων ᾠδῶν;). However, one may well raise questions regarding the sort of things they will accomplish, or the kind of songs they will perform if they are going to sing. However, the text does not supply answers to these questions.

There is no doubt that Plato tries to purify the dithyramb in the *Laws*, unlike the case in the rest of the Platonic dialogues. He purges the innovative principles of the New Dithyramb, weakens its uncontrolled or wild elements by applying strict rules, changes the purpose of the dithyrambic spectacle, and eventually places it in the highest position of the musical world he creates. He describes it as the best song and saves it for the most virtuous part of the State, namely, the chorus of older men. The reformed dithyramb is performed by a civic chorus without entirely losing its private character. Peponi explains that Plato singles out the dithyramb partly because "it was still largely practiced in Athens in the fourth century."[341] It is nevertheless striking that Plato's discussions revolve around the treatment of the dithyramb without

[337] Pl. *Laws* 666b-c.
[338] Pl. *Laws* 666c. The passage will be discussed in detail in the third chapter.
[339] The participation in a kind of *symposion* under the patronage of Dionysus serves these two purposes. Pl. *Laws* 666a-c.
[340] For the age of the members of the Dionysus' chorus, see Pl. *Laws* 664d, 665b, 666b, 670b. On the question of dancing, see Pl. *Laws* 665b: {ΚΛ} πῶς δή; λέγε: μάλα γὰρ ἄτοπος γίγνοιτ' ἂν ὥς γε ἐξαίφνης ἀκούσαντι Διονύσου πρεσβυτῶν χορός, εἰ ἄρα οἱ ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα καὶ πεντήκοντα δὲ γεγονότες ἔτη μέχρι ἑξήκοντα αὐτῷ χορεύσουσιν. || Pl. *Laws* 666d: {ΑΘ} ποίαν δὲ ἥσουσιν οἱ ἄνδρες φωνήν; ἢ μοῦσαν ἢ δῆλον ὅτι πρέπουσαν αὐτοῖς δεῖ γέ τινα;
[341] Peponi (2013a) 356.

explicitly addressing this kind of song. For example, there is no use of the terms 'dithyramb' or 'dithyrambic' in the passages of the *Laws* that concern the Dionysiac chorus.

Despite the negative treatment of dithyramb in the majority of his works, Plato reforms and accepts the genre of dithyramb in the *Laws*. On a broader scale, he seems to incorporate the changing cultural, religious, and social practices of his time in a unique way in his last dialogue. He invites us to become acquainted with the various aspects of late-classical poetic and musical culture.

II.2.3. *Encômium*

As Harvey states, "in the time of Plato there were at least two uses of this word, one literary and one rhetorical. i) In the literary sense it denoted a specific kind of composition… ii) In the same period the word was used as a term of rhetoric to denote an extended eulogy whether in prose or verse…"[342]

In the *Lysis*, the *encômium* (praise) is presented as a kind of *erotic epinikion*. As we have already seen, Hippothales has composed and performed an *encômium* for his beloved, before even conquering his heart (Pl. *Lys*. 205d: ὦ καταγέλαστε Ἱππόθαλες, πρὶν νενικηκέναι ποιεῖς τε καὶ ᾄδεις εἰς σαυτὸν ἐγκώμιον;). But the *encômium* is not suitable for the approach of the beloved.[343]

In the *Symposium*, the *encômium* denotes the praise for the god *Erôs*,[344] which is the purpose of the Agathon's party.[345] However, the generic identity of the *encômium* is not clear (Pl. *Symp*. 177a-c):

> {ΕΡ} ἄλλοις μέν τισι θεῶν ὕμνους καὶ παίωνας εἶναι ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πεποιημένους, τῷ δὲ Ἔρωτι, τηλικούτῳ ὄντι καὶ τοσούτῳ θεῷ, μηδὲ ἕνα πώποτε τοσούτων γεγονότων ποιητῶν πεποιηκέναι μηδὲν ἐγκώμιον; εἰ δὲ βούλει αὖ σκέψασθαι τοὺς χρηστοὺς σοφιστάς, Ἡρακλέους μὲν καὶ ἄλλων

[342] Harvey (1995) 163.

[343] On the Hippothales' *encômium,* see my discussion in the third chapter.

[344] Pl. *Symp*. 177b; 194d; 212c. These passages will be included in the discussion of the hymns in this chapter (II.2.5).

[345] Pl. *Symp*. 177d: {ER} … δοκεῖ γάρ μοι χρῆναι ἕκαστον ἡμῶν λόγον εἰπεῖν ἔπαινον Ἔρωτος ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ὡς ἂν δύνηται κάλλιστον […]

ἐπαίνους καταλογάδην συγγράφειν, ὥσπερ ὁ βέλτιστος Πρόδικος – καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἧττον καὶ θαυμαστόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔγωγε ἤδη τινὶ ἐνέτυχον βιβλίῳ ἀνδρὸς σοφοῦ, ἐν ᾧ ἐνῆσαν ἅλες ἔπαινον θαυμάσιον ἔχοντες πρὸς ὠφελίαν, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα συχνὰ ἴδοις ἂν ἐγκεκωμιασμένα – τὸ οὖν τοιούτων μὲν πέρι πολλὴν σπουδὴν ποιήσασθαι, ἔρωτα δὲ μηδένα πω ἀνθρώπων τετολμηκέναι εἰς ταυτηνὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ἀξίως ὑμνῆσαι· ἀλλ᾽ οὕτως ἠμέληται τοσοῦτος θεός.

{ER} Is it not a curious thing, Eryximachus, that while other gods have hymns and paeans composed in their honor by the poets, the god of Love, so ancient and so great, has had no song of praise composed for him by a single one of all the many poets that ever have been? And again, if you consider our worthy professors, and the praises they write of Hercules and others in prose, as for example, the excellent Prodicus. This indeed is not so surprising but I recollect coming across a book by somebody, in which I found a wonderful praise for the usefulness of salt, and many more such matters one could see you have praised. To think of all this bustle about such trifles, and not a single man ever essaying till this day to make a fitting hymn to Love.

In this passage the term *encômium* is a synonym of *epainos* (praise). More specifically, it seems that the *encômium* is a melic genre in verse, which is mentioned together with paean and hymn, whereas *epainos* is its prose alternative. The verb ἐγκωμιάζω (to praise) denotes the bizarre praises of the sophists. But when it comes to the composition for the god of love, Eryximachus uses the verb ὑμνέω-ῶ (ὑμνῆσαι), a verb with a musical coloring. It is in this word choice that the limits between *encômium* and hymn become blurred in the *Symposium.* The interlocutors celebrate the god of love by composing a prose *encômium* without singing or using any musical accompaniment. The word *encômium* may be used in a broader sense here; it is not a generic term, but it denotes praise and laudation in general.[346]

In the *Republic*, the *encômia* and the hymns are permitted in the fair city as non-mimetic genres. There is a clear separation of the genres per addressee: the hymns are for the gods, whereas the *encômia* for the humans. (Pl. *Rep*. 607a: ὅσον μόνον ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν).

Similarly, in the *Laws*, the Athenian establishes a close connection between the *encômium* and the hymn. What is new here is that he presents the addressees of praise:

[346] See Le Meur-Weissman (2012) 83.

gods, daemons, heroes,[347] virtuous dead men and women, those who had a noble death,[348] and the winners in athletic competitions.[349] Regarding the victorious athletes, the *encômium* seems to clearly denote an *epinikion* sung on the occasion of an athletic victory for the victorious athlete. (Pl. *Laws* 822b: ἐγκώμιά τε ποιοῦντες ᾔδομεν τὸν ἡττώμενον νενικηκότα, οὔτε ὀρθῶς ἂν οὔτ᾽ οἶμαι προσφιλῶς τοῖς δρομεῦσιν ἡμᾶς ἂν τὰ ἐγκώμια προσάπτειν ἀνθρώποις οὖσιν·). Although Plato insists on rigid, distinct categories in the *Laws*, he nevertheless suggests for the first three addressees hymns and *encômia* united with prayers. *Encômium* is thus presented as a mixed melic genre.

In addition, praise (ἐγκώμιον) and blame (ψόγος) represent two poles in the cultural, social and moral construction of Cretan city. As Morgan well puts it, "praise and blame provide the framework for life in the designer city"[350] and "in several places the language of citizen prerogatives is mapped onto that of encomium".[351]

In general, Plato accepts the genre of *encômium*, basically in the sense of hymn, under certain conditions and on certain occasions. Especially in the *Laws*, the *encômium* holds a prominent position thanks to its significant role in almost every aspect of a citizen's life – politics, poetics, ethics, athletics.

II.2.4. Paean

As with the dithyramb, we have many different forms of the paean – not all are sung, though all are in some sense 'song': its association with purification and order is surely sympathetic to Plato. But, there is no doubt that the background picture is a lot more complex that could be reconstructed from Plato's references alone.

In passage 534d-535a of the *Ion* that I briefly discussed in the first chapter,

[347] Pl. *Laws* 801e: {ΑΘ} μετά γε μὴν ταῦτα ὕμνοι θεῶν καὶ ἐγκώμια κεκοινωνημένα εὐχαῖς ᾄδοιτ᾽ ἂν ὀρθότατα, καὶ μετὰ θεοὺς ὡσαύτως περὶ δαίμονάς τε καὶ ἥρωας μετ᾽ ἐγκωμίων εὐχαὶ γίγνοιντ᾽ ἂν τούτοις πᾶσιν πρέπουσαι.

[348] Pl. *Laws* 801e-802a: τῶν πολιτῶν ὁπόσοι τέλος ἔχοιεν τοῦ βίου, κατὰ σώματα ἢ κατὰ ψυχὰς ἔργα ἐξειργασμένοι καλὰ καὶ ἐπίπονα καὶ τοῖς νόμοις εὐπειθεῖς γεγονότες, ἐγκωμίων αὐτοὺς τυγχάνειν πρέπον ἂν εἴη. […] τούς γε μὴν ἔτι ζῶντας ἐγκωμίοις τε καὶ ὕμνοις τιμᾶν οὐκ ἀσφαλές, πρὶν ἂν ἅπαντά τις τὸν βίον διαδραμὼν τέλος ἐπιστήσηται καλόν· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἡμῖν ἔστω κοινὰ ἀνδράσιν τε καὶ γυναιξὶν ἀγαθοῖς καὶ ἀγαθαῖς διαφανῶς γενομένοις.

[349] Pl. *Laws* 822b

[350] Morgan (2013) 270. On the subject of praise in sympotic contexts in order to communicate fundamental ethical values of community, see Calame (1999) 94-98.

[351] Ibid. 279.

Socrates refers to some widely known melic genres, but he gives paean a special position. The paean of Tynnichos of Chalcis, a man who composed no other song worth remembering/mentioning, so a *non-poet*, an anti-poet, if we define poetry as technical mastery of an art, is repeatedly described as 'the best song' (Pl. *Ion* 534d: πάντων μελῶν κάλλιστον, 535a: τὸ κάλλιστον μέλος) sung by everyone (Pl. *Ion* 534d: ὅν πάντες ᾄδουσι). Tynnichos is the ultimate example of the poet who cannot work without divine help.[352]

The high quality of the paean that Tynnichos produced is mentioned as an anecdote by Porphyry (Porph. *De Abst*. 18):

> Τὸν γοῦν Αἰσχύλον φασί, τῶν Δελφῶν ἀξιούντων εἰς τὸν θεὸν γράψαι παιᾶνα, εἰπεῖν ὅτι βέλτιστα Τυννίχῳ πεποίηται·
>
> It is said that Aeschylus, when his brothers asked him to write a paean for the god, he answered that Tynnichos had composed the best.

The excessive praise of Tynnichos' paean serves one of Plato's main purposes in the *Ion*, which is the denigration of the poets' ability to compose their poems without divine inspiration. As a religious song, the *paean* is also found in the *Symposium* (Pl. *Symp*. 177a: ἄλλοις μέν τισι θεῶν ὕμνους καὶ παίωνας εἶναι ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πεποιημένους).

In the *Critias*, Hermocrates encourages Critias to invoke Paean and the Muses in order to speak bravely of the courage of the Athenians, who had managed to defeat the kings of the mighty island of Atlantis (Pl. *Crit*. 108c):

> προϊέναι τε οὖν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ἀνδρείως χρή, καὶ τὸν <u>Παίωνά</u> τε καὶ τὰς μούσας ἐπικαλούμενον τοὺς παλαιοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ὄντας ἀναφαίνειν τε καὶ <u>ὑμνεῖν</u>.
>
> you must, really, let your speech drop courageously, and, invoking <u>Paean</u> and the Muses, display the and <u>celebrate with hymns</u> the excellence of your ancient citizens.[353]

Paean is another name for the god Apollo and is frequently invoked on similar

[352] Cf. the story about the medieval English monk Caedmon, who did admittedly, once the Holy Spirit taught him, compose many songs, but one famous Hymn in particular.
[353] The translation is that of Lamb (1925).

occasions. He is called upon to provide physical safety before war or danger, and is invoked afterwards in order to receive the gratitude of those whom he has helped.[354] Hermocrates calls upon Paean before the discussion on the war between the ancient Athenians and the Atlanteans in order to encourage the speaker. Critias will commemorate the past excellence of his ancestors in front of an audience, aided by the additional contribution of Mnemosyne, not through song (ὑμνεῖν) but through prose narration (ἀπαγγείλαντες) (Pl. *Crit.* 108c: καὶ πρὸς οἷς θεοῖς εἶπες τούς τε ἄλλους κλητέον καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα Μνημοσύνην. σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ μέγιστα ἡμῖν τῶν λόγων ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ θεῷ πάντ᾽ ἐστίν· μνησθέντες γὰρ ἱκανῶς καὶ ἀπαγγείλαντες τά ποτε ῥηθέντα ὑπὸ τῶν ἱερέων καὶ δεῦρο ὑπὸ Σόλωνος κομισθέντα σχεδὸν οἶδ᾽ ὅτι τῷδε τῷ θεάτρῳ δόξομεν τὰ προσήκοντα μετρίως ἀποτετελεκέναι).

In the third book of the *Laws*, the second chorus that consists of men under thirty years old will invoke Apollo *Paean* as a witness of the truth of what is said (Pl. *Laws* 664c: δεύτερος δὲ ὁ μέχρι τριάκοντα ἐτῶν, τόν τε Παιᾶνα ἐπικαλούμενος μάρτυρα τῶν λεγομένων ἀληθείας πέρι). We know from the descriptions of the choruses in the *Laws* that Apollo is the leader of this second chorus of young men.[355] We cannot be sure, however, if what Apollo's chorus sings and dances is a *paean*. At the end of the third book, the *paean* denotes the melic genre[356] that should not be mixed with that of the dithyramb.[357]

As already seen, the word *paean* denotes both the god Apollo and the song addressed to him.[358] Plato's attitude towards the genre seems to be consistently positive, probably because he regarded it as a kind of hymn.

[354] Käppel (1992) 45.
[355] Pl. *Laws* 665a: θεοὺς δὲ ἔφαμεν ἐλεοῦντας ἡμᾶς συγχορευτάς τε καὶ χορηγοὺς ἡμῖν δεδωκέναι τόν τε Ἀπόλλωνα καὶ μούσας, καὶ δὴ καὶ τρίτον ἔφαμεν, εἰ μεμνήμεθα, Διόνυσον.
[356] Pl. *Laws* 700a-c. The passage can be found on pp. 79-80. The passage can be found in Rutherford (2001) 4: "In the fifth century BC genre seems to be largely a descriptive category, reflecting actual practice, whatever that might be. Genres are not yet ideal norms; the latter idea surfaces first in the *Laws*, where Plato laments the tendency of modern poets (perhaps tragedians of the late fifth century BC) to mix different lyric genres, ignoring strict generic models which would have kept them apart."
[357] Pl. *Laws* 700d. The passage can be found on p. 80. For an example of the fusion of the genres in Philodemus' *Paean to Dionysus* composed in the fourth century B.C., see Weil (1895) 393-418.
[358] See Käppel's (1992) discussion on the generic identity of the paean in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.

II.2.5. Hymn

Furley and Bremer give the following definition to help in the understanding of Greek hymns:

> a hymn has poetic form (ποίημα), includes heroes among recipients of hymnic worship, and uses the expression eucharistia, 'thanksgiving' to denote an essential element of the worshippers' offering of song.[359]

In the *Republic*, Plato exiles all mimetic poetry from his ideal city,[360] with the exception of the hymns to the gods and of the *encômia* to the brave men (Pl. *Rep.* 607a: μόνον ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν). As the passage shows, the hymn denotes the song in honor of the gods in contrast to the *encômium,* which denotes the song for men. In the *Symposium*, the word 'hymn' is similarly used for a song dedicated to the gods (Pl. *Symp.* 177a: θεῶν ὕμνους). In passage 177a-c discussed above,[361] we saw that the generic identities of the hymns overlap with the identities of the *encômia*. In the *Phaedrus*, the word hymn denotes the song for the god *Erôs*. In this dialogue, Socrates focuses both on the form and on the content of the hymn (Pl. *Phdr.* 265b-c):

> καὶ οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅπῃ τὸ ἐρωτικὸν πάθος ἀπεικάζοντες, ἴσως μὲν ἀληθοῦς τινος ἐφαπτόμενοι, τάχα δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἄλλοσε παραφερόμενοι, κεράσαντες οὐ παντάπασιν ἀπίθανον λόγον, μυθικόν τινα ὕμνον προσεπαίσαμεν μετρίως τε καὶ εὐφήμως τὸν ἐμόν τε καὶ σὸν δεσπότην ἔρωτα, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καλῶν παίδων ἔφορον.
>
> We described the passion of love in some sort of figurative manner, expressing some truth, perhaps, and probably being led away in another direction, and after composing a somewhat plausible discourse, we sang a mythic hymn simply and piously in praise of your lord and mine, Phaedrus, *Erôs*, the guardian of beautiful boys.[362]

Mythikon tina hymnon surely characterises the entire preceding *speech*: the

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[359] Furley and Bremer I (1991) 9.
[360] Pl. *Rep.* 599a-b.
[361] The passage 177a-c has been discussed on pp. 90-1 of this chapter.
[362] The translation is that of Fowler (1925).

indefinite pronoun marks that *hymnos* is being used figuratively. Plato's clear separation of *hymnos* as a kind of sacred song seems at odds with the way the archaic/early classical poets use it as a word for any kind of song.[363] One feature that Plato and the archaic poets do share is a consistent association between *hymnos* and praise so much so that, as we shall see in the *Laws*, *hymnos* and *encômium* can be treated sometimes as synonymous.

The syntax ὕμνον προσεπαίσαμεν […] τὸν […] ἔρωτα is confusing. If προσεπαίσαμεν (προσπαίζω) is a transitive verb, a synonym for ὑμνέω-ῶ here, then the accusative ὕμνον is the internal/indirect object and the accusative ἔρωτα is the external/direct object or, perhaps, an epexegetical apposition to ὕμνον because of τινα. It seems to me that the verb προσπαίζω is an action verb, like ποιέω-ῶ, δράω-ῶ, ἐργάζομαι. In addition, I think that the noun ὕμνον cannot be attached to κεράσαντες because they are both in the accusative. If they were the objects of κεράσαντες one of them should have formed in the dative. Furthermore, I cannot overlook the fact that ὕμνον is so close to προσεπαίσαμεν, which might suggest their close association.[364] The words μυθικόν and προσεπαίσαμεν (προσπαίζω) reveal the mythical and playful[365] content of the hymn, which is for the god of Love in this instance. The adverbs μετρίως (in a moderate way) and εὐφήμως (favorably or in a pious way) describe the way the song is sung.

In the *Republic*, Plato describes the occasions on which the hymns are usually sung or should be sung. In 372b the hymns for the gods are part of everyday family feasting – the description is replete with certain sympotic elements[366] – in a licentious and ill city.[367]

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[363] See Harvey (1995) 165-168.

[364] Rowe (1988) 199 takes the ὕμνον as an internal accusative of an implied ὑμνήσαμεν, προσεπαίσαμεν as intransitive verb and the noun ἔρωτα as its direct object.
Yunis (2011) 195 takes the ὕμνον as accusative of content or internal object and ἔρωτα as the direct object. However, his translation of the passage does not agree with the syntax he proposes; he seems to attach "hymn" to κεράσαντες rather than to προσεπαίσαμεν.

[365] Yunis (2011) 195-196 argues persuasively that in this instance the verb means "to celebrate." "But since the same verb is used in the immediate vicinity with its root sense of playing as opposed to being serious (262d, 265c), that meaning is present too: the rhetorical celebration of *Erôs* carried out in the palinode is simultaneously a form of play (265c-d)."

[366] Pl. *Rep*. 372b: κατακλινέντες ἐπὶ στιβάδων ἐστρωμένων μίλακί τε καὶ μυρρίναις, εὐωχήσονται αὐτοί τε καὶ τὰ παιδία, ἐπιπίνοντες τοῦ οἴνου, ἐστεφανωμένοι καὶ ὑμνοῦντες τοὺς θεούς, ἡδέως συνόντες ἀλλήλοις […] The passage will be discussed in Chapter III.

[367] Pl. *Rep*. 372d-e: ἐπί τε κλινῶν κατακεῖσθαι οἶμαι τοὺς μέλλοντας μὴ ταλαιπωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀπὸ τραπεζῶν δειπνεῖν, καὶ ὄψα ἅπερ καὶ οἱ νῦν ἔχουσι καὶ τραγήματα. εἶεν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ·

The composition of hymns is necessary on the occasion of marriages that result from the meeting of potential brides and grooms on established feasts (Pl. *Rep*. 459e-460a):

> {ΣΩ} οὐκοῦν δὴ ἑορταί τινες νομοθετητέαι ἐν αἷς συνάξομεν τάς τε νύμφας καὶ τοὺς νυμφίους καὶ θυσίαι, καὶ ὕμνοι ποιητέοι τοῖς ἡμετέροις ποιηταῖς πρέποντες τοῖς γιγνομένοις γάμοις· […]
>
> {SO} "We shall, then, have to ordain certain festivals and sacrifices, in which we shall bring together the brides and the bridegrooms, and our poets must compose hymns suitable to the marriages that then take place. […]

In the following passage of the *Republic*, Socrates uses the term 'hymn' for a song addressed to virtuous men. The context of feast is also evident here (Pl. *Rep*. 468d):

> {ΣΩ} πεισόμεθα ἄρα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ταῦτά γε Ὁμήρῳ. καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἔν τε θυσίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις πᾶσι τοὺς ἀγαθούς, καθ᾽ ὅσον ἂν ἀγαθοὶ φαίνωνται, καὶ ὕμνοις καὶ οἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τιμήσομεν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις "ἕδραις τε καὶ κρέασιν" "ἰδὲ πλείοις δεπάεσσιν," ἵνα ἅμα τῷ τιμᾶν ἀσκῶμεν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας τε καὶ γυναῖκας.
>
> {SO} "We will then," said I, "take Homer as our guide in this at least. We, too, at sacrifices and on other like occasions, will reward the good so far as they have proved themselves good with hymns and the other privileges of which we have just spoken, and also with 'seats of honor and meat and full cups', so as to combine physical training with honor for the good, both men and women."

In the passage 700b of the *Laws,* 'hymn' is defined as εἶδος ᾠδῆς εὐχαὶ πρὸς θεούς. The term εἶδος ᾠδῆς denotes 'form' or 'genre' of song. Harvey argues that,

> So multifarious are the uses of this word throughout Greek literature (it is used of almost any kind of song) that it is at first sight surprising to find it as the name of a specific εἶδος. On the other hand, there is evidence that

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μανθάνω. οὐ πόλιν, ὡς ἔοικε, σκοποῦμεν μόνον ὅπως γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τρυφῶσαν πόλιν. … εἰ δ᾽ αὖ βούλεσθε, καὶ φλεγμαίνουσαν πόλιν θεωρήσωμεν· […]

Plato (*Rep*. 607a, *Symp*. 177a) used it in a fairly limited sense, that of a religious, as opposed to a secular song, and this enabled later writers (e.g. Ammonius περὶ διαφόρ. λέξ. p. 52 Valck) to make the distinction τὸν μὲν ὕμνον εἶναι θεὸν, τὸδ᾽ ἐγκώμιον θνητῶν.[368]

In the *Laws*, the hymns, as songs for the gods, are contrasted to *thrênoi*, which are songs addressed to men (Pl. *Laws* 700b: καὶ τούτῳ δὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ἦν ᾠδῆς ἕτερον εἶδος – θρήνους δέ τις ἂν αὐτοὺς μάλιστα ἐκάλεσεν –). They are also differentiated from the paeans and the dithyramb, the song for Dionysus (Pl. *Laws* 700b: καὶ παίωνες ἕτερον, καὶ ἄλλο, Διονύσου γένεσις οἶμαι, διθύραμβος λεγόμενος). The classification of melic poetry in passage 700b of the *Laws* starts from the definition of hymns and relies on differentiating hymns from the other melic genres.

Le Meur-Weissman suggests a different reading of this passage; instead of taking the four categories of songs as four distinct melic genres, she sees them as two contrasting pairs, hymns as opposed to *thrênoi*, and paeans as opposed to dithyrambs, considering ἕτερον as indicator of the dualism: hymns and lamentations, on the one hand, and paeans and dithyrambs, on the other. Alluding to a similar enumeration in 700d, she does not separate the first from the second and takes peans and dithyrambs as subgenres of hymns.[369] It is also worth noting, that Didymus[370] in the first century defines hymn as hyperonym, namely as a broader category (γένος) that includes other species (εἴδη). On the contrary, Proclus[371] in the fifth century AD dissociates hymns from dithyrambs.

The hymns, as songs for the gods, also appear in the seventh book of the *Laws*, where the Athenian refers again to the Egyptian cultural model.[372] He proposes a better one for the new city by sacralizing singing and dancing (Pl. *Laws* 799a-b):

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[368] Harvey (1955) 165.

[369] Le Meur-Weissman (2012) 84-85.

[370] Et. Or. 155-156, s.v. Ὕμνος: ... κεχώρισται δὲ τῶν ἐγκωμίων καὶ τῶν προσῳδιῶν, καὶ παιάνων, οὐχ ὡς κἀκείνων μὴ ὄντων ὕμνων, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς γένος ἀπὸ εἴδους. Πάντα γὰρ εἰς τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας γραφόμενα, ὕμνους ἀποφαινόμεθα· καὶ ἐπιλέγομεν τὸ εἶδος τῷ γένει, ὕμνος προσῳδιῶν, ὕμνος ἐγκωμίου, ὕμνος παιᾶνος. … οὕτω Δίδυμος ἐν τῷ περὶ Λυρικῶν ποιητῶν.

[371] Phot. *Biblioth*. 320a12-17: Ἐκάλουν δὲ καθόλου πάντα τὰ εἰς τοὺς ὑπερόντας γραφόμενα ὕμνους· διὸ καὶ τὸ προσόδιον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ προειρημένα φαίνονται ἀντιδιαστέλλοντες τῷ ὕμνῳ ὡς εἴδη πρὸς γένος· καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν αὐτῶν ἀκούειν γραφόντων ὕμνος προσοδίου, ὕμνος ἐγκωμίου, ὕμνος παιᾶνος καὶ τὰ ὅμοια […]

[372] The first time that Plato expresses his admiration of the Egyptian model is in the second book of the *Laws*, 656d-e. For a discussion of the passage, see Chapter 1. For a detailed discussion of Plato's interest in the Egyptian model, see Brisson (1987) 164-5.

> {ΑΘ} ἔχει τις οὖν ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα βελτίω τινα τέχνην τῆς τῶν Αἰγυπτίων; {ΚΛ} ποίας δὴ λέγεις; {ΑΘ} τοῦ καθιερῶσαι πᾶσαν μὲν ὄρχησιν, πάντα δὲ μέλη, τάξαντας πρῶτον μὲν τὰς ἑορτάς, συλλογισαμένους εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἅστινας ἐν οἷς χρόνοις καὶ οἷστισιν ἑκάστοις τῶν θεῶν καὶ παισὶ τούτων καὶ δαίμοσι γίγνεσθαι χρεών, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν θεῶν θύμασιν ἑκάστοις ἣν ᾠδὴν δεῖ ἐφυμνεῖσθαι, καὶ χορείαις ποίαισιν γεραίρειν τὴν τότε θυσίαν, τάξαι μὲν πρῶτόν τινας, ἃ δ᾽ ἂν ταχθῇ, Μοίραις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι θεοῖς θύσαντας κοινῇ πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, σπένδοντας καθιεροῦν ἑκάστας τὰς ᾠδὰς ἑκάστοις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἂν δὲ παρ᾽ αὐτά τίς τῳ θεῶν ἄλλους ὕμνους ἢ χορείας προσάγῃ […]
>
> {ATH} To attain this end, can any one of us suggest a better device than that of the Egyptians? {CL} What device is that? {ATH} The device of consecrating all dancing and all music. First, they should ordain the sacred feasts, by drawing up an annual list of what feasts are to be held, and on what dates, and in honor of what special gods and children of gods and daemons; and they should ordain next what song is to be sung at each of the religious sacrifices, and with what dances each such sacrifice is to be graced; these ordinances should be first made by certain persons, and then the whole body of citizens, after making a public sacrifice to the Fates and all the other deities, should consecrate with a libation these ordinances – dedicating each of the songs to their respective gods and divinities. And if any man proposes other hymns or dances besides these for any god […]

The use of the term 'hymn' is important here. Songs and dances take place on the occasion of religious feasts. After the establishment of the feasts, it must be decided what song is appropriate for each occasion. While one would expect to find 'hymn' in this statement, Plato uses the phrase ᾠδὴν ἐφυμνεῖσθαι. Ὠδὴν as the cognate object of ἐφυμνεῖσθαι is a synonym for 'hymn'. This is also confirmed a little later in the passage where the noun ὕμνους is used instead of the preceding noun ᾠδὰς. The word 'hymn' seems to have a broader meaning in this passage and, combined with *choreia,* it plays a central role in the ritual processions of Magnesia.

A little later, during the discussion on establishing musical laws, the Athenian approves the singing of the hymns to the gods along with *encômia* (Pl. *Laws* 801e: μετά γε μὴν ταῦτα ὕμνοι θεῶν καὶ ἐγκώμια κεκοινωνημένα εὐχαῖς ᾄδοιτ᾽ ἂν ὀρθότατα). But his later statement is confusing: Pl. *Laws* 802a: {ΑΘ} τούς γε μὴν ἔτι ζῶντας ἐγκωμίοις τε καὶ ὕμνοις τιμᾶν οὐκ ἀσφαλές, πρὶν ἂν ἅπαντά τις τὸν βίον διαδραμὼν τέλος ἐπιστήσηται καλόν.

It appears that the hymns are also addressed to both men and women[373] who passed away nobly. Thus, the hymns for men and women, which are not easily distinguishable from *encômia*, replace *thrênoi*.

The replacement of *thrênoi* is also attested to in the description of the priests' funerals in the twelfth book of the *Laws*. Two fifteen-member choruses, one of girls and one of boys, and dressed in white, should sing praise in the form of hymn (Pl. *Laws* 947b):

> {ΑΘ} […] λευκὴν μὲν τὴν στολὴν ἔχειν πᾶσαν, θρήνων δὲ καὶ ὀδυρμῶν χωρὶς γίγνεσθαι, κορῶν δὲ χορὸν πεντεκαίδεκα καὶ ἀρρένων ἕτερον περιισταμένους τῇ κλίνῃ ἑκατέρους οἷον <u>ὕμνον πεποιημένον ἔπαινον</u> εἰς τοὺς ἱερέας ἐν μέρει ἑκατέρους <u>ᾄδειν</u>, εὐδαιμονίζοντας <u>ᾠδῇ</u> διὰ πάσης τῆς ἡμέρας· […]
>
> {ATH} […] nothing but white raiment shall be used at it, and there shall be no dirges or lamentations; a chorus of girls and another of boys shall stand round the bier, and they shall <u>chant</u> alternately <u>a praise</u> for the priests <u>in the form of a hymn</u>, glorifying them with their <u>song</u> all the day long; […]

The praise composed for the death of virtuous men (πεποιημένον ἔπαινον) such as the priests is a hymn performed by choruses. It is described as ᾠδή and will reveal their glory. Since *thrênos* is replaced by hymn, grief is replaced by positive emotions, even on such occasions.

Although the generic identity of the hymn is ambiguous in the Platonic dialogues, Plato's attitude towards this melic genre is generally positive. Plato does not exile it from the city of the *Republic* and broadens its role in the city of the *Laws*.

II.2.6. *Kitharôidikos Nomos*

The origins of the term *nomos* are pretty well lost, but the association with 'established custom' or 'law' are certainly convenient for Plato.

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[373] Pl. *Laws* 802a: ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἡμῖν ἔστω κοινὰ ἀνδράσιν τε καὶ γυναιξὶν ἀγαθοῖς καὶ ἀγαθαῖς διαφανῶς γενομένοις […]

During the discussion in the *Laws* of the supervision of musical competitions to take place in Magnesia, Plato mentions *kitharôidia* alongside *rhapsôidia.* These are considered as solo performances (μονῳδίαν), in contrast to the choral ones (χορῳδίαν) (Pl. *Laws* 764d-e):

> {ΑΘ} ἔν τε τοῖς γυμνικοῖς καὶ περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν ἀθλοθέτας ἀθληταῖς, διττοὺς αὖ τούτους, περὶ μουσικὴν μὲν ἑτέρους, περὶ ἀγωνίαν δ᾽ ἄλλους. ἀγωνιστικῆς μὲν οὖν ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ ἵππων τοὺς αὐτούς, μουσικῆς δὲ ἑτέρους μὲν τοὺς περὶ μονῳδίαν τε καὶ μιμητικήν, οἷον ῥαψῳδῶν καὶ κιθαρῳδῶν καὶ αὐλητῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ἀθλοθέτας ἑτέρους πρέπον ἂν εἴη γίγνεσθαι, τῶν δὲ περὶ χορῳδίαν ἄλλους.
>
> {ATH} By competition-officers it means umpires for the competitors both in gymnastic and in music, these also being of two grades. For competitions there should be the same umpires both for men and for horses; but in the case of music it will be proper to have separate umpires for solos and for mimetic performances, – I mean, for instance, one set chosen for rhapsodists, harp-players and singers, flute-players, and all such musicians, and another set for choral performers.

Kitharôidia is described as a solo performance in a public context, and, more precisely, in a competition. As Power remarks, *kitharôidia* "falls in between two melic macrogenres, namely, private lyric monody and public choral song."[374]

Following Heracleides, (Pseudo-)Plutarch narrates that Plato's student, the inventor of *kitharôidia,* was the mythical figure of Amphion, son of Zeus and Antiope.[375] The archaic Lesbian poet Terpander composed *kitharôidikoi nomoi*, which he sang in competitions and gave them names to. He also composed *prooimia* in dactylic hexameter.[376] A little later (Pseudo-)Plutarch explains the meaning of the word *nomoi,* as well as the simple form and the content of the *kitharôidikoi nomoi* in Terpander's time. The Plutarchean description mirrors the description of passage 722d of the *Laws*, which will be discussed below, and in which the whole conversation is characterized as *prooimia*. (Pseudo-)Plutarch says (Plut. *De Mus.* 1133b-c):

[374] Power (2010) xii-xiii.
[375] Plut. *On Music* 1131e: Ἡρακλείδης δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Συναγωγῇ τῶν ἐν μουσικῇ τὴν κιθαρῳδίαν καὶ τὴν κιθαρῳδικὴν ποίησιν πρῶτόν φησιν Ἀμφίονα ἐπινοῆσαι τὸν Διὸς καὶ Ἀντιόπης […]
[376] Plut. *On Music* 1132c-d.

> τὸ δ᾽ ὅλον ἡ μὲν κατὰ Τέρπανδρον κιθαρῳδία καὶ μέχρι τῆς Φρύνιδος ἡλικίας παντελῶς ἁπλῆ τις οὖσα διετέλει· οὐ γὰρ ἐξῆν τὸ παλαιὸν οὕτω ποιεῖσθαι τὰς κιθαρῳδίας ὡς νῦν οὐδὲ μεταφέρειν τὰς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νόμοις ἑκάστῳ διετήρουν τὴν οἰκείαν τάσιν· διὸ καὶ ταύτην ἐπωνυμίαν εἶχον· νόμοι γὰρ προσηγορεύθησαν, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐξῆν παραβῆναι καθ᾽ ἕκαστον νενομισμένον εἶδος τῆς τάσεως. τὰ γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ὡς βούλονται ἀφοσιωσάμενοι ἐξέβαινον εὐθὺς ἐπί τε τὴν Ὁμήρου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποίησιν· δῆλον δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ διὰ τῶν Τερπάνδρου προοιμίων.

> Now the music appropriated to the cithara, such as it was in the time of Terpander, continued in all its simplicity, till Phrynis grew into esteem. For it was not the ancient custom to sing to the cithara/make songs to the kithara in the present style, or to intermix measures and rhythms. For in each nomos they were careful to observe its own proper pitch; whence came the expression nomos, because it was unlawful to alter the pitch appointed for each one. At length, falling from their devotion to the Gods, they began to sing the verses of Homer and other poets. This is manifest by the *prooimia* of Terpander.

The musical meaning of the word *'nomoi'* originates from the political meaning of the word, which comes from νενομισμένον (accustomed, established), a clearly political term. The association between *prooimia* and *nomoi* is stressed, but not explained.

For Plato the *kitharôidikos nomos* is a melic genre, which is placed at the end of the list of melic genres, as already seen (Pl. *Laws* 700b: νόμους τε αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἐκάλουν, ᾠδὴν ὥς τινα ἑτέραν· ἐπέλεγον δὲ κιθαρῳδικούς). As Power states, Plato frequently evokes the traditional order of *proomion-nomos* in order to develop his political views.[377] This is especially obvious in the *Laws*, where he plays with the double meaning of *nomos*. In the fourth book of the *Laws* the Athenian realizes that their discussion of the political *nomoi* of the Cretan city has the form of a *kitharôidikos nomos* because it consists of a *prooimion*[378] and the main part of the

[377] See Power's (2010) 189 discussion on the metaphorical use of *prooimion* and *nomos* in Plato's *Timaeus*.

[378] Maslov (2012) 191-205 discusses the genre of *prooimion* and based on the occurences of the term in Pindar and Attic sources he concludes that "προοίμιον originally referred to a

song (Pl. *Laws* 722d-e):

> {ΑΘ} νόμους δὲ ἄρτι μοι δοκοῦμεν λέγειν ἄρχεσθαι, τὰ δ᾽ ἔμπροσθεν ἦν πάντα ἡμῖν προοίμια νόμων. τί δὲ ταῦτ᾽ εἴρηκα; τόδε εἰπεῖν βουληθείς, ὅτι λόγων πάντων καὶ ὅσων φωνὴ κεκοινώνηκεν προοίμιά τέ ἐστιν καὶ σχεδὸν οἷόν τινες ἀνακινήσεις, ἔχουσαί τινα ἔντεχνον ἐπιχείρησιν χρήσιμον πρὸς τὸ μέλλον περαίνεσθαι. καὶ δή που κιθαρῳδικῆς ᾠδῆς λεγομένων νόμων καὶ πάσης μούσης προοίμια θαυμαστῶς ἐσπουδασμένα πρόκειται· τῶν δὲ ὄντως νόμων ὄντων, οὓς δὴ πολιτικοὺς εἶναί φαμεν, οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτ᾽ εἶπέ τι προοίμιον οὔτε συνθέτης γενόμενος ἐξήνεγκεν εἰς τὸ φῶς, ὡς οὐκ ὄντος φύσει. ἡμῖν δὲ ἡ νῦν διατριβὴ γεγονυῖα, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, σημαίνει ὡς ὄντος, οἵ τέ γε δὴ διπλοῖ ἔδοξαν νυνδή μοι λεχθέντες νόμοι οὐκ εἶναι ἁπλῶς οὕτω πως διπλοῖ, ἀλλὰ δύο μέν τινε, νόμος τε καὶ προοίμιον τοῦ νόμου· […]
>
> {ATH} yet it is only recently that we have begun, as it seems, to utter laws, and what went before was all simply preludes to laws. What is my object in saying this? It is to explain that all utterances and vocal expressions have preludes and tunings-up (as one might call them), which provide a kind of artistic preparation which assists towards the further development of the subject. Indeed, we have examples before us of preludes, admirably elaborated, in those prefixed to that type of harp-song called the "nomos," and to musical compositions of every description. But for the "nomoi" which are real nomoi – and which we designate "political" – no one has ever yet uttered a prelude, or composed or published one, just as though there were no such thing. But our present conversation proves, in my opinion, that there is such a thing; and it struck me just now that the laws we were then stating are something more than simply double, and consist of these two things combined – law, and prelude to law […].

The Athenian imagines the conversation between himself and his interlocutors as being until this point a *prooimion* that is prefixed to a political law (*nomos*). He announces that it is something that nobody has ever done before. The use of *prooimion* in reference to a beginning becomes common in the early 5th century, for example in Pindar; also, Thucydides uses the word to refer to the so-called 'Homeric Hymns.'

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primary speech genre of opening prayer or invocation" (5). See the discussion in Chapter III.3.2 (esp. pp 209-223) and Chapter IV.1.1 (pp 230-231).

The structure of the discussion follows the structure of the *kitharôidikos nomos*, and the Athenian therefore tacitly presents himself as a citharoedic poet who gives a solo performance. After this statement, he suggests that they should proceed with the real *nomoi* of the state (Pl. *Laws* 734e: καὶ τὸ μὲν προοίμιον τῶν νόμων ἐνταυθοῖ λεχθὲν τῶν λόγων τέλος ἐχέτω, μετὰ δὲ τὸ προοίμιον ἀναγκαῖόν που νόμον ἕπεσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ τό γε ἀληθὲς νόμους πολιτείας ὑπογράφειν). In the seventh book, he again puns on the word *nomos,* stating that the *kitharôidia* must become (political) *nomos* (Pl. *Laws* 799e: δεδόχθω μὲν δή, φαμέν, τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, νόμους τὰς ᾠδὰς ἡμῖν γεγονέναι, καὶ καθάπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ τότε περὶ κιθαρῳδίαν οὕτω πως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὠνόμασαν).

The structural affinities between the *kitharôidikoi*, the political *nomoi*, and the philosophical dialogue of the *Laws* presented in the Athenian's statement, together with the recurring play on the double meaning of *nomos,* shows how playful and intriguing Platonic thought is. The musical *nomos* undoubtedly serves the political orientation of the *Laws*. The musical city must be framed by strict legislation in order to fulfill its cultural, religious, and eventually moral purpose. In the initially theoretical discussion of the first three books of the *Laws* – Clinias announces the foundation of the Cretan colony at the end of the third book[379]– the Athenian vividly describes the various activities of song and dance of the citizens in the context of abroader discussion of the appropriate musical training that leads to virtue. However, all these descriptions are just *prooimia*. The brief discussion of *kitharôidikos nomos* facilitates the shift of attention to politics and, hence, to the real *nomos*.

Conclusions

The first general conclusion that can be drawn from the examination of Plato's explicit reference to poetry is that his attitude in the *Laws* towards every kind of poetry – epic, dramatic, and melic poetry – is less intense and severe than in the other Platonic dialogues.

In the brief discussion of epic poetry and, particularly, of Homeric poetry in the

[379] Pl. *Laws* 702c-d.

Platonic works, one can easily see that Plato's explicit references to Homer are not always consistent. Even in the *Laws*, the Homeric poetry is displaced.

Plato's comments on drama are consistently negative throughout his dialogues. In the *Laws*, however, drama is not severely criticized, but is rather marginalized.

Regarding melic poetry, the generic identity of the melic genres that Plato discusses is not always clear. In addition, his criticism is restricted to certain melic genres, such as the genre of *thrênos* and that of dithyramb, particularly the New Dithyramb. These are condemned in the *Republic* but accepted in the *Laws* provided that certain conditions are fulfilled. By contrast, Plato generally praises the genres of *encômia*, hymns, and *kitharōidikos nomos*. Plato approves the majority of melic genres in the new city, especially in the *Laws*, where strict regulations and rules are used as a safety valve. It seems, then, that there is room for *melos*.

CHAPTER III

The tacit displacement of *melos*

> *Socrates autem primus philosophiam devocavit e caelo et in urbibus conlocavit et in domus etiam introduxit et coëgit de vita et moribus rebusquebonis et malis quaerere.*
> *[Cic.Tusc.5.10]*

Introduction

Of all the Platonic works (28 authentic, 7 dubia,[380] 10 spuria[381]) only 15 include descriptions of indications of the spaces, where the philosophical discussions take place. Plato sets his dialogues in private houses located in Athens or outside the city walls (*Symposium, Protagoras, Republic, Parmenides, Timaeus*[382]), in *gymnasia* and *palaistrai* (*Lysis, Charmides, Euthydemus, Laches*), in the countryside (*Phaedrus*,

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[380] *Alcibiades I, Lovers, Theages, Mino, Epinomis, Letters, Epigrams*. Regarding the *Clitophon*, Irwin believes that it might be an introduction to the *Republic* (Irwin 2008: 79).

[381] *Alcibiades II, Hipparchus, Definitions, On justice, On virtue, Demodocus, Sissyphus, Eryxias, Axiochus, Halcyon.*

[382] The topographical references in Plato's Timaeus are undoubtedly ambiguous. Pl. *Tim*. 17a-b: {ΣΩ} εἷς, δύο, τρεῖς· ὁ δὲ δὴ τέταρτος ἡμῖν, ὦ φίλε Τίμαιε, ποῦ τῶν χθὲς μὲν δαιτυμόνων, τὰ νῦν δὲ ἑστιατόρων; {ΤΙ} ἀσθένειά τις αὐτῷ συνέπεσεν, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἑκὼν τῆσδε ἀπελείπετο τῆς συνουσίας. {ΣΩ} οὐκοῦν σὸν τῶνδέ τε ἔργον καὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀπόντος ἀναπληροῦν μέρος; {ΤΙ} πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ κατὰ δύναμίν γε οὐδὲν ἐλλείψομεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν εἴη δίκαιον, χθὲς ὑπὸ σοῦ ξενισθέντας οἷς ἦν πρέπον ξενίοις, μὴ οὐ προθύμως σὲ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἡμῶν ἀνταφεστιᾶν.
Tecusan (1990) 243 based on the diction (δαιτυμόνων, ἑστιατόρων, συνουσίας) and on the fact that Socrates dressed up for the occasion (as he says later in 20c: κεκοσμημένος), believes that this is a "real symposion." But first of all, Plato does not actually use the word *symposium* and secondly, Socrates himself characterizes this social gathering as a feast, an entertainment of words a few lines later (20c: αὐτοὺς εἰς νῦν ἀνταποδώσειν μοι τὰ τῶν λόγων ξένια, πάρειμί τε οὖν δὴ κεκοσμημένος ἐπ' αὐτὰ καὶ πάντων ἑτοιμότατος ὢν δέχεσθαι.). Therefore, I agree with Kalfas (1995) 335 n.2 ad loc., who argues that Socrates is speaking metaphorically here. Hence, we cannot be sure about the specific place of the dialogue.

Laws), in the *agora* (*Euthyphro*), in the court of law (*Apology*) and in the prison (*Crito*, *Phaedo*).

I will not discuss all the dramatic settings included in the above list. Instead, I will focus only on the works that include extended descriptions of the places, into which philosophy, as we shall see, unexpectedly intrudes. Thus, the *Euthyphro*, the *Apology*, the *Crito* and the *Phaedo* are excluded from my discussion. It is true that in the *Phaedo* the reference to *prooimion* might raise plausible questions on its exclusion from the current analysis. The case of the *Phaedo*, however, is quite the reverse: the song is here the 'intruder.' Therefore, this dialogue will be discussed in the fourth chapter of my thesis.

In my discussion I have included the spurious dialogue *Axiochus*, since it is the only inauthentic Platonic dialogue that contains a detailed description of the setting. Hence, the reception of Plato by a writer who has been influenced by him can be proven extremely helpful for the better understanding of the use of philosophy, its nature and its association with song and dance in Plato's original dialogues.

The places that I will discuss are intended for dining and discussion (private houses), for physical training (*gymnasia* and *palaistrai*) or for walking (sacred countryside places). In my analysis, I will attempt to understand where *melos* and philosophy stand in these contexts, if and how the one undermines or overshadows the other.

The first group of works in my arrangement consists of three dialogues: the *Symposium* (III.1.1.), the *Protagoras* (III.1.2), and the *Republic* (III.1.3). Although the private residences, where these dialogues take place make us think of a *sympotic* context, each case is different and unique and therefore I examine it independently. The second group of works includes the *Lysis* (III.2.1.) and the *Charmides* (III.2.2.) that are set in *palaistrai* as well as the *Euthydemus* (III.2.3.), which takes place in the *Lyceum*.[383] It is important to see how Plato uses these places, which were traditionally meant for physical training. However, by the middle of the 5th century the courses offered in the *palaistra* might have included dance as a physical exercise, possibly with musical accompaniment.[384] Indeed, sixth- and fifth century vases depict *auletes* accompanying practitioners of long jump, javeling throw, discus throw and

[383] There are also two more dialogues (the *Laches* and the *Gorgias*), where Plato does not specify the setting.
[384] Dynneson (2008) 98.

sometimes boxing and thus showing the clear association of *aulos* with these physical activities.[385] The architectural changes of the *palaistrai* in this time may be well justified by the broadening of their activities beyond athletics.[386] The *Phaedrus* (III.3.1.) and the *Laws* (III.3.2.) that constitute the third group in my taxonomy differ from all the other Platonic dialogues regarding the *locus* of discussion. The place that the *Phaedrus* is set, is an erotic sacred place, a locus amoenus, located near the river of Ilissos outside Athens. Similarly, the philosophical discussion in the *Laws* is also considered as taking place in a similar locus amoenus; in the beautiful Cretan countryside not very far from the cave of Zeus.

III.1. Private residences

III.1.1. *Symposium*. The *symposium* at Agathon's house

The dialogue represents a *symposium* given by the poet Agathon at his house in order to celebrate his first victory in a dramatic competition. So Agathon's party is a kind of victory celebration. The main subject of the discussion is *Erôs/erôs*. Plato sets up many layers between the original banquet and his written narrative.[387] The first narrators, Glaucon and Apollodorus, inform us already from the beginning about the place and the subject of the meeting. We should, however, pay attention to the distinction nature of the party. The diction is helpful (Pl. *Symp*. 172a-b):

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[385] Bundrick (2005) 74-80. According to Bundrick this association can be explained by the significance of rhythm for the physical exercise. Apart from the images of vases included in her discussion she also cites the descriptions of Philostratos (On Gymnastics 31, 15) and Pausanias (5.7.10) to highlight the important role of auletes in physical training. For the architecture of palaistrai and gymnasia see Winter (2006) who provides an extensive discussion and rich bibliographical references on the architecture of *palaistra* in archaic and classical time.

[386] KlPauly s.v. (von Gladiß).

[387] For the layers of the narration of the discussion during Agathon's gathering see Hunter (2004) 23 (figure I). Aristodemus, who was present, reported the conversation that took place in Agathon's house to Apollodorus and Phoinix. Phoinix told it to an unnamed person, whereas Apollodorus asked Socrates for certain details. The unnamed person told it to Glaucon, but he has given him an obscure version of the discussion. Thus, Glaucon asks Apollodorus to give him a reliable account of the conversation back then. Apollodorus recites to an unnamed friend his narration to Glaucon during their walk from Faliro to Athens. (Five layers in total: Four layers for the oral transmission and one for the written format of the story). For the dramatic time of Agathon's gathering and the time of the narration see Hunter (2004) 2-3.

> 'Ἀπολλόδωρε,' ἔφη, 'καὶ μὴν καὶ ἔναγχός σε ἐζήτουν βουλόμενος διαπυθέσθαι τὴν Ἀγάθωνος συνουσίαν καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τότε ἐν τῷ συνδείπνῳ παραγενομένων, περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων τίνες ἦσαν· ἄλλος γάρ τίς μοι διηγεῖτο ἀκηκοὼς Φοίνικος τοῦ Φιλίππου, ἔφη δὲ καὶ σὲ εἰδέναι. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν εἶχε σαφὲς λέγειν. σὺ οὖν μοι διήγησαι· δικαιότατος γὰρ εἶ τοὺς τοῦ ἑταίρου λόγους ἀπαγγέλλειν. πρότερον δέ μοι,' ἦ δ' ὅς, 'εἰπέ, σὺ αὐτὸς παρεγένου τῇ συνουσίᾳ ταύτῃ ἢ οὔ;'

> "Apollodorus," he said, "do you know, I have just been looking for you, as I want to hear all about the meeting that brought together Agathon and Socrates and Alcibiades and the rest of that party, and what were the speeches they delivered upon love. For somebody else was relating to me the account he had from Phoenix, son of Philip, and he mentioned that you knew it too. But he could not tell it at all clearly so you must give me the whole story, for you are the most proper reporter of your dear friend's discourses. But first tell me this," he went on; "were you at that meeting yourself, or not?"

Glaucon wants to know the time of the party and the source of information on it (Pl. *Symp*. 173a: 'ἀλλ' εἰπέ μοι πότε ἐγένετο ἡ συνουσία αὕτη.' […] τίς σοι διηγεῖτο; ἢ αὐτὸς Σωκράτης;'). Apollodorus answers that the *synousia* took place one day after Agathon's victory in the dramatic competition and that he heard the story from Aristodemus, who was present at that meeting (Pl. *Symp*. 173b):

> 'οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία,' ἦν δ' ἐγώ, 'ἀλλ' ὅσπερ Φοίνικι. Ἀριστόδημος ἦν τις, Κυδαθηναιεύς, σμικρός, ἀνυπόδητος ἀεί· παρεγεγόνει δ' ἐν τῇ συνουσίᾳ, Σωκράτους ἐραστὴς ὢν ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα τῶν τότε, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ.

> "It was the person", said I, "who told Phoenix – Aristodemus of Cydathenaeum, a little man, who went always barefoot. He was at the meeting there, being one of the chief among Socrates' lovers at that time, I believe."

The gathering at Agathon's house is not yet referred to as a *symposium*, as one would expect, but as a society, a 'party' or a common meal (συνουσία),[388] and as a

[388] LSJ s.v.

'banquet' (σύνδειπνον).[389] One wonders if it will be a *symposium* as the title of the dialogue suggests. If so, there are high expectations for a performance of *melos*.

According to Apollodorus, Aristodemus[390] meets accidentally Socrates and proposes that he accompany him to Agathon's gathering. Again, one must pay attention to the vocabulary; the use of three synonyms δεῖπνον, δαίς, θοίνη make us definitely think of a banquet (Pl. *Symp*. 174a-174c):

> καὶ τὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐπὶ δεῖπνον εἰς Ἀγάθωνος. χθὲς γὰρ αὐτὸν διέφυγον τοῖς ἐπινικίοις, φοβηθεὶς τὸν ὄχλον· ὡμολόγησα δ᾽ εἰς τήμερον παρέσεσθαι. ταῦτα δὴ ἐκαλλωπισάμην, ἵνα καλὸς παρὰ καλὸν ἴω. ἀλλὰ σύ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἐθέλειν ἂν ἰέναι ἄκλητος ἐπὶ δεῖπνον; κἀγώ, ἔφη, εἶπον ὅτι οὕτως ὅπως ἂν σὺ κελεύῃς. ἕπου τοίνυν, ἔφη, ἵνα καὶ τὴν παροιμίαν διαφθείρωμεν μεταβαλόντες, ὡς ἄρα καὶ "Ἀγάθων᾽ ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν αὐτόματοι ἀγαθοί". Ὅμηρος μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύει οὐ μόνον διαφθεῖραι ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑβρίσαι εἰς ταύτην τὴν παροιμίαν· ποιήσας γὰρ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα διαφερόντως ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα τὰ πολεμικά, τὸν δὲ Μενέλεων "μαλθακὸν αἰχμητήν" θυσίαν ποιουμένου καὶ ἑστιῶντος τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἄκλητον ἐποίησεν ἐλθόντα τὸν Μενέλεων ἐπὶ τὴν θοίνην, χείρω ὄντα ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀμείνονος. ταῦτ᾽ ἀκούσας εἰπεῖν ἔφη ἴσως μέντοι κινδυνεύσω καὶ ἐγὼ οὐχ ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ Ὅμηρον φαῦλος ὢν ἐπὶ σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἰέναι θοίνην ἄκλητος.

> "To dinner at Agathon's," he answered. "I evaded him and his celebrations yesterday, fearing the crowd; but I agreed to be present today. So I got myself up in this handsome style in order to be a match for my handsome host. Now tell me," said he, "do you feel in the mood for going unasked to dinner?" "For anything," he said he replied, "that you may bid me do." "Come along then," he said; "let us corrupt the proverb with a new version: What if they go of their own accord, the good men to our good man's banquet? Though indeed Homer may be said to have not merely corrupted the adage, but debauched it: for after setting forth Agamemnon as a man eminently good at warfare, and Menelaus as only "a spearman spiritless," he makes the latter come unbidden to the meal of the former, who was offering sacrifice and holding a feast; so the worse man was the guest of the better." To this my friend's answer, as he told me, was: "I

[389] LSJ s.v.
[390] The first source of information for Agathon's banquet.

> am afraid mine, most likely, is a case that fits not your version, Socrates, but Homer's – a dolt coming unbidden to the meal of a scholar".

While Glaucon and Apollodorus name Agathon's gathering a social intercourse (συνουσία), Socrates insists on calling it a 'dinner-party' (δεῖπνον) and alludes to the Homeric 'banquet' (δαις)[391] and 'meal or feast' (θοίνη),[392] and Aristodemus uses the word 'meal' (θοίνη) to characterize the party. The nouns selected by Plato clearly define the gathering already from the beginning as a dinner-party and not as a drinking one. Although the imagery is sympotic it is not (yet) called a *symposium*.

The playful scene of Socrates' arrival at Agathon's house echoes the humoristic scene of his arrival at Callias' house in the *Protagoras*[393] (Pl. *Symp*. 174d-175a):

> ἐπειδὴ δὲ γενέσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ οἰκίᾳ τῇ Ἀγάθωνος, ἀνεῳγμένην καταλαμβάνειν τὴν θύραν, καί τι ἔφη αὐτόθι γελοῖον παθεῖν. οἷ μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς παῖδά τινα τῶν ἔνδοθεν ἀπαντήσαντα ἄγειν οὗ κατέκειντο οἱ ἄλλοι, καὶ καταλαμβάνειν ἤδη μέλλοντας δειπνεῖν· εὐθὺς δ' οὖν ὡς ἰδεῖν τὸν Ἀγάθωνα, ὦ, φάναι, Ἀριστόδημε, εἰς καλὸν ἥκεις ὅπως συνδειπνήσῃς […] σὺ δ', ἦ δ' ὅς, Ἀριστόδημε, παρ' Ἐρυξίμαχον κατακλίνου. καὶ ἓ μὲν ἔφη ἀπονίζειν τὸν παῖδα ἵνα κατακέοιτο· ἄλλον δέ τινα τῶν παίδων ἥκειν ἀγγέλλοντα ὅτι 'Σωκράτης οὗτος ἀναχωρήσας ἐν τῷ τῶν γειτόνων προθύρῳ ἕστηκεν, κἀμοῦ καλοῦντος οὐκ ἐθέλει εἰσιέναι.'
>
> So he came to Agathon's house, and found the door open; where he found himself in a rather ridiculous position. For he was met immediately by a servant from within, who took him where the company was reclining, and he found them just about to dine. However, as soon as Agathon saw him "Ha, Aristodemus," he cried, "right welcome to dine with us! […] You, Aristodemus, recline by Eryximachus." So the attendant washed him and made him ready for reclining, when another of the servants came in with the news that our good Socrates hadretreated into their neighbors' porch; there he was standing, and when bidden to come in, he refused.

Plato does not describe Agathon's house in detail. The only information that he gives us pertains to the open door that Aristodemus observes at the moment of his

[391] LSJ s.v.
[392] LSJ s.v.
[393] Pl. *Prot*. 314c-e.

arrival. The ‘sympotic’ code is completely followed by him, although the *symposium* has not started yet. The servant leads the guest into the dining room, where the host welcomes him and shows him his seat. The sympotic overtones are clear (κατακλίνου, κατακέοιτο, with the meaning ‘to lie down, to recline’). The attendant washes his feet so that he can lie down and dine. Meanwhile, Socrates is standing ‘at the doorway of the neighbor’s house’ (ἐν τῷ τῶν γειτόνων προθύρῳ). Instead of paying tribute to the winner with a song,[394] Socrates is possibly lost in his philosophical thoughts.

It is widely known that the first part of the banquet is ‘dining’ (ἑστιᾶτε). After completing his thoughts, Socrates enters Agathon’s house ‘in the middle of the dinner’ (μεσοῦν δειπνοῦντας) (Pl. *Symp*. 175b-c):

> ἀλλ᾽ ἡμᾶς, ὦ παῖδες, τοὺς ἄλλους ἑστιᾶτε. […] μετὰ ταῦτα ἔφη σφᾶς μὲν δειπνεῖν, τὸν δὲ Σωκράτη οὐκ εἰσιέναι. τὸν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα πολλάκις κελεύειν μεταπέμψασθαι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἓ δὲ οὐκ ἐᾶν. ἥκειν οὖν αὐτὸν οὐ πολὺν χρόνον ὡς εἰώθει διατρίψαντα, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα σφᾶς μεσοῦν δειπνοῦντας.

> “Come, boys,” he called to the servants, “serve the feast for the rest of us”. […] Thereupon, he said, they all began dinner, but Socrates did not arrive; and though Agathon ever and anon gave orders that they should go and fetch him, my friend would not allow it. When he did come, it was after what, for him, was no great delay, as they were only about halfway through dinner.

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[394] Cf. Pindar’s *Isthmian* 8, where at the beginning of his song one of the young celebrants is told to go before Telesarchos’ house and begin the revel for his son’s victories (vv. 1-5):

> Κλεάνδρῳ τις ἁλικίᾳ τε λύτρον
> εὔδοξον, ὦ νέοι, καμάτων
> πατρὸς ἀγλαὸν Τελεσάρχου παρὰ πρόθυρον ἰὼν ἀνεγειρέτω
> κῶμον, Ἰσθμιάδος τε νίκας ἄποινα, καὶ Νεμέᾳ
> ἀέθλων ὅτι κράτος ἐξεῦρε.

Similarly, Bacchylides’ 6th victory ode for Lachon of Ceos, is sung before his father’s house, Aristomenes (vv. 10-15):

> Οὐρανίας ὕμνος ἕκατι νίκ[ας
> Ἀριστομένειον
> ὦ ποδάνεμον τέκος,
> γεραίρει προδόμοις ἀοι-
> δαῖς, ὅτι στάδιον κρατή-
> σας Κέον εὐκλέϊξας.

It is plausible to raise the question about the time that the 'drinking' part (πότος) is going to start. The avoidance of the term *symposium* so far is certainly not accidental. By focusing only on the first part, namely on the meal, Plato prepares the setting for the second part. After Socrates has reclined and has finished his meal the transition from the first to the second stage is achieved through libations and hymns to the god *Erôs* (Pl. *Symp*. 176a):

> κατακλινέντος τοῦ Σωκράτους καὶ δειπνήσαντος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, σπονδάς τε σφᾶς ποιήσασθαι, καὶ ᾄσαντας τὸν θεὸν καὶ τἆλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα, τρέπεσθαι πρὸς τὸν πότον
>
> After this, it seems, when Socrates had reclined and had dined with the rest, they made libation and sang a chant to the god and so forth, as custom bids, till they betook them to drinking.

The description of the customs that take place after meal is remarkably short. Plato wants to proceed quickly to the main part of the dialogue without insisting on details that would place his '*symposium'* in the standard sympotic tradition. Therefore, immediately afterwards, he establishes some restrictions as regards the fundamental entertaining elements of a *symposium*, namely wine and music (Pl. *Symp*. 176e):

> ταῦτα δὴ ἀκούσαντας συγχωρεῖν πάντας μὴ διὰ μέθης ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι συνουσίαν, ἀλλ᾽ οὕτω πίνοντας πρὸς ἡδονήν. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν, φάναι τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον, τοῦτο μὲν δέδοκται, πίνειν ὅσον ἂν ἕκαστος βούληται, ἐπάναγκες δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰσηγοῦμαι τὴν μὲν ἄρτι εἰσελθοῦσαν αὐλητρίδα χαίρειν ἐᾶν, αὐλοῦσαν ἑαυτῇ ἢ ἂν βούληται ταῖς γυναιξὶ ταῖς ἔνδον, ἡμᾶς δὲ διὰ λόγων ἀλλήλοις συνεῖναι τὸ τήμερον […]
>
> Then all of them, on hearing this, consented not to make their present meeting a tipsy affair, but to drink just as it might serve their pleasure. "Since it has been resolved, then," said Eryximachus, "that we are to drink only so much as each desires, with no constraint on any, I next propose that the flute-girl who came in just now be dismissed: let her pipe to herself or, if she likes, to the women-folk

> within, but let us seek our entertainment today in conversation. I am ready, if you so desire, to suggest what sort of discussion it should be." […]

Wine is permitted – only for pleasure – but drunkenness is forbidden in the present 'social interaction' (συνουσίαν). The flute-girl, who is present at the moment, is driven away from the room. The participants agree to amuse themselves through conversation. Thus, are we allowed to consider it a traditional *symposium*? Clearly the negotiations show that this is a special kind of *symposium*, one that departs in some way from normal practice (less drinking/speeches), but which in a way 'reverts to form' with the arrival of Alcibiades' drunken *komos*, as we shall see. There is a sense in which prose 'symposium literature' creates a different kind of symposium from the one marked out in the songs.

At this point, it is useful to recall a poem from Xenophanes of Colophonon the organization of a banquet. It seems that the banquet described in the following elegy, which is cited and preserved by Athenaeus in his *Deipnosophistae* (11.7), is a wonderful example of a *symposium* in a traditional setting that, however, includes innovative ideas on the content of the speeches (Ath. *Deipn*. 11.7):

> νῦν γὰρ δὴ ζάπεδον καθαρὸν καὶ χεῖρες ἁπάντων
> καὶ κύλικες· πλεκτοὺς δ᾽ ἀμφιτιθεῖ στεφάνους,
> ἄλλος δ᾽ εὐῶδες μύρον ἐν φιάλῃ παρατείνει·
> κρατὴρ δ᾽ ἕστηκεν μεστὸς ἐυφροσύνης·
> ἄλλος δ᾽ οἶνος ἕτοιμος, ὃς οὔποτέ φησι προδώσειν,
> μείλιχος ἐν κεράμοις, ἄνθεος ὀσδόμενος·
> ἐν δὲ μέσοις ἁγνὴν ὀδμὴν λιβανωτὸς ἵησι·
> ψυχρὸν δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὕδωρ καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ καθαρόν.
> πάρκεινται δ᾽ ἄρτοι ξανθοὶ γεραρή τε τράπεζα
> τυροῦ καὶ μέλιτος πίονος ἀχθομένη·
> βωμὸς δ᾽ ἄνθεσιν ἀν τὸ μέσον πάντῃ πεπύκασται,
> μολπὴ δ᾽ ἀμφὶς ἔχει δώματα καὶ θαλίη.
> χρὴ δὲ πρῶτον μὲν θεὸν ὑμνεῖν εὔφρονας ἄνδρας
> εὐφήμοις μύθοις καὶ καθαροῖσι λόγοις·
> σπείσαντας δὲ καὶ εὐξαμένους τὰ δίκαια δύνασθαι
> πρήσσειν 'ταῦτα γὰρ ὦν ἐστι προχειρότερον'
> οὐχ ὕβρις πίνειν ὁπόσον κεν ἔχων ἀφίκοιο

οἴκαδ᾽ ἄνευ προπόλου, μὴ πάνυ γηραλέος.
ἀνδρῶν δ᾽ αἰνεῖν τοῦτον ὃς ἐσθλὰ πιὼν ἀναφαίνῃ,
ὡς οἱ μνημοσύνη, καὶ τὸν ὃς ἀμφ᾽ ἀρετῆς.
οὔτι μάχας διέπειν Τιτήνων οὐδὲ Γιγάντων
οὐδέ <τι> Κενταύρων, πλάσματα τῶν προτέρων,
ἢ στάσιας σφεδανάς, τοῖς οὐδὲν χρηστὸν ἔνεστι,
θεῶν <δὲ> προμηθείην αἰὲν ἔχειν ἀγαθόν.

For now the floor and all men's hands are clean,
And all the cups, and since the feasters' brows
Are wreathed with garlands, while the slaves around
Bring fragrant perfume in well-suited dishes;
And in the middle stands the joyful bowl.
And wine's at hand, which ne'er deserts the guests
Who know its worth, in earthen jars well kept,
Well flavoured, fragrant with the sweet fresh flowers;
And in the midst the frankincense sends forth
Its holy perfume; and the water's cold,
And sweet, and pure; and golden bread's at hand,
And duly honoured tables, groaning under
Their weight of cheese and honey; – then an altar,
Placed in the centre, all with flowers is crowned.
And song and feasting occupies the house,
And dancing, and all sorts of revelry: –
Therefore it does become right-minded men
First with well-omened words and pious prayers
To hymn the praises of the Gods; and so,
With pure libations and well-ordered vows,
To win from them the power to act with justice-
For this comes from the favor of the Gods;
And you may drink as much as shall not hinder
You from returning home without assistance,
Unless, indeed, you're very old: and he
Deserves to be above his fellows lauded
Who drinks and then says good and witty things,
Such as his memory and taste suggests, –
Who lays down rules, and tells fine tales of virtue;

Not raking up the old Titanic fables,
Wars of the Giants, or the Lapithæ,
Figments of ancient times, mere pleasing trifles,
Full of no solid good; but always speaking
Things that may lead to right ideas of God.[395]

The external setting and the conventional sympotic order is absolutely respected in Xenophanes' poem: clean atmosphere, hands and cups, garlands round the heads of the symposiasts, fragrants of flowers, cool water, bread, cheese, honey, altar, song and dance, hymns to the gods and libations, wine drinking and story-telling.

Comparing Plato's treatment of the sympotic atmosphere with Xenophanes' poem, one can observe that Plato has kept the libations and the prayers to the gods – procedures that he only briefly mentions. Yet he passes quickly, after having excluded song and dance but, surprisingly, not wine drinking, to the story-telling, which he considers as the real entertainment. Plato does not place emphasis on the conventional stages of the procedure, but on what should be said.

The purpose of the *symposium* is to compose an *encômium* in favour of *Erôs*,[396] because no one has ever written a laudatory ode in verses or in prose dedicated to him before. Each participant will deliver his speech from the left to the right side, as the sympotic code imposes. Phaedrus will deliver the first speech, and, therefore, he is regarded as 'the father of the *logos*' (πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου) (Pl. *Symp*. 177a-d):

> […] οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος, ἀλλὰ Φαίδρου τοῦδε, ὃν μέλλω λέγειν. Φαῖδρος γὰρ ἑκάστοτε πρός με ἀγανακτῶν λέγει οὐ δεινόν, φησίν, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, ἄλλοις μέν τισι θεῶν ὕμνους καὶ παίωνας εἶναι ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πεποιημένους, τῷ δὲ Ἔρωτι, τηλικούτῳ ὄντι καὶ τοσούτῳ θεῷ, μηδὲ ἕνα πώποτε τοσούτων γεγονότων ποιητῶν πεποιηκέναι μηδὲν ἐγκώμιον; […] ἔρωτα δὲ μηδένα πω ἀνθρώπων τετολμηκέναι εἰς ταυτηνὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ἀξίως ὑμνῆσαι· ἀλλ᾽ οὕτως ἠμέληται τοσοῦτος θεός. ταῦτα δή μοι δοκεῖ εὖ λέγειν Φαῖδρος. ἐγὼ οὖν ἐπιθυμῶ ἅμα μὲν τούτῳ ἔρανον εἰσενεγκεῖν καὶ χαρίσασθαι, ἅμα δ᾽ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πρέπον μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡμῖν τοῖς παροῦσι κοσμῆσαι τὸν θεόν. εἰ οὖν συνδοκεῖ καὶ ὑμῖν, γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ἡμῖν ἐν λόγοις ἱκανὴ διατριβή· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι χρῆναι ἕκαστον ἡμῶν λόγον εἰπεῖν ἔπαινον Ἔρωτος ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ὡς ἂν δύνηται

[395] The translation is that of Yonge (1854).
[396] For the genre of *epideictic encômium* in the *symposia* see Hunter's (2004) 34-7 discussion.

κάλλιστον, ἄρχειν δὲ Φαῖδρον πρῶτον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρῶτος κατάκειται καὶ ἔστιν ἅμα πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου.

[…] it is not my speech, but it comes from Phaedrus here. He is constantly complaining to me and saying, – Is it not a curious thing, Eryximachus, that while other gods have hymns and psalms indited in their honor by the poets, <u>the god of Love, so ancient and so great, has had no song of praise composed for him by a single one of all the many poets that ever have been</u>? […] and not a single man ever essaying till this day to make a fitting hymn to Love! So great a god, and so neglected! Now I think Phaedrus' protest a very proper one. Accordingly I am not only desirous of obliging him with a contribution of my own, but I also pronounce the present to be a fitting occasion for us here assembled to honor the god. So if you on your part approve, we might pass the time well enough in discourses; for my opinion is that we ought each of us to make a speech in turn, from left to right, praising Love as beautifully as he can. Phaedrus shall open first; for he has the topmost place at the table, and besides is father of our debate."

But, what does Socrates really mean when he says that no one has ever composed an *encômium* for *Erôs* before? The statement is not true. What about the various love poems of the great melic poets such as Sappho, Anacreon, Ibycus, Theognis, Alcman that underline the great power of erotic desire and pleasure, the famous choral parts in drama that praise the strength of Love,[397] or the presentation of

[397] <u>Soph. *Antig.* 781-800 (third *stasimon*)</u>:

<u>Χορός</u>
Ἔρως ἀνίκατε μάχαν, Ἔρως, ὃς ἐν κτήμασι πίπτεις,
ὃς ἐν μαλακαῖς παρειαῖς νεάνιδος ἐννυχεύεις,
φοιτᾷς δ᾽ ὑπερπόντιος ἔν τ᾽ ἀγρονόμοις αὐλαῖς·
καί σ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἀθανάτων φύξιμος οὐδεὶς
οὔθ᾽ ἁμερίων σέ γ᾽ ἀνθρώπων. ὁ δ᾽ ἔχων μέμηνεν.
σὺ καὶ δικαίων ἀδίκους φρένας παρασπᾷς ἐπὶ λώβᾳ,
σὺ καὶ τόδε νεῖκος ἀνδρῶν ξύναιμον ἔχεις ταράξας·
νικᾷ δ᾽ ἐναργὴς βλεφάρων ἵμερος εὐλέκτρου
νύμφας, τῶν μεγάλων πάρεδρος ἐν ἀρχαῖς
θεσμῶν. ἄμαχος γὰρ ἐμπαίζει θεός, Ἀφροδίτα.

<u>Eurip. *Hippol.* 525-542</u>:

<u>Χορός</u>
Ἔρως Ἔρως, ὁ κατ᾽ ὀμμάτων

the irresistible influence of *Erôs* on the soul that might be the cause of Helen's behavior as Gorgias examines in *Helen's encômium*?[398] Certainly, Socrates does not

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στάζων πόθον, εἰσάγων γλυκεῖαν
ψυχᾷ χάριν οὓς ἐπιστρατεύσῃ,
μή μοί ποτε σὺν κακῷ φανείης
μηδ᾽ ἄρρυθμος ἔλθοις.
οὔτε γὰρ πυρὸς οὔτ᾽ ἄστρων ὑπέρτερον βέλος,
οἷον τὸ τᾶς Ἀφροδίτας ἵησιν ἐκ χερῶν
Ἔρως ὁ Διὸς παῖς.
ἄλλως ἄλλως παρά τ᾽ Ἀλφεῷ
Φοίβου τ᾽ ἐπὶ Πυθίοις τεράμνοις
βούταν φόνον Ἑλλὰς <αἶ> ἀέξει·
Ἔρωτα δέ, τὸν τύραννον ἀνδρῶν,
τὸν τᾶς Ἀφροδίτας
φιλτάτων θαλάμων κληδοῦχον, οὐ σεβίζομεν,
πέρθοντα καὶ διὰ πάσας ἱέντα συμφορᾶς
θνατοὺς ὅταν ἔλθῃ.

Eurip. *Med.* 835-845:

Χορός
τοῦ καλλινάου τ᾽ ἐπὶ Κηφισοῦ ῥοαῖς
τὰν Κύπριν κλῄζουσιν ἀφυσσαμέναν
χώρας καταπνεῦσαι μετρίους ἀνέμων
840ἀέρας ἡδυπνόους· αἰεὶ δ᾽ ἐπιβαλλομέναν
χαίταισιν εὐώδη ῥοδέων πλόκον ἀνθέων
τᾷ Σοφίᾳ παρέδρους πέμπειν Ἔρωτας,
παντοίας ἀρετᾶς ξυνεργούς.
[398] Gorg. *Encômium of Helen* §§15-19:

(15) καὶ ὅτι μέν, εἰ λόγωι ἐπείσθη, οὐκ ἠδίκησεν ἀλλ᾽ ἠτύχησεν, εἴρηται· τὴν δὲ τετάρτην αἰτίαν τῶι τετάρτωι λόγωι διέξειμι. εἰ γὰρ ἔρως ἦν ὁ ταῦτα πάντα πράξας, οὐ χαλεπῶς διαφεύξεται τὴν τῆς λεγομένης γεγονέναι ἁμαρτίας αἰτίαν. ἃ γὰρ ὁρῶμεν, ἔχει φύσιν οὐχ ἣν ἡμεῖς θέλομεν, ἀλλ ἣν ἕκαστον ἔτυχε· διὰ δὲ τῆς ὄψεως ἡ ψυχὴ κἀν τοῖς τρόποις τυποῦται.
(16) αὐτίκα γὰρ ὅταν πολέμια σώματα [καὶ] πολέμιον ἐπὶ πολεμίοις ὁπλίσηι κόσμον χαλκοῦ καὶ σιδήρου, τοῦ μὲν ἀλεξητήριον τοῦ δὲ ... προβλήματα, εἰ θεάσεται ἡ ὄψις ἐταράχθη καὶ ἐτάραξε τὴν ψυχήν, ὥστε πολλάκις κινδύνου τοῦ μέλλοντος [ὡς] ὄντος φεύγουσιν ἐκπλαγέντες. ἰσχυρὰ γὰρ ἡ συνήθεια τοῦ νόμου διὰ τὸν φόβον ἐξωικίσθη τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως, ἥτις ἐλθοῦσα ἐποίησεν ἀμελῆσαι καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ διὰ τὸν νόμον κρινομένου καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ διὰ τὴν νίκην γινομένου.
(17) ἤδη δέ τινες ἰδόντες φοβερὰ καὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἐν τῶι παρόντι χρόνωι φρονήματος ἐξέστησαν· οὕτως ἀπέσβεσε καὶ ἐξήλασεν ὁ φόβος τὸ νόημα. πολλοὶ δὲ ματαίοις πόνοις καὶ δειναῖς νόσοις καὶ δυσιάτοις μανίαις περιέπεσον· οὕτως εἰκόνας τῶν ὁρωμένων πραγμάτων ἡ ὄψις ἐνέγραψεν ἐν τῷ φρονήματι. καὶ τὰ μὲν δειματοῦντα πολλὰ μὲν παραλείπεται, ὅμοια δ' ἐστὶ τὰ παραλειπόμενα οἷάπερ [τὰ] λεγόμενα.
(18) ἀλλὰ μὴν οἱ γραφεῖς ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν χρωμάτων καὶ σωμάτων ἓν σῶμα καὶ σχῆμα τελείως ἀπεργάσωνται, τέρπουσι τὴν ὄψιν· ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀνδριάντων ποίησις καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀγαλμάτων ἐργασία θέαν ἡδεῖαν παρέσχετο τοῖς ὄμμασιν. οὕτω τὰ μὲν λυπεῖν τὰ δὲ ποθεῖν πέφυκε τὴν ὄψιν. πολλὰ δὲ πολλοῖς πολλῶν ἔρωτα καὶ πόθον ἐνεργάζεται πραγμάτων καὶ σωμάτων.
(19) εἰ οὖν τῶι τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου σώματι τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης ὄμμα ἡσθὲν προθυμίαν καὶ ἅμιλλαν ἔρωτος τῆι ψυχῆι παρέδωκε, τί θαυμαστόν; ὃς εἰ μὲν θεὸς [ὢν ἔχει] θεῶν θείαν δύναμιν, πῶς

ignore this long literary tradition. What he means by his statement above is, as Sykoutris argues, that there is no poem or prose text entirely dedicated to the god of love; all these compositions are parts of broader compositions.[399] At the same time, it is highly possible that Socrates implicitly criticizes, through a statement that seems ironic, everything that has been written on the subject. In other words, he might imply that nobody has yet grasped the true nature and value of *Erôs*, and thus no one has ever been able to give a thorough and profound depiction of the identity of this deity. It is, therefore, anticipated that he will fill this gap.

It can be admitted that there is a degree of ambiguity in lyric poetry and tragedy when as well they address *Erôs*. One might then argue that Socrates' statement is a recognition that love is not necessarily the kind of power you can pray to or try to control with song/words. Just as no sane person (outside perhaps of some weird local cults in Epirus or Arcadia) sacrifices to Hades. What Phaedrus (the lover of *logoi*) wants is an unabashed epideictic performance on love that covers all the aspects and exhausts all the possible avenues of praise: the sort of thing Gorgias might compose: a rhetorical symphony. And Socrates (and to some extent Aristophanes as well) interpret this somewhat differently: as a call to uncover the *true nature* of *Erôs*.

Socrates keeps his promise with the delivery of Diotimas' speech, presented as an initiation to the mysteries of *Erôs*. This is the real *encômium* for the god that Plato has been asking for (Pl. *Symp*. 209e-210a):

> {ΣΩ} ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, κἂν σὺ μυηθείης· τὰ δὲ τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικά, ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς μετίῃ, οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ οἷός τ' ἂν εἴης.
>
> {SO} Into these love-matters even you, Socrates, might haply be initiated; but I doubt if you could approach the rites and revelations to which these, for the properly instructed, are merely the avenue.

ἂν ὁ ἥσσων εἴη τοῦτον ἀπώσασθαι καὶ ἀμύνασθαι δυνατός; εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπινον νόσημα καὶ ψυχῆς ἀγνόημα, οὐχ ὡς ἁμάρτημα μεμπτέον ἀλλ' ὡς ἀτύχημα νομιστέον· ἦλθε γάρ, ὡς ἦλθε, τύχης ἀγρεύμασιν, οὐ γνώμης βουλεύμασι, καὶ ἔρωτος ἀνάγκαις, οὐ τέχνης παρασκευαῖς.
(The greek text from Diels' ed. (1922)).

[399] Sykoutris (1949) n.4.ad loc.

Until the end of Socrates' speech the rules of this particular *symposium* are respected in their entirety. After the delivery of the six speeches, the arrival of Alcibiades' *kômos* puts the sympotic order in danger[400] (Pl. *Symp*. 212c-212e):

> […] καὶ ἐξαίφνης τὴν αὔλειον θύραν κρουομένην πολὺν ψόφον παρασχεῖν ὡς κωμαστῶν, καὶ αὐλητρίδος φωνὴν ἀκούειν. τὸν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα, παῖδες, φάναι, οὐ σκέψεσθε; καὶ ἐὰν μέν τις τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ᾖ, καλεῖτε· εἰ δὲ μή, λέγετε ὅτι οὐ πίνομεν ἀλλ' ἀναπαυόμεθα ἤδη. καὶ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον Ἀλκιβιάδου τὴν φωνὴν ἀκούειν ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ σφόδρα μεθύοντος καὶ μέγα βοῶντος, ἐρωτῶντος ὅπου Ἀγάθων καὶ κελεύοντος ἄγειν παρ' Ἀγάθωνα. ἄγειν οὖν αὐτὸν παρὰ σφᾶς τήν τε αὐλητρίδα ὑπολαβοῦσαν καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς τῶν ἀκολούθων, καὶ ἐπιστῆναι ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας ἐστεφανωμένον αὐτὸν κιττοῦ τέ τινι στεφάνῳ δασεῖ καὶ ἴων, καὶ ταινίας ἔχοντα ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς πάνυ πολλάς, καὶ εἰπεῖν· ἄνδρες, χαίρετε· μεθύοντα ἄνδρα πάνυ σφόδρα δέξεσθε συμπότην, ἢ ἀπίωμεν ἀναδήσαντες μόνον Ἀγάθωνα, ἐφ' ᾧπερ ἤλθομεν;

> […] when suddenly there was a knocking at the outer door, which had a noisy sound like that of revellers, and they heard notes of a flute-girl. "Go and see to it," said Agathon to the servants; "and if it be one of our intimates, invite him in: otherwise, say we are not drinking, but just about to retire." A few moments after, they heard the voice of Alcibiades in the forecourt, very drunken and bawling loud, to know where Agathon was, and bidding them bring him to Agathon. So he was brought into the company by the flute-girl and some others of his people supporting him: he stood at the door, crowned with a bushy wreath of ivy and violets, and wearing a great array of ribands on his head. "Good evening, sirs," he said; "will you admit to your drinking a fellow very far gone in liquor, or shall we simply set a wreath on Agathon – which indeed is what we came for – and so away?

Alcibiades stands at 'the outer door of the court' (τὴν αὔλειον θύραν) accompanied by other revelers and by a flute-girl and knocks on the door. Although he is drunk and noisy, he asks for permission to enter without forgetting to announce the reason of his arrival. Alcibiades characterises himself as a potential *sympotes* (drinking fellow), which shows that the participants consider it a drinking party: this

[400] As Heath (1988) 180 concisely states: 'Alcibiades, by contrast, though drunk and disorderly (212d4), scrupulously observes *kômastic* etiquette.'

scene is orchestrated according to the established etiquette of the *komos*, which we see reflected in comedy, in Pindar (to a small degree), and in some later 'sympotic' texts as well. Will Alcibiades' presence bring back the two fundamental elements of the traditional *symposium*, namely wine and music?[401] (Pl. *Symp*. 213e-214b):

> […] ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατεκλίνη, εἰπεῖν· εἶεν δή, ἄνδρες· δοκεῖτε γάρ μοι νήφειν. οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον οὖν ὑμῖν, ἀλλὰ ποτέον· ὡμολόγηται γὰρ ταῦθ᾽ ἡμῖν. ἄρχοντα οὖν αἱροῦμαι τῆς πόσεως, ἕως ἂν ὑμεῖς ἱκανῶς πίητε, ἐμαυτόν. ἀλλὰ φερέτω, Ἀγάθων, εἴ τι ἔστιν ἔκπωμα μέγα. μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἀλλὰ φέρε, παῖ, φάναι, τὸν ψυκτῆρα ἐκεῖνον, ἰδόντα αὐτὸν πλέον ἢ ὀκτὼ κοτύλας χωροῦντα. τοῦτον ἐμπλησάμενον πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸν ἐκπιεῖν, ἔπειτα τῷ Σωκράτει κελεύειν ἐγχεῖν καὶ ἅμα εἰπεῖν· πρὸς μὲν Σωκράτη, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὸ σόφισμά μοι οὐδέν· ὁπόσον γὰρ ἂν κελεύῃ τις, τοσοῦτον ἐκπιὼν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον μή ποτε μεθυσθῇ. τὸν μὲν οὖν Σωκράτη ἐγχέαντος τοῦ παιδὸς πίνειν· τὸν δ᾽ Ἐρυξίμαχον πῶς οὖν, φάναι, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ποιοῦμεν; οὕτως οὔτε τι λέγομεν ἐπὶ τῇ κύλικι οὔτε τι ᾄδομεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ οἱ διψῶντες πιόμεθα;
>
> […] Reclining there, he proceeded: "Now then, gentlemen, you look sober: I cannot allow this; you must drink, and fulfil our agreement. So I appoint as president of this bout, till you have had a reasonable drink – myself. Agathon, let the boy bring me as large a goblet as you have. Ah well, do not trouble," he said; "boy, bring me that cooler there," – for he saw it would hold a good half-gallon and more. This he got filled to the brim, and after quaffing it off himself bade them fill up for Socrates, saying, "Against Socrates, sirs, my crafty plan is as nought. However large the bumper you order him, he will quaff it all off and never get tipsy with it." Socrates drank as soon as the boy had filled: but "What procedure is this, Alcibiades?" asked Eryximachus. "Are we to have nothing to say or sing over the cup? Are we going to drink just like any thirsty folk?"

Heath argues that Alcibiades might have expressed his request in the form of a song, which can be incorporated in his general *kômastic* behavior.[402] Although it is an attractive idea, there is not enough textual evidence to verify it. Alcibiades asks for a lot of wine, something that 'will mark a new start for the *symposium*' as Hunter

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[401] See Heath (1988) 181-2.
[402] Heath (1988) 2.

stresses,[403] but the young man is not engaged in any sort of singing or dancing. The flute-girl that joins his *kômos* is not mentioned again. She might have gone – perhaps to join the first flute-girl in another room of the house – or else she has joined in the group in silence. Alcibiades' presence has not ruined this peculiar *symposium*. The acceptance of unlimited wine makes the atmosphere more convivial, but the sympotic gathering still remains an unusual, philosophically oriented drinking-party. Plato plays with the long-established standards and limits.

After crowning Socrates in 213e, Alcibiades decides to give a speech in praise of his beloved Socrates, whom he compares to a satyr. Alcibiades' speech is strong and passionate (Pl. *Symp*. 215b-e):

> {ΑΛ} καὶ φημὶ αὖ ἐοικέναι αὐτὸν τῷ σατύρῳ τῷ Μαρσύᾳ. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τό γε εἶδος ὅμοιος εἶ τούτοις, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸς ἄν που ἀμφισβητήσαις· ὡς δὲ καὶ τἆλλα ἔοικας, μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκουε. ὑβριστὴς ε· ἢ οὔ; ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ ὁμολογῇς, μάρτυρας παρέξομαι. ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ αὐλητής; πολύ γε θαυμασιώτερος ἐκείνου. […] σὺ δ᾽ ἐκείνου τοσοῦτον μόνον διαφέρεις, ὅτι ἄνευ ὀργάνων ψιλοῖς λόγοις ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιεῖς. ἡμεῖς γοῦν ὅταν μέν του ἄλλου ἀκούωμεν λέγοντος καὶ πάνυ ἀγαθοῦ ῥήτορος ἄλλους λόγους, οὐδὲν μέλει ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδενί· ἐπειδὰν δὲ σοῦ τις ἀκούῃ ἢ τῶν σῶν λόγων ἄλλου λέγοντος, κἂν πάνυ φαῦλος ᾖ ὁ λέγων, ἐάντε γυνὴ ἀκούῃ ἐάντε ἀνὴρ ἐάντε μειράκιον, ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἐσμὲν καὶ κατεχόμεθα. […] ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούω, πολύ μοι μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν κορυβαντιώντων ἥ τε καρδία πηδᾷ καὶ δάκρυα ἐκχεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων τῶν τούτου, ὁρῶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλους παμπόλλους τὰ αὐτὰ πάσχοντας […]
>
> {AL} And I further suggest that he resembles the satyr Marsyas. Now, as to your likeness, Socrates, to these in figure, I do not suppose even you yourself will dispute it; but I have next to tell you that you are like them in every other respect. You are a fleering fellow, eh? If you will not confess it, I have witnesses at hand. Are you not a piper? Why, yes, and a far more marvellous one than the satyr. […] You differ from him in one point only – that you produce the same effect with simple prose unaided by instruments. For example, when we hear any other person – quite an excellent orator, perhaps – pronouncing one of the usual discourses, no one, I venture to say, cares a jot; but so soon as we hear you, or your discourses in the mouth of another, –

[403] Hunter (2004) 5.

> though such person be ever so poor a speaker, and whether the hearer be a woman or a man or a youngster – we are all amazed and possessed. […] For when I hear him I am worse than any wild fanatic; I find my heart leaping and my tears gushing forth at the sound of his speech, and I see great numbers of other suffering with the same things.

What is remarkable at this point is that the initial goal of the *symposium* – the *encômium* of *Erôs* – shifts abruptly to a praise for Socrates. The praise of Socrates is also in its way a hymn to *Erôs* (as the god expresses himself in the philosopher) and a veiled (and therefore rather sweet) declaration of love: here we see Socrates as the paradoxical master and true but certainly unusual (in the sense that he enjoys the feeling of attraction but feels no need for pleasure) devotee of the god. Love takes shape, but not the shape of beauty as one would expect. He takes the shape of an ugly man with magnificent spirit. The enchantment of Socrates' words is vividly described through metaphors. Alcibiades' heart is leaping and his eyes are filled with tears, much like the Corybantian dancers do. His speech seems to incorporate or replace singing – through the description of Socrates' enchanting words – and dancing – through the 'orgiastic dancing' of his heart. Furthermore, the emotions that all the listeners of Socrates' speeches experience (ἐκπεπληγμένοι … κατεχόμεθα, which means 'amazed … under possession') echo the emotions of the inspired poets in the *Ion*; amazement and possession in the passage 215b-e, shame[404] and ambivalence[405] in other parts of Alcibiades' speech. Socrates is, by association to the description of the *Ion*, a god, a source of inspiration that causes, however, suffering to those he inspires. Alcibiades uses the verb πάσχω (to suffer) twice.[406]

A little later Alcibiades finds Socrates' personality so attractive that he compares him with the famous flute-player Marsyas and characterizes his words as 'flute compositions' (Pl. *Symp*. 216c):

> {ΑΛ} καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν δὴ τῶν αὐλημάτων καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τοιαῦτα πεπόνθασιν ὑπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ σατύρου […]

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[404] Pl. *Symp*. 216b: […] τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι ὁντινοῦν […]

[405] Pl. *Symp*. 216c: […] καὶ πολλάκις μὲν ἡδέως ἂν ἴδοιμι αὐτὸν μὴ ὄντα ἐν ἀνθρώποις· εἰ δ' αὖ τοῦτο γένοιτο, εὖ οἶδα ὅτι πολὺ μεῖζον ἂν ἀχθοίμην, ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι χρήσωμαι τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.

[406] Pl. *Symp*. 215e: […] ὁρῶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλους παμπόλλους τὰ αὐτὰ πάσχοντας […] || 216c: […] καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τοιαῦτα πεπόνθασιν […]

{AL} Such then is the effect that our satyr can work upon me and many another with his piping; […]

All these statements and descriptions betray Alcibiades' *eros* towards Socrates. He also expresses his admiration for Socrates' moral beauty, self-control in 216e-217a and 219b-d, as well as for his physical strength in 217b-c. Alcibiades does not pay attention to the appearance of his beloved. He is attracted by his various intellectual and moral gifts. Besides, the key to the right initiation to the rites of Love is not the physical beauty, but 'the beauty of the soul,' as Diotima has stressed in 210b: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸ <u>ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κάλλος</u> τιμιώτερον ἡγήσασθαι τοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι.

The notion of opening a man's breast to peer inside and see what his real nature is (Carm. Conv. 889 PMG), Alcaeus' 'Wine and Truth' (fr. 366 LP) or the idea of 'erotic praise of a boy,' which Alcibiades so cleverly inverts when he presents himself as Socrates' *erastes* are a few possible connections to the tradition of *skolion* singing.

Socrates' crowning by Alcibiades,[407] his intellectual, moral and physical power, his victories in contests of philosophy and love, and the shared emotional experiences[408] of his listeners converts Alcibiades' speech into an attempt to immortalize him. The philosophic frenzy of Alcibiades' speech is attributed to all the participants of the banquet (Pl. *Symp*. 218b):

{ΑΛ} πάντες γὰρ κεκοινωνήκατε τῆς φιλοσόφου μανίας τε καὶ βακχείας

{AL} every one of you has had his share of philosophic passion and Bacchic frenzy

We can see that there is a shared emotion at this point. Alcibiades observes that the influence of philosophy has driven the symposiasts to madness. But, as far as Alcibiades is concerned, the combination of the emotion of *eros* with great

[407] On Alcibiades' performance as a satyr drama, see the detailed discussion in Usher (2002). On the presentation of the whole *Symposium* as a satyr play see Shaw (2014) esp. pp. 15-21.
[408] See Athanassaki (2012) 173-219, who starts her discussion by examining the epinician ritual as a shared emotional experience.

admiration for the philosopher's personality is driving him crazy. Perhaps it is about time the *symposium* came to an end.

The arrival of the second *kômos* terminates the banquet by bringing too much noise, too much wine, and a general anarchy. Too many revelers stand at the door and then enter the house and take seats at random and apparently without respecting any *sympotic* law. The place is filled with noise, disorder predominates and wine drinking is excessive (Pl. *Symp*. 223b):

> […] ἐξαίφνης δὲ κωμαστὰς ἥκειν παμπόλλους ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας, καὶ ἐπιτυχόντας ἀνεῳγμέναις ἐξιόντος τινὸς εἰς τὸ ἄντικρυς πορεύεσθαι παρὰ σφᾶς καὶ κατακλίνεσθαι, καὶ θορύβου μεστὰ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν κόσμῳ οὐδενὶ ἀναγκάζεσθαι πίνειν πάμπολυν οἶνον.

> […] when suddenly a great crowd of revelers arrived at the door, which they found just opened for some one who was going out. They marched straight into the party and seated themselves: the whole place was in an uproar and, losing all order, they were forced to drink a vast amount of wine.

Although it is not explicitely stated that the revelers are singing, Pindar's and Bacchylides' poems, which are sung and danced by revelers, come directly to mind. Of course these are highly stylized odes and not the kind of *kômos* we encounter here. Thus, the long and widely disseminated poetic tradition evokes *melos*. The guests either leave Agathon's house or go to sleep, except for Socrates, who heads for the *Lyceum*. Under these circumstances, there is no space for philosophy any more.[409]

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[409] On the contrary, Xenophon's *Symposium*, considered to be a response to that of Plato, includes everything that Plato prohibits: a flute-girl, a dancing girl, and a boy who is playing the *kithara* and dancing at the same time (Xen. *Symp*. 2.1.): ὡς δ᾽ ἀφῃρέθησαν αἱ τράπεζαι καὶ ἔσπεισάν τε καὶ ἐπαιάνισαν, ἔρχεται αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ κῶμον Συρακόσιός τις ἄνθρωπος, ἔχων τε αὐλητρίδα ἀγαθὴν καὶ ὀρχηστρίδα τῶν τὰ θαύματα δυναμένων ποιεῖν, καὶ παῖδα πάνυ γε ὡραῖον καὶ πάνυ καλῶς κιθαρίζοντα καὶ ὀρχούμενον. ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἐπιδεικνὺς ὡς ἐν θαύματι ἀργύριον ἐλάμβανεν.
Later, we can surprisingly see a detailed description of Socrates' dance (Xen. *Symp*. 2.21-23). This performance does not expel or marginalize philosophy. On the contrary, as Wohl (2004) 337-363 well puts it, "it transforms the pleasures of dance into lessons in philosophy." Xenophon corrects Plato's aggressiveness towards song by associating dance with philosophy and writing an entertaining philosophical dialogue. Neverthless, in the end the spectacle, the final dance dissolves the *symposium* (9.5-7), confirming Plato's greatest fear. The physicality of the performance has a strong influence on the spectators who desire to imitate what they see. Their body is uncontrollable. Inevitably, when sex is on the table there is no more space

At this point it may be valuable to refer to the *Philebus*, where, as Rinella[410] has already remarked, Plato deploys traditional sympotic practices: the mixing of wine along with the prayer to Dionysus and Hephaistos as well as the reference to Zeus the Savior toward the end of the dialogue.[411] Plato draws a comparison between the mixture of wine and the mixture of 'pleasure' (ἡδονή) with 'reason, prudence' (φρόνησις). The *Philebus* seems to echo the conclusion of a hearer or a reader of the *Symposium* on a metaphorical level (Pl. *Phil*. 61b-c):

> {ΣΩ} τοῖς δὴ θεοῖς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εὐχόμενοι κεραννύωμεν, εἴτε Διόνυσος εἴτε Ἥφαιστος εἴθ' ὅστις θεῶν ταύτην τὴν τιμὴν εἴληχε τῆς συγκράσεως. {ΠΡΩ} πάνυ μὲν οὖν. {ΣΩ} καὶ μὴν καθάπερ ἡμῖν οἰνοχόοις τισὶ παρεστᾶσι κρῆναι – μέλιτος μὲν ἂν ἀπεικάζοι τις τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς, τὴν δὲ τῆς φρονήσεως νηφαντικὴν καὶ ἄοινον αὐστηροῦ καὶ ὑγιεινοῦ τινος ὕδατος – ἃς προθυμητέον ὡς κάλλιστα συμμειγνύναι.

> {SO} Let us make the mixture, Protarchus, with a prayer to the gods, to Dionysus or Hephaestus, or whoever he be who presides over the mixing. {PRO} By all means. {SO} We are like wine-pourers, and beside us are fountains – that of pleasure may be likened to a fount of honey, and the sober, wineless fount of wisdom to one of pure, health-giving water – of which we must do our best to mix as well as possible.

The pure mixture of pleasure and prudence that results in measure and proportion is recommended (Pl. *Phil*. 61e-66c). It is remarkable that in this dialogue too, the sympotic practices frame the development of philosophical arguments.

In the *Symposium*, *melos*, in the sense of melody or song, is displaced from its usual place, the sympotic gathering. On the contrary, Plato revitalizes the conventional sympotic context by modifying its rules and by playing with its boundaries. Although the reason for the banquet is Agathon's celebration for his

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for philosophy. Is the ending scene of Xenophon's *Symposium* a vindication for Plato's fears and restrictions in his *Symposium* – and generally to the dialogues where he uses sympotic practices?

[410] Rinella (2010) 51.

[411] Pl. *Phil*. 66d: τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι τὸν αὐτὸν διαμαρτυράμενοι λόγον ἐπεξέλθωμεν

victory[412] in the dramatic competition, the real reason is Socrates' crowning for his spiritual preeminence[413] and more generally the victory of philosophy over every other activity. In the end, however, philosophy is expelled by noise and wine that turn everything into chaos.

Essentially, Plato teaches how to and how not to behave at a *symposium*. In Aristophanes' *Wasps* (1204-1268) Bdelykleon prepares his father Philokleon how to behave in at a *symposium*, which makes an interesting comparandum. In fact, fifth-century sources are pretty rich in references to sympotic conversation as well as sympotic song. In Plato's *Symposium*, there is singing (176a: σπονδάς τε σφᾶς ποιήσασθαι, καὶ ᾄσαντας τὸν θεὸν καὶ τἆλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα, τρέπεσθαι πρὸς τὸν πότον.) which is of course not strongly emphasised in the narrative, but the sympotic event is defined/framed, as tradition demands, by the performance of the paean: a kind utterance that falls I guess in the sphere of traditional *melo*s. There is no doubt however that the emphasis is on the formal sympotic speech-performances, just as in the *Protagoras* and the *Phaedrus*.

Plato's innovation lies in the depiction of a new type of *symposium* that differs from the traditional *symposia* of the archaic and classical period.[414] By reforming the traditional practices of the *symposium* he creates a new literary genre by shrewdly associating philosophy, instead of *melos*, with the motifs of *eros* (as sexual desire) and wine drinking.[415] *Melos* is overshadowed by philosophy that is found in a context originally associated with music and song. Nevertheless, one might see in the end of the dialogue a defeat of philosophy, but it seems to me that the arrival of the second, undisciplined group of revelers highlights the difference between the more sophisticated and delicate practice of philosophy and the conventional, lowly

[412] Hunter (2004) 79: "After Alcibiades' speech we are led to expect an *encômium* of Agathon by Socrates (223a1-2)."
[413] For this persuasive interpretation of the Platonic *Symposium* see Athanassaki (2009) 188-193.
[414] Cf. Hunter's (2004) 6 argument: "Plato's *Symposium* is to be seen within an evolving fourth-century tradition of prose sympotika, which develop the themes of the sympotic poetry of the earlier archaic period."
[415] Seidensticker (1995) 189: "Auch wenn Xenophons und Platons *Symposia* wohl kaum als repräsentativ für das *Symposion* angesehen werden dürfen, so ist die Entstehung dieser neuen literarischen Gattung doch paradigmatisch für die im 4. Jh. weitgehend abgeschlossene Verwandlung des *Symposion* vom politischen, sozialen und kulturellen Zentrum des gesellschaftlichen Lebens zu einem fiktiven literarischen Ort". See Rinella's (2010) 49-50 discussion on the 'reformulation of the *symposion'* in the Platonic dialogues.

sympotic practices, basically characterized by excessive noise and wine drinking and untamed behavior.

III.1.2. *Protagoras*. The *synedrion* at Callias' house

Socrates narrates to an unnamed friend the conversation he just had with Protagoras at Callias' house after Hippocrates' request. Socrates tries to pinpoint what sort of knowledge a student might gain from the sophists and whether virtue can be taught. The dramatic elements of the dialogue have been well discussed.[416] However, I shall mention the most representative ones in order to assess the importance of its context, into which the discussion of the Simonidean *melos* takes place.

From an early point the gathering at Callias' house is labeled as *synousia,* as was the case in the *Symposium* too[417] (Pl. *Prot*. 310a):

> {ET} τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσω ἡμῖν τὴν συνουσίαν, εἰ μή σέ τι κωλύει, καθεζόμενος ἐνταυθί, ἐξαναστήσας τὸν παῖδα τουτονί;
>
> {FRIEND} Then do let us hear your account of the meeting at once, if you are disengaged take my boy's place, and sit here.

Hippocrates arrives at Socrates' place very early in the morning expressing his wish to hear Protagoras' speech and become his student. Socrates suggests that they should wait in the courtyard until the daylight comes before they set off in order to meet the famous sophist in Callias' house. There is no worry, since the sophist is an indoor person, as Socrates explains (Pl. *Prot*. 310e-311a):

> {ΣΩ} ἀλλὰ τί οὐ βαδίζομεν παρ᾽ αὐτόν, ἵνα ἔνδον καταλάβωμεν; καταλύει δ', ὡς ἐγὼ ἤκουσα, παρὰ Καλλίᾳ τῷ Ἱππονίκου· ἀλλ᾽ ἴωμεν. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· 'μήπω,

[416] Wolfsdorf (1998) 126-133; Provencal (1999); Charalabopoulos (2001); Lavery (2007); Denyer (2008); Arieti and Barrus (2010); Ford (2011).

[417] The word is used twice in the *Protagoras*: at 316c and again at 316d. Bosch-Veciana (2000) 43-46 names it *socratic synousia* (see p.32 in this chapter) and examines its association with the activity of *dialegesthai*.

ἀγαθέ, ἐκεῖσε ἴωμεν – πρῴ γάρ ἐστιν – ἀλλὰ δεῦρο ἐξαναστῶμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλήν, καὶ περιιόντες αὐτοῦ διατρίψωμεν ἕως ἂν φῶς γένηται· εἶτα ἴωμεν. καὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Πρωταγόρας ἔνδον διατρίβει, ὥστε, θάρρει, καταληψόμεθα αὐτόν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἔνδον.'

{SO} But, let us step over to him at once, to make sure of finding him in; he is staying, so I was told, with Callias, son of Hipponicus. Now, let us be going. To this I replied: We had better not go there yet, my good friend, it is so very early: let us rise and turn into the court here, and spend the time strolling there till daylight comes; after that we can go. Protagoras, you see, spends most of his time indoors, so have no fear, we shall find him in all right, most likely.

Socrates and Hippocrates have a short discussion about the latter's expectations for Protagoras' teaching. They decide to spend a little time at Socrates' place (at first indoors and then in the court) before going to Callias' house to meet the sophist. It is twice repeated that Protagoras is to be found indoors (ἔνδον). So, the main part of the dialogue will no doubt take place inside Callias' house.

Socrates and Hippocrates continue their discussion during their trip to Callias' house. They are still talking even after their arrival, standing at the doorway, until they finish their conversation (Pl. *Prot*. 314c):

{ΣΩ} δόξαν ἡμῖν ταῦτα ἐπορευόμεθα· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ ἐγενόμεθα, ἐπιστάντες περί τινος λόγου διελεγόμεθα, ὃς ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐνέπεσεν· ἵν' οὖν μὴ ἀτελὴς γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ διαπερανάμενοι οὕτως ἐσίοιμεν, στάντες ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ διελεγόμεθα ἕως συνωμολογήσαμεν ἀλλήλοις.

{SO} This we resolved on, and set forth; and when we arrived at the doorway, we stood discussing some question or other that had occurred to us by the way: so, not to leave it unfinished, but to get it settled before we went in, we stood there and discussed in front of the door, until we had come to an agreement with each other.

The scene brings to mind the scene of the arrival at Agathon's house in the *Symposium*, where Socrates is said to stand at the neighbours' doorway until he

finishes his thoughts.[418] Similarly, in the *Protagoras*, the two friends finish their conversation and then decide to knock on the door. After the comic scene[419] with the eunuch who assumes that they are sophists and slams the door in their faces, they knock on again (Pl. *Prot*. 314d-e):

> ‘ἀλλ᾽ ὠγαθέ,’ ἔφην ἐγώ, ‘οὔτε παρὰ Καλλίαν ἥκομεν οὔτε σοφισταί ἐσμεν. ἀλλὰ θάρρει· Πρωταγόραν γάρ τοι δεόμενοι ἰδεῖν ἤλθομεν· εἰσάγγειλον οὖν.’ μόγις οὖν ποτε ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος ἀνέῳξεν τὴν θύραν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἰσήλθομεν, κατελάβομεν Πρωταγόραν ἐν τῷ προστῴῳ περιπατοῦντα […]

> “But, my good fellow”, I said, “we have not come to see Callias, nor are we sophists. Have no fear: I tell you, we have come to ask if we may see Protagoras;” so go and announce us. Then with much hesitation the fellow opened the door to us and when we had entered, we came upon Protagoras as he was walking round in the cloister […]

After Socrates’ reassurance that they are not sophists, the porter lets them in. Protagoras was walking in the portico (προστῴῳ). Socrates gives a list of Protagoras’ followers and describes the dynamics of the relationship between the charming Protagoras and his admirers in choral terms[420] (Pl. *Prot*. 315a-b):

> τούτων δὲ οἳ ὄπισθεν ἠκολούθουν ἐπακούοντες τῶν λεγομένων τὸ μὲν πολὺ ξένοι ἐφαίνοντο – οὓς ἄγει ἐξ ἑκάστων τῶν πόλεων ὁ Πρωταγόρας, δι᾽ ὧν διεξέρχεται, κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ ὥσπερ Ὀρφεύς, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἕπονται κεκηλημένοι – ἦσαν δέ τινες καὶ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἐν τῷ χορῷ.

> The persons who followed in their rear, listening to what they could of the talk, seemed to be mostly strangers, brought by the great Protagoras from the several cities which he traverses, enchanting them with his voice like Orpheus, while they follow where the voice sounds, enchanted; and some of our own inhabitants were also in the chorus.

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[418] Pl. *Symp*. 175d: ‘Σωκράτης οὗτος ἀναχωρήσας ἐν τῷ τῶν γειτόνων προθύρῳ ἕστηκεν, κἀμοῦ καλοῦντος οὐκ ἐθέλει εἰσιέναι.’

[419] See Charalabopoulos (2001) 149-178 for a detailed discussion on the stage directions of the *Protagoras*, considered as a prose drama.

[420] For a more detailed discussion on the scene see I.2 in chapter 1 (pp. 20-22).

The use of the verb κηλέω is attributed to Protagoras' enchanting voice. His voice is compared to that of Orpheus,[421] whose musical talent and the charm of his art was a commonplace in antiquity.[422] Protagoras' followers are characterized as a chorus (χορός) that moves in a circle (περιεσχίζοντο, ἐν κύκλῳ περιιόντες). Socrates also comments on both the aesthetics of the movement (εὖ, ἐν κόσμῳ, which mean 'nicely,' 'in orderly manner') and on the final position of the chorus of the aspiring sophists (κάλλιστα). By association, Protagoras is the chorus-leader, although there is no such explicit characterization in the passage.[423] It is fascinating that here we have the mystic attractions of choral *melos* again, this time attached to the person of the sophist!

The sophist's audience is big, consisting of foreigners and Athenians too. The description that Plato offers implies that sometimes they form a circle, while at other times they split into two parts. Socrates is really impressed by the movements of the sophists' followers (Pl. *Prot*. 315b):

> {ΣΩ} τοῦτον τὸν χορὸν μάλιστα ἔγωγε ἰδὼν ἥσθην, ὡς καλῶς ηὐλαβοῦντο μηδέποτε ἐμποδὼν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν εἶναι Πρωταγόρου, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς

[421] The name of Orpheus is frequently used in the platonic dialogues. He is mentioned as *kitharōdos* in the *Ion* (533b5) and the *Symposium* (179d), as an inventor of the music art in the *Laws* (677d), as an important musician in the *Apology* (41a) along with Mousaios and Homer, as a source of creative ability in the *Ion* (536b) and as a musical creature (swan) in the eschatological myth in the end of the *Republic* (829e). His excellence in music is due to his origin from the Muses (Pl. *Rep.* 364e).

[422] See, for example, the great admiration of the tragic Euripides toward Orpheus' song:

Eur. *Alc*. 357:
εἰ δ' Ὀρφέως μοι γλῶσσα καὶ μέλος παρῆν,
ὥστ' ἢ κόρην Δήμητρος ἢ κείνης πόσιν
ὕμνοισι κηλήσαντά σ' ἐξ Ἅιδου λαβεῖν

Eur. *Iph. Aul*. 1211:
{Ιφ.} εἰ μὲν τὸν Ὀρφέως εἶχον, ὦ πάτερ, λόγον,
πείθειν ἐπᾴδουσ', ὥσθ' ὁμαρτεῖν μοι πέτρας
κηλεῖν τε τοῖς λόγοισιν οὓς ἐβουλόμην

Eur. *Med*. 542-3:
εἴη δ' ἔμοιγε μήτε χρυσὸς ἐν δόμοις
μήτ' Ὀρφέως κάλλιον ὑμνῆσαι μέλος,
εἰ μὴ 'πίσημος ἡ τύχη γένοιτό μοι.

[423] See Charalabopoulos (2001) 159-162.

ἀναστρέφοι καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ ἐκείνου, εὖ πως καὶ ἐν κόσμῳ περιεσχίζοντο οὗτοι οἱ ἐπήκοοι ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν, καὶ ἐν κύκλῳ περιιόντες ἀεὶ εἰς τὸ ὄπισθεν καθίσταντο κάλλιστα.

{SO} As for me, when I saw this chorus I was delighted with the admirable care they took not to hinder Protagoras at any moment by getting in front; but whenever the master turned about and those with him, it was fine to see the orderly manner in which his train of listeners split up into two parties on this side and on that, and wheeling round formed up again each time in his rear most admirably.

As Charalabopoulos says, "… the division of the whole group into two and its subsequent reunion may perfectly well point to the semi-choruses and their possible manoeuvres in the orchestra."[424] Despite their characterization as chorus, the young sophists do not dance. However, their movements look like dancing figures under the guidance of their leader, Protagoras.[425] The emphasis on the aesthetics of the sophists' movements shows that Plato imagines here a choral performance of sophists.

Apart from Protagoras, the well-known sophists Hippias and Prodicus, as well as Pausanias of Cerameis are also present in Callias' house. After Protagoras' presence in the portico Plato leads us gradually to the interior space of the house. Socrates sees Hippias, sitting on a chair of a teacher opposite the portico, surrounded by his listeners, who are seated on benches (Pl. *Prot*. 315b-c):

τὸν δὲ μετ᾽ εἰσενόησα, ἔφη Ὅμηρος, Ἱππίαν τὸν Ἠλεῖον, καθήμενον ἐν τῷ κατ᾽ ἀντικρὺ προστῴῳ ἐν θρόνῳ· περὶ αὐτὸν δ᾽ ἐκάθηντο ἐπὶ βάθρων Ἐρυξίμαχός τε ὁ Ἀκουμενοῦ καὶ Φαῖδρος ὁ Μυρρινούσιος καὶ Ἄνδρων ὁ Ἀνδροτίωνος καὶ τῶν ξένων πολῖταί τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλοι τινές. ἐφαίνοντο δὲ περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τῶν μετεώρων ἀστρονομικὰ ἄττα διερωτᾶν τὸν Ἱππίαν, ὁ δ᾽ ἐν θρόνῳ καθήμενος ἑκάστοις αὐτῶν διέκρινεν καὶ διεξῄει τὰ ἐρωτώμενα.

"And next did I mark," as Homer says, Hippias of Elis, seated high on a chair in the doorway opposite; and sitting around him on benches were Eryximachus,

[424] See Charalabopoulos (2001) 160.
[425] For the characteristics of this choral performance see Charalabopoulos (2001) 149-178 passim.

> son of Acumenus, Phaedrus of Myrrhinous, Andron son of Androtion and a number of strangers, – fellow-citizens of Hippias and some others. They seemed to be asking him a series of astronomical questions on nature and the heavenly bodies, while he, seated in his chair, was distinguishing and expounding to each in turn the subjects of their questions.

Prodicus is in a room, which was previously used as a store-room (ταμιείῳ), but Callias turned it into a guest-room (ξένοις κατάλυσιν) for his visitors. Prodicus has already begun to deliver his speech that is heard by some men who are lying close to him in the beds of the chamber (Pl. *Prot*. 315c-d):

> […] ἐπεδήμει γὰρ ἄρα καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος – ἦν δὲ ἐν οἰκήματί τινι, ᾧ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ὡς ταμιείῳ ἐχρῆτο Ἱππόνικος, νῦν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν καταλυόντων ὁ Καλλίας καὶ τοῦτο ἐκκενώσας ξένοις κατάλυσιν πεποίηκεν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἔτι κατέκειτο, ἐγκεκαλυμμένος ἐν κῳδίοις τισὶν καὶ στρώμασιν καὶ μάλα πολλοῖς, ὡς ἐφαίνετο· παρεκάθηντο δὲ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ ταῖς πλησίον <u>κλίναις</u> Παυσανίας τε ὁ ἐκ Κεραμέων […]

> […] for you know Prodicus of Ceos is in Athens too: he was in a certain apartment formerly used by Hipponicus as a store-room, but now cleared out by Callias to make more space for his numerous visitors, and turned into a guest-chamber. Well, Prodicus was still abed, wrapped up in sundry fleeces and rugs, and plenty of them too, it seemed; and near him on the <u>beds</u> hard by lay Pausanias from Cerames […]

In 317d, Protagoras agrees to give a speech in front of everyone in the house, thus, before the other sophists and their followers. At the same time the diction evokes the conventional setting of a *symposium* (κλίναις, which means ‘couches’). The meeting, however, is referred to by the host as συνέδριον (council, meeting, place of meeting). The participants arrange the benches and the couches where Hippias is. This *synedrion* will take place in Hippias’ room and all the participants will be seated (Pl. *Prot*. 317d-e):

> βούλεσθε οὖν, ὁ Καλλίας ἔφη, <u>συνέδριον κατασκευάσωμεν</u>, ἵνα <u>καθεζόμενοι</u> διαλέγησθε; ἐδόκει χρῆναι· ἅσμενοι δὲ πάντες ἡμεῖς, ὡς <u>ἀκουσόμενοι ἀνδρῶν</u>

> σοφῶν, καὶ αὐτοί τε ἀντιλαβόμενοι τῶν βάθρων καὶ τῶν κλινῶν κατεσκευάζομεν παρὰ τῷ Ἱππίᾳ – ἐκεῖ γὰρ προϋπῆρχε τὰ βάθρα – ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Καλλίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἡκέτην ἄγοντε τὸν Πρόδικον, ἀναστήσαντες ἐκ τῆς κλίνης, καὶ τοὺς μετὰ τοῦ Προδίκου.
>
> Then do you agree, said Callias, to our making a session of it, so that we may sit at ease for our conversation? The proposal was accepted; and all of us, delighted at the prospect of listening to wise men, took hold of the benches and couches ourselves and arranged them where Hippias was, since the benches were there already. Meanwhile Callias and Alcibiades came, bringing with them Prodicus, whom they had induced to rise from his couch, and Prodicus' circle also.

But what exactly does the word συνέδριον denote? The etymology of the term σύν + ἕδρα (sitting together) is valuable for its meaning. Callias' first suggestion is 'to make a *synedrion*' (συνέδριον κατασκευάσωμεν) in order to be able 'to sit and discuss' (ἵνα καθεζόμενοι διαλέγησθε). His idea becomes immediately accepted and they all start to arrange the benches and the couches next to him. The verb κατεσκευάζομεν describes the process of arranging the things in the place. We watch the arrangement of the seats, side by side, which will render the place suitable (συνέδριον) for all the attendants 'to listen to wise men' (ὡς ἀκουσόμενοι ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν). The details of the preparation of the *synedrion* establish high expectations for the *synedrion* itself.

Referring to this type of gathering as a *synedrion* might indicate Plato's desire to delineate it as a non-sympotic meeting. As expected, the *synedrion* of Callias will not include any kind of music or dance, but it will focus on the speeches of wise men,[426] namely of the sophists. The main protagonists are the professional sophist Protagoras of Abdera, who believes that he possesses wisdom as well as the capacity to transmit it as well as Socrates who never stops seeking knowledge and wisdom and is widely considered a wise man.[427]

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[426] Pl. *Prot*. 317d: ὡς ἀκουσόμενοι ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν

[427] See Pl. *Apol.* 20d-21a: ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι' οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα. ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός. οὗτοι δὲ τάχ' ἄν, οὓς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ' ὅστις φησὶ ψεύδεταί τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καί μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδ' ἐὰν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον ὃν ἂν λέγω,

However, in the archaic Greek poetry, one type of σοφός (wise man) is the poet. The poets were also the singers at the *symposia*. Even though the meeting of the *Protagoras* is a non-sympotic meeting, the *symposium* is on everybody's mind. But instead of a song performance the participants will enjoy the sophist's delivery of speeches. Surprisingly, at an advanced point of the discussion Protagoras and Socrates are engaged in the literary criticism of a well-known Simonidean ode (339a-347a). The ode, however, treated as a written text and neatly incorporated into the philosophical discourse, replaces the basic means of amusement during the traditional drinking-parties, song, and dance. Another interesting aspect of this scene is that Simonides (the poet/singer) is being treated as a kind of 'proto-Sophist' or philosopher: again we find a text (this time a long, complex poetic utterance) taken out of its original context.

After Protagoras' negative comment on a song composed by Simonides, whom he accuses of contradiction (339a-d) Socrates will take the floor and provide his own interpretation of the Simonidean ode to Scopas (341d-347a). Although I quote the song, I do not examine the interpretation that Protagoras and Socrates offer, since their arguments have been extensively discussed.[428]

ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δή τίς ἐστιν σοφία καὶ οἵα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε που. οὗτος ἐμός τε ἑταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἑταῖρός τε καὶ συνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν κατῆλθε. καὶ ἴστε δὴ οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ᾽ ὅτι ὁρμήσειεν. καὶ δή ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι – καί, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες – ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ εἴ τις ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος. ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι.;

Kurke (2006) 21 refers also to the well-known passage from Plato's *Phaedo*, where Socrates considers himself a "fellow-servant of the swans and consecrated to the same god (Apollo)": Pl. *Phaedo* 85b: ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγοῦμαι ὁμόδουλός τε εἶναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ χεῖρον ἐκείνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, οὐδὲ δυσθυμότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. See also Martin (1998) 124*:* "Against the background I have sketched, of sages who are performers in several spheres, we can certainly see continuities in Socrates' life, in the form of his relationship with Delphi, his role in politics, even his versifying of Aesopic fables. But as he is depicted, all these are marginal activities in Socrates' career. No archaic sage invented the *elenchos*; it was the speciality of a man who constantly broke the frame of the performance by confronting his audience in dialogue and refusing to rely on the power of emphatic, unidirectional self-presentation."

[428] For the examination of the Simonidean ode in Plato's *Protagoras* see: Woodbury (1953) 135-63; Gentili (1964) 278-306; Parry (1965) 197-320; des Places (1969) 236-244; Weingartner (1973); Thayer (1975) 3-26; Dickie (1978) 21-33; Annas (1982) 1-28; Frede (1986) 713-53; Giuliano (1991) 105-90; Carson (1992) 110-30; Rutherford (1992) 133-156; Most (1994) 127-52; Demos (1999); McCoy (1999) 349-367; Provencal (1999) 58-66; Halliwell (2000) 94-112; Plax (2008) 285-304; Beresford (2008) 237-56 and (2009) 167-202; Martin (1998) 108-28 and (2009) 116-27.

Simonides was a very popular elegiac poet and epigrammatist and one of the major representatives of the old moral and wise tradition. In the *Republic*, Simonides is characterized as a wise and divine man and his verses are used as proverbs; he is an authority in moral issues.[429] He is also compared with Bias of Priene and Pittacus of Mytilene, who belong to the circle of the Seven Sages of antiquity. All of them are described as wise and blessed.[430] In the *Protagoras*, however, Simonides is described as 'eager for wisdom' (Pl. *Prot.* 343c: φιλότιμος ... ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ) and not as a wise man.

Simonides' song in the *Protagoras* is a response to a saying attributed to Pittacus, thus it is a *melos* of moral content. The melic poem has been reconstructed by scholars from the quotations in the Platonic dialogue (Pl. *Prot.* 339a-346e; PMG 542):

ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι
χαλεπὸν (χαλεττὸν), χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόωι
    τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον·
θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας· ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ
    ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι,
ὃν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέληι·
πράξας γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός,
κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς, <οὓς

(Shorter) discussions on the Simonides' song can also be found in commentaries of the *Protagoras*. See for example Taylor (1976); Goldberg (1983); Coby (1987); Arietti and Barrus (2010) and in Hutchinson's (2001) commentary on Greek Lyric Poetry. On the mixture of poetic genres in Socrates' speech in the *Protagoras* see Halliwell 2000: 104-5: "Socrates' response falls into two main parts. In the first, he produces a series of linguistic considerations designed to save Simonides from self-contradiction. Despite some irony, Socrates is here using a form of exegesis, which was available for serious use in contemporary intellectual circles. It is germane that the semantic arguments he brings to bear are of the kind later included in Aristotle's analysis of poetic 'problems' in *Poetics* 25. This is confirmed by the fact that comparable linguistic details enter into the second (and more earnest) part of Socrates' response, when, after suggesting that Simonides' poem was intended to negate and compete with the wisdom of one of Pittacus' 'sayings', he offers a new construal of certain features of the song, making syntactical and verbal remarks which once again anticipate interpretative techniques codified in Aristotle's *Poetics.* In both parts of his response to Protagoras, Socrates accepts and indeed develops his interlocutor's premise that it is possible to locate a logos, a 'statement' that is also an 'argument,' spoken by the 'voice' of the poet in the poem. The extent to which, bypassing consideration of generic conventions of utterance, he thereby turns the poem into a sequence of personal declaration vividly emphasized by his device of imagining Simonides conversing and disputing directly with Pittacus (343d, 343e-4a, 346b-7a)."

[429] Pl. *Rep.* 331d5, 331e2, 331e5, 332a7, 332b3, 332b3, 332b9, 332c6, 334e4

[430] Pl. *Rep.* 335e

δ’ οἱ θεοὶ φιλέωσιν

πλεῖστον, εἰσ’ ἄριστοι.>

οὐδ’ ἐμοὶ ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον

νέμεται, καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰ-

ρημένον· χαλεπὸν φάτ’ ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.

<ἐμοὶ ἀρκέει> μητ’ <ἐὼν> ἀπάλαμνος εἰ-

δώς τ’ ὀνησίπολιν δίκαν,

ὑγιὴς ἀνήρ· οὐ<δὲ μή νιν> ἐγώ

μωμήσομαι· τῶν γὰρ ἠλιθίων

ἀπείρων γενέθλα.

πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσίν

τ’ αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμεικται.

τοὔνεκεν οὔ ποτ’ ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι

δυνατὸν διζήμενος κενεὰν ἐς ἄ-

πρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω,

πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδέος ὅσοι

καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός·

ἐπὶ δ’ ὔμμιν εὑρὼν ἀπαγγελέω.

πάντας δ’ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω,

ἑκὼν ὅστις ἔρδηι

μηδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἀνάγκαι

δ’ οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται.

For a man it’s certainly hard to be truly good – perfect in hands, feet, and mind, built without a flaw; only a god could have that prize; but a man, there’s no way he can help being bad when some crisis that he cannot deal with takes him down. Any man’s good when life treats him well, bad if it treats him badly, and the best are those the gods love most.

But for me that Pittacus saying doesn’t ring true (even if he was a smart man): he says “being good is hard.” For me, a man’s good enough if he’s not lawless, and if he has the sense of right that does cities good – a decent guy; I certainly won’t find fault with him. After all, there’s an endless supply of fools. The way I see it, if there’s no shame in it, all’s fair.

So I’m not going to throw away my short span of life on a vain and empty hope, searching for something there cannot be, a completely

blameless man – not among us mortals who win our bread from the
broad earth. (If I do come across one, mind you, I'll let you know.) So
long as he does no wrong willfully, I give my praise and love to anyone.
Not even the gods can fight necessity.[431]

The song was probably composed and perhaps performed, when Simonides was living in Thessaly under the patronage of the Scopads, one of the wealthiest and most powerful aristocratic families of the region.[432] Athenaeus refers to Scopas, the tyrant of Crannon in Thessaly, who was fond of drinking and convivial gatherings (Ath. *Deipn*.10.51 Kaibel):

Φαινίας δὲ ὁ Ἐρέσιος ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Τυράννων ἀναίρεσις ἐκ τιμωρίας Σκόπα φησὶ τὸν Κρέοντος μὲν υἱόν, Σκόπα δὲ τοῦ παλαιοῦ ὑιδοῦν φιλοποτοῦντα διατελέσαι καὶ τὴν ἐπάνοδον τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν συμποσίων ποιεῖσθαι ἐπὶ θρόνου καθήμενον καὶ ὑπὸ τεσσάρων βασταζόμενον οὕτως οἴκαδε ἀπιέναι.

And Phainias the Eresian, in the book entitled, The Slaying of Tyrants out of Revenge, says that Scopas the son of Creon, and the grandson of the former Scopas, was throughout his whole life very fond of drinking; and that he used to return from banquets at which he had been present, sitting on a throne, and carried by four palanquin-bearers, and in that way he used to enter his house.

Cicero, among others,[433] narrates an anecdote about Simonides and Scopas that depicts the context of the performances of the songs that Simonides composed in his honor (Cic. De *Or*. 2.352-3 Wilkins):

Dicunt enim, cum cenaret Crannone in Thessalia Simonides apud Scopam fortunatum hominem et nobilem cecinissetque id carmen, quod in eum scripsisset, in quo multa ornandi causa poetarum more in Castorem scripta et

[431] The translation is that of Bereford (2009) 178-9.
[432] Taylor ((1975) (1991)) 141-2.
[433] One of the most important sources for this story is M. F. Quint. *Institut. Orat.* 11. 2. 11 – 16. The story has been discussed or mentioned by many ancient authors, such as Callim. fr. 64.1-14 Pfeiffer; Ov. Ib. 511-512; Val. Max.1.8. Ext. 7 (pp. 52 f. Kempf); Phaedr.4.25.4 ff.; Alciphron 3.32.2 (p. 98 Schepers); Aristid.50.36 (2. 434-435 Keil; 1. 512 Dind.); Ael.frs. 63 (= Suda s.v. 441), 78 Hercher; Libanius Or. 5.53 (1. 1 p. 320 Foerster). Cf. also Stob. *Eel.* 4.41.62 (5. 946 Hense), Simon.fr. 16/521 Page. I owe the references to Molinyeux (1971) 197-205, who examines Quintilian's version of the story.

> Pollucem fuissent, nimis illum sordide Simonidi dixisse se dimidium eius ei, quod pactus esset, pro illo carmine daturum; reliquum a suis Tyndaridis, quos aeque laudasset, peteret, si ei videretur. Paulo post esse ferunt nuntiatum Simonidi, ut prodiret; iuvenes stare ad ianuam duo quosdam, qui eum magno opere evocarent; surrexisse illum, prodisse, vidisse neminem: hoc interim spatio conclave illud, ubi epularetur Scopas, concidisse; ea ruina ipsum cum cognatis oppressum suis interisse […]
>
> It is said that, when Simonides was dining at Crannon in Thessaly at the house of a wealthy nobleman named Scopas, and sung a song that he had composed for him, in which, in the manner of the poets there were for decorative purposes many passages referred to Castor and Pollux, he (Scopas) said to him with excessive contempt that he would pay him half the fee that they had agreed on before the delivery of the song and if he liked he might ask his sons of Tyndareus for the rest, whom he had equally praised. A little later, a message was brought to Simonides to go outside; two young men standing at the door strongly called him out. Therefore, he rose from his seat and went out, and did not see anybody. In the meantime, the room, within which Scopas was giving the banquet collapsed; Scopas himself and his relations were crushed below the ruins and killed. […][434]

The Simonidean ode in honor of Scopas in Cicero's anecdote was sung at a banquet. The sympotic context of Cicero's story helps us imagine the possible context of the Simonidean odes in the court of Scopas. Therefore, the Simonidean ode in the *Protagoras* probably alludes to a sympotic context, but the discussion of the song takes place in a *synedrion*, as it has been shown. Since the *symposium* is converted into a *synedrion*, one might well think of a consequent adaptation of the song, too.

The dialogue between Socrates and Protagoras is defined as contest of speech (ἀγών λόγων) by the latter (Pl. *Prot*. 335a: ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐγὼ πολλοῖς ἤδη εἰς ἀγῶνα λόγων ἀφικόμην ἀνθρώποις). This contest of speech between Socrates, a lover of wisdom, and the sophist Protagoras in the Platonic dialogue seems to reflect the

[434] The translation is mine.

quarrel between the wise Simonides and the wise Pittacus[435] in the melic poem that is discussed. The moral content of the song is inextricably associated with the subject of the whole dialogue as well as with the purpose of the Socratic (Platonic) philosophy, that is the acquisition of virtue.[436] The interlocutors, however, are not interested in its melodic form, but only in its content. What is remarkable here is that this is consciously done. In 326a-b, (ἄλλων αὖ ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα διδάσκουσι μελοποιῶν, εἰς τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνοντες, καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς τε καὶ τὰς ἁρμονίας ἀναγκάζουσιν οἰκειοῦσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν παίδων), which has been discussed in the first chapter,[437] Protagoras describes the last stage of school education, which includes the learning of melic poems, melodies and rhythms. Thus, Protagoras who refers to the Simonides' ode knows that it is a melic poem, meant to be performed, and he consciously and intentionally treats it as text. Despite the initial impression that Socrates defends the poem, it is accepted by most scholars that his interpretation is ironic and comical.[438] Consequently, from this standpoint, Socrates undermines Simonides.

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[435] The quarrel between the two is established by Plato. One may notice the use of ἐρίζοντα in Pl. *Prot*. 343d: τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕνα λόγον φαίνεται ἐμβεβλῆσθαι, ἐὰν μή τις ὑπολάβῃ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥῆμα ὥσπερ <u>ἐρίζοντα</u> λέγειν τὸν Σιμωνίδην· […]

[436] Beresford (2009) 168 argues that Plato, who totally conceives Simonides' ideas, undermines and mocks his views: "Plato turns his attention to Simonides' song because it makes philosophical claims that he strongly disagrees with, and that his repudiation of its message, although deliberately obscured in the discussion itself, meshes very closely with the philosophical arguments of the other parts of the Protagoras." After offering a new version of the text and thus a new interpretation he concludes (p. 185): "We can now easily see, then, why Plato must have objected to this song very strongly, both considered in itself, and in his capacity as an aspiring public educator if it was popular and influential. He has Aristotle's reasons for disagreeing with it – only much more so. He regards the tragic view of life as not merely wrong, but blasphemous, and has powerful reasons for rejecting the idea of moral luck in particular. In the Platonic view, life is fair," says Beresford, and continues by arguing that human excellence can be achieved through his philosophy (p. 191): "Philosophy in the elevated Platonic sense just is the pursuit of ethical self-perfection through wisdom, and it is supposed to make us far better than 'most people,' who approach ethical questions in their emotional, haphazard, inconstant, unreflective way. So Simonides' claim that searching for ethical perfection is a waste of our short lives is to Plato precisely the equivalent of saying that philosophy itself is a big waste of time."

[437] Chapter I, p. 29

[438] Beresford (2009), 176: "The Socratic reading is not just wrong but, as seems clear, ironic, and comical – and you cannot give ironic misinterpretations of a text unless you have a very good sense of what the text is really saying. Also, if the irony was funny for Plato's readers then it seems likely that there was a standard, public understanding of the song." cf. Demos (1999) 11., who says that "if some of Socrates' statements seem ludicrous to us, it is because we are lacking the knowledge that Plato's – not to mention Socrates' – intended audience possessed regarding the poem under discussion."

Even so, the discussion on the meaning of the melic poem, despite the disregard of its form or performance, has transformed the *synedrion*[439] into a *symposium*, something that Socrates suddenly realizes and severely disapproves (Pl. *Prot*. 347b-d):

> εἰ δὲ βούλεται, περὶ μὲν ᾀσμάτων τε καὶ ἐπῶν ἐάσωμεν, περὶ δὲ ὧν τὸ πρῶτον ἐγώ σε ἠρώτησα, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἡδέως ἂν ἐπὶ τέλος ἔλθοιμι μετὰ σοῦ σκοπούμενος. καὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ μοι τὸ περὶ ποιήσεως διαλέγεσθαι ὁμοιότατον εἶναι τοῖς συμποσίοις τοῖς τῶν φαύλων καὶ ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀλλήλοις δι᾽ ἑαυτῶν συνεῖναι ἐν τῷ πότῳ μηδὲ διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν φωνῆς καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἑαυτῶν ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας, τιμίας ποιοῦσι τὰς αὐλητρίδας, πολλοῦ μισθούμενοι ἀλλοτρίαν φωνὴν τὴν τῶν αὐλῶν, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων φωνῆς ἀλλήλοις σύνεισιν· [...]
>
> But if he does not mind, let us talk no more of poems and verses, but consider the points on which I questioned you at first, Protagoras, and on which I should be glad to reach, with your help, a conclusion. For it seems to me that arguing about poetry is comparable to the *symposia* of common market-folk. These people, owing to their inability to carry on a familiar conversation over their wine by means of their own voices and discussions – such is their lack of education – put a premium on flute-girls by hiring the extraneous voice of the flute at a high price, and carry on their intercourse by means of its utterance; […]

Socrates characterization of the *synedrion* as '*symposium* of vulgar men,' who are incapable of amusing themselves with their own voices (speeches), and, who, instead must pay in order to hear 'external voices' leads him to the conclusion that an essential feature of *symposia*, namely the song in every form – either as song or as a written text – must be expelled from this gathering in Callias' house. Immediately afterwards, Socrates talks about the gathering of the educated people, which is idealized (Pl. *Prot*. 347d-348a):

[439] However, Socrates is not against wine drinking (Pl. *Prot*. 347b). Similarly, in the *Laws,* wine is accepted under certain conditions. Wine reinforces the sentiments but weakens the senses, the memories, the thoughts and the judgement. Pl. *Laws* 645de, 649de, 650ab, 653a, 666a, 672ab, 672d, 673e-674a, 773cd, 775b

> {ΣΩ} ὅπου δὲ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ συμπόται καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι εἰσίν, οὐκ ἂν ἴδοις οὔτ᾽ αὐλητρίδας οὔτε ὀρχηστρίδας οὔτε ψαλτρίας, ἀλλὰ αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς ἱκανοὺς ὄντας συνεῖναι ἄνευ τῶν λήρων τε καὶ παιδιῶν τούτων διὰ τῆς αὑτῶν φωνῆς, λέγοντάς τε καὶ ἀκούοντας ἐν μέρει ἑαυτῶν κοσμίως, κἂν πάνυ πολὺν οἶνον πίωσιν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε συνουσίαι, ἐὰν μὲν λάβωνται ἀνδρῶν οἷοίπερ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοί φασιν εἶναι, οὐδὲν δέονται ἀλλοτρίας φωνῆς οὐδὲ ποιητῶν, οὓς οὔτε ἀνερέσθαι οἷόν τ᾽ ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν, ἐπαγόμενοί τε αὐτοὺς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οἱ μὲν ταῦτά φασιν τὸν ποιητὴν νοεῖν, οἱ δ᾽ ἕτερα, περὶ πράγματος διαλεγόμενοι ὃ ἀδυνατοῦσι ἐξελέγξαι· ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας συνουσίας ἐῶσιν χαίρειν, αὐτοὶ δ᾽ ἑαυτοῖς σύνεισιν δι᾽ ἑαυτῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν λόγοις πεῖραν ἀλλήλων λαμβάνοντες καὶ διδόντες. τοὺς τοιούτους μοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι μᾶλλον μιμεῖσθαι ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ, καταθεμένους τοὺς ποιητὰς αὐτοὺς δι᾽ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πεῖραν λαμβάνοντας· [...]
>
> {SO} But where the party consists of thorough gentlemen who have had a proper education, you will see neither flute-girls nor dancing-girls nor harp-girls, but only the company contenting themselves with their own voice, and none of these fooleries and frolics – each speaking and listening decently in his turn, even though they may drink a great deal of wine. And so a gathering like this of ours, when it includes such men as most of us claim to be, requires no extraneous voices, not even of the poets, whom one cannot question on the sense of what they say; when they are adduced in discussion we are generally told by some that the poet thought so and so, and by others, something different, and they go on arguing about a matter which they are powerless to determine. No, this sort of meeting is avoided by men of culture, who prefer to converse directly with each other, and to use their own way of speech in putting one another by turns to the test. It is this sort of person that I think you and I ought rather to imitate; putting the poets aside, let us hold our discussion together in our own persons, making trial of the truth and of ourselves. […]

As Demos has observed, "Socrates paints a vivid picture of the sympotic environment of the 'common' men"[440] in order to highlight the contrast between these kinds of *symposia* and the gatherings of well-educated men and show what exactly distorted the current meeting.

[440] Demos (1999) 35.

Thus, how should the party for educated men be constructed and what should its main characteristics and its ultimate purpose be? Socrates creates an appropriate setting for discourse. As he explains, the virtuous participants of a party must use their own capacities for their amusement, therefore flute-girls, dancing-girls, harp-girls, and poets are unwelcome. On the contrary, κόσμος (good order/behavior) and πεῖρα (trial || experience) are necessary during the discussion in order to reach the ἀλήθεια (truth). That is the main difference between a *synedrion*, a sort of συνουσία (social interaction), which is suitable for educated men, and a *symposium*, which consists of uneducated men. Their common feature is wine.[441]

Xenophon, who seems to open up a dialogue with Plato, shows an entirely different view in his *Symposium*, by making the *symposiasts* sing and Socrates himself dance. Xenophon is an important comparandum in this respect, because his representation of the *symposium* highlights an aspect that Plato intentionally suppresses; the fact that the assembled company was able to sing and dance. In this way, Xenophon corrects the Platonic *Symposium*.

In the *Protagoras*, I have drawn attention to the architecture of the place. It seems to me that the reader is encouraged to imagine Callias' house with his portico outside and the rooms inside, where benches, couches and at least one chair exist. The meeting is described as a gathering for educated men and not as a *symposium* and is set in a place, where *melos* recedes and makes room for philosophy. The number of the guests is not limited: there are twenty-one named guests and others that are kept unnamed.

The spectators watch for the longest part of the dialogue the interpretation of the Simonidean ode that is not treated as a song. Despite the fact that wine is not prohibited, we do not see anyone of the participants drinking. No other sort of entertainment is offered or demonstrated except from the discussion of the Simonides' song to Scopas. Socrates, however, puts an end to the discussion of the melic poem, because even the interpretation of the song reminds him of the *symposia* of vulgar men. It seems that in deciphering Simonides' statements Socrates had to adopt sophistic methods and strategies, something that brought him really close to the world of sophists and musicians too. Despite the fact that *melos* was stripped from its melody and rhythm, the poetic text that remains has no place in the dialogue. Plato,

[441] Plato also adopts a similar attitude in the *Symposium*.

however, uses it in order to describe the suitable context, form, and content for his philosophy. Through poetry he promotes his "philosophical tenets."[442] He explains what one should say and avoid, creating the basis of a proper philosophical conversation.

In the *Protagoras*, Plato offers an interpretation of *melos* by widely known representatives of wisdom. The association of wisdom with music dominates the biggest part of the dialogue. The sophist Protagoras is compared with the famous musician Orpheus; the wise or the lover of wisdom Socrates defends the ode of the wise Simonides. The sage Pittacus, Simonides' rival, composed songs[443] and poems.[444] The double identities of the persons included in the dialogue imply multiple ironies. It is also ironic that Simonides' song is preserved thanks to Plato's quotation.

The sympotic overtones are clear, but the traditional form of the sympotic context is built anew, exactly as in the *Symposium*. The sympotic-like meeting in this dialogue is upgraded to a *synedrion*, a word that reveals the interplay and the bond between spatial context and philosophical dialogue.

III.1.3. *Republic.* The *synousia* at Cephalus' house

The discussion of the *Republic* takes place in Cephalus'[445] house. The participants attempt to give a thorough definition of justice and underscore its relation to happiness. In his attempt to solve these two basic problems, Socrates and his interlocutors construct a fictional city in theory.[446]

The beginning of the *Republic* is detailed and includes many topographical references. Socrates has visited Piraeus with Glaucon in order to pray to the

[442] Demos (1999) 37.
[443] Some fragments of his songs survive in Diogenes Laërtius' *Lives of Eminent Philosophers.*
[444] See Martin (1998) 113: "First, the sages are poets; second, they are involved in politics and, third, they are performers," and later in 118: "[...] the functions of the wise men as poets and as actors come together in their production of proverbial sayings. [...] Even without explicit "performance" factors mentioned, one can hear in the sages' sayings the poetic turn."
[445] A rich old man from Syracouse, Polemarchus' father.
[446] καλλίπολις (fair city). See Pl. *Rep*. 527c: μάλιστα προστακτέον ὅπως οἱ ἐν τῇ καλλιπόλει σοι μηδενὶ τρόπῳ […]

goddess[447] and attend the religious festival and now is about to return to Athens.[448] However, he is persuaded by Polemarchus and Adeimantus to stay for dinner at the former's house (Pl. *Rep*. 327a-b):

> κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος προσευξόμενός τε τῇ θεῷ καὶ ἅμα τὴν ἑορτὴν βουλόμενος θεάσασθαι τίνα τρόπον ποιήσουσιν ἅτε νῦν πρῶτον ἄγοντες. καλὴ μὲν οὖν μοι καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων πομπὴ ἔδοξεν εἶναι, οὐ μέντοι ἧττον ἐφαίνετο πρέπειν ἣν οἱ Θρᾷκες ἔπεμπον. προσευξάμενοι δὲ καὶ θεωρήσαντες ἀπῇμεν πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ.
>
> I went down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, to pay my devotions to the Goddess, and also because I wished to see how they would conduct the festival since this was its inauguration. I thought the procession of the citizens very fine, but it was no better than the show, made by the marching of the Thracian contingent. After we had said our prayers and seen the spectacle we were starting for town.

There is a ritual 'plot' underpinning the opening of the *Republic*. As Nightingale points out, Socrates, here, describes his private *theôria* in the festival of the Thracian goddess.[449] According to Nightingale, the model of the festival *theôria* that Plato transforms includes three stages:

> 1. Detachment: the *theōros* departs from his native city, leaving behind ordinary practical and political activities; freed from traditional constraints, he is able to achieve a different perspective on the world and his place in it.
> 2. Spectating: the *theōros* travels to a sacred 'space' where he views spectacles, rituals, and holy objects. Although he might carry this out in the context of an official mission, the act of spectating was, while it lasted, a simple matter of seeing, witnessing, and reflectively responding. This activity is distinct from the journey per se and the other activities in the pilgrimage: while spectating, the *theōros* suspended other activities and pursuits and opened himself to the

[447] The goddess is not named.

[448] From the beginning of the *Timaeus* we are informed that Socrates recites the dialogue of the *Republic* on the day after the festival to a small party, consisting of Critias, Timaeus, Hermocrates, and another unnamed person.

[449] Nightingale (2004 (repr. 2009)) 75. It is almost generally agreed that Socrates refers to the Thracian goddess Bendis. Campese (1998) 106-116 offers much information about the origin of the goddess, her identification with Greek goddesses and the comparison with Athena. For the practices of the cult of Bendis and its integration in the official religious calendar see Gastaldi (1998) 117-131 in the same volume.

spectacle. In addition, since the *theōros* viewed sacred objects and spectacles, his spectatorial activity had a religious orientation. He thus entered into a ritualized form of seeing in which other (more secular) forms of visualization were filtered out by religious rites and ceremonies.
3. The Return: the *theōros* eventually journeyed home and re-entered domestic and civic life. Like any individual who travels abroad, the *theōros* may have returned from the journey with different perspectives and points of view. The *theōros'* re-entry into the city created apprehension on the part of the citizens, since it was possible that he might bring foreing and 'corrupt' ideas into the polis.[450]

Socrates makes a positive comment on the procession of the citizens and summarizes his actions in two verbal forms: προσευξάμενοι and θεωρήσαντες (to pray and see as spectators). There is no description of the spectacle, hence, no reference to song or dance. The moment he sets off to Athens in order re-enter his domestic and civic life he changes his mind. What really makes Socrates stay in the Piraeus? It is the double promise of seeing the night festival and discussing with the youth (Pl. *Rep*. 328a):

> καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, ἆρά γε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, οὐδ᾽ ἴστε ὅτι λαμπὰς ἔσται πρὸς ἑσπέραν ἀφ᾽ ἵππων τῇ θεῷ; ἀφ᾽ ἵππων; ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ· καινόν γε τοῦτο. λαμπάδια ἔχοντες διαδώσουσιν ἀλλήλοις ἁμιλλώμενοι τοῖς ἵπποις; ἢ πῶς λέγεις; οὕτως, ἔφη ὁ Πολέμαρχος. καὶ πρός γε παννυχίδα ποιήσουσιν, ἣν ἄξιον θεάσασθαι· ἐξαναστησόμεθα γὰρ μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον καὶ τὴν παννυχίδα θεασόμεθα. καὶ συνεσόμεθά τε πολλοῖς τῶν νέων αὐτόθι καὶ διαλεξόμεθα.

> "Do you mean to say," interposed Adeimantus, "that you haven't heard that there is to be a torchlight race this evening on horseback in honor of the Goddess?" "On horseback?" said I. "That is a new idea. Will they carry torches and pass them along to one another as they race with the horses, or how do you mean?" "That's the way of it," said Polemarchus, "and, besides, there is to be a night festival which will be worth seeing. For after dinner we will get up and go out and see the night festival and meet a lot of the lads there and have good talk.

[450] Nightingale (2005) 162-163.

It is rare to find Socrates outside Athens and away from his haunts in the city.[451] However, the spectating of the torch-races on horses (θεασόμεθα), the social interaction with young people (συνεσόμεθά), and the discussion with them (διαλεξόμεθα) are strong enough reasons for Socrates to stay. Thus, the meeting at Polemarchus' house will include only dinner (δεῖπνον). After the dinner, social interaction (συνουσία < σύνειμι (συνεσόμεθα)) and conversation (διάλογος < διαλέγομαι (διαλεξόμεθα)) will follow.

Pannychis, the all-night festival will probably take place in a public place. It was inextricably connected with rites appropriate for the deity being celebrated, songs and dances.[452] In this instance there is no reference to or hint of singing or dancing activity, only to a torchlight race that is going to be held in honor of Bendis. In the dialogue, the celebration of Bendis includes a double procession of natives and Thraces (ἐπιχωρίων πομπή and Θρᾳκων πομπή), prayers to the god, a spectacle that is not described at all, a torchlight race on horses (λαμπάδια ἔχοντες διαδώσουσιν ἀλλήλοις ἁμιλλώμενοι τοῖς ἵπποις) and a night festival (παννυχίς).[453] There is no reference to *melos*.

When Socrates arrives at Polemarchus' house he finds six people. Among the persons present, Socrates notices Polemarchus' elderly father, Cephalus, who is sitting, newly-crowned for having presented a sacrifice in the court (ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ) (Pl. *Rep*. 328c):

> καθῆστο δὲ ἐστεφανωμένος ἐπί τινος προσκεφαλαίου τε καὶ δίφρου· τεθυκὼς γὰρ ἐτύγχανεν ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ.ἐκαθεζόμεθα οὖν παρ' αὐτόν· ἔκειντο γὰρ δίφροι τινὲς αὐτόθι κύκλῳ.

[451] In Plato's *Parmenides* Socrates (very young at that time) has come with some friends to Pythodorus' house in order to hear a reading from Zeno's treatise. Pythodorus' house is located in Ceramicus outside the city walls. There is no further description or reference to the house (or to any specific room), where the dialogue takes place or to the general context of the philosophical discussion. It is, however, worth noting that Socrates travels outside the city walls – but not very far way – in order to listen to Zeno. Like in the *Republic*, Socrates is not found in his usual places, but he participates in philosophical discussions. In the *Parmenides*, despite the fact that during the Great Panathenaia the two Eleatic philosophers attempt to 'harness Socrates into a regimen of Eleatic mental gymnastics,' as Roecklein (2011) 138 well puts it, Socrates prefers to 'exercise' in his own philosophical method.

[452] RE 36.2.s.v.; OCD s.v. (Mikalson).

[453] Gastaldi (1998) 121-131 considers Plato the most complete source for Bendis' feast. The Platonic description can be confirmed by various other sources, so the possibility that Plato added arbitrary elements and hence created a fictional depiction can be excluded.

> He was sitting on a sort of couch with cushions and he had a chaplet on his head, for he had just finished sacrificing in the court. So we went and sat down beside him, for there were seats there disposed in a circle.

Everyone sits on stools (δίφροι) beside Cephalus (παρ᾽ αὐτόν) in a circle (κύκλῳ). From the description it seems, however, that the seats are arranged in a semi-circle.[454] Instead of the κλίναι (couches) in the *Protagoras'* setting, here, Socrates uses the word δίφρος (seat, stool) in his attempt to eliminate every allusion to sympotic context.

Socrates starts to talk with Cephalus, but shortly afterwards Cephalus cedes the floor to his son Polemarchus and leaves the discussion to take care of his sacrifices.[455] There is no mention to dining, drinking, or any kind of singing and dancing, and one cannot be sure where exactly the whole dialogue takes place. The adverb αὐτόθι (there, on the spot) is not clear.

However, the references to music are frequent during the philosophical discussion of the *Republic*. Socrates creates an ideal city, a musical world where people should grow up and live.[456] Songs and dances are essential part of everyday life (Pl. *Rep*. 372b):

> θρέψονται δὲ ἐκ μὲν τῶν κριθῶν ἄλφιτα σκευαζόμενοι, ἐκ δὲ τῶν πυρῶν ἄλευρα, τὰ μὲν πέψαντες, τὰ δὲ μάξαντες, μάζας γενναίας καὶ ἄρτους ἐπὶ κάλαμόν τινα παραβαλλόμενοι ἢ φύλλα καθαρά, κατακλινέντες ἐπὶ στιβάδων ἐστρωμένων μίλακί τε καὶ μυρρίναις, εὐωχήσονται αὐτοί τε καὶ τὰ παιδία, ἐπιπίνοντες τοῦ οἴνου, ἐστεφανωμένοι καὶ ὑμνοῦντες τοὺς θεούς, ἡδέως συνόντες ἀλλήλοις […]

> And for their nourishment they will provide meal from their barley and flour from their wheat, and kneading and cooking these they will serve noble cakes and loaves on some arrangement of reeds or clean leaves, and, reclined on rustic beds strewn with bryony and myrtle, they will feast with their children, drinking

[454] The comparison with the arrangements of seats in the *Protagoras* is inevitable, see Pl. *Prot*. 317d-e.
[455] Pl. *Rep*. 331d: καὶ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Κέφαλος, καὶ παραδίδωμι ὑμῖν τὸν λόγον· δεῖ γάρ με ἤδη τῶν ἱερῶν ἐπιμεληθῆναι.
[456] Pl. *Rep*. 402a: Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τῶν τοιούτων ἕνεκα ἐν μουσικῇ εἶναι ἡ τροφή […]

> of their wine thereto, crowned and singing hymns to the gods in pleasant fellowship with each other […]

The text is pervaded by sympotic elements: κατακλινέντες (reclined), εὐωχήσονται (feast), οἴνου (wine), ἐστεφανωμένοι (crowned), ὑμνοῦντες τοὺς θεούς (singing hymns for the gods), ἡδέως συνόντες ἀλλήλοις (in pleasant fellowship with each other). But, this *symposium* and everything that takes place within its context is not marked out of the ordinary. As we read a little later, this kind of *symposium* is an essential part of everyday life, a usual practice for the citizens of a city of pigs (Pl. *Rep*. 372d):

> καὶ ὅς, εἰ δὲ ὑῶν πόλιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, κατεσκεύαζες, τί ἂν αὐτὰς ἄλλο ἢ ταῦτα ἐχόρταζες;
>
> And he said, "If you were founding a city of pigs, Socrates, what other fodder than this would you provide?"

This city that is also characterized in 372d as τρυφῶσαν (luxurious) and φλεγμαίνουσαν (fevered). This seems to be a subtle way for Plato to undermine the sympotic context without explicitly rejecting it. It is through the correction of the defects of such a city that the healthy city will eventually emerge and bloom. As we shall see in a moment, the sympotic practices and elements are entirely disapproved.

Socrates criticizes many conventional principles of the *symposium*, such as certain kind of musical modes. In the following passage, the Ionian and Lydian modes are accused of being 'soft and convivial' (Pl. *Rep*. 398e):

> {ΣΩ} τίνες οὖν μαλακαί τε καὶ συμποτικαὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν; ἰαστί, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, καὶ λυδιστὶ αὖ τινες χαλαραὶ καλοῦνται. ταύταις οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ἐπὶ πολεμικῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔσθ᾽ ὅτι χρήσῃ; οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· […]
>
> {SO} "What, then, are the soft and convivial modes?" "There are certain Ionian and also Lydian modes that are called lax." "Will you make any use of them for warriors?" "None at all," he said; […]

After the rejection of the sympotic harmonies Socrates and his interlocutors must choose the musical instruments that must be allowed and those that must be forbidden from the ideal city (Pl. *Rep*. 399d):

> τί δέ; αὐλοποιοὺς ἢ αὐλητὰς παραδέξῃ εἰς τὴν πόλιν; ἢ οὐ τοῦτο πολυχορδότατον, καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ παναρμόνια αὐλοῦ τυγχάνει ὄντα μίμημα; δῆλα δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. λύρα δή σοι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ κιθάρα λείπεται καὶ κατὰ πόλιν χρήσιμα· καὶ αὖ κατ᾽ ἀγροὺς τοῖς νομεῦσι σῦριγξ ἄν τις εἴη.
>
> "Well, will you admit to the city flute-makers and flute-players? Or is not the flute the most 'many-stringed' of instruments and do not the pan-harmonics themselves imitate it?" "Clearly," he said. "You have left," said I, "the lyre and the kithara. These are useful in the city, and in the fields the shepherds would have a syrinx to pipe on."

The flute, the most popular instrument in the *symposia*, is not admitted to the city. So far, there are three constraints on the everyday *symposium*: no drunkenness (wine is permitted though), no soft and convivial musical modes, and no use of the flute. This is undoubtedly a non-traditional *symposium*.

In the *Republic*, we find Socrates far from his regularly-frequented places in a context that is loosely associated with religious rites, and as promised it is completely dedicated to philosophical discourse. It is worthy of note that the sympotic context is a matter of discussion during the creation of the good and fair city that is only an imaginary future creation.[457] However, Socrates does not discuss, or perhaps avoids discussing, any sympotic methods and practices and, as it has been already remarked, there is no reference to *melos* in the context of *synousia* at Cephalus' house, despite the occasion of the festival of Bendis, Socrates' private *theôria* and the mention of Cephalus' engagement in offering a sacrifice. The focus is again on the philosophical discussion, which, however, gives emphasis on various aspects of musical education. So, *melos* is kept within a philosophical frame, tamed by specific rules.

[457] The idea of the creation of a city in theory is stated in Pl. *Rep*. 369c: ἴθι δή, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τῷ λόγῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῶμεν πόλιν· ποιήσει δὲ αὐτήν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ ἡμετέρα χρεία.

III.2. *Palaistrai* and *gymnasia*

III.2.1. *Lysis*. The *palaistra* of Miccus

In the beginning of the *Lysis* Socrates narrates that he was walking from the Academy towards the *Lyceum* when he came across Hippothales and Ctessipus. He was persuaded to follow them to a recently made *palaistra* (wrestling school) in order to participate in discussions with other men. Socrates behaves as a teacher for everyone. In the first part of the dialogue he teaches Hippothales the most appropriate style in order to address his beloved Lysis. In the second part, per Lysis' request, Plato – addressing Menexenus – tries to understand what friendship (φιλία) is.

In the following passage Socrates gives a short, but detailed description of the surroundings during his walk to the *Lyceum* (Pl. *Lys*. 203a):

> {ΣΩ} ἐπορευόμην μὲν ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας εὐθὺ Λυκείου τὴν ἔξω τείχους ὑπ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ τεῖχος· ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἐγενόμην κατὰ τὴν πυλίδα ᾗ ἡ Πάνοπος κρήνη, ἐνταῦθα συνέτυχον Ἱπποθάλει τε τῷ Ἱερωνύμου καὶ Κτησίππῳ τῷ Παιανιεῖ καὶ ἄλλοις μετὰ τούτων νεανίσκοις ἁθρόοις συνεστῶσι.

> {SO} I was making my way from the Academy straight to the *Lyceum*, by the road outside the town wall, – just under the wall; and when I reached the little gate that leads to the spring of Panops, I chanced there upon Hippothales, son of Hieronymus, and Ctesippus of Paeania, and some other youths with them, standing in a group together.

The accuracy of the geographical instructions has been disputed.[458] However, whether accurate or not, the reader is able to imagine and follow the path and the specific location, where Socrates meets Hippothales and Ctesippus. The mention of

[458] See Planeaux's (2001) 61 argument against the inaccuracy of the geographical instructions given in this passage. Planeaux argues that Socrates' real intention was to "go to the Fountain of Panops and not the Lyceum." Cf. Hennig (2010) 3, who refutes Planeaux's argument by explaining that "if Socrates, someone who is frequently stopped by others who want to converse with him, actually wanted to go to the Lyceum in an efficient manner, then he might have to take an indirect, 'less traveled' path. Avoiding others may, in fact, be, for Socrates, the most direct and time efficient way to the *Lyceum*."

the path outside the wall, the small gate, and the fountain of Panops offer a short but vivid picture of Socrates' walk from the one *gymnasium* to the other.

Plato's desire to direct the readers' attention to the landscape is confirmed by the fact that a little later he uses the same words to answer at Hippothales' relevant question: ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πορεύομαι εὐθὺ Λυκείου. Hippothales points at the *palaistra* that stood opposite the wall (καταντικρὺ τοῦ τείχους) and invites Socrates to meet his companions who are already there (Pl. *Lys*. 203a-204a):

> καί με προσιόντα ὁ Ἱπποθάλης ἰδών, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ποῖ δὴ πορεύῃ καὶ πόθεν; ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πορεύομαι εὐθὺ Λυκείου. δεῦρο δή, ἦ δ' ὅς, εὐθὺ ἡμῶν. οὐ παραβάλλεις; ἄξιον μέντοι. ποῖ, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις, καὶ παρὰ τίνας τοὺς ὑμᾶς; δεῦρο, ἔφη, δείξας μοι ἐν τῷ καταντικρὺ τοῦ τείχους περίβολόν τέ τινα καὶ θύραν ἀνεῳγμένην. διατρίβομεν δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, αὐτόθι ἡμεῖς τε αὐτοὶ καὶ ἄλλοι πάνυ πολλοὶ καὶ καλοί ἔστιν δὲ δὴ τί τοῦτο, καὶ τίς ἡ διατριβή; παλαίστρα, ἔφη, νεωστὶ ᾠκοδομημένη· ἡ δὲ διατριβὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἐν λόγοις, ὧν ἡδέως ἄν σοι μεταδιδοῖμεν. καλῶς γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιοῦντε· διδάσκει δὲ τίς αὐτόθι; σὸς ἑταῖρός γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ ἐπαινέτης, Μίκκος. μὰ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ φαῦλός γε ἀνήρ, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸς σοφιστής. βούλει οὖν ἕπεσθαι, ἔφη, ἵνα καὶ ἴδῃς τοὺς ὄντας αὐτόθι αὐτοῦ;
>
> Then Hippothales, as he saw me approaching, said: Socrates, whither away, and whence? From the Academy, I replied, on my way straight to the *Lyceum*. Come over here, he said, straight to us. You will not put in here? But you may as well. Where do you mean? I asked; and what is your company? Here, he said, showing me there, just opposite the wall, a sort of enclosure and a door standing open. We pass our time there, he went on; not only we ourselves, but others besides, – a great many, and handsome. And what, pray, is this place, and what your amusement? A wrestling-school, he said, of recent construction; and our amusement chiefly consists of discussions, in which we should be happy to let you have a share. That is very good of you, I said; and who does the teaching there? Your own comrade, he replied, and supporter, Miccus. Upon my word, I said, he is no slight person, but a qualified professor. Then will you please come in with us, he said, so as to see for yourself the company we have there?

The *palaistra* has been recently built (νεωστὶ ᾠκοδομημένη) and is described as a delimited area with an open door (περίβολόν τέ τινα καὶ θύραν ἀνεῳγμένην).

Miccus[459] is lecturing in this *palaistra*. Socrates' question on the *diatribê* in the *palaistra* anticipates the description of the activities that take place in it.

But, what exactly is a *palaistra*? According to the definition given in the Oxford Classical Dictionary:[460]

> *palaistra* was a wrestling ground, a place for athletic exercise, whether public or private, which eventually took the conventional form of an enclosed courtyard surrounded by rooms for changing, washing, etc. The application of the term to actual buildings is often uncertain; conventionally it is used for structures significantly smaller in size than the developed gymnasia. […].[461]

Thus, *palaistra* was – at least in its primitive form – a delimited open-air space intended for athletic activities. It is not certain wheter Plato enriches the spectrum of activities that take place in the *palaistra* with the addition of philosophical

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[459] For the identity of Miccus I quote the relevant paragraph from Nails' book (2002) 206: "Prosopographical notes. LGPN2 lists the three PA persons of this name, two of whom are much too late to be compatible with a dramatic date for the Lysis of ±409. FRA adds a Miccus of Torone, son of Calliclides, known from a funerary monument dated 450–20, which is too early. PA 10193 = LGPN2 1 (= NIA 3 T26) is the 5th–4th c. father of an Alcaeus who was a comic poet (writing mythological burlesques, and known from Aristophanes' Plutus schol., for having composed a Pasiphae in 388 that competed against Plu.). LGPN2 includes the Suda reference "A 1274 Ἀλκαῖος" which identifies the son as "a Mytilenian, then an Athenian," prompting FRA to accept that the son of Miccus must have been a naturalized citizen of Athens. PP (p. 197) mentions Miccus only to list him among prefects of various types of schools."

[460] OCD s.v. (Tomlinson). See also the definition given in DGRA s.v.: PALAESTRA (παλαίστρα) properly means a place for wrestling (παλαίειν, πάλη), and appears to have originally formed a part of the *gymnasium*. The word was, however, used in different senses at various periods, and its exact meaning, especially in relation to the gymnasium, has occasioned much controversy among modern writers. Its first use occurs in Herodotus (VI.126, 128), who says that Cleisthenes of Sicyon built a dromos and a *palaistra*, both of which he calls by the general name of *palaistra*. At Athens, however, there was a considerable number of *palaistrai*, quite distinct from the *gymnasium*, which were called by the names either of their founders, or of the teachers who gave instruction there; thus, for example, we read of the palaestra of Taureas (Plut. Charmid. init.). Krause (Gymnastik und Agonistik der Hellenen, p. 117, etc.) contends that the *palaistrai* at Athens were appropriated to the gymnastic exercises of boys and youths (παίδες and μειράκια), and the *gymnasia* to those of men; but Becker (Charikles, vol. I pp. 311, 335, etc.) has shown that this cannot be the true distinction, although it appears that certain places were, for obvious reasons, appropriated to the exclusive use of boys (Aesch. c. Timarch. p. 35, Reiske). But that the boys exercised in the *gymnasia* as well, is plain from many passages (Antiph. de Caed. invol. p. 661, Reiske; παῖς ὡραῖος ἀπὸ γυμνασίου, Aristoph. Av. 138, 140); while, on the other hand, we read of men visiting the palaistrai (Lucian, Navig. 4, vol. III p. 251, Reitz).

[461] A shorter, but similar description of the *palaistra* is also given in the OCCL.

conversations or whether the *palaistra* was in fact used as an athletic, religious, and intellectual center before Plato, which might be the case.[462]

Unlike in the *Lysis*, where the *palaistra* is intended for athletic and philosophical pursuits as well, in the *Gorgias*, Plato describes the *palaistra* as a school, where boys where trained in gymnastics (Pl. *Gorg*. 456d-e):

> καὶ γὰρ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ πρὸς ἅπαντας χρῆσθαι ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἔμαθεν πυκτεύειν τε καὶ παγκρατιάζειν καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, ὥστε κρείττων εἶναι καὶ φίλων καὶ ἐχθρῶν, οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα τοὺς φίλους δεῖ τύπτειν οὐδὲ κεντεῖν τε καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι. οὐδέ γε μὰ Δία ἐάν τις εἰς παλαίστραν φοιτήσας εὖ ἔχων τὸ σῶμα καὶ πυκτικὸς γενόμενος, ἔπειτα τὸν πατέρα τύπτῃ καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν οἰκείων ἢ τῶν φίλων, οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ τοὺς παιδοτρίβας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις διδάσκοντας μάχεσθαι μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων.

> For other exercises are not to be used against all and sundry, just because one has learnt boxing or wrestling or fighting in armour so well as to vanquish friend and foe alike: this gives one no right to strike one's friends, or stab them to death. Nor, in all conscience, if a man took lessons at a wrestling-school, and having got himself into good condition and learnt boxing he proceeded to strike his father and mother, or some other of his relations or friends, should that be a reason for hating athletic trainers and teachers of fighting in armour, and expelling them from our cities.

The *palaistra* in the *Lysis* serves as setting for the Platonic dialogue. Plato exploits the wrestling school, which is filled with young persons, into a place for philosophical exercise. More specifically, Socrates understands that the real reason of Hippothales' request to accompany them in the *palaistra* is his desire to learn the most suitable way to approach the beautiful young Lysis. Ctesippus reveals that Hippothales is so infatuated with Lysis that he writes poems and prose compositions for him and then sings them with his extraordinary voice (Pl. *Lys*. 204d):

[462] See Bordt (1998) 109-110 incl. the references. See also pp. 111-112 of this thesis, where important bibliography on the matter has been included.

{KTH} καὶ ἃ μὲν καταλογάδην διηγεῖται, δεινὰ ὄντα, οὐ πάνυ τι δεινά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὰν τὰ ποιήματα ἡμῶν ἐπιχειρήσῃ καταντλεῖν καὶ συγγράμματα. καὶ ὅ ἐστιν τούτων δεινότερον, ὅτι καὶ ᾄδει εἰς τὰ παιδικὰ φωνῇ θαυμασίᾳ, ἣν ἡμᾶς δεῖ ἀκούοντας ἀνέχεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐρυθριᾷ.

{CTE} The descriptions he gives us in conversation, though dreadful enough, are not so very bad: it is when he sets about inundating us with his poems and prose compositions. More dreadful than all, he actually sings about his favorite in an extraordinary voice, which we have the trial of hearing. And now, at a question from you, he blushes.

The qualitative hierarchy of Hippothales' artistic skills according to Ctesippus is well worth noting; his oral descriptions are not very bad (οὐ πάνυ τι δεινά), his numerous (καταντλεῖν) poetic and prose compositions are terrible, but his voice when singing his composed pieces is the worst of all (ὅ ἐστιν τούτων δεινότερον).[463] How does Hippothales react when hearing these words from Ctesippus? Hippothales blushes at Ctesippus' revelations, something that is repeated later. Socrates, however, is interested in the content of his compositions (Pl. *Lys*. 205a-b):

{ΣΩ} ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, οὔ τι τῶν μέτρων δέομαι ἀκοῦσαι οὐδὲ μέλος εἴ τι πεποίηκας εἰς τὸν νεανίσκον, ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας, ἵνα εἰδῶ τίνα τρόπον προσφέρῃ πρὸς τὰ παιδικά.

{SO} Hippothales, I do not want to hear your verses, or any song that you may have composedfor the youth; I only ask for their purport, that I may know your manner of dealing with your favorite.

As I have already mentioned, Socrates is not willing to hear Hippothales' singing. The subject of love and the rejection of *melos* by Socrates recalls the similar

[463] Tecusan (1990) 242-3 sees sympotic motifs in the *Lysis* too. She argues that "the young company following Ktesippos and Hippothales … is made up of friends, who form not just a group of friends, but also 'a drinking-group'." The use of the verb ὑποπίῃ (drink moderately) in 204d in order to denote one of Hippothales' usual activities combined with the frequent use of the personal pronoun in the plural ἡμεῖς are neither strong nor enough evidence to support this case. She also adds that all these "eulogies in praise of Lysias … were performed at symposia."

initial scene of the *Symposium*, where the philosophic discourse devoted to *Erôs* begins after the flute-girl is expelled from Agathon's party.

Ctesippus answers to Socrates' request. As he explains, Hippothales includes in his compositions what the whole city sings about the athletic victories of his ancestors at the Pythian, the Isthmian, and the Nemean Games as well as ancient tales that show Lysis' association with heroes and gods (Pl. *Lys*. 205c-d):

> {ΚΤΗ} […] ἃ δὲ ἡ πόλις ὅλη ᾄδει περὶ Δημοκράτους καὶ Λύσιδος τοῦ πάππου τοῦ παιδὸς καὶ πάντων πέρι τῶν προγόνων, πλούτους τε καὶ ἱπποτροφίας καὶ νίκας Πυθοῖ καὶ Ἰσθμοῖ καὶ Νεμέᾳ τεθρίπποις τε καὶ κέλησι, ταῦτα ποιεῖ τε καὶ λέγει, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἔτι τούτων κρονικώτερα. τὸν γὰρ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ξενισμὸν πρῴην ἡμῖν ἐν ποιήματί τινι διῄει, ὡς διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἡρακλέους συγγένειαν ὁ πρόγονος αὐτῶν ὑποδέξαιτο τὸν Ἡρακλέα, γεγονὼς αὐτὸς ἐκ Διός τε καὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου ἀρχηγέτου θυγατρός, ἅπερ αἱ γραῖαι ᾄδουσι, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἃ οὗτος λέγων τε καὶ ᾄδων ἀναγκάζει καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀκροᾶσθαι.

> {CTE} […] but he only writes and relates things that the whole city sings of, recalling Democrates and the boy's grandfather Lysis and all his ancestors, with their wealth and the horses they kept, and their victories at Delphi, the Isthmus, and Nemea, with chariot-teams and coursers, and, in addition, even hoarier antiquities than these. Only two days ago he was recounting to us in some poem of his the entertainment of Hercules, – how on account of his kinship with Hercules their forefather welcomed the hero, being himself the offspring of Zeus and of the daughter of their deme's founder; such old wives' tales, and many more of the sort, Socrates, – these are the things he tells and trolls, while compelling us to be his audience.

The description of the songs brings immediately to mind the epinician songs of the great masters.[464] Thus, what Hippothales does, is to take the epinician songs attributed to Lysis' family, compose his own poems or prose writings, and sing them in front of an audience, which is compelled to listen to them. The love for the young boy prompts Hippothales to write epinician songs and prose *encômia* for his sake and

[464] For a comprehensive and detailed discussion of the Pindaric epinician songs as monuments of shared emotional experiences see Athanassaki (2012) 173-219.

perform them in front of a group that instead of τέρψις (enjoyment) experiences a negative wonder. The reception of Hippothales' performance is evident from the comments that Ctesippus makes, speaking not only for himself.[465]

The discussion between Socrates and Hippothales takes place outside the *palaistra*. Socrates discourages him from composing poetry for his beloved and accepts to help him by showing in action the most suitable way to address his favourite. They will enter the *palaistra* after leaving the epinician song outside (Pl. *Lys*. 206c-d):

> {ΙΠ} ἂν γὰρ εἰσέλθῃς μετὰ Κτησίππου τοῦδε καὶ καθεζόμενος διαλέγῃ, οἶμαι μὲν καὶ αὐτός σοι πρόσεισι – φιλήκοος γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, διαφερόντως ἐστίν, καὶ ἅμα, ὡς Ἑρμαῖα ἄγουσιν, ἀναμεμειγμένοι ἐν ταὐτῷ εἰσιν οἵ τε νεανίσκοι καὶ οἱ παῖδες – πρόσεισιν οὖν σοι.
>
> {HIP} If you will go in with Ctesippus here, and take a seat and talk, I think he will come to you of his own accord; he is singularly fond of listening, Socrates, and besides, they are keeping the Hermaea, so that the youths and boys are all mingled together.

The occasion is good thanks to the festival of Hermes that is celebrated at the time in the wrestling school for the mixing of young men and boys. After the description of the exterior of the *palaistra* in 203a-204a Socrates enters and proceeds with the description of the various ongoing activities inside it (Pl. *Lys*. 206d-207b):

> {ΣΩ} καὶ ἅμα λαβὼν τὸν Κτήσιππον προσῇα εἰς τὴν παλαίστραν· οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι ὕστεροι ἡμῶν ᾖσαν. εἰσελθόντες δὲ κατελάβομεν αὐτόθι τεθυκότας τε τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰ ἱερεῖα σχεδόν τι ἤδη πεποιημένα, ἀστραγαλίζοντάς τε δὴ καὶ κεκοσμημένους ἅπαντας. οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ ἔπαιζον ἔξω, οἱ δέ τινες τοῦ ἀποδυτηρίου ἐν γωνίᾳ ἠρτίαζον ἀστραγάλοις παμπόλλοις, ἐκ φορμίσκων τινῶν προαιρούμενοι· τούτους δὲ περιέστασαν ἄλλοι θεωροῦντες. ὧν δὴ καὶ ὁ Λύσις ἦν, καὶ εἱστήκει ἐν τοῖς παισί τε καὶ νεανίσκοις ἐστεφανωμένος καὶ τὴν ὄψιν διαφέρων, οὐ τὸ καλὸς εἶναι μόνον ἄξιος ἀκοῦσαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι καλός τε κἀγαθός. καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ ἀποχωρήσαντες

[465] Pl. *Lys*. 204c-d: ἡμῶν γοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκκεκώφωκε τὰ ὦτα, 204d: φωνῇ θαυμασίᾳ, 205b: καταγέλαστα.

ἐκαθεζόμεθα – ἦν γὰρ αὐτόθι ἡσυχία – καί τι ἀλλήλοις διελεγόμεθα. περιστρεφόμενος οὖν ὁ Λύσις θαμὰ ἐπεσκοπεῖτο ἡμᾶς, καὶ δῆλος ἦν ἐπιθυμῶν προσελθεῖν. τέως μὲν οὖν ἠπόρει τε καὶ ὤκνει μόνος προσιέναι, ἔπειτα ὁ Μενέξενος ἐκ τῆς αὐλῆς μεταξὺ παίζων εἰσέρχεται, καὶ ὡς εἶδεν ἐμέ τε καὶ τὸν Κτήσιππον, ᾔει παρακαθιζησόμενος

{SO} Whereupon I took Ctesippus with me into the wrestling-school, and the others came after us. When we got inside, we found that the boys had performed the sacrifice in the place and, as the ceremonial business was now almost over, they were all playing at knuckle-bones and wearing their finest attire. Most of them were playing in the court out-of-doors; but some were at a game of odd-and-even in a corner of the undressing room, with a great lot of knuckle-bones which they drew from little baskets; and there were others standing about them and looking on. Among these was Lysis: he stood among the boys and youths with a garland on his head, a distinguished figure, deserving not merely the name of well-favored, but also of well-made and well-bred. As for us, we went and sat apart on the opposite side -for it was quiet there- and started some talk amongst ourselves. The result was that Lysis ever and anon turned round to observe us, and was obviously eager to join us. For a while, however, he hesitated, being too shy to approach us alone; till Menexenus stepped in for a moment from his game in the court and, on seeing me and Ctesippus, came to take a seat beside us.

Sacrifices and ceremonies are almost over (τεθυκότας … καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰ ἱερεῖα…[466] πεποιημένα) and games are being played everywhere and by everyone (ἀστραγαλίζοντάς… ἅπαντας || οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ ἔπαιζον ἔξω, οἱ δέ τινες τοῦ ἀποδυτηρίου ἐν γωνίᾳ ἠρτίαζον ἀστραγάλοις παμπόλλοις…). There is no mention of hymns that usually accompany the sacrifices and the rites.

The *palaistra* of Miccus consists of an open-air court (ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ) that adjoins undressing rooms (τοῦ ἀποδυτηρίου). In each of these spaces different kinds of activities and games take place. Although Socrates emphasizes the lively atmosphere of the *palaistra*, he is aware of the fact that the philosophical discussion cannot be

[466] Socrates also mentions the participation in the rites in Pl. *Lys*. 207d: μεταξὺ οὖν τις προσελθὼν ἀνέστησε τὸν Μενέξενον, φάσκων καλεῖν τὸν παιδοτρίβην· ἐδόκει γάρ μοι ἱεροποιῶν τυγχάνειν.

held in such a noisy place; therefore, he finds a quite place to sit and talk (… εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ … ἐκαθεζόμεθα - ἦν γὰρ αὐτόθι ἡσυχία).

Socrates does not need any other activity in order to be amused. He has already rejected Hippothales' epinician songs and prose compositions and now he decides to move away from the ritual and any other activity that is associated with the *palaistra* in pursuit of his beloved intellectual habit, which is the philosophical discussion. It seems that this is his only real entertainment, something that everyone knows (Pl. *Lys*. 211c-d):

> τί ὑμεῖς, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, αὐτὼ μόνω ἑστιᾶσθον, ἡμῖν δὲ οὐ μεταδίδοτον τῶν λόγων;[467]
>
> What is this feast, said Ctesippus, that you two are having by yourselves, without allowing us a share in your talk?

Socrates leads the conversation assuming the role of the teacher for the young boys Lysis and Menexenus on the subject of φιλία. His intellectual ability is evident, but there are no references to the reactions of the listeners. In the end, Socrates admits that they got drunk from the discussion. Therefore, all his interlocutors are encouraged to come to an agreement in order to move forward (Pl. *Lys*. 222c):

> {ΣΩ} βούλεσθ᾽ οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ ὥσπερ μεθύομεν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, συγχωρήσωμεν καὶ φῶμεν ἕτερόν τι εἶναι τὸ οἰκεῖον τοῦ ὁμοίου;
>
> {SO} "So how if we agree now", I said, "since we got drunk from our speech, to say that the belonging and the like are two different things"?

The verb μεθύω alludes to a *symposium*, where someone drinks heavily. But, how does one become drunk with philosophy? Is this proof of Plato's attempt to reform the traditional *symposium*, as he did in the *Symposium*, in the *Protagoras*, and in the *Republic* by making philosophy the main entertainment that overshadows and undermines song, dance and wine drinking? The philosophic dialogue that takes the

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[467] See also Pl. *Phdr*. 227b: τίς οὖν δὴ ἦν ἡ διατριβή; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῶν λόγων ὑμᾶς Λυσίας εἱστία; || Pl. *Tim*. 27b: τελέως τε καὶ λαμπρῶς ἔοικα ἀνταπολήψεσθαι τὴν τῶν λόγων ἑστίασιν.

position of wine drinking here obtains the qualities of wine and thus, causes the same problems. Hence, philosophy becomes more easily accessible and more pleasant in the eyes of the uninitiated. This blend of philosophical practice with the function of wine drinking in a place meant for athletic activities is a wonderful example of Plato's complex way of thinking.

In the meantime, the angry tutors of Menexenus and Lysis, who came to pick up the boys, interrupt the dialogue and bring the meeting to an end (Pl. *Lys*. 223a-b):

> κᾆτα, ὥσπερ δαίμονές τινες, προσελθόντες οἱ παιδαγωγοί, ὅ τε τοῦ Μενεξένου καὶ ὁ τοῦ Λύσιδος, ἔχοντες αὐτῶν τοὺς ἀδελφούς, παρεκάλουν καὶ ἐκέλευον αὐτοὺς οἴκαδ᾽ ἀπιέναι· ἤδη γὰρ ἦν ὀψέ.τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ οἱ περιεστῶτες αὐτοὺς ἀπηλαύνομεν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐφρόντιζον ἡμῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑποβαρβαρίζοντες ἠγανάκτουν τε καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐκάλουν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐδόκουν ἡμῖν ὑποπεπωκότες ἐν τοῖς Ἑρμαίοις ἄποροι εἶναι προσφέρεσθαι, ἡττηθέντες οὖν αὐτῶν διελύσαμεν τὴν συνουσίαν.

> when, like spirits from another world, there came upon us the tutors of Menexenus and Lysis: they were bringing along the boys' brothers, and called out to them the order to go home; for it was getting late. At first we tried, with the help of the group around us, to drive the tutors off; but they took no notice of us at all, and went on angrily calling, as before, in their foreign accent. We decided that they had taken a drop too much at the festival and might be awkward customers; so we gave in to them, and broke up our gathering.

The ending scene of the *Lysis* recalls the end of the *Symposium*, where the arrival of the second *kômos* puts an end to the philosophical conversation. Their common point is that the group that dissolves the gathering in both dialogues is drunk and noisy. The main difference between the two scenes is that in the *Lysis* the tutors seem to be (ἐδόκουν ἡμῖν) slightly drunk (ὑποπεπωκότες), while in the *Symposium* the revelers are indeed heavily drunk.

Of note is the fact that the discussion in the *palaistra* of Miccus is characterized as *synousia*. This phrase (διελύσαμεν τὴν συνουσίαν) made Bosch-Veciana comment

that this dialogue is "a dramatization of a Socratic synousia,"[468] that has a strong impact on every member of it.

> Socratic *sunousia*, quite different from the *sunousia* of the old «paideia» and that of Sophists, presupposes a new understanding of philosophy itself: *sunousia* is the way Socratic philosophy has of bringing about a real transformation in those who share the 'sinousial' meeting. This transformation takes place even in Socrates himself (who becomes a friend of the youth: 223b7). The refusal of this way of understanding philosophy on the part of the polis leads to Socrates' death sentence, since the Socratic synousia was understood by some of his fellow citizens to be a meeting for sedition. Plato places philosophy in a safe shelter: from the arenes and the agora, philosophy becomes enclosed inside a space, that of the Athenian Academy.[469]

As we have seen, the dialogue takes place in the *palaistra* that is lively depicted. Socrates rejects song before entering the *palaistra* and does not participate in any kind of athletic, ritual activity or celebratory activity that the festival of Hermaia would permit. He focuses merely on the shared intellectual and emotional experience that his philosophy may offer in the frame of the competitive atmosphere that the *palaistra* creates.[470] The subject of love and friendship is treated with the contribution of philosophy and not with the use of any kind or element of *melos*. The subject shifts from the trivial sexual love outside the *palaistra*, to the valuable friendship inside the *palaistra*. Philosophy manages to enter the *palaistra*, whereas *melos* stays notably out of it.

III.2.2. *Charmides*. The *palaistra* of Taureas

In the *Charmides*, Socrates narrates to an unknown addressee that after his return from the battle at Potidaea (432 BC), he wished to return to his old favorite habits. Therefore, he headed to the *palaistra* of Taureas, where he engaged Critias and his young cousin Charmides in a discussion about temperance (σωφροσύνη) (Pl. *Charm.* 153a-b):

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[468] Bosch-Vecciana (2000) 57.
[469] Ibid.
[470] For the competitive atmosphere of the *palaistra* see Gonzalez (2003) 17.

ἥκομεν τῇ προτεραίᾳ ἑσπέρας ἐκ Ποτειδαίας ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου, οἷον δὲ διὰ χρόνου ἀφιγμένος ἁσμένως ᾖα ἐπὶ τὰς συνήθεις διατριβάς. καὶ δὴ καὶ εἰς τὴν Ταυρέου παλαίστραν τὴν καταντικρὺ τοῦ τῆς Βασίλης ἱεροῦ εἰσῆλθον, καὶ αὐτόθι κατέλαβον πάνυ πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν καὶ ἀγνῶτας ἐμοί, τοὺς δὲ πλείστους γνωρίμους. καί με ὡς εἶδον εἰσιόντα ἐξ ἀπροσδοκήτου, εὐθὺς πόρρωθεν ἠσπάζοντο ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν· [...]

We arrived yesterday evening from the army at Potidaea, and I sought with delight, after an absence of some time, my wonted conversations. Accordingly I went into the wrestling-school of Taureas, opposite the Queen's shrine, and there I came upon a large number of people, some of whom were unknown to me, but most of whom I knew. And as soon as they saw me appear thus unexpectedly, they hailed me from a distance on every side; [...][471]

The *palaistra* of Taureas is situated, according to Plato, opposite the sanctuary of Basile.[472] The *palaistra* is a place that Socrates visits in order to partake in his pleasant pursuits (ἁσμένως ᾖα ἐπὶ τὰς συνήθεις διατριβάς), namely in philosophical discussions, and apparently not in athletic exercises. Like in the *Lysis*, the traditional wrestling-school is upgraded to a place for physical as well as intellectual training.

The fact that many people were in the *palaistra* the moment Socrates arrives (καὶ αὐτόθι κατέλαβον πάνυ πολλούς) and the use of the adverb πόρρωθεν (from a long distance) implies that the *palaistra* has ample space. The mention of the door in the following passage confirms that the *palaistra* was a delimited, if not enclosed, place (Pl. *Charm*. 153d-154a):

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[471] The translation is that of Lamb (1927).

[472] Lucian mentions the *palaistra* of Taureas without specifying its location. See Lucian *De Parasito* 43: καὶ πᾶς οὗτος ὁ ὅμιλος οὐδὲ εἶδον παράταξιν μόνος δὲ τολμήσας ἐξελθεῖν εἰς τὴν ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ μάχην ὁ σοφὸς αὐτῶν Σωκράτης φεύγων ἐκεῖθεν ἀπὸ τῆς Πάρνηθος εἰς τὴν Ταυρέου παλαίστραν κατέφυγεν.
Travlos (1971 (1980)) 332 and fig. 435, 436 discusses the location of the shrine of Basile: "The most important find was a boundary stone of the mid-5th century B.C. with the inscription hόρος τō hιερō, fig. 436, found in January 1962 in situ at the corner of Syngrou Boulevard and Chatzichristou St. This boundary stone together with the ancient road running past the boundary stone on the line of Chatzichristou St. defines one side of the sanctuary, which extended to the north, fig. 435. South of the ancient road, considerable remains of walls bave been found; they date at least as early as the 5th century B.C. and because of their careful construction they derive, in our opinion, from a civic building, probably the palaestra of Taureas, mentioned by Plato (Charmides 153a) as being opposite to the shrine of Basile." However, Morisson (2005) expresses his lack of confindence about their exact location.

> αὖθις ἐγὼ αὐτοὺς ἀνηρώτων τὰ τῇδε, περὶ φιλοσοφίας ὅπως ἔχοι τὰ νῦν, περί τε τῶν νέων, εἴ τινες ἐν αὐτοῖς διαφέροντες ἢ σοφίᾳ ἢ κάλλει ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ἐγγεγονότες εἶεν. καὶ ὁ Κριτίας ἀποβλέψας πρὸς τὴν θύραν, ἰδών τινας νεανίσκους εἰσιόντας καὶ λοιδορουμένους ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἄλλον ὄχλον ὄπισθεν ἑπόμενον […]
>
> When we had had enough of such matters, I in my turn began to inquire about affairs at home, how philosophy was doing at present, and whether any of the rising young men had distinguished themselves for wisdom or beauty or both. Then Critias, looking towards the door, for he saw some young fellows who were coming in with some railing at each other, and a crowd of people following on behind them […]

There is no other description of or reference to the wrestling-school. Unlike the detailed description of the *palaistra* in the *Lysis*, here the location does not seem to be one of Plato's main concerns. It is worth drawing attention to the crowd that welcomes Socrates. Many known and unknown men greet him and a large crowd enters the *palaistra*. The cordial reception of Socrates by a large group of people – both known and unknown to him – proves his widespread fame and recognition.

At the arrival of Charmides, the crowd grows. The description of Charmides' beauty can be deduced through the reactions of the persons who are present in the discussion. He is a 'marvel of stature and beauty,'[473] says Socrates and witnesses that everyone is in love with him.[474] At the sight of him everyone felt 'astonishment and confusion' and 'gazed upon him as if he were a statue.'[475] Socrates admits that he is extremely handsome,[476] but a little later, he feels 'perplexed' and experiences an irresistible desire for the young boy, when he accidentally catches sight of his beautiful, naked body.[477] Socrates' first reaction to the boy's beauty is unexpected for

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[473] Pl. *Charm*. 154c: θαυμαστὸς ἐφάνη τό τε μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος
[474] Pl. *Charm*. 154c: πάντες ἐρᾶν… αὐτοῦ
[475] Pl. *Charm*. 154c: οὕτως ἐκπεπληγμένοι τε καὶ τεθορυβημένοι ἦσαν, ἡνίκ᾽ εἰσῄει – πολλοὶ δὲ δὴ ἄλλοι ἐρασταὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὄπισθεν εἵποντο. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἡμέτερον τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἧττον θαυμαστὸν ἦν· ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ καὶ τοῖς παισὶ προσέσχον τὸν νοῦν, ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλοσ᾽ ἔβλεπεν αὐτῶν, οὐδ᾽ ὅστις σμικρότατος ἦν, ἀλλὰ πάντες ὥσπερ ἄγαλμα ἐθεῶντο αὐτόν.
[476] Pl. *Charm*. 154d: Χαιρεφῶν καλέσας με, τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ νεανίσκος, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὐκ εὐπρόσωπος; ὑπερφυῶς, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ. οὗτος μέντοι, ἔφη, εἰ ἐθέλοι ἀποδῦναι, δόξει σοι ἀπρόσωπος εἶναι· οὕτως τὸ εἶδος πάγκαλός ἐστιν.
[477] Pl. *Charm*. 155d: καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ παλαίστρᾳ ἅπαντες περιέρρεον ἡμᾶς κύκλῳ κομιδῇ, τότε δή, ὦ γεννάδα, εἶδόν τε τὰ ἐντὸς τοῦ ἱματίου καὶ ἐφλεγόμην καὶ οὐκέτ᾽ ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ ἦν […]

the great lover of philosophy. A few lines of the love-poet Cydias[478] come immediately to his mind (Pl. *Charm*. 155d-e):

> εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ κατέναντα λέοντος
> νεβρὸν ἐλθόντα μοῖραν αἱρεῖσθαι κρεῶν·
>
> beware of coming as a fawn before the lion,
> and being seized as his portion of flesh

Here, one may recall Socrates' etymology of *erôs* in the *Cratylus*, which, however unworthy of serious linguistic consideration, seems to explain persuasively the way *erôs* spreads out from gaze, a popular view in archaic poetry[479] (Pl. *Crat*. 420a-b):

> {ΣΩ} […] 'ἔρως' δέ, ὅτι εἰσρεῖ ἔξωθεν καὶ οὐκ οἰκεία ἐστὶν ἡ ῥοὴ αὕτη τῷ ἔχοντι ἀλλ' ἐπείσακτος διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων, διὰ ταῦτα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐσρεῖν 'ἔσρος' τό γε παλαιὸν ἐκαλεῖτο – τῷ γὰρ οὖ ἀντὶ τοῦ ὦ ἐχρώμεθα – νῦν δ' 'ἔρως' κέκληται διὰ τὴν τοῦ ὦ ἀντὶ τοῦ οὖ μεταλλαγήν.
>
> {SO} […] And ἔρως (love) is so called because it flows in (ἐσρεῖ) from without, and this flowing is not inherent in him who has it, but is introduced through the eyes; for this reason it was in ancient times called ἔσρος, from ἐσρεῖν – for we used to employ omicron instead of omega – but, now, it is called ἔρως through the change of omicron to omega.

[478] For the poet see also Plut. *Mor*. (*De faciae quae in orbe lunae apparet*) 931e (mentioned along with Mimnermus, Archilochus, Stesichorus and Pindar). Whether the Cydias mentioned by Plato is the same as the poet of Hermione who composed dithyrambs and is called by the Scholiast (ad Nub. 966) Cydides (Κηδείδης) of Hermione, is uncertain. See RE s.v. Kydeides; In BNP v.3. s.v. there is special reference to his popularity: "He was obviously popular in Athens as he is depicted as a komast on a red-figured dish (Munich 2614) and on a psykter (London, BM E767) from c. 500 BC [1. 12-13]. Robbins, Emmet (Toronto); Weißenberger, Michael (Greifswald); Hoesch, Nicola (München); Nutton, Vivian (London)."

[479] Calame presents the reactions and emotions that the erotic desire provokes by discussing the vocabulary used by archaic poets, see Calame (1999) 19-23.
Similar description can be found in Greek traditional folksongs and proverbs.

As Socrates argues in the *Charmides*, Cydias is the wisest in love matters.[480] This must be ironic, since Cydias may have been popular, but certainly not for his wisdom. However, we cannot be sure of Cydias' precise words.[481] Burnet's edition of the text differs from the oldest manuscript and from Page's correction.[482] Therefore, it is hard to understand the metre of his poem. If we accept Burnet's version, then we can see that the meter of the first verse follows the scheme of a dactyloepitrete (− U− − −U U – U − −), whereas the second is a combination of iambic metres, cretic and baccheus (− U − − U – U − − − U −). This raises the question of whether this poem is a *melos* or not. It is certainly an odd combination outside of drama. Unfortunately, due to the differing versions of the text, this question cannot be answered if we focus on meter. On the other hand, the subject of the lines would suggest that it could have been identified as melic in essence.

Shortly after his interior monologue, Socrates asserts that he knows the remedy (φάρμακον) for Charmides' headache in order to approach him. However, philosophy could also function as a remedy for the philosopher's headache at the sight of Charmides, as an elaborate, logical construction of impulses.

From this point onwards, Socrates regains his confidence and his organized way of thinking and begins his philosophical discussion with the young boy, who is a philosopher and a poet too,[483] as Critias says. But, Socrates prefers to approach him only through his philosophical method. This is the *antidote* to his spontaneous passionate admiration towards the handsome Charmides, who has had a great physical and intellectual impact on him expressed through extreme sexual desire and recall of love verses. Like the famous sophists and poets, Socrates is going to develop his philosophical ideas in front of a large crowd – everyone who is present in the *palaistra* – that has surrounded the interlocutors (Pl. *Charm*. 155d):

> {ΣΩ} […] καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ παλαίστρᾳ ἅπαντες περιέρρεον ἡμᾶς κύκλῳ κομιδῇ.

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[480] Pl. *Charm*. 155d: καὶ ἐνόμισα σοφώτατον εἶναι τὸν Κυδίαν τὰ ἐρωτικά […]

[481] For a detailed analysis of the form, content and incorporation of Cydias' verses into the platonic context see Tuozzo (2011) 108-110.

[482] Page (1962) 714 gives:
μὴ κατέναντα λέοντος
νεβρὸς ἐλθὼν μοῖραν αἱρεῖσθαι κρεῶν·
αὐτὸς γάρ μοι ἐδόκουν ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου θρέμματος ἑαλωκέναι.

[483] Pl. *Charm*. 155a: πάνυ ποιητικός

{SO} […] and when all the people in the wrestling-school surged round about us on every side.

The audience, especially when it is large (Pl. *Charm*. 153a: πάνυ πολλούς, 154a: καὶ ἄλλον ὄχλον ὄπισθεν ἑπόμενον) reminds us of the audience of various spectacles, such as the one of the religious rites and dramatic performances. Now, this crowd becomes Socrates' audience;[484] thus, philosophy seems to occupy the spaces of these types of spectacles. Socrates' infatuation with the young boy inspires him, but it does not make him a poet. Unlike Hippothales' actions in the *Lysis*, Socrates does not compose any epinician song or prose *encômium* for the boy's sake; instead, after rejecting Cydias' *melos* (or poem), he focuses on the philosophical discussion. In the *Charmides*, one observes the victory of the elaborate spiritual pursuits over the physical instincts that are celebrated in a wrestling-school.

III.2.3. *Euthydemus*. The *Lyceum*

In the *Euthydemus*, Socrates narrates to Crito the public conversation he had at the *Lyceum* the previous day with Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, Cleinias and Ctesippus in front of a large audience. The presentation of two strikingly different educational methods is the subject of this dialogue: on the one hand the eristic method – favored by the sophists – and on the other hand the Socratic dialectic method (Pl. *Euthyd*. 271a-b):

{ΚΡ.} τίς ἦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ᾧ χθὲς ἐν Λυκείῳ διελέγου; ἦ πολὺς ὑμᾶς ὄχλος περιειστήκει, ὥστ᾽ ἔγωγε βουλόμενος ἀκούειν προσελθὼν οὐδὲν οἷός τ᾽ ἦ ἀκοῦσαι σαφές· ὑπερκύψας μέντοι κατεῖδον, καί μοι ἔδοξεν εἶναι ξένος τις ᾧ διελέγου. τίς ἦν; {ΣΩ.} πότερον καὶ ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Κρίτων; οὐ γὰρ εἷς ἀλλὰ δύ᾽ ἤστην. {ΚΡ.} ὃν μὲν ἐγὼ λέγω, ἐκ δεξιᾶς τρίτος ἀπὸ σοῦ καθῆστο· ἐν μέσῳ δ᾽ ὑμῶν τὸ Ἀξιόχου μειράκιον ἦν.

{CR} Who was it, Socrates, that you were talking with yesterday at the *Lyceum*? Why, there was such a crowd standing about you that when I came up

[484] Cf. the role of the big crowd in Pl. *Prot*. and in Pl. *Euthyd*.

in the hope of listening I could hear nothing distinctly: still, by craning over I got a glimpse, and it appeared to me that it was a stranger with whom you were talking. Who was he? {SO} About which are you asking, Crito? There were two of them, not one. {CR} The man whom I mean was sitting next but one to you, on your right: between you was Axiochus' boy.[485]

As in the *Charmides*, in this dialogue too Plato underlines the crowd (πολὺς… ὄχλος) that is present in Socrates' conversation with the sophists. The incorporation of the motif of the large audience appears elsewhere in the Platonic works.[486] The place of the dialogue is indicated by name: *Lyceum* (ἐν Λυκείῳ).

Socrates is in the *apodyterion* (undressing-room) alone. The moment he decides to leave, the divine inspiration, his *daimonion*, convinces him to stay. Suddenly, many people enter the *Lyceum* (Pl. *Euthyd*. 272e1-273a):

κατὰ θεὸν γάρ τινα ἔτυχον καθήμενος ἐνταῦθα, οὗπερ σύ με εἶδες, ἐν τῷ ἀποδυτηρίῳ μόνος, καὶ ἤδη ἐν νῷ εἶχον ἀναστῆναι· ἀνισταμένου δέ μου ἐγένετο τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον. πάλιν οὖν ἐκαθεζόμην, καὶ ὀλίγῳ ὕστερον εἰσέρχεσθον τούτω – ὅ τ' Εὐθύδημος καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος – καὶ ἄλλοι μαθηταὶ ἅμα αὖ πολλοὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν· εἰσελθόντε δὲ περιπατείτην ἐν τῷ καταστέγῳ δρόμῳ. καὶ οὔπω τούτω δύ' ἢ τρεῖς δρόμους περιεληλυθότε ἤστην, καὶ εἰσέρχεται Κλεινίας […]

By some providence I chanced to be sitting in the place where you saw me, in the undressing-room, alone, and was just intending to get up and go; but the moment I did so, there came my wonted spiritual sign. So I sat down again, and after a little while these two persons entered – Euthydemus and Dionysodorus – and accompanying them, quite a number, as it seemed to me, of their pupils: the two men came in and began walking round inside the cloister. Hardly had they taken two or three turns, when in stepped Cleinias […]

[485] The translation is that of Lamb (1977).
[486] In the *Laches*, too, Socrates is invited to participate in a discussion before a big audience (Pl. Lach. 183c-d): ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτον τὸν Στησίλεων, ὃν ὑμεῖς μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐν τοσούτῳ ὄχλῳ ἐθεάσασθε ἐπιδεικνύμενον. Similarly, in the *Gorgias*, Socrates is the main speaker in a dialogue that takes place in front of a very large audience in an indeterminate space (Pl. *Gorg*. 490b): ἐὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦμεν, ὥσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἀθρόοι […].

The *Lyceum* was a big *gymnasium* situated possibly outside the eastern city wall of Athens, near the Diochares Gate. It was used for military exercises, athletic events, and cult practices.[487] In the following passage, two important indices are mentioned: the *apodyterion* (ἐν τῷ ἀποδυτηρίῳ) and the *dromoi*; the first is the undressing-room, while the latter is used to denote the cloister (ἐν τῷ καταστέγῳ δρόμῳ) as well as the turns in the cloister (δύ᾽ ἢ τρεῖς δρόμους περιεληλυθότε).

The discussion begins when the participants find the right positions and all their admirers stand around them in order to listen to Euthydemus' exhibition and Dionysodorus' power of wisdom (Pl. *Euthyd*. 274b-d):

> πρῶτος μὲν ἐγώ, ἔπειτα δὲ Κλεινίας οὑτοσί, πρὸς δ᾽ ἡμῖν Κτήσιππός τε ὅδε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οὗτοι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγὼ δεικνὺς αὐτῷ τοὺς ἐραστὰς τοὺς Κλεινίου· οἱ δὲ ἐτύγχανον ἡμᾶς ἤδη περιστάμενοι. ὁ γὰρ Κτήσιππος ἔτυχε πόρρω καθεζόμενος τοῦ Κλεινίου – κἀμοὶ δοκεῖν ὡς ἐτύγχανεν ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἐμοὶ διαλεγόμενος προνενευκὼς εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν, ἐν μέσῳ ὄντος ἡμῶν τοῦ Κλεινίου ἐπεσκότει τῷ Κτησίππῳ τῆς θέας – βουλόμενός τε οὖν θεάσασθαι ὁ Κτήσιππος τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ἅμα φιλήκοος ὢν ἀναπηδήσας πρῶτος προσέστη ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ καταντικρύ· οὕτως οὖν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐκεῖνον ἰδόντες περιέστησαν ἡμᾶς, οἵ τε τοῦ Κλεινίου ἐρασταὶ καὶ οἱ τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου τε καὶ Διονυσοδώρου ἑταῖροι. τούτους δὴ ἐγὼ δεικνὺς ἔλεγον τῷ Εὐθυδήμῳ ὅτι πάντες ἕτοιμοι εἶεν μανθάνειν· ὅ τε οὖν Κτήσιππος συνέφη μάλα προθύμως καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, καὶ ἐκέλευον αὐτὼ κοινῇ πάντες ἐπιδείξασθαι τὴν δύναμιν τῆς σοφίας.

> "myself to begin with, then Clinias here and, besides us, Ctesippus and all these others", I said, "showing him the lovers of Clinias, who were by this time standing around us. For Ctesippus, as it happened, was sitting some way from Clinias, I noticed; and by chance, as Euthydemus leant forward in talking to me he obscured Ctesipus' view of Clinias, who was between us. Then Ctesippus, desiring to gaze upon his favorite and being also an eager listener, led the way by jumping up and placing himself opposite us; and this made the others, upon seeing what he did, stand around us, both Clinias' lovers and the followers of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. Pointing to these, I told Euthydemus that they were all ready to learn; to which Ctesippus assented with great eagerness, and

[487] For the location of the *Lyceum* see the detailed discussion based on the literary, epigraphic and archaeological evidence in Ritchie's article (with all the references, Ritchie (1989)).

so did the rest; and they all joined in urging the two men to exhibit the power of their wisdom."

The diction (περιιστάμενοι, περιέστησαν, which mean 'to stand round about') suggests that the listeners surround Socrates and the sophists.

In the following passage Socrates imitates the poets in an ironic manner. Apart from the motif of the large audience Socrates employs the usual strategy of the poets, which is the invocation to the Muses and Memory,[488] in order to recall the dialogue he had with the two eristic brothers (Pl. *Euthyd*. 275c-d):

> οὐ γὰρ σμικρὸν τὸ ἔργον δύνασθαι ἀναλαβεῖν διεξιόντα σοφίαν ἀμήχανον ὅσην· ὥστ᾽ ἔγωγε, καθάπερ οἱ ποιηταί, δέομαι ἀρχόμενος τῆς διηγήσεως μούσας τε καὶ Μνημοσύνην ἐπικαλεῖσθαι.
>
> For no slight matter it is to be able to recall in description such enormous knowledge as theirs. Consequently, like the poets, I must need to begin my narrative with an invocation of the Muses and Memory.

After starting to narrate the details of the dialogue, Socrates characterizes the audience of the two eristic sophists as a chorus and the sophists as the *chorodidaskaloi* of it. The similarities of this scene with the one in the *Protagoras*, where the sophist's admirers follow him,[489] are striking. In both dialogues the sophists form a chorus that Socrates describes (Pl. *Euthyd*. 276b-c):

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[488] See also Pl. *Tim*. 27b-d, where Socrates and Timaeus invoke the gods and the deities before the discussion: {ΣΩ} σὸν οὖν ἔργον λέγειν ἄν, ὦ Τίμαιε, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη καλέσαντα κατὰ νόμον θεούς. {ΤΙ} ἀλλ᾽, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε δὴ πάντες ὅσοι καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ σωφροσύνης μετέχουσιν, ἐπὶ παντὸς ὁρμῇ καὶ σμικροῦ καὶ μεγάλου πράγματος θεὸν ἀεί που καλοῦσιν· ἡμᾶς δὲ τοὺς περὶ τοῦ παντὸς λόγους ποιεῖσθαί πῃ μέλλοντας, ᾗ γέγονεν ἢ καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ παντάπασι παραλλάττομεν, ἀνάγκη θεούς τε καὶ θεὰς ἐπικαλουμένους εὔχεσθαι πάντα κατὰ νοῦν ἐκείνοις μὲν μάλιστα, ἑπομένως δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν. καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ θεῶν ταύτῃ παρακεκλήσθω· τὸ δ᾽ ἡμέτερον παρακλητέον, ᾗ ῥᾷστ᾽ ἂν ὑμεῖς μὲν μάθοιτε, ἐγὼ δὲ ᾗ διανοοῦμαι μάλιστ᾽ ἂν περὶ τῶν προκειμένων ἐνδειξαίμην.

[489] Pl. *Prot*. 315a-b: τούτων δὲ οἳ ὄπισθεν ἠκολούθουν ἐπακούοντες τῶν λεγομένων τὸ μὲν πολὺ ξένοι ἐφαίνοντο – οὓς ἄγει ἐξ ἑκάστων τῶν πόλεων ὁ Πρωταγόρας, δι᾽ ὧν διεξέρχεται, κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ ὥσπερ Ὀρφεύς, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἕπονται κεκηλημένοι – ἦσαν δέ τινες καὶ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἐν τῷ χορῷ.

> ταῦτ᾽ οὖν εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διδασκάλου χορὸς ἀποσημήναντος, ἅμα ἀνεθορύβησάν τε καὶ ἐγέλασαν οἱ ἑπόμενοι ἐκεῖνοι μετὰ τοῦ Διονυσοδώρου τε καὶ Εὐθυδήμου· […]
>
> When he had thus spoken, all those followers of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus raised a cheer and a laugh, like a chorus at the signal of their director; […]

There is a clear distinction between Socrates, a solo performer of the dialectical method, on the one hand, and the chorus of the sophists, on the other hand. A little later the sophist Euthydemus is described as a 'skillful dancer' due to his ability to 'twist' his questions (Pl. *Euthyd*. 276d):

> ἐνταῦθα δὴ καὶ πάνυ μέγα ἐγέλασάν τε καὶ ἐθορύβησαν οἱ ἐρασταὶ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν, ἀγασθέντες τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῖν· οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι ἡμεῖς ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἐσιωπῶμεν. γνοὺς δὲ ἡμᾶς ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἐκπεπληγμένους, ἵν᾽ ἔτι μᾶλλον θαυμάζοιμεν αὐτόν, οὐκ ἀνίει τὸ μειράκιον, ἀλλ᾽ ἠρώτα, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὀρχησταί, διπλᾶ ἔστρεφε τὰ ἐρωτήματα περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ […]
>
> Thereupon arose a great deal of laughter and loud applause from the pair's adorers, in admiration of their cleverness; while we on our side were dismayed and held our peace. Then Euthydemus, observing our dismay, and seeking to astonish us still further, would not let the boy go, but went on questioning him and, like a skilful dancer, gave a twofold twist to his questions on the same point […]

Socrates brilliantly describes the various reactions of Euthydemus' audience: on his admirers' side, there is great deal of laughter (πάνυ μέγα ἐγέλασαν), loud applause (ἐθορύβησαν), and admiration (ἀγασθέντες). On Socrates' side, we can see only consternation and silence (ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἐσιωπῶμεν). Euthydemus' goal is to astonish them more (ἵν᾽ ἔτι μᾶλλον θαυμάζοιμεν αὐτόν). Here, it is the words of the sophist that dance and play, as we will further see.

In the passage 277d-e Socrates uses a more detailed metaphor to describe the sophists. He compares them with the celebrants of the Corybantic rites, because they act like 'initiators' into the sophistic art. That is why they 'dance around' Clinias (Pl. *Euthyd*. 277d-e):

ὦ Κλεινία, μὴ θαύμαζε εἴ σοι φαίνονται ἀήθεις οἱ λόγοι. ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ οἷον ποιεῖτον τὼ ξένω περὶ σέ· ποιεῖτον δὲ ταὐτὸν ὅπερ οἱ ἐν τῇ τελετῇ τῶν Κορυβάντων, ὅταν τὴν θρόνωσιν ποιῶσιν περὶ τοῦτον ὃν ἂν μέλλωσι τελεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ χορεία τίς ἐστι καὶ παιδιά, εἰ ἄρα καὶ τετέλεσαι· καὶ νῦν τούτω οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χορεύετον περὶ σὲ καὶ οἷον ὀρχεῖσθον παίζοντε, ὡς μετὰ τοῦτο τελοῦντε.νῦν οὖν νόμισον τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ἱερῶν ἀκούειν τῶν σοφιστικῶν.

Clinias, do not be surprised that these arguments seem strange to you; for perhaps you do not discern what our two visitors are doing to you. They are acting just like the celebrants of the Corybantic rites, when they perform the enthronement of the person whom they are about to initiate. There, as you know, if you have been through it, they have choreia and merrymaking: so here these two are merely dancing about you and performing their sportive gambols with a view to your subsequent initiation. You must now, accordingly, suppose you are listening to the first part of the professorial mysteries.

The sophists share the same purpose with the celebrants of the Corybantic mysteries, namely the initiation into their art or mystery by means of *choreia* and fun (παιδιά).[490] Thus, the sophistic art – and especially the one used by Euthydemus and Dionysodorus – is depicted as a ritual performance with educational and amusing purpose, which will further lead to the introduction of the newcomer to their field, in other words to his understanding of the utility or superiority of their art and to the eagerness to learn it. Of course, Socrates wants to learn the sophistic art in order to undermine it.

Socrates repeats once more, that at the hearing of the sophists' arguments their followers burst out laughing and applauding. Socrates adds – of course with irony – that even the pillars of the *Lyceum* almost rejoiced in the acclamations in honor of the sophists (Pl. *Euthyd*. 303b):

[490] In the *Laws*, the term παιδιά is used again in a choral context (Pl. *Laws* 656c): ὅπου δὴ νόμοι καλῶς εἰσι κείμενοι ἢ καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ἔσονται τὴν περὶ τὰς μούσας παιδείαν τε καὶ παιδιάν, οἰόμεθα ἐξέσεσθαι τοῖς ποιητικοῖς, ὅτιπερ ἂν αὐτὸν τὸν ποιητὴν ἐν τῇ ποιήσει τέρπῃ ῥυθμοῦ ἢ μέλους ἢ ῥήματος ἐχόμενον, τοῦτο διδάσκοντα καὶ τοὺς τῶν εὐνόμων παῖδας καὶ νέους ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς, ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ ἀπεργάζεσθαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ μοχθηρίαν;

ἐνταῦθα μέντοι, ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ τῶν παρόντων ὑπερεπῄνεσε τὸν λόγον καὶ τὼ ἄνδρε, καὶ γελῶντες καὶ κροτοῦντες καὶ χαίροντες ὀλίγου παρετάθησαν. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστοις πᾶσι παγκάλως ἐθορύβουν μόνοι οἱ τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου ἐρασταί, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὀλίγου καὶ οἱ κίονες οἱ ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ ἐθορύβησάν τ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν καὶ ἥσθησαν.

Hereupon I confess, my dear Crito, that everyone present without exception wildly applauded the argument and the two men, till they all nearly died of laughing and clapping and rejoicing. For their previous successes had been highly acclaimed one by one, but only by the devotees of Euthydemus; whereas now almost the very pillars of the Lyceum took part in the joyful acclamations in honor of the pair.

The personification of the house, which Socrates presents ironically, allows the active participation of the place in the initiation of the participants into the sophistic mysteries and makes the place itself part of the audience.

As we have seen, in the *Euthydemus*, Socrates recites the discussion that was held in the *Lyceum* the previous day, when the dancing of the sophists' words competes with Socrates' philosophical spirit. Socrates expresses in the end the wish to become their student. Surprisingly, in the *Euthydemus*, Socrates' attitude towards the sophists is not oppositional; philosophy seems to yield to the attractiveness of the sophistic art. Furthermore, all this I have put in conversation happens in a place that is meticulously described and takes part in the approval of the sophists' arguments and not without irony.

III.3. Natural landscapes

III.3.1. *Phaedrus*. *Locus amoenus* I

After Phaedrus has heard Lysias' speech in Athens he decides to take a walk in the country, where he meets Socrates. During their conversation we watch the meeting of rhetoric, melic poetry and philosophy on the subject of love.

The introductory scene of the dialogue, 'sets the tone of the whole dialogue'[491] and informs us of the time, the place and the characters. In a street of Athens Socrates meets Phaedrus, who is going to walk on country roads, outside the city wall. Socrates decides to escort him, although he is a man of the city. Phaedrus has just heard a speech delivered by Lysias in a private house in Athens and Socrates wishes to take part into this 'feast of speeches' (τῶν λόγων … εἱστία)[492] by listening to the rhetorical speech (Pl. *Phaedr*. 227a-b):

> {ΣΩ.} ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε, ποῖ δὴ καὶ πόθεν; {ΦΑΙ.} παρὰ Λυσίου, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ Κεφάλου, πορεύομαι δὲ πρὸς περίπατον ἔξω τείχους· συχνὸν γὰρ ἐκεῖ διέτριψα χρόνον καθήμενος ἐξ ἑωθινοῦ. τῷ δὲ σῷ καὶ ἐμῷ ἑταίρῳ πειθόμενος Ἀκουμενῷ κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς ποιοῦμαι τοὺς περιπάτους· φησὶ γὰρ ἀκοπωτέρους εἶναι τῶν ἐν τοῖς δρόμοις. {ΣΩ.} καλῶς γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, λέγει. ἀτὰρ Λυσίας ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐν ἄστει. {ΦΑΙ.} ναί, παρ' Ἐπικράτει, ἐν τῇδε τῇ πλησίον τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου οἰκίᾳ τῇ Μορυχίᾳ. {ΣΩ.} τίς οὖν δὴ ἦν ἡ διατριβή; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῶν λόγων ὑμᾶς Λυσίας εἱστία; {ΦΑΙ.} πεύσῃ, εἴ σοι σχολὴ προϊόντι ἀκούειν.

> {SO} Dear Phaedrus, whither away, and where do you come from? {PHAE} From Lysias, Socrates, the son of Cephalus; and I am going for a walk outside the wall. For I spent a long time there with Lysias, sitting since early morning; and on the advice of your friend and mine, Acumenus, I am taking my walk on the roads; for he says they are less fatiguing than the streets. {SO} He is right, my friend. Then Lysias, it seems, was in the city? {PHAE} Yes, at Epicrates' house, the one that belonged to Morychus, near the Olympieum. {SO} What was your conversation? But it is obvious that Lysias entertained you with his speeches. {PHAE} You shall hear, if you have leisure to walk along and listen.

Phaedrus promises to reproduce the speech if Socrates walks with him. The philosopher is willing to travel to the Long Walls of the city of Megara[493] and back in order to hear the speech of the famous orator (Pl. *Phaedr*. 227d):

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[491] Rowe (1988) 135.

[492] Cf. Plato's *Lysis* 211c-d: τί ὑμεῖς, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, αὐτὼ μόνω ἑστιᾶσθον, ἡμῖν δὲ οὐ μεταδίδοτον τῶν λόγων; and a few lines further down in the same dialogue, 222c: βούλεσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ ὥσπερ μεθύομεν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, συγχωρήσωμεν καὶ φῶμεν ἕτερόν τι εἶναι τὸ οἰκεῖον τοῦ ὁμοίου; || See also n. 58 in this chapter.

[493] A city located in the northern section of the Isthmus of Corinth.

{ΣΩ} ἔγωγ᾽ οὖν οὕτως ἐπιτεθύμηκα ἀκοῦσαι, ὥστ᾽ ἐὰν βαδίζων ποιῇ τὸν περίπατον Μέγαράδε καὶ κατὰ Ἡρόδικον προσβὰς τῷ τείχει πάλιν ἀπίῃς, οὐ μή σου ἀπολειφθῶ.

{SO} I am so determined to hear you, that I will not leave you, even if you extend your walk to Megara, and, as Herodicus says, go to the wall and back again.

It is in the middle of a hot summer day. The location is meticulously described like a painting depicting a landscape of the Attic countryside (Pl. *Phaedr*. 228e-229b):

{ΦΑΙ.} παῦε. ἐκκέκρουκάς με ἐλπίδος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἣν εἶχον ἐν σοὶ ὡς ἐγγυμνασόμενος. ἀλλὰ ποῦ δὴ βούλει καθιζόμενοι ἀναγνῶμεν; {ΣΩ.} Δεῦρ᾽ ἐκτραπόμενοι κατὰ τὸν Ἰλισὸν ἴωμεν, εἶτα ὅπου ἂν δόξῃ ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καθιζησόμεθα. {ΦΑΙ.} Εἰς καιρόν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνυπόδητος ὢν ἔτυχον· σὺ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἀεί. ῥᾷστον οὖν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸ ὑδάτιον βρέχουσι τοὺς πόδας ἰέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἀηδές, ἄλλως τε καὶ τήνδε τὴν ὥραν τοῦ ἔτους τε καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας. {ΣΩ.} Πρόαγε δή, καὶ σκόπει ἅμα ὅπου καθιζησόμεθα. {ΦΑΙ.} Ὁρᾷς οὖν ἐκείνην τὴν ὑψηλοτάτην πλάτανον; {ΣΩ.} Τί μήν; {ΦΑΙ.} Ἐκεῖ σκιά τ᾽ ἐστὶν καὶ πνεῦμα μέτριον, καὶ πόα καθίζεσθαι ἢ ἂν βουλώμεθα κατακλινῆναι. {ΣΩ.} Προάγοις ἄν.

{PHAE} Stop. You have robbed me of the hope I had of practicing on you. But where shall we sit and read? {SO} Let us turn aside here and go along the Ilissus; then we can sit down quietly wherever we please. {PHAE} I am fortunate, it seems, in being barefoot; you are so always. It is easiest then for us to go along the brook with our feet in the water, and it is not unpleasant, especially at this time of the year and the day. {SO} Lead on then, and look out for a good place where we may sit. {PHAE} Do you see that very tall plane tree? {SO} What of it? {PHAE} There is shade there and a moderate breeze and grass to sit on, or, if we like, to lie down on. {SO} Lead the way.

Plato gives detailed topographical instructions that reveal the beauty of the nature, which provides a shelter from the heat: cool water, tall trees, grass, breeze.

The location brings to Phaedrus' mind the myth of Boreas, whose shrine is nearby (Pl. *Phaedr*. 229b-d):

> {ΦΑΙ.} Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἐνθένδε μέντοι ποθὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰλισοῦ λέγεται ὁ Βορέας τὴν Ὠρείθυιαν ἁρπάσαι; {ΣΩ.} Λέγεται γάρ. {ΦΑΙ.} Ἆρ' οὖν ἐνθένδε; χαρίεντα γοῦν καὶ καθαρὰ καὶ διαφανῆ τὰ ὑδάτια φαίνεται, καὶ ἐπιτήδεια κόραις παίζειν παρ' αὐτά. {ΣΩ.} Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ κάτωθεν ὅσον δύ' ἢ τρία στάδια, ᾗ πρὸς τὸ ἐν Ἄγρας διαβαίνομεν· καί πού τίς ἐστι βωμὸς αὐτόθι Βορέου. {ΦΑΙ.} Οὐ πάνυ νενόηκα· ἀλλ' εἰπὲ πρὸς Διός, ὦ Σώκρατες, σὺ τοῦτο τὸ μυθολόγημα πείθῃ ἀληθὲς εἶναι; {ΣΩ.} Ἀλλ' εἰ ἀπιστοίην, ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοί, οὐκ ἂν ἄτοπος εἴην, εἶτα σοφιζόμενος φαίην αὐτὴν πνεῦμα Βορέου κατὰ τῶν πλησίον πετρῶν σὺν Φαρμακείᾳ παίζουσαν ὦσαι καὶ οὕτω δὴ τελευτήσασαν λεχθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ Βορέου ἀνάρπαστον γεγονέναι.
>
> {PHAE} Tell me, Socrates, is it not from some place along here by the Ilissus that Boreas is said to have carried off Oreithyia? {SO} Yes, that is the story. {PHAE} Well, is it from here? The streamlet looks very pretty and pure and clear and fit for girls to play by. {SO} No, the place is about two or three furlongs farther down, where you cross over to the precinct (?) of Agra; and there is an altar of Boreas somewhere on the spot. {PHAE} I have never noticed it. But, for Heaven's sake, Socrates, tell me; do you believe this tale is true? {SO} If I disbelieved, as the wise men do, I should not be extraordinary; then I might give a rational explanation, that a blast of Boreas, the north wind, pushed her off the neighboring rocks as she was playing with Pharmacea, and that when she had died in this manner she was said to have been carried off by Boreas.

The sanctity of the place is firstly marked out by Phaedrus with the reference to the 'shrine of Agra' and the 'altar of Boreas,' while the myth is a significant example of erotic seduction. Socrates will intensify the religious features of the place by referring to sacred figurines and statuettes consecrated to some Nymphs and to the god Achelous in the passage 230b that will be discussed in the following pages. Yunis links the noun ἱερόν (sanctuary) with the phrase τὸ ἐν Ἄγρας (of Agra). As he explains,

> The locution ἐν Ἄγρας, preserved by the conservative force of religious usage, is found in contemporary inscriptions in connection with the

Lesser Mysteries and it attracted the attention of ancient lexicographers who found it in the comic poet Pherecrates and the fourth-century Attic historian Cleidemus.[494]

Pausanias in the *Description of Greece* renarrates the myth of Boreas and refers to the temple of Artemis Agrotera in the area of Agra[495] (Paus. *Descr*. 1.19.5-6):

ὁ δὲ Ἰλισός ἐστιν οὗτος, ἔνθα παίζουσαν Ὠρείθυιαν ὑπὸ ἀνέμου Βορέου φασὶν ἁρπασθῆναι· καὶ συνοικεῖν Ὠρειθυίᾳ Βορέαν καί σφισι διὰ τὸ κῆδος ἀμύναντα τῶν τριήρων τῶν βαρβαρικῶν ἀπολέσαι τὰς πολλάς. ἐθέλουσι δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ἄλλων θεῶν ἱερὸν εἶναι τὸν Ἰλισόν, καὶ Μουσῶν βωμὸς ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ ἐστιν Ἰλισιάδων· δείκνυται δὲ καὶ ἔνθα Πελοποννήσιοι Κόδρον τὸν Μελάνθου βασιλεύοντα Ἀθηναίων κτείνουσι. διαβᾶσι δὲ τὸν Ἰλισὸν χωρίον Ἄγραι καλούμενον καὶ ναὸς Ἀγροτέρας ἐστὶν Ἀρτέμιδος· ἐνταῦθα Ἄρτεμιν πρῶτον θηρεῦσαι λέγουσιν ἐλθοῦσαν ἐκ Δήλου, καὶ τὸ ἄγαλμα διὰ τοῦτο ἔχει τόξον.

This Ilisus is the river by which Oreithyia was playing when, according to the story, she was carried off by the North Wind. With Oreithyia he lived in wedlock, and be cause of the tie between him and the Athenians he helped them by destroying most of the foreigners' warships. The Athenians hold that the Ilisus is sacred to other deities as well, and on its bank is an altar of the Ilisian Muses. The place too is pointed out where the Peloponnesians killed Codrus, son of Melanthus and king of Athens. Across the Ilisus is a district called Agrae and a temple of Artemis Agrotera the Huntress. They say that Artemis first hunted here when she came from Delos, and for this reason the statue carries a bow.

In the *Phaedrus*, the altar of Boreas is situated 'on the spot' (αὐτόθι) of the precinct of Agra. Three motifs dominate the scene: Boreas' aggressive erotic behavior, the motif of 'girls at play' near the stream and Oreithyia's death. Plato plays with the motifs of love and danger. The place is described as a locus amoenus, a beautiful, erotic, and sacred place, implying a clear eroticism: the myth of Boreas

[494] Yunis (2011) 92 (ad loc.). Cf. Rowe (1988) 138-9 suggests the disctrict of Agra ("the part belonging to Agra or Agrae").
[495] Yunis, based on Parker, adds another shrine, the Metroon, where the Lesser Mysteries were celebrated. See Yunis (2011) 92 (ad loc.: Parker (2005) 56, 344).

who seducted Oreithyia as well as the image of girls at play near the streams[496] mark this *topos* as a place of erotic encounter, where danger is lurking everywhere.[497] They also provide, as we shall see, the main point of contact between the three speeches that follow in the dialogue.

Before proceeding with the discussion about the topography I would like to draw attention to the vocabulary of the passage and particularly to the meaning of the verb παίζω (play). The verb παίζω can be regularly found in early Greek poetry with the meaning 'to dance and 'to sing and dance' in choral contexts. In Homer and Pindar the verb is attributed to male dancers.[498] The image of the 'girls at play'[499] that Plato

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[496] For a thorough discussion on the motif of stream see Pender (2007a) esp. pp. 36-46, who concludes that 'the stream serves in *Phaedrus* as an apt image for artistic creativity and marks Plato's own engagement with poetic tradition.' (p. 37).

[497] Pl. *Phaedr*. 229b4-9.

[498] Hom. *Od*. 8.250-1:

ἀλλ' ἄγε, Φαιήκων βητάρμονες ὅσσοι ἄριστοι,
παίσατε […]

But come now, all you that are the best dancers of the Phaeacians,
make sport […]

Hom. *Od*. 23.143-7:

ὁ δ' εἵλετο θεῖος ἀοιδὸς
φόρμιγγα γλαφυρήν, ἐν δέ σφισιν ἵμερον ὦρσε
μολπῆς τε γλυκερῆς καὶ ἀμύμονος ὀρχηθμοῖο.
τοῖσιν δὲ μέγα δῶμα περιστεναχίζετο ποσσὶν
ἀνδρῶν παιζόντων καλλιζώνων τε γυναικῶν.

And the divine minstrel took
the hollow lyre and aroused in them the desire
of sweet song and goodly dance.
So the great hall resounded all about with the tread
of dancing men and of fair-girdled women.

Pi. *O*.1. 14-17:

ἀγλαΐζεται δὲ καὶ
μουσικᾶς ἐν ἀώτῳ,
οἷα παίζομεν φίλαν
ἄνδρες ἀμφὶ θαμὰ τράπεζαν.

and is glorified by the choicest music,
which we men often play
around his hospitable table.

Pi. *O*.13. 84-86:

uses in the *Phaedrus* has strong similarities with the famous Homeric scene that describes Nausicaa playing ball with her handmaidens by the riverbank and singing. The verb παίζω denotes the ballplaying[500] here, but it is accompanied by the maiden's song, which might permit us to imagine the group of friends as a chorus (Hom. *Od*. 6 96-109):

αἱ δὲ λοεσσάμεναι καὶ χρισάμεναι λίπ᾽ ἐλαίῳ
δεῖπνον ἔπειθ᾽ εἵλοντο παρ᾽ ὄχθῃσιν ποταμοῖο,
εἵματα δ᾽ ἠελίοιο μένον τερσήμεναι αὐγῇ.
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ σίτου τάρφθεν δμῳαί τε καὶ αὐτή,
σφαίρῃ ταὶ δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ <u>ἔπαιζον</u>, ἀπὸ κρήδεμνα βαλοῦσαι·
τῇσι δὲ Ναυσικάα λευκώλενος ἤρχετο μολπῆς.
οἵη δ᾽ Ἄρτεμις εἶσι κατ᾽ οὔρεα ἰοχέαιρα,
ἢ κατὰ Τηΰγετον περιμήκετον ἢ Ἐρύμανθον,
τερπομένη κάπροισι καὶ ὠκείῃς ἐλάφοισι·
τῇ δέ θ᾽ ἅμα νύμφαι, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο,
ἀγρονόμοι <u>παίζουσι</u>, γέγηθε δέ τε φρένα Λητώ·
πασάων δ᾽ ὑπὲρ ἥ γε κάρη ἔχει ἠδὲ μέτωπα,
ῥεῖά τ᾽ ἀριγνώτη πέλεται, καλαὶ δέ τε πᾶσαι·
ὣς ἥ γ᾽ ἀμφιπόλοισι μετέπρεπε παρθένος ἀδμής.

ἤτοι καὶ ὁ καρτερὸς ὁρμαίνων ἕλε Βελλεροφόντας,
φάρμακον πραῢ τείνων ἀμφὶ γένυι,
ἵππον πτερόεντ᾽· ἀναβαὶς δ᾽ εὐθὺς ἐνόπλια χαλκωθεὶς ἔπαιζεν.

And so mighty Bellerophon eagerly stretched
the gentle charmed bridle around its jaws and caught
the winged horse. Mounted on its back and armored in bronze, at once he began to play with weapons.

[499] See the discussion in Rosenmeyer (2004) 163-178.

[500] For the use of v. <u>συμπαίζω</u> for a ballplaying see Anacreon PMG 538. The verb here has a sexual nuance:

σφαίρῃ δηὖτέ με πορφυρέῃ
βάλλων χρυσοκόμης Ἔρως,
νήνι ποικιλοσαμβάλῳ
<u>συμπαίζειν</u> προκαλεῖται

Now yet again golden-haired Eros,
striking me with a purple ball,
calls me out to play with
a girl with many-colored sandals

> And they, after they had bathed and anointed themselves richly with oil, took their meal on the river's banks, and waited for the clothing to dry in the bright sunshine. Then when they had had their joy of food, she and her handmaids,
> they threw off their head-gear and fell to playing at ball,
> and white-armed Nausicaa was leader in the song.
> And even as Artemis, the archer, roves over the mountains,
> along the ridges of lofty Taygetus or Erymanthus,
> joying in the pursuit of boars and swift deer, and with her play the wood-nymphs, the daughters of Zeus who bears the *aegis*, and Leto is glad at heart
> – high above them all Artemis holds her head and brows,
> and easily may she be known, though all are fair
> – so amid her handmaidens shone the maid unwed.[501]

Nausicaa, the daughter of King Alcinous, is compared with the deity Artemis and the girl's companions with wood nymphs. The verb παίζω is also used to describe the activity of the deity and the nymphs that make sport in the hills. Plato's allusion to Homer is evident.

In the Platonic dialogue, Oreithyia, the daughter of King Erechtheus, is described to play with the nymph Pharmacea near Ilissos. The χάρις (grace) of 'the beautiful, clear and transparent waters' (χαρίεντα γοῦν καὶ καθαρὰ καὶ διαφανῆ τὰ ὑδάτια) seems to reflect or interact with the beauty and the innocence of the two girls.

In both Homer and Plato the innocent play of the maidens will be interrupted by the male presence. Odysseus' presence in Homer and Boreas' interference in Plato signal the end of the girls' innocent play. The difference is that Odysseus – despite his uncivilized appearance – is peaceful,[502] while Boreas is violent. In the first case, the erotic desire between Odysseus and Nausicaa is mutual, while in the second case it is only Boreas who desires Oreithyia and grabs her in order to rape her, as the myth narrates. In the *Phaedrus*, the collision between the peaceful nature that is enhanced by the playful atmosphere that the girls' play creates and

[501] The translation is that of Murray (1919).
[502] Rosenmeyer (2004) 170: "The girls' innocent ballgame becomes imbued with eroticism and danger when we locate ourselves as observers in the bushes with the naked and hungry hero."

the violent seduction provoked by the male intervention allows various interpretations. It is, however, obvious that the verb παίζω in both works denotes the innocent play between girls and, as it has been remarked, the sudden arrival of men eliminates the girls' purity and puts an end to their innocent interaction.

The 'choral performance' background of Oreithyia's abduction by Boreas brings also to mind Herme's passion for the fair dancer Polymele that arose when she saw her among the singing maidens of Artemis' chorus, as described in the *Iliad* (Hom. *Il*. 16. 179-183):

> τῆς δ᾽ ἑτέρης Εὔδωρος ἀρήϊος ἡγεμόνευε
> παρθένιος, τὸν ἔτικτε χορῷ καλὴ Πολυμήλη
> Φύλαντος θυγάτηρ· τῆς δὲ κρατὺς ἀργεϊφόντης
> ἠράσατ᾽, ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἰδὼν μετὰ μελπομένῃσιν
> ἐν χορῷ Ἀρτέμιδος χρυσηλακάτου κελαδεινῆς.

> And of the next company warlike Eudorus was captain,
> the son of a girl unwed, and him did Polymele, fair in the dance,
> daughter of Phylas, bear. Of her the strong Argeiphontes
> became enamoured, when his eyes had sight of her amid the singing maidens,
> in Artemis' chorus, huntress of the golden arrows and the echoing chase.

In the scene of the *Iliad* there is no use of the verb παίζω, but the myth-pattern of the erotic seduction in the frame of chorality is clearly used.

In the Homeric *Hymn to Aphrodite*, Aphrodite tells Anchises that Hermes caught her up from Artemis dancing group, consisting of nymphs and maidens, who were playing together (*HHA* vv. 115-125):

> νῦν δέ μ᾽ ἀνήρπαξε χρυσόρραπις Ἀργειφόντης
> ἐκ χοροῦ Ἀρτέμιδος χρυσηλακάτου, κελαδεινῆς.
> πολλαὶ δὲ νύμφαι καὶ παρθένοι ἀλφεσίβοιαι
> <u>παίζομεν</u>, ἀμφὶ δ᾽ ὅμιλος ἀπείριτος ἐστεφάνωτο.
> ἔνθεν μ᾽ ἥρπαξε χρυσόρραπις Ἀργειφόντης·
> πολλὰ δ᾽ ἔπ᾽ ἤγαγεν ἔργα καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων,
> πολλὴν δ᾽ ἄκληρόν τε καὶ ἄκτιτον, ἣν διὰ θῆρες
> ὠμοφάγοι φοιτῶσι κατὰ σκιόεντας ἐναύλους·

οὐδὲ ποσὶ ψαύσειν ἐδόκουν φυσιζόου αἴης·

And now the Slayer of Argus with the golden wand has caught me up from
the dance of huntress Artemis, her with the golden arrows.
For there were many of us, nymphs and marriageable maidens,
playing together; and an innumerable company encircled us.
From these the Slayer of Argus with the golden wand rapped me away.
He carried me over many fields of mortal men
and over much land untilled and unpossessed,
where savage wild-beasts roam through shady coombes,
until I thought never again to touch the life-giving earth with my feet.[503]

The verb παίζω denotes here, again, the play between females and is connected once more with choral dancing. The association of the verb with choruses can also be seen in the Homeric *Hymn to Earth*, where the virgins play happily in the flowery place. The participation of the nature (flowers) and the joy of the maidens fill the scene with a sense of purity (*HHE* vv. 13-16):

παρθενικαί τε χοροῖς πολυανθέσιν εὔφρονι θυμῷ
παίζουσαι σκαίρουσι κατ᾽ ἄνθεα μαλθακὰ ποίης,
οὕς κε σὺ τιμήσῃς, σεμνὴ θεά, ἄφθονε δαῖμον.

and their daughters in flower-laden bands
play and skip merrily over the soft flowers of the field.
Thus is it with those whom you honor O holy goddess, bountiful spirit.[504]

Similarly, in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter the abduction of Persephone occurs in a soft meadow, where Persephone and Ocean's daughters were playing by picking flowers (HHD vv. 1-11):

Δήμητρ᾽ ἠύκομον, σεμνὴν θεόν, ἄρχομ᾽ ἀείδειν,
αὐτὴν ἠδὲ θύγατρα τανύσφυρον, ἣν Ἀιδωνεὺς
ἥρπαξεν, δῶκεν δὲ βαρύκτυπος εὐρύοπα Ζεύς,

[503] The translation is that of Evelyn-White (1914).
[504] Ibid.

νόσφιν Δήμητρος χρυσαόρου, ἀγλαοκάρπου,
παίζουσαν κούρῃσι σὺν Ὠκεανοῦ βαθυκόλποις
ἄνθεά τ᾽ αἰνυμένην, ῥόδα καὶ κρόκον ἠδ᾽ ἴα καλὰ
λειμῶν᾽ ἂμ μαλακὸν καὶ ἀγαλλίδας ἠδ᾽ ὑάκινθον
νάρκισσόν θ᾽, ὃν φῦσε δόλον καλυκώπιδι κούρῃ
Γαῖα Διὸς βουλῇσι χαριζομένη Πολυδέκτῃ,
θαυμαστὸν γανόωντα· σέβας τό γε πᾶσιν ἰδέσθαι
ἀθανάτοις τε θεοῖς ἠδὲ θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποις·

I begin to sing of Demeter, the holy goddess with the beautiful hair.
And her daughter [Persephone] too. The one with the delicate ankles, whom Hadês
seized. She was given away by Zeus, the loud-thunderer, the one who sees far and wide. Demeter did not take part in this, she of the golden double-axe, she who glories in the harvest. She [Persephone] was having a good time, along with the daughters of Okeanos, who wear their girdles slung low. She was picking flowers: roses, crocus, and beautiful violets.
Up and down the soft meadow. Iris blossoms too she picked, and hyacinth.
And the narcissus, which was grown as a lure for the flower-faced girl
by Gaia [Earth]. All according to the plans of Zeus. She [Gaia] was doing a favor for the one who receives many guests [Hadês].
It [the narcissus] was a wondrous thing in its splendor. To look at it gives a sense of holy awe to the immortal gods as well as mortal humans.[505]

In the *Phaedrus*, the contribution of the beautiful natural surroundings to the happy mood of the two protagonists is decisive. Socrates does not cease to admire the beauty and the sanctity of the place. The two men decide to find an appropriate spot in which to sit so that Phaedrus can read Lysias' speech. In the meantime, Socrates offers an animated and detailed description of the surroundings (Pl. *Phaedr*. 230a-c):

{ΣΩ.} […] ἀτάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων, ἆρ᾽ οὐ τόδε ἦν τὸ δένδρον ἐφ᾽ ὅπερ ἦγες ἡμᾶς; {ΦΑΙ.} τοῦτο μὲν οὖν αὐτό. {ΣΩ.} νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, καλή γε ἡ καταγωγή. ἥ τε γὰρ πλάτανος αὕτη μάλ᾽ ἀμφιλαφής τε καὶ ὑψηλή, τοῦ τε ἄγνου τὸ ὕψος καὶ τὸ σύσκιον πάγκαλον, καὶ ὡς ἀκμὴν ἔχει τῆς ἄνθης, ὡς ἂν εὐωδέστατον παρέχοι τὸν τόπον· ἥ τε αὖ πηγὴ χαριεστάτη ὑπὸ τῆς πλατάνου ῥεῖ μάλα ψυχροῦ ὕδατος, ὥστε γε τῷ ποδὶ τεκμήρασθαι. Νυμφῶν τέ τινων καὶ

[505] The translation is that of Nagy.

Ἀχελῴου ἱερὸν ἀπὸ τῶν κορῶν τε καὶ ἀγαλμάτων ἔοικεν εἶναι. εἰ δ᾽ αὖ βούλει, τὸ εὔπνουν τοῦ τόπου ὡς ἀγαπητὸν καὶ σφόδρα ἡδύ· θερινόν τε καὶ λιγυρὸν ὑπηχεῖ τῷ τῶν τεττίγων χορῷ. πάντων δὲ κομψότατον τὸ τῆς πόας, ὅτι ἐν ἠρέμα προσάντει ἱκανὴ πέφυκε κατακλινέντι τὴν κεφαλὴν παγκάλως ἔχειν. ὥστε ἄριστά σοι ἐξενάγηται, ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε.

{SO} […] But, my friend, while we were talking, is not this the tree to which you were leading us? {PHAE} Yes, this is it. {SO} By Hera, it is a beautiful resting place. For this plane tree is very spreading and lofty, and the tall and shady willow is very beautiful, and it is in full bloom, so as to make the place most fragrant; then, too, the spring is very pretty as it flows under the plane tree, and its water is very cool, to judge by my foot. And it seems to be a sacred place of some nymphs and of Achelous, judging by the figurines and statues. Then again, if you please, how lovely and perfectly charming the breeziness of the place is! And it resounds with the shrill summer music of the chorus of cicadas. But the most delightful thing of all is the grass, as it grows on the very gentle slope, thick enough to be just right when you lay your head on it. So you have guided the stranger most excellently, dear Phaedrus.

The divine presence dominates the landscape, which is immediately attractive and captivates the senses of the protagonists. Despite his initial reluctance and after a more careful gaze at the landscape, Socrates enriches Phaedrus' previous description (229b, p. 177) by skillfully adding bright touches, which highlight the constitutional elements of this dreamland. The use of the adjective καλός (here, beautiful) and the compound πάγκαλον (very beautiful), the choice of three superlatives εὐωδέστατον (most fragrant), χαριεστάτη (very pretty), κομψότατον (very gentle) and the great variety of adjectives uncover the striking beauty of the place. Socrates notices the presence of the statues (ἀγάλματα) of some Nymphs and of Achelous to which the excellence of the place seems to be attributed.[506]

[506] About the specific location of this wonderful place see Travlos (1980) 289: "We believe that Sokrates and Phaidros strolled along this very old road on the north side of the Olympieion when they were going for a walk outside the city walls. The house of Morychos by the Olympieion, mentioned by Plato (Phaedrus 227c) must be one of the excavated houses. As Sokrates and Phaidros leave the town they turn off the road, cross the lIissos and reach the east bank or the river at the root of Ardettos hill. There they sit down to converse at the entrance to a delightful vale, the contours of which were altered when Lykourgos constructcd the, Stadium later on (p. 498). The idyllic spot, described in Plato, with the great

The translation of κόραι as 'female figures' may be incorrect in this context. Since Socrates mentions statues, which includes figurines too, the usage of the word κόραι as figurines seems to be pleonastic. Although no commentator or scholar has described it otherwise, the shrine of Achelous and the Nymphs might allow us to imagine a chorus of maidens that dance in this sacred area. Of course, this is only speculation. The location dominated by the god Achelous and the Nymphs can be compared with the previous spot in 229b-d (p. 177-178), where the sanctuary of Agra is. Close to this shrine there is an ideal location for the girls to play by the riverbanks. Both spots have a river, a shrine and female presence. Close to the shrine of Agra there is an ideal location for the girls to play by the riverbanks, while close to the shrine of Nypmhs there are statuettes. The use of the noun κόραι (maidens) in both cases is worthy of attention. In 229b, the imaginary maidens are active (κόραις παίζειν). In 230b, the maidens are paired with statues. If the word κόραι denotes a real female chorus in the passage 230b, it is of course strange that there is no other reference to it, not one single detail to describe this spectacle. There is, however, a long tradition in archaic choral poetry of the presentation and re-presentation of choral performances in sacred places.[507] On the other hand, the cult of the river-god Achelous was widely spread in Greece,[508] therefore, the possibility that these κόραι are in fact votive offerings[509] is strong and cannot be easily refuted.

The description slides smoothly from one sense into another[510] and into more general pleasurable psychic impressions. One could define synaesthesia[511] in a

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plane tree, the refreshing spring, and the shrine of Acheloos, Pan and the Nymphs was, we believe, at this place. This identification is confirmed by a relief showing Acheloos, Pan and the Nymphs which is thought to have come from this shrine and was found nearby in the Stadium, fig. 382. G. Rodenwaldt attempted to identify Phaidros' shrine of Pan with the one by the church or St. Photini where a relief of Pan has been curved on the artificial scarp, figs 386-387. This is undoubtedly the site of another shrine of Pan and the Nymphs near the spring of Kallirrhoe. Had Sokrates and Phaidros indeed gone there, it would follow that the district of Agrai must be about 500-600 metres further downstream, according to the figures given by Sokrates (Plato *Phaedr.* 229c), but this view is not supported by the evidence."

[507] For a thorough discussion on this subject see (Athanassaki) 2009.

[508] Larson (2010) 65: 'The only river-god to achieve panhellenic status in cult is Achelous, the longest river in Greece, who shared many sanctuaries with the nymphs by the fifth century.'

[509] Yunis (2011) 96 (ad loc. incl. references).

[510] There is a confluence of external sensory stimuli detected by four senses in this passage:
i. Sight (description of the place: 'charming,' 'very beautiful,' 'most delightful')
ii. Hearing ('the shrill summer music of the chorus of cicadas')
iii. Smell ('most fragrant')
iv. Touch ('its water is very cool, to judge by my foot,' 'the breeziness of the place').

[511] Synaesthesia with the meaning: how the activation of one sense can lead to/awake another.

broader sense here as 'activation' of one sense from another or as perception of an external sensory stimulus from the soul. For example, the beautiful willow that is in full bloom (sight) makes the place the most fragrant (smell), or the very pretty stream (sight) flows with the coolest water (touch), and the breeziness of the place perceived by the sense of touch is is experienced as something lovely and perfectly charming. It is also important to stress the initial aesthetic use of the adjective πάγκαλον (very beautiful) for the characterization of the spring, the more general meaning of the adverb παγκάλως (beautifully, wonderfully) used to describe the appropriateness of the thick grass for someone who wants to lie down and the shift to an even more general use of the superlative ἄριστα (most excellently) in the end of the passage, when Socrates says: 'you have guided the stranger most excellently, dear Phaedrus.'

The use of the noun chorus (χορός) for the cicadas' activity is also important. Do we have additional clues that could justify a dancing activity on their part?[512] It is possible that the word χορός is used to denote cicadas as a group of insects and not necessarily as a dancing band. In fact, 'cicadas nearly always sing from a position of rest […]. Singing while in flight is extremely rare though it has been recorded from few species. Cicadas usually sing in a sunny spot, and normally only on sunny days.'[513] In any case, thanks to them the dialogue that takes place in this locus amoenus is accompanied by natural music.

The finding of the appropriate spot indicates the beginning of the conversation.[514] The beauty of the surroundings is shrewdly connected with the love of beauty that Socrates targets. Phaedrus believes that the idyllic surroundings are the best conditions for the delivery of Lysias' speech. The escape from the noise and problems of the city and the enjoyment of the nature would be an ideal environment

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[512] Yunis (2011) 96 characterizes the cicadas' activity as "chirping." More specifically he argues (p. 175) that: "The metaphor in τῷ τῶν τεττίγων χορῷ combines elevated (χορῷ) and humble (τεττίγων), producing mock grandeur. The effect is produced and extended in the myth of the cicadas (258e-259d), which focuses on their chirping, anticipating by ὑπηχεῖ." But even later (259a), Plato makes the cicadas combine song and conversation (not dance). The cicadas' myth "emulates the cicadas' service to the Muses by pursuing the very activities which the Muses sponsor." Dance is mentioned by Yunis as an activity supervised by Terpsichore (259c), but still Calliope and Ourania are the "Muses par excellence"! On the cicadas' song see also the discussion in Ferrari (1987) esp. pp. 25-36. Rowe (1988) 27 ad loc. translates the word *χορῷ* as 'song.'

[513] The quotation is from Ramel's page: http://www.earthlife.net/insects/cicadidae.html#4

[514] As Ferrari (1987) 3-4 well puts it: "In short, what is particularly striking about this dialogue is that the background will not stay where it belongs. It becomes a prominent topic of discussion and a direct cause of the conversational action rather than, as one would expect, at most an indirect influence on its course."

for everyone, but not for Socrates,[515] who is placed in an alien physical context, as Phaedrus says and Socrates himself admits (Pl. *Phaedr*. 230c-e):

{ΦΑΙ.} σὺ δέ γε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἀτοπώτατός τις φαίνῃ. ἀτεχνῶς γάρ, ὃ λέγεις, ξεναγουμένῳ τινὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχωρίῳ ἔοικας· οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεος οὔτ᾽ εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν ἀποδημεῖς, οὔτ᾽ ἔξω τείχους ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς τὸ παράπαν ἐξιέναι. {ΣΩ.} συγγίγνωσκέ μοι, ὦ ἄριστε. φιλομαθὴς γάρ εἰμι· τὰ μὲν οὖν χωρία καὶ τὰ δένδρα οὐδέν μ᾽ ἐθέλει διδάσκειν, οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἄνθρωποι. σὺ μέντοι δοκεῖς μοι τῆς ἐμῆς ἐξόδου τὸ φάρμακον ηὑρηκέναι. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ τὰ πεινῶντα θρέμματα θαλλὸν ἤ τινα καρπὸν προσείοντες ἄγουσιν, σὺ ἐμοὶ λόγους οὕτω προτείνων ἐν βιβλίοις τήν τε Ἀττικὴν φαίνῃ περιάξειν ἅπασαν καὶ ὅποι ἂν ἄλλοσε βούλῃ. νῦν δ᾽ οὖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεῦρ᾽ ἀφικόμενος ἐγὼ μέν μοι δοκῶ κατακείσεσθαι, σὺ δ᾽ ἐν ὁποίῳ σχήματι οἴει ῥᾷστα ἀναγνώσεσθαι, τοῦθ᾽ ἑλόμενος ἀναγίγνωσκε.

{PHAE}You are an amazing and most remarkable person. For you really do seem exactly like a stranger who is being guided about, and not like a native. You don't go away from the city out over the border, and it seems to me you don't go outside the walls at all. {SO} Forgive me, my dear friend. You see, I am fond of learning. Now the country places and the trees won't teach me anything, and the people in the city do. But you seem to have found the charm to bring me out. For as people lead hungry animals by shaking in front of them a branch of leaves or some fruit, just so, I think, you, by holding before me discourses in books, will lead me all over Attica and wherever else you please. So now that I have come here, I intend to lie down, and you may choose the position in which you think you can read most easily, and proceed with the reading.

Phaedrus, humoristically and ironically, swears by the plane tree to read Lysias' speech (Pl. *Phaedr*. 236d-e):

{ΦΑΙ.} οὔκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ δὴ λέγω· ὁ δέ μοι λόγος ὅρκος ἔσται. ὄμνυμι γάρ σοι – τίνα μέντοι, τίνα θεῶν; ἢ βούλει τὴν πλάτανον ταυτηνί; – ἦ μήν, ἐάν μοι μὴ εἴπῃς τὸν λόγον ἐναντίον αὐτῆς ταύτης, μηδέποτέ σοι ἕτερον λόγον μηδένα μηδενὸς μήτε ἐπιδείξειν μήτε ἐξαγγελεῖν.

[515] Although he expresses his admiration for it.

{PHAE} Yes, but I will. And my saying shall be an oath. I swear to you by – by what god? By this plane tree? I take my solemn oath that unless you produce the discourse in the very presence of this plane tree, I will never read you another or tell you of another.

The setting authorizes the reproduction of Lysias' original speech. In other words, nature obtains a divine authoritative power. But, is this place appropriate for such an engagement? The power of nature has no doubt an intense impact on Socrates. After listening to Lysias' speech, Socrates passes judgement on the rhetorical interpretation of erotic desire. His own talk begins with an invocation of the Muses, which seems to be a mocking usage of the traditional poetic motif, as Yunis persuasively remarks.[516] Suddenly, Socrates realizes that he has been 'seized by nymphs' and that he is 'uttering dithyrambs' (Pl. *Phaedr*. 238c-d):

{ΣΩ.} […] ἀτάρ, ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε, δοκῶ τι σοί, ὥσπερ ἐμαυτῷ, θεῖον πάθος πεπονθέναι; {ΦΑΙ.} πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς εὔροιά τίς σε εἴληφεν. {ΣΩ.} σιγῇ τοίνυν μου ἄκουε. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ θεῖος ἔοικεν ὁ τόπος εἶναι, ὥστε ἐὰν ἄρα πολλάκις <u>νυμφόληπτος</u> προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου γένωμαι, μὴ θαυμάσῃς· τὰ νῦν γὰρ οὐκέτι πόρρω <u>διθυράμβων φθέγγομαι</u>.

{SO} […] Well, my dear Phaedrus, does it seem to you, as it does to me, that I am inspired? {PHAE} Certainly, Socrates, you have an unusual fluency. {SO} Then listen to me in silence; for truly the place seems filled with a divine presence; so do not be surprised if I often seem <u>to be seized by nymphs</u> as my discourse progresses, for I am already almost <u>uttering dithyrambs</u>.

There seems to be an appropriation with a simultaneous reformation of this melic genre here. Socrates uses the term dithyramb, which is inextricably connected with the bacchic frenzy, in order to characterize the form and the content of his first speech. Since he is going to correct his first speech by delivering a second one, the future rejection of this *melic* genre is anticipated. Neverthless, Socrates utters, but does not sing dithyrambs. Possessed by the sacred place, he realizes that his fluency is due to the possession of the nymphs. The *nympholêpsia* echoes the bacchic frenzy

[516] Yunis (2011) 112 (ad. loc.)

of the melic composers in the *Ion* that I have discussed in the first chapter. Yet, although Socrates understands that something is going wrong, he continues to talk.

Quickly, he interrupts his first speech acknowledging that he is speaking in hexameters, which he considers even worse than dithyrambs, and he is finding fault with the lover (Pl. *Phaedr*. 241d-242a):

> {ΦΑΙ.} […] νῦν δὲ δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἀποπαύῃ; {ΣΩ.} οὐκ ᾔσθου, ὦ μακάριε, ὅτι ἤδη ἔπη φθέγγομαι ἀλλ᾽ οὐκέτι διθυράμβους, καὶ ταῦτα ψέγων; ἐὰν δ᾽ ἐπαινεῖν τὸν ἕτερον ἄρξωμαι, τί με οἴει ποιήσειν; ἆρ᾽ οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν Νυμφῶν, αἷς με σὺ προύβαλες ἐκ προνοίας, σαφῶς ἐνθουσιάσω; λέγω οὖν ἑνὶ λόγῳ ὅτι ὅσα τὸν ἕτερον λελοιδορήκαμεν, τῷ ἑτέρῳ τἀναντία τούτων ἀγαθὰ πρόσεστιν. καὶ τί δεῖ μακροῦ λόγου; περὶ γὰρ ἀμφοῖν ἱκανῶς εἴρηται. καὶ οὕτω δὴ ὁ μῦθος ὅτι πάσχειν προσήκει αὐτῷ, τοῦτο πείσεται· κἀγὼ τὸν ποταμὸν τοῦτον διαβὰς ἀπέρχομαι πρὶν ὑπὸ σοῦ τι μεῖζον ἀναγκασθῆναι. {ΦΑΙ.} μήπω γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὶν ἂν τὸ καῦμα παρέλθῃ. ἢ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὡς σχεδὸν ἤδη μεσημβρία ἵσταται ἡ δὴ καλουμένη σταθερά; ἀλλὰ περιμείναντες καὶ ἅμα περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων διαλεχθέντες, τάχα ἐπειδὰν ἀποψυχῇ ἴμεν.
>
> {PHAE} […] So now, Socrates, why do you stop? {SO} Did you not notice, my friend, that I am already speaking in hexameters, not mere dithyrambics, even though I am finding fault with the lover? But if I begin to praise the non-lover, what kind of hymn do you suppose I shall raise? I shall surely be possessed of the nymphs to whom you purposely exposed me. So, in a word, I say that the non-lover possesses all the advantages that are opposed to the disadvantages we found in the lover. Why make a long speech? I have said enough about both of them. And so my tale shall fare as it may; I shall cross this stream and go away before you put some further compulsion upon me. {PHAE} Not yet, Socrates, till the heat is past. Don't you see that it is already almost noon? Let us stay and talk over what has been said, and then, when it is cooler, we will go away.

Socrates seems to be entirely absorbed by the charm of the surroundings. His behavior is the result of the possession of the Nymphs, whose presence had been confirmed through the presence of their statues (?) in 230b. Here, Socrates, who is uttering hexameters, could be compared with a rhapsode. Predicting that things would get even worse, he decides to cross the river and return to the city and thus, to his

normal, rational (and philosophical) state of mind. The contact with nature has done harm to his mind. The *topos* saved his body from the summer heat, but it betrayed his philosophical spirit.

At this point, one would recall Pindar's dithyramb 4 for the Athenians, where Pindar's chorus observes carefully and gives a detailed description of the sacred place, which is depicted as a locus amoenus (P. *Dith*. 4: vv.1-7):

Δεῦτ᾽ ἐν χορόν, Ὀλύμπιοι,
ἐπί τε κλυτὰν πέμπετε χάριν, θεοί,
πολύβατον οἵ τ᾽ ἄστεος ὀμφαλὸν θυόεντ᾽
ἐν ταῖς ἱεραῖς Ἀθάναις
οἰχνεῖτε πανδαίδαλόν τ᾽ εὐκλέ᾽ ἀγοράν·
ἰοδέτων λάχετε στεφάνων τᾶν τ᾽ ἐαριδρόπων ἀοιδᾶν
Διόθεν τέ με σὺν ἀγλαΐᾳ
ἴδετε πορευθέντ᾽ ἀοιδᾶν δεύτερον
ἐπὶ τὸν κισσοδαῆ θεόν,
τὸν Βρόμιον, τὸν Ἐριβόαν τε βροτοὶ καλέομεν,
γόνον ὑπάτων μὲν πατέρων μέλπομεν<οι>
γυναικῶν τε Καδμεΐᾶν {Σεμέλην}.
ἐναργέα τ᾽ ἔμ᾽ ὥτε μάντιν οὐ λανθάνει,
φοινικοεάνων ὁπότ᾽ οἰχθέντος Ὡρᾶν θαλάμου
εὔοδμον ἐπάγοισιν ἔαρ φυτὰ νεκτάρεα.
τότε βάλλεται, τότ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀμβρόταν χθόν᾽ ἐραταί
ἴων φόβαι, ῥόδα τε κόμαισιν μείγνυται,
ἀχεῖ τ᾽ ὀμφαὶ μελέων σὺν αὐλοῖς,
οἴχνεῖ τε Σεμέλαν ἑλικάμπυκα χοροί.

Come to the chorus, Olympians,
and send over it glorious grace, you gods
who are coming to the city's crowded, incense-rich navel
in holy Athens
and to the glorious, richly adorned agora.
Receive wreaths of plaited violets and the songs plucked in springtime,
and look upon me with favor as I proceed from Zeus
with splendor of songs secondly
to that ivy-knowing god,

whom we mortals call Bromios and Eriboas
as we sing of the offspring of the highest of fathers
and of Kadmeian women.
Like a seer, I do not fail to notice the clear signs,
when, as the chamber of the purple-robed Horai is opened,
the nectar-bearing flowers bring in the sweet-smelling spring.
Then, then, upon the immortal earth are cast
the lovely tresses of violets, and roses are fitted to hair
and voices of songs echo to the accompaniment of pipes
and choruses come to Semele of the circling headband.[517]

The invocation of the gods, the burning of incense, the chorus that dances around the altar, the flowers, and the songs of springtime form a sacred place, where the poetic inspiration (mind) meets the bodily movement of the dancers. The dancers offer a vivid description of the place, exactly as Socrates does. Moreover, in both the dithyramb and the Platonic dialogue there is a combination of song and prophecy. The dithyrambic chorus in Pindar describes himself as a seer, something that Socrates will explicitly do in the passage 242c that will be discussed in a moment.[518] Naturally, the dancers describe the place by performing a song, whereas Socrates describes it through conversation. Plato must have been familiar with Pindar's work, thus it is not impossible that he alludes to the poet here. Consciously or not, the cicadas' chorus in the *Phaedrus* echoes the Pindaric chorus of men, who sing in this sacred place.[519] Socrates finally decides to stay and correct his error against the deity of *Erôs* forcing himself to resist the negative influence of the surroundings (Pl. *Phaedr*. 242b-c):

{ΣΩ.} ἡνίκ᾽ ἔμελλον, ὠγαθέ, τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνειν, τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖόν μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο – ἀεὶ δέ με ἐπίσχει ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν –

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[517] The translation is that of Race (1997).
[518] Socrates' poetic and prophetic tendency make him part of the famous group of poets and musicians, who used music as a mask for sophistry, such as Homer, Hesiod, Simonides, Orpheus and Musaios, see Pl. *Prot*. 316d: ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην φημὶ μὲν εἶναι παλαιάν, τοὺς δὲ μεταχειριζομένους αὐτὴν τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν, φοβουμένους τὸ ἐπαχθὲς αὐτῆς, πρόσχημα ποιεῖσθαι καὶ προκαλύπτεσθαι, τοὺς μὲν ποίησιν, οἷον Ὅμηρόν τε καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ Σιμωνίδην, τοὺς δὲ αὖ τελετάς τε καὶ χρησμῳδίας, τοὺς ἀμφί τε Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον·
[519] For the Pindaric poems cited in the Platonic dialogues see Irigoin (1952) 16-18.

καί τινα φωνὴν ἔδοξα αὐτόθεν ἀκοῦσαι, ἥ με οὐκ ἐᾷ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἂν ἀφοσιώσωμαι, ὡς δή τι ἡμαρτηκότα εἰς τὸ θεῖον. εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν μάντις μέν, οὐ πάνυ δὲ σπουδαῖος, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ γράμματα φαῦλοι, ὅσον μὲν ἐμαυτῷ μόνον ἱκανός· σαφῶς οὖν ἤδη μανθάνω τὸ ἁμάρτημα.

{SO} My good friend, when I was about to cross the stream, the spirit and the sign that usually comes to me came – it always holds me back from something I am about to do – and I thought I heard a voice from it which forbade my going away before clearing my conscience, as if I had committed some sin against deity. Now I am a seer, not a very good one, but, as the bad writers say, good enough for my own purposes; so now I understand my error.

Even if Socrates has claimed no knowledge from the natural setting, his reaction to its beauty so far indicates an initiation to and an active interaction with the environment. He thinks of himself as a seer (μάντις), which is why he is able to realize his mistake and correct it through a palinode (Pl. *Phaedr*. 247c):

{ΣΩ} τὸν δὲ ὑπερουράνιον τόπον οὔτε τις ὕμνησέ πω τῶν τῇδε ποιητὴς οὔτε ποτὲ ὑμνήσει κατ᾽ ἀξίαν.

{SO} But the region above the heaven was never worthily sung by any earthly poet, nor will it ever be sung.

Socrates' palinode, a hymn[520] in honor of the god *Erôs*, includes a praise to the place beyond heavens that fills the existing literary gap, since 'no one has ever composed such a hymn before.' Perhaps, this distance from the earthly beauty helps him remain uninfluenced by its irresistible power.

However, the association between the actual setting and the dialogue 'is maintained throughout deliberately and with subtle skill'[521] and nature intervenes again to remind us of its presence. In the following passage Socrates hears 'the cicadas singing above their heads' (Pl. *Phaedr*. 258e-259b):

[520] Pl. *Phaedr.* 265c: μυθικόν τινα ὕμνον προσεπαίσαμεν μετρίως τε καὶ εὐφήμως τὸν ἐμόν τε καὶ σὸν δεσπότην ἔρωτα, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καλῶν παίδων ἔφορον.
[521] Wycherkey (1963) 90.

{ΣΩ.} σχολὴ μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε· καὶ ἅμα μοι δοκοῦσιν ὡς ἐν τῷ πνίγει ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἡμῶν οἱ τέττιγες ᾄδοντες καὶ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμενοι καθορᾶν καὶ ἡμᾶς. εἰ οὖν ἴδοιεν καὶ νὼ καθάπερ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ μὴ διαλεγομένους ἀλλὰ νυστάζοντας καὶ κηλουμένους ὑφ᾽ αὑτῶν δι᾽ ἀργίαν τῆς διανοίας, δικαίως ἂν καταγελῷεν, ἡγούμενοι ἀνδράποδ᾽ ἄττα σφίσιν ἐλθόντα εἰς τὸ καταγώγιον ὥσπερ προβάτια μεσημβριάζοντα περὶ τὴν κρήνην εὕδειν· ἐὰν δὲ ὁρῶσι διαλεγομένους καὶ παραπλέοντάς σφας ὥσπερ Σειρῆνας ἀκηλήτους, ὃ γέρας παρὰ θεῶν ἔχουσιν ἀνθρώποις διδόναι, τάχ᾽ ἂν δοῖεν ἀγασθέντες.

{SO} We have plenty of time, apparently; and besides, the locusts seem to be looking down upon us as they sing and talk with each other in the heat. Now if they should see us not conversing at mid-day, but, like most people, dozing, lulled to sleep by their song because of our mental indolence, they would quite justly laugh at us, thinking that some slaves had come to their resort and were slumbering about the fountain at noon like sheep. But if they see us conversing and sailing past them unmoved by the charm of their Siren voices, perhaps they will be pleased and give us the gift which the gods bestowed on them to give to men.

Here, one may realize the dangerous power lurking in the beauty of nature, as the cicadas' 'Siren song' can easily bewitch the two interlocutors unless they keep their mind activated and their soul open to the philosophical discourse. It is remarkable that the cicadas do not only sing, but also converse (οἱ τέττιγες ᾄδοντες καὶ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμενοι), paving the way for Socrates' appropriation of the song, as we shall also see later in this chapter. The interlocutors should not be carried away by the charm of the surroundings. The intervention of nature through the cicadas' song is used to 'orient our reading'[522] as Ferrari says, and points out the transition from 'celebration of love to celebration over rhetoric.'[523] Philosophy is the remedy for 'the sickness' that Lysias' speech[524] on *erôs* and the locus amoenus itself caused. The

[522] Ferrari (1987) 25.
[523] Ibid., 26.
[524] Griswold (1986) 35.

cicadas' song leads Socrates to report the relevant myth of their origin (Pl. *Phaedr*. 259b-d):[525]

> {ΣΩ} λέγεται δ' ὥς ποτ' ἦσαν οὗτοι ἄνθρωποι τῶν πρὶν μούσας γεγονέναι, γενομένων δὲ Μουσῶν καὶ φανείσης ᾠδῆς οὕτως ἄρα τινὲς τῶν τότε ἐξεπλάγησαν ὑφ' ἡδονῆς, ὥστε ᾄδοντες ἠμέλησαν σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν, καὶ ἔλαθον τελευτήσαντες αὑτούς ἐξ ὧν τὸ τεττίγων γένος μετ' ἐκεῖνο φύεται, γέρας τοῦτο παρὰ Μουσῶν λαβόν, μηδὲν τροφῆς δεῖσθαι γενόμενον, ἀλλ' ἄσιτόν τε καὶ ἄποτον εὐθὺς ᾄδειν, ἕως ἂν τελευτήσῃ, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐλθὸν παρὰ μούσας ἀπαγγέλλειν τίς τίνα αὐτῶν τιμᾷ τῶν ἐνθάδε. Τερψιχόρᾳ μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς τετιμηκότας αὐτὴν ἀπαγγέλλοντες ποιοῦσι προσφιλεστέρους, τῇ δὲ Ἐρατοῖ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις οὕτως, κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἑκάστης τιμῆς· τῇ δὲ πρεσβυτάτῃ Καλλιόπῃ καὶ τῇ μετ' αὐτὴν Οὐρανίᾳ τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγοντάς τε καὶ τιμῶντας τὴν ἐκείνων μουσικὴν ἀγγέλλουσιν, αἳ δὴ μάλιστα τῶν Μουσῶν περί τε οὐρανὸν καὶ λόγους οὖσαι θείους τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνους ἱᾶσιν καλλίστην φωνήν. πολλῶν δὴ οὖν ἕνεκα λεκτέον τι καὶ οὐ καθευδητέον ἐν τῇ μεσημβρίᾳ.

[525] One may notice that the pseudo-Platonic dialogue *Halcyon*, which, was attributed to Lucian and appears in the Lucianic corpus, (pseudo-Lucian) seems to be derived from this passage in the *Phaedrus*, as Hutchinson (1997) 1714 argues. The myth of the transformation of a woman into a singing sea-bird by divine intervention and the fine weather as well as the peaceful, transparent water in the *Halcyon* brings to mind the myth of transformation of the Proto-cicada men into cicadas by the Muses' will and the natural setting in the *Phaedrus*, respectively. The verbal φθεγγόμενον and not ᾀδόμενον is used to denote the bird's vocal activity.
Ps-Luc. Soph. *Halcyon* 1-: {ΧΑΙ} Τίς ἡ φωνὴ προσέβαλεν ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πόρρωθεν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰγιαλῶν καὶ τῆς ἄκρας ἐκείνης; ὡς ἡδεῖα ταῖς ἀκοαῖς. τί ποτ' ἄρ' ἐστὶ τὸ φθεγγόμενον ζῷον; ἄφωνα γὰρ δὴ τά γε καθ' ὕδατος διαιτώμενα. {ΣΩ} Θαλαττία τις, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ὄρνις ἀλκυὼν ὀνομαζομένη, πολύθρηνος καὶ πολύδακρυς, περὶ ἧς δὴ παλαιὸς ἀνθρώποις μεμύθευται λόγος· φασὶ γυναῖκά ποτε οὖσαν Αἰόλου τοῦ Ἕλληνος θυγατέρα κουρίδιον ἄνδρα τὸν ἑαυτῆς τεθνεῶτα θρηνεῖν πόθῳ φιλίας, Κήϋκα τὸν Τραχίνιον τὸν Ἑωσφόρου τοῦ ἀστέρος, καλοῦ πατρὸς καλὸν υἱόν· εἶτα δὴ πτερωθεῖσαν διά τινα δαιμονίαν βούλησιν εἰς ὄρνιθος τρόπον περιπέτεσθαι τὰ πελάγη ζητοῦσαν ἐκεῖνον, ἐπειδὴ πλαζομένη γῆν πέρι πᾶσαν οὐχ οἵα τ' ἦν εὑρεῖν. {ΧΑΙ} Ἀλκυὼν τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ὃ σὺ φῄς; οὐ πώποτε πρόσθεν ἠκηκόειν τῆς φωνῆς, ἀλλά μοι ξένη τις τῷ ὄντι προσέπεσε· γοώδη γοῦν ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν ἦχον ἀφίησι τὸ ζῷον. πηλίκον δέ τι καὶ ἔστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες; {ΣΩ} Οὐ μέγα· μεγάλην μέντοι διὰ τὴν φιλανδρίαν εἴληφε παρὰ θεῶν τιμήν· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῇ τούτων νεοττιᾷ καὶ τὰς ἀλκυονίδας προσαγορευομένας ἡμέρας ὁ κόσμος ἄγει κατὰ χειμῶνα μέσον διαφερούσας ταῖς εὐδίαις, ὧν ἐστι καὶ ἡ τήμερον παντὸς μᾶλλον. οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὡς αἴθρια μὲν τὰ ἄνωθεν, ἀκύμαντον δὲ καὶ γαλήνιον ἅπαν τὸ πέλαγος, ὅμοιον ὡς εἰπεῖν κατόπτρῳ; {ΧΑΙ} Λέγεις ὀρθῶς· φαίνεται γὰρ ἀλκυονὶς ἡ τήμερον ὑπάρχειν ἡμέρα, καὶ χθὲς δὲ τοιαύτη τις ἦν. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν, πῶς ποτε χρὴ πεισθῆναι τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐξ ὀρνίθων γυναῖκές ποτε ἐγένοντο ἢ ὄρνιθες ἐκ γυναικῶν; παντὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον ἀδύνατον φαίνεται πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον.

> {SO} The story goes that these locusts were once men, before the birth of the Muses, and when the Muses were born and song appeared, some of the men were so overcome with delight that they sang and sang, forgetting food and drink, until at last unconsciously they died. From them the locust tribe afterwards arose, and they have this gift from the Muses, that from the time of their birth they need no sustenance, but sing continually, without food or drink, until they die, when they go to the Muses and report who honors each of them on earth. They tell Terpsichore of those who have honored her in dances, and make them dearer to her; they gain the favor of Erato for the poets of love, and that of the other Muses for their votaries, according to their various ways of honoring them; and to Calliope, the eldest of the Muses, and to Urania who is next to her, they make report of those who pass their lives in philosophy and who worship these Muses who are most concerned with heaven and with thought divine and human and whose voice is the sweetest. So for many reasons we ought to talk and not sleep in the noontime.

The birth of the Muses, which is interwoven with the birth of the song, leads the cicada-men to death, or alternatively, to their historical birth (reincarnation) as cicadas, and in the case of the *Phaedrus*, to their specific position and role within the nature. Through the motif of cicadas, the performance of the Muses is shrewdly integrated into the place. The reference to men incarnated in cicadas brings the divine performance to life. It is, however, an imagined performance narrated in a myth. It is not seen, heard or enjoyed in any way by the protagonists, but it stirs their imagination. Since no other kind of performance is presented in the locus amoenus, the Muses' performance, an imagined performance par excellence, fills this gap. But, while there is an animated and thorough description of the physical landscape, the aesthetic excellence of the Muses' performance is demonstrated solely by the reaction of the audience, in other words by the great pleasure of the 'proto-cicada men,' in Yunis' words.[526] The spectacle of the Muses led them to forget their primary needs and die. Moreover, the use of the adjective καλλίστην[527] (the most beautiful) for

[526] Yunis (2011) 174 ad loc.
[527] The aesthetic meaning of the adjective καλός is most of the times inseparable from its ethical meaning in Plato's dialogues.

Calliope's and Urania's voice implies the excellence of their performance. Calliope and Urania, who stand out, are evidently the philosophical Muses.[528]

What remained from the glory of the Muses' performance is the particular cicadas' song. Although, it is pleasant to Socrates' and Phaedrus' ears, it entails the risk of causing them to fall sleep. For this reason, the discussion of the enchantment of the nature – including the enchantment of the song – has to be quickly replaced by the dialectical inquiry. The excellence of the Muses' artistic activities, framed by a myth, is the culmination of Socrates' inspiration provoked by the real, beautiful place.

The cicadas are mentioned again a few lines later, as prophets of the Muses and possible sources of the inspiration responsible for Socrates' fluency during his second speech (Pl. *Phaedr*. 262c-d):

> {ΣΩ.} καὶ μὴν κατὰ τύχην γέ τινα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐρρηθήτην τὼ λόγω ἔχοντέ τι παράδειγμα, ὡς ἂν ὁ εἰδὼς τὸ ἀληθὲς προσπαίζων ἐν λόγοις παράγοι τοὺς ἀκούοντας. καὶ ἔγωγε, ὦ Φαῖδρε, αἰτιῶμαι τοὺς ἐντοπίους θεούς· ἴσως δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Μουσῶν προφῆται οἱ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ᾠδοὶ ἐπιπεπνευκότες ἂν ἡμῖν εἶεν τοῦτο τὸ γέρας· οὐ γάρ που ἔγωγε τέχνης τινὸς τοῦ λέγειν μέτοχος.

> {SO} And by some special good fortune, as it seems, the two discourses contain an example of the way in which one who knows the truth may lead his hearers on with sportive words; and I, Phaedrus, think the divinities of the place are the cause thereof; and perhaps too, the prophets of the Muses, who are singing above our heads, may have granted this boon to us by inspiration; at any rate, I possess no art of speaking.

The cidadas, however, as prophets of the Muses, are expected to bestow the gift of the song to the two interlocutors, because they possess the art of the song. But, as we have already seen, Plato also gives them also the ability to discuss with each other. We have also seen that during his possession by the nymphs, Socrates was driven to epic and dithyrambic poetry. Now, he realizes that the cicadas, who speak for the Muses, led him for fun to speak as an orator in his first speech (προσπαίζων ἐν

[528] Yunis (2011) 176-7 ad loc.

λόγοις). Muses thus gave him a rhetorical fluency instead of their well-known abilities, song and dance.

The Platonic myth of the cicadas' diet and their association with the Muses is extremely influential. As Fantuzzi[529] has observed, in Theocritus first Idyll the poet offers a similar description to that of Plato in the *Phaedrus* (Theoc. I. 45-54):

> τυτθὸν δ᾽ ὅσσον ἄπωθεν ἁλιτρύτοιο γέροντος
> πυρναίαις σταφυλαῖσι καλὸν βέβριθεν ἀλωά,
> τὰν ὀλίγος τις κῶρος ἐφ᾽ αἱμασιαῖσι φυλάσσει
> ἥμενος· ἀμφὶ δέ νιν δύ᾽ ἀλώπεκες ἁ μὲν ἀν᾽ ὄρχως
> φοιτῇ σινομένα τὰν τρώξιμον, ἁ δ᾽ ἐπὶ πήρᾳ
> πάντα δόλον κεύθοισα τὸ παιδίον οὐ πρὶν ἀνησεῖν
> φατὶ πρὶν † ἢ ἀκράτιστον ἐπὶ ξηροῖσι καθίξῃ†.
> αὐτὰρ ὅγ᾽ ἀνθερίκοισι καλὰν πλέκει ἀκριδοθήραν (v.l. ἀκριδοθήκαν)
> σχοίνῳ ἐφαρμόσδων· μέλεται δέ οἱ οὔτέ τι πήρας
> οὔτε φυτῶν τοσσῆνον, ὅσον περὶ πλέγματι γαθεῖ.
>
> A little further on from the old man worn by the sea,
> there is a vineyard laden with dark bunches of grapes,
> guarded by a boy sitting on a little wall;
> beside him there are two foxes, one of which is prowling
> between the rows of vines to steal the ripe grapes, while the other
> is plotting all kinds of attacks against the boy's lunch-bag,
> thinking that he wil not leave the boy without (?) stealing his lunch from him (?).
> But the boy is weaving a pretty trap (var. lect. cage) for crickets,
> using asphodels combined with reeds, and he has less care for the lunch-bag
> of the vines, than the joy he takes in his weaving.[530]

In Theocritus' poem the boy enjoys weaving traps or cages in order to keep the crickets he catches inside. Fantuzzi argues that, the crickets are "traditionally connected with music no less than were cicadas and τέττιγες 'cicadas' are the habitual accompaniment of the shepherd's song."[531] Thus the boy in Theocritus' idyll keeps the crickets in the cage disregarding his need for food in order to listen to their

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[529] Fantuzzi (2004) 144.
[530] Text and translation that of Fantuzzi (2004) 142-3.
[531] Ibid. 143-144.

singing, just like the cicadas do in Plato's *Phaedrus*. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that Theocritus' poem echoes the Platonic passage of the *Phaedrus* (259b-c).

At this point, it would be useful to summarize the multiple roles of the cicadas in the Platonic dialogue. The cicadas sing to people (ᾄδειν) reminding them the birth of the song; they inform (ἀπαγγέλλειν) the Muses of the people's behavior in Earth towards them and they interpret the Muses' will (οἱ τῶν Μουσῶν προφῆται) granting the people the Muses' boon (ἐπιπεπνευκότες ... τοῦτο τὸ γέρας). They function as the link that connects the human and the divine world. It is well noting that the cicadas are a male chorus that sings, converses, interprets, and conveys the word of a female divine chorus to people. However, the sense of chorality appears only in the cicadas' group and not in that of Muses, who are presented rather as independent performers, although their inherent choral identity is undeniable.

The cicadas' myth and and the identity of Muses evokes Pindar's Paean B.2. 102-123 Rutherford (=8.65-90 Maehler), where the poet sings the choral performance of Κηληδόνες at the Alcmaeonid temple at Delphi:[532]

ὦ Μοῖσαι, το<ῦ> δὲ παντέχ[νοις
Ἁφαίστου παλάμαις καὶ Ἀθά[νας
τίς ὁ ῥυθμὸς ἐφαίνετο;
χάλκεοι μὲν τοῖχοι χάλκ[εαί
θ' ὑπὸ κίονες ἕστασαν,
χρύσεαι δ' ἓξ ὑπὲρ αἰετοῦ
ἄειδον Κηληδόνες.
ἀλλά μιν Κρόνου παῖ[δες
κεραυνῷ χθόν' ἀνοιξάμ[ε]νο[ι
ἔκρυψαν τὸ [π]άντων ἔργων ἱερώτ[ατον
γλυκείας ὀπὸς ἀγασ[θ]έντες
ὅτι ξένοι ἔφ[θ]<ι>νον
ἄτερθεν τεκέων
ἀλόχων τε μελ[ί]φρονι
αὐδ[ᾷ θυ]μὸν ἀνακρίμναντες· επε[
λυσίμβροτον παρθενίᾳ κε[
ἀκηράτων δαίδαλμα [
ἐνέθηκε δὲ Παλλὰς ἀμ[

[532] For a lengthy discussion on the identity of Κηληδόνες see Power (2011) 67-113.

φωνᾷ τά τ’ ἐόντα τε κα[ὶ
πρόσθεν γεγενημένα
]ται Μναμοσύνα[
]παντα σφιν ἔφρα[σ.ν
[…]

But what, O Muses, was the pattern (ῥυθμός) that the latter temple displayed, through the all-skillful hands of Hephaestus and Athena? Bronze were the walls, bronze columns stood beneath, and six golden Κηληδόνες (kēlēdones) sang above the gable. But the sons of Cronus opened the ground with a thunderbolt and hid it, the most holy of all works … astonished at the sweet voice, that foreigners/visitors wasted away apart from children and wives, hanging up their spirits as a dedication to the voice that is like honey to the mind…contrivance that causes mortals to fall into fatal dissolution (λυσίμβροτον δαίδαλμα), of pure (words: ἐπέ[ων [Snell]?) with/in the maiden's…and Pallas inserted…to the voice…and Mnemosyne (and the Muses?) told them everything that is and was before (and will be?)[533]
[…]

Pindar's Charmers (Κηληδόνες), were probably acroterial figures, a kind of Cyberchorus, as Power puts it, that stand between mortal and immortal life.[534] Astonished and carried away by their sweet voice (γλυκείας ὀπὸς) and their honey-minded song (μελ[ί]φρονι αὐδ[ᾶ]) the mortals are led to death (λυσίμβροτον). Undoubtedly, the Muses' identity in the *Phaedrus* is similar to that of Κηληδόνες in the Pindaric song. The sublime performance and its fatal consequence on the mortals is a common point between the philosophic dialogue and the Paean. Moreover, in both cases the places of the divine performances are sacred: in Pindar's song the Charmers are affixed to the temple, while in Plato's dialogue the Muses' performance is interwoven with the cicadas' myth that is narrated in a sacred place. However, Pindar's Κηληδόνες are golden animated statues who sing and dance on Earth, whereas Plato's Muses are the traditional deities who perform the arts of song, dance and philosophy in heaven. Yet, the reference to a shrine of Muses (μουσεῖον) in the passage 278b of the *Phaedrus*, that will be discussed in a moment, makes their

[533] The translation is that of Power (2011) 69.
[534] See Power (2011) 71-3, 77.

imagined presence visible and creates another link to Κηληδόνες. Essentially, the cicadas in Plato assume a double role: the role of the poets that traditionally interprete and convey the messages of the Muses to the mortals and at the same time the role of the chorus that sings to an audience – or better produces a distinctive sound. Hence, the cicadas' singing chorus becomes also the 'prophet of the Pierians' (Πιερίδων προφάταν), as Pindar says in his Paean 6.6 Maehler. One may deduce, hence, that there is no need for poets.

So far, I have shown that dithyrambic poetry, rhetoric, and the relevant agencies have been completely rejected and the maieutic dialogue has occupied the whole erotic sacred place. The intrusion of philosophy weakens the power of every other artistic activity and is not intercepted by misleading divine signs.

A little later, Socrates reveals in a self-referential and meta-philosophical passage the nature of the dialogue between himself and Phaedrus. The constant play with the melic motifs and forms is remarkable (Pl. *Phaedr*. 265c):

> {ΣΩ} […] <u>μυθικόν</u> τινα <u>ὕμνον προσεπαίσαμεν</u> μετρίως τε καὶ εὐφήμως τὸν ἐμόν τε καὶ σὸν δεσπότην ἔρωτα, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καλῶν παίδων ἔφορον. {ΦΑΙ} καὶ μάλα ἔμοιγε οὐκ ἀηδῶς ἀκοῦσαι. {ΣΩ} τόδε τοίνυν αὐτόθεν λάβωμεν, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ψέγειν πρὸς τὸ <u>ἐπαινεῖν</u> ἔσχεν ὁ λόγος μεταβῆναι. {ΦΑΙ} πῶς δὴ οὖν αὐτὸ λέγεις; {ΣΩ} ἐμοὶ μὲν φαίνεται τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῷ ὄντι <u>παιδιᾷ</u> πεπαῖσθαι· […]

> {SO} […] <u>we chanted a mythic hymns</u> imply and piously in praise of your lord and mine, Phaedrus, Love, the guardian of beautiful boys. {PHAE} Yes, and I found it very pleasant to hear. {SO} Here let us take up this point and see how the discourse succeeded in passing from blame to <u>praise</u>. {PHAE} What do you mean? {SO} It seems to me that the discourse was, as a whole, really sportive <u>jest</u>; […]

Socrates considers his palinode as a mythic hymn and as a praise to *Erôs*. The verb προσπαίζω means 'to sing in praise of,' but its second compound παίζω and the noun παιδιά in the end of the passage give a playful coloring to the hymn and to the whole conversation in general: 'it was all a jest.'

Near the end of the dialogue, the presence of the Nymphs and Muses highlight the sacredness of the place once more (Pl. *Phaedr*. 278b):

{ΣΩ} καὶ σύ τε ἐλθὼν φράζε Λυσίᾳ ὅτι νὼ καταβάντε ἐς τὸ Νυμφῶν νᾶμά τε καὶ μουσεῖον ἠκούσαμεν λόγων […]

Go and tell Lysias that you and I came down to the fountain and sacred place of the nymphs and the shrine of the Muses […]

That the whole conversation takes place under the divine guidance is shown for the last time in the end of the dialogue, where Socrates prays to Pan, not by singing a hymn, but by uttering a prayer in prose (Pl. *Phaedr*. 279b-c):

{ΦΑΙ.} ταῦτ᾽ ἔσται· ἀλλὰ ἴωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ πνῖγος ἠπιώτερον γέγονεν. {ΣΩ.} οὐκοῦν εὐξαμένῳ πρέπει τοῖσδε πορεύεσθαι; {ΦΑΙ.} τί μήν; {ΣΩ.} ὦ φίλε Πάν τε καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇδε θεοί, δοίητέ μοι καλῷ γενέσθαι τἄνδοθεν· ἔξωθεν δὲ ὅσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναί μοι φίλια. πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν· τὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πλῆθος εἴη μοι ὅσον μήτε φέρειν μήτε ἄγειν δύναιτο ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σώφρων. ἔτ᾽ ἄλλου του δεόμεθα, ὦ Φαῖδρε; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ μετρίως ηὖκται. {ΦΑΙ.} καὶ ἐμοὶ ταῦτα συνεύχου· κοινὰ γὰρ τὰ τῶν φίλων. {ΣΩ.} ἴωμεν.

{PHAE} It shall be done; but now let us go, since the heat has grown gentler. {SO} Is it not well to pray to the deities here before we go? {PHAE} Of course. {SO} O beloved Pan and all ye other gods of this place, grant to me that I be made beautiful in my soul within, and that all external possessions be in harmony with my inner man. May I consider the wise man rich; and may I have such wealth as only the self-restrained man can bear or endure. – Do we need anything more, Phaedrus? For me that prayer is enough. {PHAE} Let me also share in this prayer; for friends have all things in common. {SO} Let us go.

In the *Republic*, Plato makes provisions for the singing of hymns in his new city. Here, Socrates actually prays to Pan. The prayer, which is admitted to the sacred place, is not a hymn, as one would expect, but a prose composition, as I have already mentioned. As Socrates has stressed, the god Pan and the Nymphs are more scientific

in speeches than Lysias.[535] With this closing prayer, dedicated to Pan, a god associated with the cult of Dionysus, 'Socrates acknowledges Pan as the inspirer of his speech.'[536] In addition, the prayer highlights the importance of the locus amoenus throughout the dialogue. The sacred place invites a hymn in honor of the divinities that dominate it and Plato offers it. Everything that inspires Socrates is expressed with divine consent.

As we have seen, the *Phaedrus* is inextricably linked with the sacred erotic topography of the Ilissos, which creates the most appropriate circumstances for the two speakers to begin their discussion about *erôs*. The sanctity of the place is firstly indicated through the reference to the shrine of Agrathe altar of Boreasand later through the description of the sanctuary of Achelous and the Nymphs. The myth of Boreas and Oreithyia that Phaedrus recalls is one of erotic and dangerous seduction. Socrates' mention of statues consecrated to some Nymphs and to the god Achelous adds further evidence that point to the location's sacred status.

The locus amoenus or the 'eroticized meadow,' as Calame describes it, 'is a particularly suitable spot to engage in dialogue on the subject of *Erôs*, since it is the place that, at the end of the dialogue, turns out to be the sanctuary of the Muses, where Socrates fist began to philosophize with his disciples, his *erômenoi*.'[537] Erotic meadows often frame melic love poems. In discussing erotic places in melic poetry, one has to bear in mind that the necessary components are at least a lover – usually an older one – and a beloved of either sex placed in *erotic* surroundings. The sexual experience between the two persons under the ideal circumstances of the natural landscape will bring the former to the role of the educator and underscore the

[535] Pl. *Phaedr*. 263d: φεῦ, ὅσῳ λέγεις τεχνικωτέρας Νύμφας τὰς Ἀχελῴου καὶ Πᾶνα τὸν Ἑρμοῦ Λυσίου τοῦ Κεφάλου πρὸς λόγους εἶναι.
[536] Rosenmeyer (1962) 34-44.
[537] Calame (1999) 154 describes the meadow of love in the *Phaedrus*: "And in the myth that even Socrates is prepared to recognize, the love of Boreas for the Nymph Oreithyia is consummated not far from a meadow through which the clear waters of the Illisus flow. It is there, to the shade cast by a plane tree and a fragrantly blooming agnus castus (chaste tree) that he leads Phaedrus. […] Actually, to be altogether precise, the soft meadow of the Ilissus was the place where the Nymph was seized by the North Wind, who then carried her off and was united with her somewhere else." Ibid. p. 156: "More often, the meadow represents a space filled with *Eros*, which serves as an immediate prelude to the gratification of sexual desire."

initiation of the latter to adulthood.[538] Sappho's fr. 2 [Voigt] is a typical example of the use of erotic meadow (or locus amoenus) in melic poetry:

Δεῦρύ μ᾽ ἐκ Κρήτας ἐπὶ Κρήτας ἐπ[ὶ τόνδ]ε ναῦον
ἄγνον, ὄππ[ᾳ τοι] χάριεν μὲν ἄλσος
μαλί[αν], βῶμοι δὲ τεθυμιάμε-
νοι [λι]βανώτῳ·
ἐν δ᾽ ὕδωρ ψῦχρον κελάδει δι᾽ ὕσδων
μαλίνων, βρόδοισι δὲ παῖς ὁ χῶρος
ἐσκίαστ᾽, αἰθυσσομένων δὲ φύλλων
κῶμα κατέρρει·
ἐν δὲ λείμων ἰππόβοτος τέθαλεν
ἠρίνοισιν ἄνθεσιν, αἰ δ᾽ἄηται
μέλλιχα πνέοισιν [
[ ]
ἔνθα δὴ σὺ . . . . έλοισα Κύπρι
χρυσίαισιν ἐν κυλίκεσσιν ἄβρως
ὀμμεμείχμενον θαλίαισι νέκταρ
οἰνοχόαισον

Hither to me from Crete to this holy temple,
here you will find an apple grove to welcome you
and upon the altars fuming
with incense;
there is ice water babbles through apple-branches,
and the whole place is shadowed by roses, and from the shivering leaves
the sleep (of enchantment) comes down;
there are meadows too, where horses graze,
blossoms with spring flowers, and the winds
blow gently . . . ;
there, Cypris, take . . .
and pour gracefully into golden cups
nectar that is mingled
with our festivities.[539]

[538] See Calame (1999) 169. For a detailed discussion on the topographic descriptions of the melic poets see Pender (2007a) esp. pp. 46-51.

All the main motifs that define a place as locus amoenus are here: temple, altars, trees, cool water, shade, sleep, meadow, horses, flowers, breezes, the goddess of love and a playful atmosphere.[540] Plato uses most of these elements[541] to create his own *erotic* space in order to frame his new philosophical genre, that of *erotic* philosophy.

In the following passages, Plato uses the word meadow (λειμών) to describe the superheaven realm where the divine soul can see the Forms. Plato composes and says a prose hymn for this place:

> [Pl. *Phaedr*. 247c-d] τὸν δὲ ὑπερουράνιον τόπον οὔτε τις ὕμνησέ πω τῶν τῇδε ποιητὴς οὔτε ποτὲ ὑμνήσει κατ᾽ ἀξίαν. ἔχει δὲ ὧδε – τολμητέον γὰρ οὖν τό γε ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ ἀληθείας λέγοντα – ἡ γὰρ ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφὴς οὐσία ὄντως οὖσα, ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ μόνῳ θεατὴ νῷ, περὶ ἣν τὸ τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἐπιστήμης γένος, τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τόπον.
> [Pl. *Phaedr*. 247e] ἐλθούσης δὲ αὐτῆς ὁ ἡνίοχος πρὸς τὴν φάτνην τοὺς ἵππους στήσας παρέβαλεν ἀμβροσίαν τε καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῇ νέκταρ ἐπότισεν. καὶ οὗτος μὲν θεῶν βίος· […]
> [Pl. *Phaedr*. 248b-c] οὗ δ᾽ ἕνεχ᾽ ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ τὸ ἀληθείας ἰδεῖν πεδίον οὗ ἐστιν, ἥ τε δὴ προσήκουσα ψυχῆς τῷ ἀρίστῳ νομὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖ λειμῶνος τυγχάνει οὖσα, ἥ τε τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις, ᾧ ψυχὴ κουφίζεται, τούτῳ τρέφεται. θεσμός τε Ἀδραστείας ὅδε.
>
> [Pl. *Phaedr*. 247c-d] But the region above the heaven was never worthily sung by any earthly poet, nor will it ever be. It is, however, as I shall tell; for I must dare to speak the truth, especially as truth is my theme. For the colorless, formless, and intangible truly existing essence, with which all true knowledge is concerned, holds this region and is visible only to the mind, the pilot of the soul.
> [Pl. *Phaedr*. 247e] And there the charioteer puts up the horses at the manger and feeds them with ambrosia and then gives them nectar to drink. Such is the life of the gods; […]
> [Pl. *Phaedr*. 248b-c] But the reason of the great eagerness to see where the plain of truth is, lies in the fact that the fitting pasturage for the best part of the soul is

539 The translation is that of Campbell (1977).
540 Pender (2007b) 3-8 compares the erotic meadows of melic poetry with Plato's Ilissus' description.
541 See Pender's article especially pp. 6-8 (Pender 2007), where she compares the *locus amoenus* in Plato found in various melic poets.

in the meadow there, and the wing on which the soul is raised up is nourished by this.

The idea that this divine region is a 'cosmic locus amoenus' in form of a hymn in prose seems to me attractive. We can see horses, wings, a meadow, and of course divine elements (superheaven realm, nectar, ambrosia). Color, shape and touch do not exist; they can only be mentally perceived. Plato appropriates the traditional image of the locus amoenus, rendering it an intelligible experience.

Plato's constant references to topography and myth allows us to think that the beauty of the natural place releases his imagination and poetic – rhetoric creativity, proving his various writing skills and at the same time formulating his rich, 'melting pot philosophy.'[542] The natural setting empowers and makes his philosophy an astonishingly powerful experience in his dealing with different images, feelings, bodily and intellectual experiences, encouraging the protagonists and furthermore the readers to participate with all their senses and energy into this wonderful ongoing creation.

In a broader and more tacit sense the deft interweaving of melic poetry and rhetoric is reflected in the setting of the whole dialogue. The theme of love, as basis for the intergeneric communication between rhetoric and melic poetry is integrated into the dramatic location depicted by the author as a locus amoenus. The invasion of philosophy into this place, which is replete with melic motifs is evident.[543] The cicadas' power of song is enriched by their ability to converse, while the gift of the Muses will lead Socrates to formulate his own views on *erôs*. The madness of *erôs* is divided and rationalized. It is presented as *mania*,[544] as bodily desire, in the first two speeches, and as psychic force in Socrates' *Palinode*. Eventually, the erotic encounter becomes an encounter of tradition – represented by conventional rhetoric and melic poetry – with Plato's particular kind of philosophy in this dialogue.

Rhetoric and melic poetry are rejected, except from the hymn to *Erôs* and the prayer to Pan. However, it is not accidental that both are prose compositions.

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[542] As Yunis (2005) 104 argues: "This is a universal art of discourse and applies, as Socrates says, 'to all things that are said' (261e)."

[543] As Pender (2007) 8 puts it: "Plato appropriates the lyric motif of the prelude meadow to set the scene for a conversation on love between characters who are evidently aware of the literary topos and ready to tease each other with its implications for their own relationship as participants within dialectic."

[544] See also Griswold (1986) 37.

In this dialogue, Plato reshapes the melic love tradition, using a great variety of motifs and images to make his philosophy enticing for the Phaedrus' young soul and of course for the readers. He makes Socrates compose his palinode using a highly poetic language and myth-making narration and a great variety of melic motifs. He often uses melic poetry in place for his philosophical (*maieutic*) method and at the same time he manages to rewrite the erotic experience from a philosophical scope. Apart from the passages that I discussed, Socrates' speeches contain many other metaphors and allusions to melic love poetry throughout the dialogue: the wings, the chariots, and the horses, represent love's power and the madness of love.[545] Love is perceived through the eyes and strikes the mind and the heart of the lover, echoeing familiar images of melic poetry. In addition, the journey of the soul back to its origins through the process of recollection echoes many aspects of the erotic game as presented by melic poets. However, as Pender puts it, 'Plato challenges the lyric tradition by placing eros within a much larger framework of experience and understanding.'[546]

We may, then, conclude, that Plato finally rejects traditional rhetoric and the conventional forms of poetry, such as melic love poetry. Instead, he composes a new philosophical rhetoric or erotic philosophy, by offering a new concept of *erôs*, the *erôs* of the soul for the Forms. He achieves that by using a combination of rhetorical and poetic elements throughout his dialogue.

III.3.2. *Laws*. Locus amoenus II

In Plato's longest and one of his last dialogues the conversation's main purpose is to create the legal frame for the Cretan city of Magnesia. The discussion takes place in Crete, between an Athenian Stranger, who remains unnamed and leads the whole conversation, the Spartan Megillus, and the Cretan Clinias during their trip to the sanctuary of Zeus. Socrates does not take part in this dialogue – the identity of the Athenian Stranger remains uknown until the end – and the dialogue is held far away from Athens.

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[545] Pl. *Phdr*. 246a-247c; 253c-254e

[546] Pender (2007) 55.

The Cretans consider Zeus as their lawgiver.[547] Minos walked this path every nine years in order to receive instruction from Zeus on lawgiving – in other words for oracle consultation (Pl. *Laws* 624a-b):

> {ΑΘ} μῶν οὖν καθ᾽ Ὅμηρον λέγεις ὡς τοῦ Μίνω φοιτῶντος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἑκάστοτε συνουσίαν δι᾽ ἐνάτου ἔτους καὶ κατὰ τὰς παρ᾽ ἐκείνου φήμας ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑμῖν θέντος τοὺς νόμους;
>
> {ATH} Do you then, like Homer, say that Minos used to go every ninth year to hold converse with his father Zeus, and that he was guided by his divine oracles in laying down the laws for your cities?

Although the three men do not explain the reasons for their journey to the sanctuary of Zeus, it becomes evident later in the dialogue that the journey of the three interlocutors reenacts Minos' route.[548] The similarities between this place and the location described in the *Phaedrus* are obvious (Pl. *Laws* 625a-c):

> {ΑΘ.} ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τοιούτοις ἤθεσι τέθραφθε νομικοῖς σύ τε καὶ ὅδε, προσδοκῶ οὐκ ἂν ἀηδῶς περί τε πολιτείας τὰ νῦν καὶ νόμων τὴν διατριβήν, λέγοντάς τε καὶ ἀκούοντας ἅμα κατὰ τὴν πορείαν, ποιήσασθαι. πάντως δ᾽ ἥ γε ἐκ Κνωσοῦ ὁδὸς εἰς τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἄντρον καὶ ἱερόν, ὡς ἀκούομεν, ἱκανή, καὶ ἀνάπαυλαι κατὰ τὴν ὁδόν, ὡς εἰκός, πνίγους ὄντος τὰ νῦν, ἐν τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς δένδρεσίν εἰσι σκιαραί, καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις πρέπον ἂν ἡμῶν εἴη τὸ διαναπαύεσθαι πυκνὰ ἐν αὐταῖς, λόγοις τε ἀλλήλους παραμυθουμένους τὴν ὁδὸν ἅπασαν οὕτω μετὰ ῥᾳστώνης διαπερᾶναι. {ΚΛ.} καὶ μὴν ἔστιν γε, ὦ ξένε, προϊόντι κυπαρίττων τε ἐν τοῖς ἄλσεσιν ὕψη καὶ κάλλη θαυμάσια, καὶ λειμῶνες ἐν οἷσιν ἀναπαυόμενοι διατρίβοιμεν ἄν. {ΑΘ.} ὀρθῶς λέγεις. {ΚΛ.} πάνυ μὲν οὖν· ἰδόντες δὲ μᾶλλον φήσομεν. ἀλλ᾽ ἴωμεν ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ.
>
> {ATH} And, since you and our friend Megillus were both brought up in legal institutions of so noble a kind, you would, I imagine, have no aversion to our occupying ourselves as we go along in discussion on the subject of government and laws. Certainly, as I am told, the road from Cnosus to the cave and

[547] Pl. *Laws* 624a: παρὰ μὲν ἡμῖν Ζεύς, παρὰ δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὅθεν ὅδε ἐστίν, οἶμαι φάναι τούτους Ἀπόλλωνα.
[548] See also Nightingale (2013) 252.

sanctuary of Zeus is a long one, and we are sure to find, in this sultry weather, shady resting-places among the high trees along the road: in them we can rest ofttimes, as befits our age, beguiling the time with discourse, and thus complete our journey in comfort. {CL} True, Stranger; and as one proceeds further one finds in the groves cypress-trees of wonderful height and beauty, and meadows too, where we may rest ourselves and talk. {ATH} You say well. {CL} Yes, indeed: and when we set eyes on them we shall say so still more emphatically. So let us be going, and good luck attend us.

The stifling heat (πνίγος) suggests that it is possibly a summer day. We are later informed that it is close to summer.[549] The sancity of the location, the hot weather, the tall trees, the shady resting places, and the beauty of nature echo the locus amoenus in the *Phaedrus*.[550] However, in the *Laws*, instead of plane tress there are cypresses. Moreover, the grass used as resting place in the *Phaedrus* is replaced by meadows here (λειμῶνες) and there is no reference to water or breeze. The description in the *Laws* is shorter and, thus, much less detailed than the one in the *Phaedrus*. Here, the aesthetic language is restricted to a short phrase 'wonderful beauty' (κάλλη θαυμάσια) and no one mentions the psychic impressions that the natural environment causes to their mind and soul. In the *Phaedrus*, however, as we have already seen, there is a thorough description of both the beauty of the place and its impact on the protagonists' souls.[551]

The three men begin their journey from Cnossos to fulfill their pilgrimage to the sanctuary of Zeus, which is possibly the Idaean Cave.[552] By the end of the third book, Clinias reveals that he is responsible for the establishment of the laws that must be applied to a new Cretan colony. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the purpose of these men's pilgrimage is the same as Minos,' namely to receive divine

[549] Pl. *Laws* 683c: καίτοι σχεδόν γ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐκ θερινῶν εἰς τὰ χειμερινὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τρεπομένου.
[550] Cf. Pl. *Phaedr.* 229a-b: ῥᾷστον οὖν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸ ὑδάτιον βρέχουσι τοὺς πόδας ἰέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἀηδές, ἄλλως τε καὶ τήνδε τὴν ὥραν τοῦ ἔτους τε καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας. {ΣΩ} πρόαγε δή, καὶ σκόπει ἅμα ὅπου καθιζησόμεθα. {ΦΑΙ} ὁρᾷς οὖν ἐκείνην τὴν ὑψηλοτάτην πλάτανον; {ΣΩ} τί μήν; {ΦΑΙ} ἐκεῖ σκιά τ᾽ ἐστὶν καὶ πνεῦμα μέτριον, καὶ πόα καθίζεσθαι ἢ ἂν βουλώμεθα κατακλινῆναι.
[551] Cf. Pl. *Phdr* 230 b-c. See pp. 64-65 of this chapter.
[552] See Morrows' (1960) 27-8 discussion (refer. incl.). Theophr. *Hist. Plant*. 3.2.6: οἷον ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ τὰ Ἰδαῖα· κυπάριττος γὰρ ἐκεῖ· and Theophr. *Hist. Plant*. 4.1.3: ἐν Κρήτῃ γοῦν φασι ἐν τοῖς Ἰδαῖοις ὄρεσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς Λευκοῖς καλουμένοις ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων ὅθεν οὐδέποτ᾽ ἐπιλείπει χιὼν κυπάριττον εἶναι· πλείστη γὰρ αὕτη τῆς ὕλης καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῇ νήσῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσιν. || Pind. *Paean* 4 vv. 50-51: ἔα, φρήν, κυπάρισσον, ἔα δὲ νομὸν Περιδάιον.

instructions for the new city.[553] After Clinias' request, the two other men agree to assist him,[554] but until this moment the initial purpose of their trip remains uknown. Their meeting is coincidental. Away from their hometowns they head for a religious sanctuary, so it is possible to have come to this place as *theôroi*.[555] Unfortunately, there is no description of their activities at the sanctuary.

The Athenian suggests that during their trip to the cave and sanctuary of Zeus they may have a discussion on laws. The walking distance is long (ἥ … ὁδὸς … ἱκανή). Yet, they can make regular stops in order to get some rest and amuse themselves through conversation. It is not clear whether the conversation will take place throughout their journey or only during the pauses. As we have seen, in the *Phaedrus*, the interlocutors need to sit or lie down in order to commit themselves to the dialogue (229b).

As *theôroi*, or pilgrims they could accompany a chorus to the sanctuary of Zeus in order to sing and/or dance in honor of the god. The potential song and dance performances of the *theôroi* during their walk to the Idaean Cave is a conjecture, since there is no textual evidence to confirm it.[556] Instead of choral performances *en route* by a theoric chorus, what we certainly have in the *Laws* is a philosophical dialogue *en route* held by *theôroi*. Plato alters the traditional form of *theôria*, inventing a new one.

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[553] Dillon (1997) 139 says about the cave of Zeus Idaios in Crete: "Mysteries were celebrated here, and a chorus of initiates in Euripides' *The Cretans* sings that they wear white clothes, avoid contact with birth or burial, and abstain from all meat."

[554] Pl. *Laws*. 702b-d: {ΚΛ} […] ἔοικεν κατὰ τύχην τινὰ ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν λόγων τούτων πάντων ὧν διεξήλθομεν γεγονέναι· σχεδὸν γὰρ εἰς χρείαν αὐτῶν ἔγωγ' ἐλήλυθα τὰ νῦν, καὶ κατά τινα αὖ καιρὸν σύ τε παραγέγονας ἅμα καὶ Μέγιλλος ὅδε. οὐ γὰρ ἀποκρύψομαι σφῷ τὸ νῦν ἐμοὶ συμβαῖνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς οἰωνόν τινα ποιοῦμαι. ἡ γὰρ πλείστη τῆς Κρήτης ἐπιχειρεῖ τινα ἀποικίαν ποιήσασθαι, καὶ προστάττει τοῖς Κνωσίοις ἐπιμεληθῆναι τοῦ πράγματος, ἡ δὲ τῶν Κνωσίων πόλις ἐμοί τε καὶ ἄλλοις ἐννέα· ἅμα δὲ καὶ νόμους τῶν τε αὐτόθι, εἴ τινες ἡμᾶς ἀρέσκουσιν, τίθεσθαι κελεύει, καὶ εἴ τινες ἑτέρωθεν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζομένους τὸ ξενικὸν αὐτῶν, ἂν βελτίους φαίνωνται. νῦν οὖν ἐμοί τε καὶ ὑμῖν ταύτην δῶμεν χάριν· ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐκλέξαντες, τῷ λόγῳ συστησώμεθα πόλιν, οἷον ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατοικίζοντες, καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἡμῖν οὗ ζητοῦμεν ἐπίσκεψις γενήσεται, ἅμα δὲ ἐγὼ τάχ' ἂν χρησαίμην εἰς τὴν μέλλουσαν πόλιν ταύτῃ τῇ συστάσει. {ΑΘ} οὐ πόλεμόν γε ἐπαγγέλλεις, ὦ Κλεινία· ἀλλ' εἰ μή τι Μεγίλλῳ πρόσαντες, τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ γε ἡγοῦ σοι πάντα κατὰ νοῦν ὑπάρχειν εἰς δύναμιν. {ΚΛ.} εὖ λέγεις. {ΜΕ} καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ.

[555] On the characteristics of the traditional *theôria* see Nightingale (2004) 41-42.

[556] For the association of *theôria* with song and dance and the possible scenarios of the theoric performances see Rutherford (2004) 70-74 and Rutherford (2013), where the activities of the *theôroi* on the journey and at the sanctuaries are examined.

The Athenian, 'the praiser of Zeus' according to Megillus' words, [557] leads the discussion. The intellectual activity resists the physical comfort – despite the long distance. Rest is reserved only for the bodies, not for the minds. The trip and the discussion are considered as parallel routes in space and time. While the bodies travel in the beautiful countryside towards their sacred destination the minds are engaged in the construction of the legislation of the new city that will be built in the near future.

As the dialogue proceeds, the Athenian realizes that instead of discussing about laws they uttered only preludes to laws (*prooimia*) (Pl. *Laws* 722c-e):

> ἐξ αὐτῶν ὧν νυνδὴ διειλέγμεθα ἡμεῖς κατὰ θεόν τινα γεγονός. σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐξ ὅσου περὶ τῶν νόμων ἤργμεθα λέγειν, ἐξ ἑωθινοῦ μεσημβρία τε γέγονε καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ παγκάλῃ ἀναπαύλῃ τινὶ γεγόναμεν, οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ περὶ νόμων διαλεγόμενοι, νόμους δὲ ἄρτι μοι δοκοῦμεν λέγειν ἄρχεσθαι, τὰ δ᾽ ἔμπροσθεν ἦν πάντα ἡμῖν προοίμια νόμων. τί δὲ ταῦτ᾽ εἴρηκα; τόδε εἰπεῖν βουληθείς, ὅτι λόγων πάντων καὶ ὅσων φωνὴ κεκοινώνηκεν προοίμιά τέ ἐστιν καὶ σχεδὸν οἷόν τινες ἀνακινήσεις, ἔχουσαί τινα ἔντεχνον ἐπιχείρησιν χρήσιμον πρὸς τὸ μέλλον περαίνεσθαι.καὶ δή που κιθαρῳδικῆς ᾠδῆς λεγομένων νόμων καὶ πάσης μούσης προοίμια θαυμαστῶς ἐσπουδασμένα πρόκειται· τῶν δὲ ὄντως νόμων ὄντων, οὓς δὴ πολιτικοὺς εἶναί φαμεν, οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτ᾽ εἶπέ τι προοίμιον οὔτε συνθέτης γενόμενος ἐξήνεγκεν εἰς τὸ φῶς, ὡς οὐκ ὄντος φύσει. ἡμῖν δὲ ἡ νῦν διατριβὴ γεγονυῖα, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, σημαίνει ὡς ὄντος, οἵ τέ γε δὴ διπλοῖ ἔδοξαν νυνδή μοι λεχθέντες νόμοι οὐκ εἶναι ἁπλῶς οὕτω πως διπλοῖ, ἀλλὰ δύο μέν τινε, νόμος τε καὶ προοίμιον τοῦ νόμου […].
>
> A matter which, by a kind of divine direction, has sprung out of the subjects we have now been discussing. It was little more than dawn when we began talking about laws (*nomoi*), and now it is high noon, and here we are in this entrancing resting-place; all the time we have been talking of nothing but laws, yet it is only recently that we have begun, as it seems, to utter laws, and what went before was all simply *prooimia* (preludes) to laws. What is my object in saying this? It is to explain that all utterances and vocal expressions have *prooimia* and tunings-up (as one might call them), which provide a kind of artistic preparation, which assists towards the further development of the subject. Indeed, we have examples before us of *prooimia*, admirably elaborated, in those

[557] Pl. *Laws* 633a: {ΜΕ} καλῶς λέγεις, καὶ πειρῶ πρῶτον κρίνειν τὸν τοῦ Διὸς ἐπαινέτην τόνδε ἡμῖν.

prefixed to that class of lyric ode called the "*nomos*," and to musical compositions of every description. But for the "*nomoi*" (i.e. laws) which are real laws – and which we designate "political" – no one has ever yet uttered a *prooimion*, or composed or published one, just as though there were no such thing. But our present conversation proves, in my opinion, that there is such a thing; and it struck me just now that the laws we were then stating are something more than simply double, and consist of these two things combined – law, and prelude to law […].

The self-referential and meta-philosophical character of the passage, where the Athenian comments on the form of the ongoing discussion, reminds me of the self-referential passage in the *Phaedrus* 265c, where Socrates argues that his palinode was actually a mythical hymn for the god (μυθικόν … ὕμνον).

The description of the wonderful resting-place in the passage 722c-e of the *Laws* is combined with a playful manner of speaking. Time has passed; it is already midday. It is not clear when the three men saw this wonderful resting-place (ἐν ταύτῃ παγκάλῃ ἀναπαύλῃ τινὶ γεγόναμεν) and decided to rest and continue their discussion on laws (*nomoi*) more comfortably. The Athenian plays with the double sense of the word *nomos*.[558] In the passage, the Athenian uses the word *prooimion* five times and the word *nomos* eight. As Power stresses "*prooimia* are explicitly 'marked' here as citharodic."[559] The most famous examples of the melic form of *prooimion* are the Homeric Hymns, songs dedicated to gods that served as *prooimia* of epic poems,[560] as the following ending verses of three Homeric Hymns indicate:

Hom. Hymn to Aphrodite vv. 292-3:

χαῖρε, θεά, Κύπροιο ἐυκτιμένης μεδέουσα·

[558] See Mouze (2005) 304-332, who persuasively argues that the legislator of the city in the *Laws* is essentially a poet and includes a lengthy discussion based primarily on the passage of the seventh book of the dialogue (811c-812a) that follows in my discussion.
[559] Power (2010) 189.
[560] Nagy (1999) 353 defines *prooimion* as the "framework for differentiated virtuoso singing by the individual kitharoidos "lyre [kithara] singer"' that serves as a prelude to a song." Foley (1999) 28 considers *prooimia* preludes to "the recitation of other epic poetry." The same view can be seen in Power (2010) 187, who quotes Plutarch in order to complete the definition of the *prooimion*. Plut. *On Mus*. 4.1132d: πεποίηται δὲ τῷ Τερπάνδρῳ καὶ προοίμια κιθαρῳδικὰ ἐν ἔπεσιν and Plut. *On Mus*. 4.1133c: τὰ γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ὡς βούλονται ἀφοσιωσάμενοι ἐξέβαινον εὐθὺς ἐπί τε τὴν Ὁμήρου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποίησιν.

σεῦ δ᾽ ἐγὼ ἀρξάμενος μεταβήσομαι ἄλλον ἐς ὕμνον.

Hail, goddess, queen of well-builded Cyprus! With you have I begun; now I will turn to another hymn.

Hom. Hymn to Artemis vv. 8-9:

αὐτὰρ ἐγώ σε πρῶτα καὶ ἐκ σέθεν ἄρχομ᾽ ἀείδειν,
σεῦ δ᾽ ἐγὼ ἀρξάμενος μεταβήσομαι ἄλλον ἐς ὕμνον.

Of you first I sing and with you I begin; now that I have begun with you, I will turn to another hymn.

Homeric Hymn to Hermes vv. 10-11:

καὶ σὺ μὲν οὕτω χαῖρε, Διὸς καὶ Μαιάδος υἱέ·
σεῦ δ᾽ ἐγὼ ἀρξάμενος μεταβήσομαι ἄλλον ἐς ὕμνον.

And so hail to you, Son of Zeus and Maia; with you I have begun: now I will turn to another hymn.

The play between the musical and the polical *nomos* in the Platonic passage betrays the philosopher's generally playful attitude towards melic poetry. In the *Timaeus* Socrates characterizes Timaeus' previous account as a *prooimion*. Indeed, Timaeus invokes the gods and goddesses at the beginning of his speech (Pl. *Tim*. 27 b-c), remaining faithful to the citharodes' methods[561] (Pl. *Tim.*29d):

{ΣΩ} […] τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιον θαυμασίως ἀπεδεξάμεθά σου, τὸν δὲ δὴ νόμον ἡμῖν ἐφεξῆς πέραινε.

{SO} […] and certainly we have most cordially accepted your *prooimion*; so now, we beg of you, proceed straight on with the main theme.

[561] Power (2010) 189.

Similarly, in the *Laws*, the *prooimion* comprises an extensive discussion of *mousikê*, which includes many poetic citations. Mouze examines the so-called *prooimion* and explains the association between the poet and the legislator:

> The first step of the text is a dialogue between the old men and the fictional legislator. This dialogue is a reminder of what was said in the second book, that the legislator should not let poets say what they want (719a-b). The need, which is already mentioned above, but reminded here to exercise legislative control over the poet, forms thus the basis on which the discussion unfolds. Consequently, there is the problem of the possibility and of the modalities of this control.
>
> The second step introduces the dialogue with the poet. The Athenian in the poet's place addresses on his behalf a question to the legislator. In doing so, it shows that it is not enough to install the theory of a necessary control or of the duty of the poets to comply with the laws in their writings: yet, it is necessary that the legislator says explicitly what the poets must put in their speeches (719b-e).
>
> At this point, ends the dialogue itself with the poets. It offers a basis on which the notion of preamble is developed.[562]

In addition, the image of the three *theôroi* (among them the praiser of the god), who utter *prooimia*, inevitably brings to mind the significant Athenian *theôria* to Delphi, *Phythaïs*,[563] as well as the opening verses of Pindar's seventh Pythian ode, (Pi. *Pyth*. 7 vv. 1-4):

κάλλιστον αἱ μεγαλοπόλιες Ἀθᾶναι

προοίμιον Ἀλκμανιδᾶν εὐρυσθενεῖ γενεᾷ

[562] Mouze (2005) 318. The translation is mine.

[563] The most famous ancient sacred pilgrimage was Pythais, which was occasionally sent from Athens to Delphi. The Greek Inscriptions on the *Pythais*, dated back to 2nd and early 1st cent. B.C. and found in Delphi reveal that this sacred delegation was sent by the city of Athens every nine years (a decision made, as Tracy (1975) 196 argues, probably in 112 B.C.) (see IG VII-IX FD III 2:48) in order to sing a paean or a prosodion to the god (IG VII-IX: Delphi CID 3:2). One of the participants was an official praiser of the Pythian God or an interpreter of the Pythian oracle (ἐξηγητής Πυθόχρηστος, IG VII-IX FD III 2:5). As it is evident by the inscriptions, theoria was a long-lived tradition that survived at least in Athens until the end of the Hellenistic era (Fischer ((1986) x) talks about four Pythaids: 138/7, 128/7, 108/5, 98/7). The lavishness of the Pythaids, easily proved by the long list of the participants, reflects the luxury and the power of the city of Athens during these years. Knowing that in the second century B.C. Athens was the most renowned and rich artistic and philosophical center of continental Greece, one can imagine the impression that these sacred missions caused. The last Pythaid (98/7) signals the end of the cultural prosperity of Athens. The involvement of Romans into the political matters of Greece has already begun. The occupation and destruction of Athens by Sulla is a matter of time (86). See Tracy's discussions on the inscriptions of the Pythais ((1969) 371-395, (1975) 185-218) and the extensive corpus of Greek inscriptions by the PHI-Epigraphic Project available online:
http://epigraphy.packhum.org/inscriptions/main

κρηπῖδ᾽ ἀοιδᾶν
ἵπποισι βαλέσθαι.

The great city of Athens is the most beautiful
prooimion of song, which the widely powerful race of the Alcmaeonids
can lay as a foundation of odes
in honor of their horses.

Athanassaki, who explores the association of the ode with the Alcmaeonid temple of Apollo in Delphi, argues that 'the opening of the ode points to the magnificent equestrian complex that dominated the East pediment'[564] of the Delphic monument. Following a similar line of argument, it is obvious that, in the *Laws*, the main subject of the discussion – the establishment of the political *nomoi* – is clearly associated with Zeus the Lawgiver. However, the *prooimion* to the *nomoi*, alludes to the rituals and cultic practices in honor of the god as they were (re)presented in his sanctuary, bringing to mind the primary sacred aim of the *theôria*.

The fact that the *prooimion* is uttered in prose by the *theôroi* themselves is a Platonic innovation. As expected, Plato reforms the melic forms of *prooimion* and *nomos* and uses them both for his own philosophical purposes. *Nomos* has a political nuance, while *prooimion* denotes its introduction. The laws that the three interlocutors try to establish are modeled on the musical *nomoi*. However, everything is uttered (λέγειν), not sung. Plato manages to refine the dichotomy between song and philosophy by undermining the first and putting it in the service of the second.

At a very important self-referential passage in the seventh book, the Athenian realizes that the discussion about laws between him, Megillus, and Clinias, although in prose, is much like poetic compositions (Pl. *Laws* 811c-812a):

{ΑΘ} [...] νῦν γὰρ ἀποβλέψας πρὸς τοὺς λόγους οὓς ἐξ ἕω μέχρι δεῦρο δὴ διεληλύθαμεν ἡμεῖς – ὡς μὲν ἐμοὶ φαινόμεθα, οὐκ ἄνευ τινὸς ἐπιπνοίας θεῶν – ἔδοξαν δ᾽ οὖν μοι παντάπασι ποιήσει τινὶ προσομοίως εἰρῆσθαι. καί μοι ἴσως οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν πάθος ἐπῆλθε, λόγους οἰκείους οἷον ἀθρόους ἐπιβλέψαντι μάλα ἡσθῆναι· τῶν γὰρ δὴ πλείστων λόγων οὓς ἐν ποιήμασιν ἢ χύδην οὕτως

[564] Athanassaki (2011) 237.

εἰρημένους μεμάθηκα καὶ ἀκήκοα, πάντων μοι μετριώτατοί γε εἶναι κατεφάνησαν καὶ προσήκοντες τὰ μάλιστα ἀκούειν νέοις. τῷ δὴ νομοφύλακί τε καὶ παιδευτῇ παράδειγμα οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι, ὡς οἶμαι, τούτου βέλτιον φράζειν, ἢ ταῦτά τε διδάσκειν παρακελεύεσθαι τοῖσι διδασκάλοις τοὺς παῖδας, τά τε τούτων ἐχόμενα καὶ ὅμοια, ἂν ἄρα που περιτυγχάνῃ ποιητῶν τε ποιήματα διεξιὼν καὶ γεγραμμένα καταλογάδην ἢ καὶ ψιλῶς οὕτως ἄνευ τοῦ γεγράφθαι λεγόμενα, ἀδελφά που τούτων τῶν λόγων, μὴ μεθιέναι τρόπῳ μηδενί, γράφεσθαι δέ· καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς διδασκάλους αὐτοὺς ἀναγκάζειν μανθάνειν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν, οὓς δ᾽ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκῃ τῶν διδασκάλων, μὴ χρῆσθαι τούτοις συνεργοῖς, οὓς δ᾽ ἂν τῷ ἐπαίνῳ συμψήφους ἔχῃ, τούτοις χρώμενον, τοὺς νέους αὐτοῖς παραδιδόναι διδάσκειν τε καὶ παιδεύειν.

{ATH} […] For in looking back now at the discussions, which we have been pursuing from dawn up to this present hour – and that, as I fancy, not without some divine inspiration – it appeared to me that they were framed exactly like a poem. And it was not surprising, perhaps, that there came over me a feeling of intense delight when I gazed thus on our discourses all marshalled, as it were, in close array; for of all the many discourses which I have listened to or learnt about, whether in poems or in a loose flood of speech like ours, they struck me as being not only the most adequate, but also the most suitable for the ears of the young. Nowhere, I think, could I find a better pattern than this to put before the Law-warden who is educator, that he may charge the teachers to teach the children these discourses of ours, and such as resemble and accord with these; and if it should be that in his search he should light on poems of composers, or prose-writings, or speeches without music and unwritten discourses, akin to these of ours, he must in no wise let them go, but get them written down. In the first place, he must compel the teachers themselves to learn these discourses, and to praise them, and if any of the teachers fail to approve of them, he must not employ them as colleagues; only those who agree with his praise of the discourses should he employ, and entrust to them the teaching and training of the youth.

Despite the fact that the practice of *theôria*, which is also reinforced by the diction ἀποβλέψας, ἐπιβλέψαντι (to gaze, to look upon), is in the service of the philosophical dialogue, the interlocutors' efforts to create laws is inevitably merged

with the art of poetry. The breath of life from the god to the humans in Homeric[565] and Aeschylean poetry[566] becomes divine inspiration in Plato's philosophy.[567] The term ἐπίπνοια (inspiration) is rarely used in poetry. However, the notion of the divine inspiration that grants the artists the ability to compose and perform their compositions is closely associated with poetic creativity.

The Athenian, whose ἐπίπνοια reminds me of the Socratic *daimonion*, realizes, thanks to divine force, that 'a wonderful thing' (θαυμαστὸν πάθος) has happened to him: he becomes fully aware of the fact that their philosophical discourses on laws are a sort of poetry and must be included in the school curriculum; they must be taught to the youths. In this way, the Platonic philosophy becomes part of the teaching process replacing and, thus, overshadowing real poetry or other prose activity. There is only one condition: these philosophical discussions must be written down.

Apart from the shortness of time that is repeatedly mentioned, there is no other detail concerning the setting of the dialogue. As in the *Phaedrus*, where the invasion of philosophy in the locus amoenus expels the song and the art of rhetoric, in the *Laws*, too, there are no song and dance activities that one expects to find in a *theôria*. In both dialogues philosophy predominates and occupies the sacred place. Plato appropriates the musical discourse in order to present his political *nomoi*. The extensive descriptions of the choral training of the citizens, the sympotic context and the detailed discussion on *mousikê* proposed for the Cretan colony will be discussed in the fourth chapter of the thesis. As we shall see, Plato gives a significant role to *melos* and *mousikê* in general, but only as a basis for the theoretical construction of Magnesia, which has to be regulated by his political philosophy and has a clearly goal: the virtue of the citizens.[568]

[565] Hom. *Il*. 5.698
[566] Aesch. *Supp*. 17; 43
[567] See also Pl. *Phaedr*. 262d: ἴσως δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Μουσῶν προφῆται οἱ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ᾠδοὶ ἐπιπεπνευκότες ἂν ἡμῖν εἶεν τοῦτο τὸ γέρας and Pl. *Phaedr*. 265b: τῆς δὲ θείας τεττάρων θεῶν τέτταρα μέρη διελόμενοι, μαντικὴν μὲν ἐπίπνοιαν Ἀπόλλωνος θέντες […]
[568] All these subjects are discussed in the fourth chapter.

III.4. **Axiochus*. In Plato's footsteps. The consolation provided at Axiochus' house

It is generally agreed that Plato is not the author of this Socratic dialogue,[569] which probably dates from the first century B.C. The author combines Stoic, Platonic, Cynic, and Epicurean arguments.[570] The stylistic patterns that Plato uses in order to compose his philosophy have not escaped the attention of the author of the *Axiochus*.

This pseudo-Platonic dialogue is a consolation[571] given by Socrates to the old and sick father of Clinias, Axiochus. Socrates develops his theory on the immortality of the soul and manages to soothe Axiochus' fear of death. The dialogue takes place in Axiochus' house (*Ax*. 364a-365b):

> Ἐξιόντι μοι ἐς Κυνόσαργες καὶ γενομένῳ μοι κατὰ τὸν Ἰλισὸν διῇξε φωνὴ βοῶντός του, Σώκρατες, Σώκρατες. ὡς δὲ ἐπιστραφεὶς περιεσκόπουν ὁπόθεν εἴη, Κλεινίαν ὁρῶ τὸν Ἀξιόχου θέοντα ἐπὶ Καλλιρρόην μετὰ Δάμωνος τοῦ μουσικοῦ καὶ Χαρμίδου τοῦ Γλαύκωνος· ἤστην δὲ αὐτῷ ὁ μὲν διδάσκαλος τῶν κατὰ μουσικήν, ὁ δ' ἐξ ἑταιρείας ἐραστὴς ἅμα καὶ ἐρώμενος. ἐδόκει οὖν μοι ἀφεμένῳ τῆς εὐθὺ ὁδοῦ ἀπαντᾶν αὐτοῖς, ὅπως ῥᾷστα ὁμοῦ γενοίμεθα. δεδακρυμένος δὲ ὁ Κλεινίας, Σώκρατες, ἔφη, νῦν ὁ καιρὸς ἐνδείξασθαι τὴν ἀεὶ θρυλουμένην πρὸς σοῦ σοφίαν· […]

> While I was on my way to the Cynosarges and getting near the Ilisus, I heard the voice of someone shouting, "Socrates, Socrates!" When I turned around to find out where it was coming from, I saw Clinias the son of Axiochus, running toward the Callirhoe, together with Damon the musician, and Charmides the son of Glaucon. (Damon was Clinias' music teacher; Charmides and Clinias were companions, and in love with one another.) So, I decided to turn off the main road to meet up with them and get together as quickly as possible. With tears in his eyes, Clinias said: "Socrates, now is your chance to show off the wisdom they are always saying you have; […]"[572]

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[569] It is grouped by Thrasyllus as spurius dialogue.
[570] For a discussion on the philosophical arguments in the *Axiochus* see O'Keefe (2006) 388-407.
[571] Hutchinson (1997) 1734: "This dialogue is an unconventional version of a very conventional genre – the consolation letter."
[572] Translation after Hershbell (1997).

Socrates walks towards the *gymnasium* of Cynosarges (ἐς Κυνόσαργες), when he runs into Clinias, Damon and Charmides. Damon, of course, is a very important figure in the development of Greek musical theory: his presence here in the dialogue is interesting. There are two topographical indices that mark the specific place where Socrates is found: 'near the Ilisus' (κατὰ τὸν Ἰλισὸν)[573] and 'toward the Callirhoe' (ἐπὶ Καλλιρρόην). He is persuaded by Clinias to change his plans and accompany him to his house in order to console his dying father. The topographical references and the location itself echo the Platonic *Phaedrus*, while the fact that Socrates changes his mind and his direction brings to mind the introductory scene of the *Republic*.

Axiochus' house is close to the Itonian gates by the Amazon column. Socrates enters the house and describes Axiochus' condition (*Ax*. 364d-365a):

> Ὡς δὲ θᾶττον τὴν παρὰ τὸ τεῖχος ᾔειμεν ταῖς Ἰτωνίαις πλησίον γὰρ ᾤκει τῶν πυλῶν πρὸς τῇ Ἀμαζονίδι στήλῃ καταλαμβάνομεν αὐτὸν ἤδη μὲν συνειλεγμένον τὰς ἀφὰς καὶ τῷ σώματι ῥωμαλέον, ἀσθενῆ δὲ τὴν ψυχήν, πάνυ ἐνδεᾶ παραμυθίας, πολλάκις δὲ ἀναφερόμενον καὶ στεναγμοὺς ἱέντα σὺν δακρύοις καὶ κροτήσεσι χειρῶν.
>
> After hurrying along the wall to the Itonian gates – he lived near the gates by the Amazon column – we found that Axiochus had already collected his senses and was strong in body, though weak in spirit, very much in need of consolation, sobbing and groaning, again and again, as well as weeping and clapping his hands.

Initially, Socrates evokes Axiochus' virtuous character in order to console him, Socrates says that a previously confindent and courageous man must be able to deal with death joyfully and by singing a paean. The verb παιανίζω (to sing the paean, to honor with paeans) in the end of this passage alludes to the joy and strength of the soul (*Ax*. 365a-b):

> Ἀξίοχε, τί ταῦτα; ἔφην·ποῦ τὰ πρόσθεν αὐχήματα καὶ αἱ συνεχεῖς εὐλογίαι τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ τὸ ἄρρατον ἔν σοὶ θάρσος; ὡς γὰρ ἀγωνιστὴς δειλός, ἐν τοῖς

[573] Cf. Pl. *Phdr*. 229a: δεῦρ᾽ ἐκτραπόμενοι κατὰ τὸν Ἰλισὸν ἴωμεν, εἶτα ὅπου ἂν δόξῃ ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καθιζησόμεθα.

γυμνασίοις γενναῖος φαινόμενος ὑπολέλοιπας ἐν τοῖς ἄθλοις. οὐκ ἐπιλογιῇ τὴν φύσιν περιεσκεμμένως ἀνὴρ τοσόσδε τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ κατήκοος λόγων, καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἕτερον, Ἀθηναῖος, ὅτι, τὸ κοινὸν δὴ τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς ἁπάντων θρυλούμενον παρεπιδημία τίς ἐστιν ὁ βίος, καὶ ὅτι δεῖ ἐπιεικῶς διαγαγόντας εὐθύμως μόνον οὐχὶ παιανίζοντας εἰς τὸ χρεὼν ἀπιέναι; [...]

"Axiochus, what is all this? Where is your former self-confindence, and your constant praise of many virtues, and that unshakable courage of yours? You are like a feeble athlete who put on a brave show in training exercises and lost the actual contest! Consider who you are – a man of such an advanced age, who listens to reason, and, if nothing else, an Athenian! – don't you realize that life is a kind of sojourn in a foreign land indeed, that's a commonplace, on everybody's lips, and that those who have led a decent life should go to meet their fate cheerfully, almost singing a paean of praise? […]"

Later in the text, Socrates speaks of the immortal soul[574] (*Ax*. 365e: ζῷον ἀθάνατον) that is confined in the mortal prison (*Ax*. 366a: θνητῷ φρουρίῳ), namely in the body. He highlights the miseries of the body and contrasts them to the cheerful and festive life in the heaven, where the soul strives to go after death (*Ax*. 366a-b):

{ΣΩ} ἡ ψυχὴ συναλγοῦσα τὸν οὐράνιον ποθεῖ καὶ σύμφυλον αἰθέρα, καὶ διψᾷ, τῆς ἐκεῖσε διαίτης καὶ χορείας ὀριγνωμένη. ὥστε ἡ τοῦ ζῆν ἀπαλλαγὴ κακοῦ τινός ἐστιν εἰς ἀγαθὸν μεταβολή.

{SO} The soul longs for its native heavenly aether, nay, thirsts after it, striving upwards in hopes of feasting and dancing there. Thus being released from life is a transition from something bad to something good.

The promise of an immortal life, in which *choreia* has a predominant role, reduces the fear of death and makes life after death seem even more attractive. *Choreia* becomes the destination of the soul in the heaven, a promise of happiness. It is not saved only for gods; it is also offered to humans. The description is similar to that of the cheerful and feasting atmosphere of the divine chorus in the *Phaedrus*. It should be noted that in the *Phaedrus* the divine bands our immortal souls join in the

[574] Cf. Pl. *Phaedo* 78b-80b.

afterlife are referred to as χοροί.[575] The idea of choral dancing or at least the idea of music in the afterlife is popular in archaic poetry as well as in the traditions surrounding the Eleusinian and other Mysteries. In Pindar's fr. 129, the dead engage in horsemanship, gymnastics and lyre-playing (v. 6: τοὶ δὲ φορμίγγεσσι τέρπονται...). In addition, many funerary inscriptions confirm the idea of choral dancing in the afterlife.[576]

But, why should a man sing the paean on his deathbed? Surely (as at the end of *Phaedo* with the 'cock for Asclepius') because life is a kind of disease over which he is now, in the moment of dying, triumphing victoriously. One also may note the Apolline myth of the swan singing at the moment of her death.

Further on, in the *Axiochus* Socrates cites Homeric lines (367d-368a) in order to show the way poets deal with the great suffering of life (*Ax*. 367d):

> {ΣΩ} […] μακρὸν ἂν εἴη διεξιέναι τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν, οἳ στόμασιν θειοτέροις τὰ περὶ τὸν βίον θεσπιῳδοῦσιν, ὡς κατοδύρονται τὸ ζῆν· […]
>
> {SO} […] it would take too long to go through the works of the poets, who sing in a prophetic strain with inspired voices the events of life while deploring life itself. […]

Poetry relieves the sorrow and pain of life. However, the superiority of philosophy resides in the fact that in drifting apart from the misery of the physical world, it focuses on the immortal nature of the soul and on the perspective of a happy life after death. This life will be free from struggle and grief and full of philosophy (*Ax*. 370d):

> {ΣΩ} […] ἀσαλεύτῳ ἡσυχίᾳ εὐδιαζόμενος, καὶ περιαθρῶν τὴν φύσιν, φιλοσοφῶν οὐ πρὸς ὄχλον καὶ θέατρον ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀμφιθαλῆ τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

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[575] Pl. *Phdr* 247a: πολλαὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ μακάριαι θέαι τε καὶ διέξοδοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ, ἃς θεῶν γένος εὐδαιμόνων ἐπιστρέφεται πράττων ἕκαστος αὐτῶν τὸ αὑτοῦ, ἕπεται δὲ ὁ ἀεὶ ἐθέλων τε καὶ δυνάμενος· φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται. ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρὸς δαῖτα καὶ ἐπὶ θοίνην ἴωσιν

[576] Edmonds III (2015) 557.
One may also think of the peaceful/utopian associations of choral song in Bacchylides (fr. 4) and all over the place in tragedy.

{SO} […] resting in undisturbed peace, surveying Nature and practicing philosophy, not for a crowd of spectators, but in the bountiful midst of Truth.

The rejection of ὄχλος (crowd) differentiates Axiochus' from Plato's Socrates, who is frequently engaged in philosophical dialogues in front of a big audience,[577] but the disapproval of the theatre and the association of philosophy with Nature and Truth, presented as Platonic Forms, is certainly a Platonic legacy.

The following afterlife myth, with its judgement of souls, brings to mind three Platonic eschatological myths situated in the end of the following dialogues: the *Gorgias*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Republic*. Intriguing here is that the author of the *Axiochus* has adopted elements from all three dialogues in order to compose his own eschatological myth (*Ax*. 371c-d):

> ὅσοις μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ ζῆν δαίμων ἀγαθὸς ἐπέπνευσεν, εἰς τὸν τῶν εὐσεβῶν χῶρον οἰκίζονται, ἔνθα ἄφθονοι μὲν ὧραι παγκάρπου γονῆς βρύουσιν, πηγαὶ δὲ ὑδάτων καθαρῶν ῥέουσιν, παντοίοι δὲ λειμῶνες ἄνθεσι ποικίλοις ἐαριζόμενοι, διατριβαὶ δὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ θέατρα καὶ κύκλιοι χοροὶ καὶ μουσικὰ ἀκούσματα, συμπόσιά τε εὐμελῆ και εἰλαπίναι αὐτοχορήγητοι, καὶ ἀκήρατος ἀλυπία καὶ ἡδεῖα δίαιτα·οὔτε γὰρ χεῖμα σφοδρὸν οὔτε θάλπος ἐγγίγνεται, ἀλλ᾽ εὔκρατος ἀὴρ χεῖται ἁπαλαῖς ἡλίου ἀκτίσι ἀνακιρνάμενος. ἐνταῦθα τοῖς μεμυημένοις ἐστίν τις προεδρία· καὶ τὰς ὁσίους ἁγιστείας κἀκεῖσε συντελοῦσιν. πῶς οὖν οὐ σοὶ πρώτῳ μέτεστι τῆς τιμῆς, ὄντι γεννήτῃ τῶν θεῶν;
>
> Now those who were inspired by a good daemon during their lifetimes go to reside in a place for the pious, where the ungrudging seasons teem with fruits of every kind, where fountains of pure water flow, where all sorts of meadows bloom with many kinds of flowers, with philosophers discoursing, poets performing, dances in rings, musical concerts, delightful *symposia* and self-furnished feasts, undiluted freedom from pain and a rich diet of pleasure; nor does fierce cold or heat ever occur, but through it wafts a temperate breeze, infused with the gentle rays of the sun. There is a certain place of honor for those who are initiated, and there they perform their sacred rites. Why should you not be the frist in line for this privilege, you who are "kin to the gods"?

[577] See the explicit references in Pl. *Lysis*, *Charmides, Euthydemus, Gorgias*.

The description of the life for the just souls in a sacred place in bloom, where every art has a significant position is fascinating. The author puts together all elements that create a dreamland and accepts every kind of art and artist. This place has in fact everything. A virtuous soul – positively influenced by the divine inspiration – has the opportunity to satisfy all five senses by enjoying fruits of every kind. Apart from the pleasure that the natural environment brings to the soul, the philosophical discussions, the dramatic representations, the choral performances, and the sacred rites are constitutional elements of this jubilant way of life. It is true that the contribution of philosophy is crucial. The philosophical way of thinking and acting makes this dreamland accessible to the mortals. In this afterlife world, everything is allowed. Philosophy and song-and-dance performances coexist. Unlike Plato, the writer of the *Axiochus* reconciles philosophy with poetry even in the heavenly sphere described in a myth.

After helping Axiochus overcome his fears, Socrates intends to head to his initial destination, the gymnasium of Cynosarges, but he promises to return to Axiochus' place at noon.[578] Thus, the dialogue is presented as a short deviation from Socrates' regular haunts, but includes his usual and effective practice of philosophy, which is undoubtedly useful. Due to its nature and quality, philosophy makes soul 'travel' to the heavens and it is the promise of the destination of this journey that contributes to Axiochus' consolation.[579] Thus, Plato's imitator places philosophy in unusual places, just as his master did.

Conclusions

The discussion of the locations in which Plato situates many of his dialogues is not random. In fact, it serves one of his main philosophical purposes: the proof of the omnipresence of philosophy, which sparkles even in the most unusual places, such as private houses, places for physical exercise, and the erotic sacred landscapes, where one would expect *melos* instead of philosophy.

[578] *Ax*. 372a: Ποιήσω ὡς λέγεις, κἀγὼ δὲ ἐπάνειμι ἐς Κυνόσαργες, ἐς περίπατον, ὁπόθεν δεῦρο μετεκλήθην.
[579] Cf. also the journey of the soul in Plato's *Phaedo* described by Socrates for his self-consolation.

The most important dialogue and the starting point of this chapter, however, is the *Symposium*. Despite the fact that it is a middle dialogue, there are many ideas and tendencies that can be attested in the prior and in later platonic dialogues. In the *Symposium*, Plato reformulates the traditional *symposium* in order to transmit his philosophy. *Melos* is exiled. The epideictic *encômium* in prose for the deity of *Erôs*, culminates in Diotima's speech in the first part, and is followed by the epideictic *encomium* in prose in favour of Socrates in Alcibiades' attempt to immortalize him. In the end, however, it is downgraded to a real *symposium* filled with too much wine, too many people, and too much noise, all of which leave no space for philosophical discussion.

Similarly, the meeting of the *Protagoras* deviates from the traditional drinking-parties. The συνέδριον or συνουσία at Callias' house, with the intriguing description of the sophists' audience as a chorus and the attempt of interpretation of the Simonidean ode is another typical example of Plato's reformulation of the traditional *symposium*. The term συνέδριον, which lends a tinge of formality and gravity in the gathering,[580] is used both to signify the assembly of men and the place where it will be held and clarify its differentiation from the standard form of banquets. As it has been shown, the traditional banquet is altered. *Melos* is exiled and redefined through the analysis of the Simonidean ode.

In the *Republic*, Plato presents the philosophical discussion (συνουσία, διάλογος) that takes place in Polemarchus' house after Socrates' private *theôria* at the cult of Bendis in Piraeus. The diction of the dialogue does not allude to sympotic context. Furthermore, there is no reference to *melos*. The interlocutors commit themselves to the discussion of sympotic practices and strategies pertaining to the ideal city, but they do not participate in any of these in reality.

From the sympotic-like settings I turned to the *palaistrai* of the *Lysis* and the *Charmides* and to the *Lyceum* of the *Euthydemus*, where, at least as Plato explains, people are engaged not only in physical training, but also in philosophical pursuits. In the *Lysis*, philosophy is judged more appropriate for the approach of a beloved person than the poetic and prose compositions. Therefore, *melos* is expelled, whereas philosophy alone enters the *palaistra* of Taureas.

[580] Xenophon in his *Hellenika* uses the term *synedrion* to denote the council of war (HG. 1.1.31, 7.1.39).

Similarly, in the *Charmides*, the philosophical conversation, which takes place in a *palaistra*, defeats the spontaneous, almost ridiculous, recitation of poetic lines, which comes as a reaction to the young boy's astonishing beauty. The victory of the spirit over physical tendencies occurs in a wrestling-school. Philosophy takes the place of *melos*.

In the *Euthydemus*, Socrates wants to be initiated in the sophistic mysteries. In the *Lyceum*, which is described in detail, the sophists are compared to skillful dancers and their audience forms a chorus. Thus, *melos* is presented as choral song. The active participation of the place in the acclamations of the sophists' arguments seems to be ironic. The ironic treatment of the sophists and their methods presupposes an ironic approach to *melos* too.

Plato's turn from indoor, urban space to outdoor country places is attested in two Platonic dialogues, the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws*. The first one is set in the countryside, outside Athens' city walls and the second one on the island of Crete. The settings of both dialogues are described in detail and they are harmoniously integrated into the philosophical discussions.

In the *Phaedrus*, the *locus amoenus* is a context suitable for *melos*. Indeed, various melic elements permeate the whole dialogue, but gradually everything is reformed and finally occupied by philosophy. Philosophy intrudes into the beautiful and erotic sacred place. Regarding the melic genres, the dithyramb is explicitly rejected, while hymn and praise in prose are accepted and brought to the foreground. In this context, Plato's particular erotic philosophy is truly everywhere.

The locus amoenus in the *Laws* that shares many common characteristics with that in the *Phaedrus* receives a new kind of *theôria*. The traditional *theôria*, which includes song and dance, is modified because of the intrusion of philosophy. The Athenian's double identity as musician and legislator contributes decisively to the shape of this particular philosophical *theôria* that walks towards the sanctuary of Zeus on mountain Ide.

The last dialogue in my analysis is the *Axiochus*, which takes place in a private house. Discussion of this dialogue serves to illuminate the reception of Plato. More specifically I attempted to see how and in what specific context *melos* and philosophy are treated by an author who imitates Plato in form and style. The dialogue takes place in Axiochus' house, where Socrates manages to comfort the elder's soul with the help of philosophy. The core of Socrates' consolation speech, is the description of

the world of the afterlife. This cosmic space is presented as a meadow in full bloom, where the harmonious unity of philosophy with song and dance is achieved. Thus, the author of Axiochus reconciles philosophy with song and dance in the eschatological myth he narrates.

In general, the exile or tacit displacement of *melos* offers broader space to philosophy that invades and occupies public, private, urban places as well as natural landscapes by appropriating certain melic motifs and practices. The reformation of the traditional settings, where the discourses take place, and the adaptation of *melos* to Plato's philosophical needs are fundamental strategies that Plato develops as regards *melos*. Certainly, *melos* is downgraded and marginalized; everything in Plato works to serve his philosophy. The winner of this constant, lengthy, and difficult battle between *melos* and philosophy is and will always be philosophy.

CHAPTER IV

The reformation and reintegration of *melos*

Μοῦσα θεὰ μετ' ἐμοῦ ξύμπαιζε τὴν ἑορτήν.

O divine Muse keep the feast together with me.
(Aristoph. Peace 816)

Introduction

Unlike the exile of *melos* discussed in the previous chapter, this chapter attempts to show how *melos* is interpreted and reintegrated into three Platonic dialogues, namely the *Phaedo*, the *Republic,* and the *Laws*. More precisely, in the first subsection (IV.1.1.) I discuss the role of *melos* at Socrates' last meeting with his friends before his death in the *Phaedo*. The position of *melos* in the *Republic,* and particularly in the description of the audiovisual cosmic *choreia* in the tenth book, is the subject of the second subsection (IV.1.2.). This chapter ends with an examination of the role of *melos* in the new Cretan city of the *Laws*, as it is attested to in the description of the choral performances of Muses, Apollo, and Dionysus (IV.1.3.).

IV.1. *Phaedo*. Socrates' κύκνειον ᾆσμα[581]

The *Phaedo*, which takes place in the prison just before Socrates' death and describes the last meeting between Socrates and his disciples, begins with the reference to the Delian festival in honor of Apollo,[582] which was the reason for the

[581] *Kukneion aisma*, which is the swans' dying song, is used both literally and metaphorically here.
[582] On the island of Delos as a place to honor Apollo's excellence and, consequently, poetry's immortal glory due to the singing of the paean in Plato's *Phaedo*, see Susanetti (2002) 53-76.

delay of Socrates' death. The Delian festival was a celebration of life; as Calame says, 'the Delia was justified by the legend of the expedition of Theseus and his companions to Crete.'[583] However, the end of this festival signifies Socrates' death. Plato narrates the myth and underlines the importance of the *theôria* that was sent annually from Athens, and which indicates the beginning of the festival.[584]

No execution is permitted during the Delian festival to Apollo and therefore Socrates' death has been postponed until the sacred ship transporting the deputation returns to Athens. There was a sanctuary of Apollo and Artemis on Delos and Burkert says, '[…] the Apollo temple with its monumental gilded image stood next to the Artemision.'[585] In the sanctuary of Apollo on Delos, 'boys and girls dance the Crane Dance (*geranos*) with tortuous, labyrinthian movements. It is said that the maidens and youths from Athens invented this dance together with Theseus after escaping from the labyrinth.'[586] The *Delia* was a renowned festival that was celebrated annually or every four years, possibly in the Athenian month of *Hieros* or in *Thargelion.* It hosted music, gymnastic, and equestrian contests.[587]

The *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* repeatedly praises the exceptional performance of the Delian maidens, the servants of Apollo. Their performance in Delos must have been one of the most important parts of the festival and is described as a 'great wonder' (μέγα θαῦμα) (*HHA* vv. 156-64):

> πρὸς δὲ τόδε μέγα θαῦμα, ὅου κλέος οὔποτ᾽ ὀλεῖται,
> κοῦραι Δηλιάδες, ἑκατηβελέταο θεράπναι·
> αἵ τ᾽ ἐπεὶ ἂρ πρῶτον μὲν Ἀπόλλων ὑμνήσωσιν,
> αὖτις δ᾽ αὖ Λητώ τε καὶ Ἄρτεμιν ἰοχέαιραν,
> μνησάμεναι ἀνδρῶν τε παλαιῶν ἠδὲ γυναικῶν
> ὕμνον ἀείδουσιν, θέλγουσι δὲ φῦλ᾽ ἀνθρώπων.
> πάντων δ᾽ ἀνθρώπων φωνὰς καὶ κρεμβαλιαστὺν[588]

Castrucci (2013) 53-78 (particularly the pages 67-71) shows that Plato's references to the swan song, the Delian festival, and the god Apollo reflects the Euripidean tradition that Plato uses to shape an extraordinary dialogue that combines poetic and philosophical elements.

[583] Calame (2001) 108.

[584] Pl. *Phaedo* 58a-c

[585] Burkert (1985) 219.

[586] Latte ((1913) (1967)) 67-71, quoted in Burkert (1985) 102.

[587] Irene Ringwood (1933) 452-458.

[588] See Peponis' (2009) 39-70 discussion on the suitability of *krembaliastun* rather than *bambaliastun.*

μιμεῖσθ' ἴσασιν· φαίη δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἕκαστος
φθέγγεσθ'· οὕτω σφιν <u>καλὴ</u> συνάρηρεν <u>ἀοιδή</u>.

And there is this <u>great wonder</u> besides – and its renown shall never perish –,
the girls of Delos, hand-maidens of the Far-shooter;
for when they have <u>praised Apollo</u> first,
and also Leto and Artemis who delights in arrows,
<u>they sing a hymn</u> telling of men and women of past days,
and <u>charm the tribes of men</u>.
Also they can imitate the tongues of all men and their clattering speech·
each would say that
he himself were singing, so close to truth is their <u>sweet song</u>.[589]

Since Apollo's cult hymn is the paean,[590] the chorus of the Delian maidens probably sings a paean to Apollo. The possibility of the *hyporchêma* is not excluded however.[591] Peponi has persuasively shown that this wonderful, idealized performance elevates the chorus of the Delians to an archetypal chorus.[592]

At this point, I give two examples of the Delians' divine choral prototypes, namely the Muses, who provide beautiful performances in public places.[593] In *The Shield of Heracles*, the Muses sing and dance on Olympus with clear, sweet voice (Hes. *Shield* 205-6 Solmsen):

θεαὶ δ' ἐξῆρχον ἀοιδῆς
Μοῦσαι Πιερίδες, <u>λιγὺ μελπομένης</u> ἐικυῖαι

the goddesses began the song
the Muses of Pieria, similar to clear-voiced singers and dancers[594]

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[589] The translation is that of Evelyn-White (1914).
[590] Burkert (1985) 145.
[591] Peponi (2009) 56.
[592] Ibid. 66: "[...] apart from their possible professionalization, the stress on the wondrous perfection of the local chorus is meant to elevate them to the level of an archetypal chorus. By archetypal I mean paradigmatic choruses that are usually represented as performance models and are occasionally evoked by ordinary choruses as their legendary or mythical counterparts."
[593] See Scully's (2009) 91-107 discussion of the gods' dancing on Olympus.
[594] The translation is that of Scully (2009) 92.

In the *Theogony*, the Muses praise the laws and manners of all the immortals through their beautiful choral song, just as the Delian maidens know how to imitate all human voices and rhythms (Hes. *Theog*. 65-9):

> […] ἐρατὴν δὲ διὰ στόμα ὄσσαν ἱεῖσαι
> μέλπονται πάντων τε νόμους καὶ ἤθεα κεδνὰ
> ἀθανάτων κλείουσιν, ἐπήρατον ὄσσαν ἱεῖσαι.
> αἳ τότ᾽ ἴσαν πρὸς Ὄλυμπον ἀγαλλόμεναι ὀπὶ καλῇ,
> ἀμβροσίῃ μολπῇ […]

> […] lovely is the sound they produce from their mouths
> as they sing and celebrate the ordinances and the good ways
> of all the immortals, making delightful utterance.
> So then they went to Olympus, glorying in their beautiful voices,
> singing divinely; […].[595]

In addition to the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* and the reference to the Delian festival, the celebratory character of Delos is also attested to in later writers. Lucian reports that all the rites in Delos included song and dance (Luc. *De Salt.* 16):

> Ἐν Δήλῳ δέ γε οὐδὲ αἱ θυσίαι ἄνευ ὀρχήσεως ἀλλὰ σὺν ταύτῃ καὶ μετὰ μουσικῆς ἐγίγνοντο. παίδων χοροὶ συνελθόντες ὑπ᾽ αὐλῷ καὶ κιθάρᾳ οἱ μὲν ἐχόρευον, ὑπωρχοῦντο δὲ οἱ ἄριστοι προκριθέντες ἐξ αὐτῶν. τὰ γοῦν τοῖς χοροῖς γραφόμενα τούτοις ᾄσματα ὑπορχήματα ἐκαλεῖτο καὶ ἐμπέπληστο τῶν τοιούτων ἡ λύρα.

> At Delos, indeed, even the sacrifices were not without dancing, but were performed with that and with music. Choruses of boys came together, and while they moved and sang to the accompaniment of flute and lyre, those who had been selected from among them as them as the best performed an interpretative dance. Indeed, the songs that were written for these choruses were called Hyporchemes (interpretative dances), and lyric poetry is full of them.[596]

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[595] The translation is that of West (1999).
[596] The translation is that of Harmon (1936).

Callimachus describes Delos as noisy in the *Hymn to Apollo* (vv. 302-3):

> οὔτε σιωπηλὴν οὔτ᾽ ἄψοφον οὖλος ἐθείραις
> ἕσπερος, ἀλλ᾽ αἰεί σε καταβλέπει ἀμφιβόητον.

> The long curly-haired Hesperos saw you neither silent nor noiseless,
> but he always sees you resounding.[597]

In the passage 60c-d of the *Phaedo*, we learn that Socrates composed poems during his imprisonment. Cebes asks Socrates about the kind of poems he composed (Pl. *Phaedo* 60c-d):

> ὁ οὖν Κέβης ὑπολαβών, νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εὖ γ᾽ ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με. περὶ γάρ τοι τῶν ποιημάτων ὧν πεποίηκας ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλω προοίμιον καὶ ἄλλοι τινές με ἤδη ἤροντο, ἀτὰρ καὶ Εὔηνος πρῴην, ὅτι ποτὲ διανοηθείς, ἐπειδὴ δεῦρο ἦλθες, ἐποίησας αὐτά, πρότερον οὐδὲν πώποτε ποιήσας.

> Here Cebes interrupted and said, "By Zeus, Socrates, I am glad you reminded me. Several others have asked about the poems you have composed, the metrical versions of Aesop's fables and the *prooimion* to Apollo, and Evenus asked me the day before yesterday why you never thought of composing anything before, you composed these verses after you came to prison.

We learn that Socrates turned Aesop's myths into verses and composed a *prooimion* in honor of Apollo, according to Kurke, who links the *enteinas* with *Aisōpou logous,* linking *prooimion* to *ποιήσας*.[598] Socrates might also have composed the music for both Aesop's fables and the *prooimion* to Apollo, as Burnet argues.[599] This presentation of Socrates as a melic composer is unprecedented in Plato.

[597] The translation is mine.
[598] Kurke (2006) 14: "poems [Socrates] has composed putting the fables of Aesop into verse and composing the hymn to Apollo."
[599] Burnet (1911) 16: "ἐντείνας is 'setting to music,' not merely 'versifying'; for no προοίμιον could have been in prose."

The term *prooimion* is not clear. In the *Phaedrus*[600] it is defined as the introduction, or the initial part of a speech. In a recent article, Maslov, as has been already mentioned in the first chapter, detects the occurrence of the term in archaic and classical texts. He argues that "most modern discussions start from Thucydides' designation of the text we know as the Homeric Hymn to Apollo as προοίμιον Ἀπόλλωνος ('prooimion of Apollo,' 3.104.4 – 5)[601] and the assertion in Plato's *Phaedo* that Socrates before his death authored τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλω προοίμιον ('the *prooimion* to Apollo,' 60d)."[602] He adds that "it appears that Socrates 'versified' (or composed) a prayer invoking Apollo – the kind of text that would be appropriate to the religious proceedings to which he refers."[603] Maslov concludes that "the use of *prooimion* in Phaedo 60d is more easily explained based on the meaning 'prayer, invocation' rather than 'composition that precedes epic performance.'"[604]

The choice of the hymn[605] to Apollo is clearly associated with the Delian festival. Socrates might have composed this hymn in order to honor and thank the god Apollo, and all the traditional gods of Athens, despite his current situation.[606] However, his poems are not intended to be performed in the rituals.

But how did Socrates come up with the idea of composing poetry? Socrates says that the composition of the *prooimion* was imposed on him by a 'dream' (*ἐνύπνιον)* that ordered him to make music (Pl. *Phaedo* 60d-e):

> λέγε τοίνυν, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ὦ Κέβης, τἀληθῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκείνῳ βουλόμενος οὐδὲ τοῖς ποιήμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνος εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα – ᾔδη γὰρ ὡς οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἴη – ἀλλ' ἐνυπνίων τινῶν ἀποπειρώμενος τί λέγοι, καὶ ἀφοσιούμενος εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις ταύτην τὴν μουσικήν μοι ἐπιτάττοι ποιεῖν. ἦν γὰρ δὴ ἄττα τοιάδε· πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνύπνιον ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ ὄψει φαινόμενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον, 'ὦ Σώκρατες,' ἔφη, 'μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου.'

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[600] Pl. *Phdr*. 266d: καὶ καλῶς γε ὑπέμνησας. προοίμιον μὲν οἶμαι πρῶτον ὡς δεῖ τοῦ λόγου λέγεσθαι ἐν ἀρχῇ: ταῦτα λέγεις - ἦν γάρ; - τὰ κομψὰ τῆς τέχνης;
[601] Thuc. *Hist.* 3.104.4: δηλοῖ δὲ μάλιστα Ὅμηρος ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσι τοῖσδε, ἅ ἐστιν ἐκ προοιμίου Ἀπόλλωνος· […]
[602] See Maslov (2012) 191.
[603] Ibid. 197.
[604] Ibid.
[605] Both *paean* and *hyporcheme* can be defined as hymns, as seen in the first chapter.
[606] Right behaviour to the gods means song, dance, and sacrifices for them. See Pl. *Laws* 203e: τίς οὖν ὀρθότης; παίζοντά ἐστιν διαβιωτέον τινὰς δὴ παιδιάς, θύοντα καὶ ᾄδοντα καὶ ὀρχούμενον, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἵλεως αὑτῷ παρασκευάζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι.

"Then tell him, Cebes," said he, "the truth, that I composed these verses not because I wished to rival him or his poems, for I knew that would not be easy, but because I wished to test the meaning of certain dreams, and to make sure that I was neglecting no duty in case their repeated commands meant that I must cultivate the Muses in this way. They were something like this. The same dream came to me often in my past life, sometimes in one form and sometimes in another, but always saying the same thing: 'Socrates,' it said, 'make music and work at it.'

What is the precise meaning of Socrates' dream? The dream ordered Socrates 'to compose music' (μουσικὴν ποίει) and to 'work at it' (ἐργάζου). The meaning of the verb ἐργάζου is ambiguous here. One waits to see how Socrates interprets the dream (Pl. *Phaedo* 60e-61b):

καὶ ἐγὼ ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό μοι παρακελεύεσθαί τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὥσπερ οἱ τοῖς θέουσι διακελευόμενοι, καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς, ἐμοῦ δὲ τοῦτο πράττοντος. νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἥ τε δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἑορτὴ διεκώλυέ με ἀποθνῄσκειν, ἔδοξε χρῆναι, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταύτην τὴν δημώδη μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν· ἀσφαλέστερον γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἀφοσιώσασθαι ποιήσαντα ποιήματα καὶ πιθόμενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ. οὕτω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἐποίησα οὗ ἦν ἡ παροῦσα θυσία· μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεόν, ἐννοήσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εἴπερ μέλλοι ποιητὴς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦ μυθολογικός, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ οὓς προχείρους εἶχον μύθους καὶ ἠπιστάμην τοὺς Αἰσώπου, τούτων ἐποίησα οἷς πρώτοις ἐνέτυχον.

And I formerly thought it was urging and encouraging me to do what I was doing already and that just as people encourage runners by cheering, so the dream was encouraging me to do what I was doing, that is, to make music, because philosophy was the greatest kind of music and I was working at that. But now, after the trial and while the festival of the god delayed my execution, I thought, in case the repeated dream really meant to tell me to make this which is ordinarily called music, I ought to do so and not to disobey. For I thought it was

> safer not to go hence before making sure that I had done what I ought, by obeying the dream and composing verses. So first I composed a hymn to the god whose festival it was; and after the god, considering that a poet, if he is really to be a poet, must compose myths and not speeches, since I was not a maker of myths, I took the myths of Aesop, which I had at hand and knew, and turned into verse the first I came upon.

By defining philosophy as 'the greatest kind of music,' Socrates initially thinks that the dream encouraged him to compose philosophy. However, thanks to the Delian festival that delayed his execution, Socrates reinterpreted the command of the dream and composed 'ordinary music' (δημώδη μουσικήν), namely a *prooimion* for the god. But, in order to become a poet, a composer of myths and not speeches, and since he was not able to compose myths, he turned the already composed Aesopean fables into verses. So it seems that Socrates has the ability to compose music, but not poetic verses. Eventually, against his will, Socrates becomes a (melic) poet.

By composing the *prooimion* to Apollo, Socrates becomes associated with the god, something that is also attested to in the *Apology*.[607] In this dialogue, Socrates attributes his philosophical inquiry to the oracle given to his disciple Chaerophon in Delphi, when he asked if there was any man wiser than Socrates. Pythia's negative response provided Socrates' motivation for investigating and seeking the truth of the oracular response. Therefore, the cause of Socrates' quest of wisdom, according to the *Apology*, is Apollo's prophecy.[608]

But, what is the role of the *prooimion* in a philosophical dialogue that aims to present the immortal nature of the soul? It might be a proof of Socrates' joyful, creative, and brave spirit, even in these last moments of his life, something that confirms his strong belief in the immortality of the soul. There is no reason to be sad, because the soul lives forever. In this way, the readers are also introduced to the main subject of the dialogue.[609] Socrates' (first and last) musical composition can certainly be compared with the song that the swans sing before their death. That is why his *prooimion* can be seen as κύκνειον ᾆσμα. Instead of performing his *prooimion*, Socrates welcomes philosophy to the dialogue by developing his philosophical

[607] Pl. *Apol*. 21a-23a.
[608] Pl. *Apol*. 21e5-6.
[609] On the role of the dramatic setting in the *Phaedo,* see Fowler's (1914) 197 introduction.

arguments on the immortality of the soul. In this way, Plato accomplishes the order of the dream by practicing philosophy rather than not music, as we shall see. Music is only used as an introduction, a *prooimion*, to his philosophy.

In 81a-83e Socrates describes the journey of the souls to Hades after their physical death.[610] He narrates the myth of the immortality of the soul, relying on orphic dualism (of body and soul). The eschatological myth is a kind of consolation, with which he comforts himself with the thought of a better and happier afterlife. Socrates attempts to persuade his students that his current situation is not a 'misfortune' by comparing himself with the swans (Pl. *Phaedo* 84d-85b):

> […] καί, ὡς ἔοικε, τῶν κύκνων δοκῶ φαυλότερος ὑμῖν εἶναι τὴν μαντικήν, οἳ ἐπειδὰν αἴσθωνται ὅτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν, ᾄδοντες καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, τότε δὴ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα ᾄδουσι, γεγηθότες ὅτι μέλλουσι παρὰ τὸν θεὸν ἀπιέναι οὗπέρ εἰσι θεράποντες. οἱ δ᾽ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὸ αὑτῶν δέος τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῶν κύκνων καταψεύδονται, καί φασιν αὐτοὺς θρηνοῦντας τὸν θάνατον ὑπὸ λύπης ἐξᾴδειν, καὶ οὐ λογίζονται ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄρνεον ᾄδει ὅταν πεινῇ ἢ ῥιγῷ ἤ τινα ἄλλην λύπην λυπῆται, οὐδὲ αὐτὴ ἥ τε ἀηδὼν καὶ χελιδὼν καὶ ὁ ἔποψ, ἃ δή φασι διὰ λύπην θρηνοῦντα ᾄδειν. ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε ταῦτά μοι φαίνεται λυπούμενα ᾄδειν οὔτε οἱ κύκνοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἅτε οἶμαι τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄντες, μαντικοί τέ εἰσι καὶ προειδότες τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου ἀγαθὰ ᾄδουσι καὶ τέρπονται ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν διαφερόντως ἢ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ. ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγοῦμαι ὁμόδουλός τε εἶναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ χεῖρον ἐκείνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, οὐδὲ δυσθυμότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.
>
> […] And you seem to think I am inferior in prophetic power to the swans who sing at other times also, but when they feel that they are to die, sing most and best in their joy that they are to go to the god whose servants they are. But men, because of their own fear of death, misrepresent the swans and say that they sing for sorrow, in mourning for their own death. They do not consider that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold or has any other trouble; no, not even the nightingale or the swallow or the hoopoe which are said to sing in lamentation. I do not believe they sing for grief, nor do the swans; but since they are Apollo's birds, I believe they have prophetic vision, and because they have

[610] Pl. *Phaedo* 107c-110b.

> foreknowledge of the blessings in the other world they sing and rejoice on that day more than ever before. And I think that I am myself a fellow-servant of the swans; and am consecrated to the same God and have received from our master a gift of prophecy no whit inferior to theirs, and that I go out from life with as little sorrow as they.

Socrates' prophetic power, equated to that of the swans, strengthens his close association with Apollo.[611] As Socrates argues, Apollo himself taught him the art of prophecy. In addition, Socrates compares himself with the swans. Just as the swans, 'the servants of Apollo,' sing wonderfully at the approach of their death because they know that they will go to their master, so Socrates, who considers himself a disciple of the god and equally skilled in the art of prophecy, does not feel sorrow at his approaching death. He already knows his fate in the afterlife. The prophetic power of the swans is represented through their celebratory last song. However, Socrates' prophetic power is represented through philosophy. He abandons the song (*prooimion*) for the sake of philosophy.

The swans also point our attention to Orpheus. In the eschatological myth of the *Republic,*[612] Orpheus chooses the fate of a swan for his next life. These musical birds that serve Apollo create a link between the two famous musicians par excellence and Socrates.

A little later, Cebes realizes that Socrates' words have an apotropaic power forwarding off the fear of death and characterizes Socrates as 'a good singer of charms'[613] (Pl. *Phaedo* 77e-78a):

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[611] For the figure of Apollo in the HHA, see Richardson (2009) 45-54. For Apollo's singing and dancing in ancient literature, see Scully (2009) 91-107, who focuses on the following descriptions of the god's performance: In the "Shield of Heracles," ascribed to Hesiod, Apollo is described as standing in the centre of the sacred divine chorus and playing his phorminx (ἱμερόεν κιθάριζε ... χρυσείῃ φόρμιγγι), while at the same time the Pierid Muses start singing to Apollo's melody. (Hes. *Shield* 201-206). The Muses are compared to singers and dancers, and therefore I assume that they also start dancing. There is a similar description in Homer's *Iliad* (Hom. *Il.* 1.603-4.): Apollo plays his beautiful phorminx on Mount Olympus, while the Muses sing. In the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, the god's performance also encompasses dance steps (ἐγκιθαρίζει ... ὕψι βιβάς), apart from the playing of the lyre, and his presence creates the right mood for singing and dancing forthe rest of the gods (*HHA* 183-206). Pindar describes him playing his golden phorminx in the middle of the Muses' chorus (Pind. *Nem.* 5. 22-25).

[612] Pl. *Rep.* 620a.

[613] The verb *ἐπᾴδω* in the *Laws* denotes the healing power of the choral music on the young souls. Pl. *Laws* 664b: ἅπαντας δεῖν ἐπᾴδειν τρεῖς ὄντας τοὺς χοροὺς ἔτι νέαις οὔσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ ἁπαλαῖς τῶν παίδων [...]

μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ἔνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται. τοῦτον οὖν πειρῶ μεταπείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον ὥσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια. ἀλλὰ χρή, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπᾴδειν αὐτῷ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ἕως ἂν ἐξεπᾴσητε. πόθεν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθὸν ἐπῳδὸν ληψόμεθα, ἐπειδὴ σύ, ἔφη, ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπεις;

"Assume that we have that fear, Socrates, and try to convince us; or rather, do not assume that we are afraid, but perhaps there is a child within us, who has such fears. Let us try to persuade him not to fear death as if it were a hobgoblin." "Ah," said Socrates, "you must sing charms to him every day until you charm away his fear." "Where then, Socrates," said he, "shall we find a good singer of such charms, since you are leaving us?"

Socrates' double identity as both a melic composer and a prophet is enriched by his ability to sing incantations that avert the fear of death.

Orpheus is also described as a prophet in the *Protagoras* 316d and he is known as "the powerful singer who went down into Hades" and "was thought especially competent to sing about eschatology and theogony."[614] Socrates and Orpheus[615] share the abilities of prophecy and singing and also share the motif of death.

In Simmias' simile, the orphic dualism that relies on the distinction between body and soul is compared with the lyre and harmony respectively. The lyre and its strings are the mortal part (body), whereas the harmony is the immortal one (soul). If anything occurs to the lyre-body, then the harmony-soul is inevitably destroyed (Pl. *Phaedo* 85e-86d):

ταύτῃ ἔμοιγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ᾗ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἄν τις καὶ λύρας τε καὶ χορδῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον εἴποι, ὡς ἡ μὲν ἁρμονία ἀόρατον καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ πάγκαλόν τι καὶ θεῖόν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡρμοσμένῃ λύρᾳ, αὐτὴ δ᾽ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ

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[614] OCD 1078 s.v. (Graf). Plato in *Symp.* 179d2-e changes the popular myth of Orpheus' descent to Hades, introducing the element of apparition. The infernal gods only "presented an apparition" of Eurydice to him, as a punishment for his cowardliness.

[615] Orpheus is also characterized as a perfect dancer (Lucian *De Salt* 15): Ἐῶ λέγειν, ὅτι τελετὴν οὐδεμίαν ἀρχαίαν ἔστιν εὑρεῖν ἄνευ ὀρχήσεως, Ὀρφέως δηλαδὴ καὶ Μουσαίου καὶ τῶν τότε ἀρίστων ὀρχηστῶν καταστησαμένων αὐτάς, ὥς τι κάλλιστον καὶ τοῦτο νομοθετησάντων, σὺν ῥυθμῷ καὶ ὀρχήσει μυεῖσθαι. Cf. Socrates' dancing in Xen. *Symp*. 2. 18-19.

χορδαὶ σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ σύνθετα καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ συγγενῆ. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἢ κατάξῃ τις τὴν λύραν ἢ διατέμῃ καὶ διαρρήξῃ τὰς χορδάς, εἴ τις διισχυρίζοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ σύ, ὡς ἀνάγκη ἔτι εἶναι τὴν ἁρμονίαν ἐκείνην καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέναι – οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανὴ ἂν εἴη τὴν μὲν λύραν ἔτι εἶναι διερρωγυιῶν τῶν χορδῶν καὶ τὰς χορδὰς θνητοειδεῖς οὔσας, τὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν ἀπολωλέναι τὴν τοῦ θείου τε καὶ ἀθανάτου ὁμοφυῆ τε καὶ συγγενῆ, προτέραν τοῦ θνητοῦ ἀπολομένην – ἀλλὰ φαίη ἀνάγκη ἔτι που εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν ἁρμονίαν, καὶ πρότερον τὰ ξύλα καὶ τὰς χορδὰς κατασαπήσεσθαι πρίν τι ἐκείνην παθεῖν – καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτόν σε τοῦτο ἐντεθυμῆσθαι, ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν καὶ συνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν, κρᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἁρμονίαν αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ μετρίως κραθῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα – εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει ἡ ψυχὴ οὖσα ἁρμονία τις, δῆλον ὅτι, ὅταν χαλασθῇ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἀμέτρως ἢ ἐπιταθῇ ὑπὸ νόσων καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει ἀπολωλέναι, καίπερ οὖσαν θειοτάτην, ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἁρμονίαι αἵ τ᾽ ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργοις πᾶσι, τὰ δὲ λείψανα τοῦ σώματος ἑκάστου πολὺν χρόνον παραμένειν ἕως ἂν ἢ κατακαυθῇ ἢ κατασαπῇ [...]

"In this," said he, "that one might use the same argument about harmony and a lyre with its strings. Once might say that the harmony is invisible and incorporeal, and very beautiful and divine in the well attuned lyre, but the lyre itself and its strings are bodies, and corporeal and composite and earthy and akin to that which is mortal. Now if someone shatters the lyre or cuts and breaks the strings, what if he should maintain by the same argument you employed, that the harmony could not have perished and must still exist? For there would be no possibility that the lyre and its strings, which are of mortal nature, still exist after the strings are broken, and the harmony, which is related and akin to the divine and the immortal, perish before that which is mortal. He would say that the harmony must still exist somewhere, and that the wood and the strings must rot away before anything could happen to it. And I fancy, Socrates, that it must have occurred to your own mind that we believe the soul to be something after this fashion; that our body is strung and held together by heat, cold, moisture, dryness, and the like, and the soul is a mixture and a harmony of these same elements, when they are well and properly mixed. Now if the soul is a harmony, it is clear that when the body is too much relaxed or is too tightly

> strung by diseases or other ills, the soul must of necessity perish, no matter how divine it is, like other harmonies in sounds and in all the works of artists, and the remains of each body will endure a long time until they are burnt or decayed [...]

Simmias' extensive simile is inspired by the world of music, and particularly by Apollo's musical instrument, the lyre.[616] The simile takes us back to the Apollonian source, where philosophical ideas are neatly interwoven with musical elements. This combination helps Plato to elucidate the philosophical arguments in the dialogue.

In the eschatological myth of the journey of the soul at the end of the *Phaedo*,[617] Socrates offers a detailed description of the geography of the earth, its regions, and the underworld, focusing on the punishment of the wicked souls and on the reward of the philosophical ones.[618] Socrates' philosophical views are reflected in the myth of the journey that the immortal soul undertakes in Tartarus before it resettles. The 'journey' of Socrates' philosophical spirit to every part of earth to and Tartarus enables him to deal with the fear or sorrow of his imminent death, as I have already noted. It recalls the rhapsode's soul in the *Ion*, where the soul replete with divine force is transferred each time to the places of the narrative.[619]

Socrates stands between the two prophets and musicians par excellence:[620] Apollo, who lives in the heavens and Orpheus, whose name is associated with Hades. Through the composition of the *prooimion*, the motif of swan, and of prophecy, Socrates establishes a connection with Apollo. Socrates is also said to be a good singer of incantations about death, something verified by the eschatological myth of the journey of the soul. These characteristics also bring him close to Orpheus. Consequently, the statement that 'philosophy is the greatest kind of music,' might suggest that Socrates aspires to be a philosopher par excellence on earth. Instead of

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[616] Socrates refutes Simmias' argument in 94e-95a: οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ ἄριστε, ἡμῖν οὐδαμῇ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν τινὰ φάναι εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ὁμήρῳ θείῳ ποιητῇ ὁμολογοῖμεν οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. ἔχει οὕτως, ἔφη. εἶεν δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν Ἁρμονίας ἡμῖν τῆς Θηβαϊκῆς ἵλεά πως, ὡς ἔοικε, μετρίως γέγονεν· […]

[617] Pl. *Phaedo* 110b-114c.

[618] The myth has a Pythagorean connotation, but Plato enriches it with his own colorful details.

[619] Pl. *Ion* 535c: καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πράγμασιν οἴεταί σου εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴ οἷς λέγεις ἐνθουσιάζουσα, ἢ ἐν Ἰθάκῃ οὖσιν ἢ ἐν Τροίᾳ ἢ ὅπως ἂν καὶ τὰ ἔπη ἔχῃ;

[620] Schematically:

HEAVENS	EARTH	UNDERWORLD
Apollo	Socrates	Orpheus

grieving for his misfortune, Socrates resorts to philosophy to comfort his soul, and eventually to celebrate his death.

Like the Delian maidens, who charmed everyone with their performance by imitating all people's voices and rhythms in the feast of life on Delos, Socrates charms his students with his philosophical incantations. The reference to the Delians' performance is overshadowed by Socrates' reference to his poetic composition, and, mainly, by his philosophical speech, which contains an extensive eschatological myth. On a metaphorical level, Socrates seals the rituals of the feast of his death, which takes place in the prison with his own sacrifice. As we have seen, his statement in 61b that he cannot make myths is not true. Socrates' composition of the *prooimion*, which involves the creation of a myth, and his close association with Apollo and Orpheus brings him close to the melic poets.

IV.2. *Republic*. The *choreia* of the Sirens

As already discussed, Plato ends up expelling both the poets and almost every kind of poetry from his ideal city. Yet at the end of the dialogue he describes the *choreia* of the Sirens, a peculiar cosmic spectacle that takes place in the 'superheaven realm' (*hyperouranios topos*), as we shall see.

The interlocutors explore two fundamental questions. The first question, 'What is justice?' leads to the second one, 'What is the relation of justice to happiness?' The dialogue focuses on the moral education of the individual soul, which can only be achieved in ideal sociopolitical circumstances, or, in other words, in an ideal city. There is a constant shift from the individual soul to the community and vice versa. The social structure of the city, discussed in the second and third books, is reflected in the tripartite structure of the soul, which is analyzed in the fourth book. In the eighth and ninth books, the defective political constitutions correspond to states of the soul.

The main purpose of the dialogue is the construction of an ideal city in every individual soul. And the model for this is possibly an ideal city in heaven, as Socrates stresses (Pl. *Rep*. 592a-b):

> μανθάνω, ἔφη· ἐν ᾗ νῦν διήλθομεν οἰκίζοντες πόλει λέγεις, τῇ ἐν λόγοις κειμένῃ, ἐπεὶ γῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ οἶμαι αὐτὴν εἶναι. ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν οὐρανῷ

ἴσως παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὁρῶντι ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν. διαφέρει δὲ οὐδὲν εἴτε που ἔστιν εἴτε ἔσται· τὰ γὰρ ταύτης μόνης ἂν πράξειεν, ἄλλης δὲ οὐδεμιᾶς.

"I understand," he said; "you mean the city whose establishment we have described, the city whose home is in the ideal; for I think that it can be found nowhere on earth. "Well," said I, "perhaps there is a pattern of it laid up in heaven for him who wishes to contemplate it and so beholding to constitute himself its citizen.

It seems that Plato's main focus in the *Republic* is the formation of a just soul, which will come about as the result of personal effort[621] and will contribute to the constitution of a just city. Therefore it is essential that the young soul be educated correctly, through engagement in *mousikê* and *gymnastikê*.[622] But what is beneficial in *paideia* and what must be avoided? In the second book of the *Republic* Socrates disapproves of the poets' making of myths.[623] He later criticizes the epic mythical narratives on the gods[624] and demonstrates their harmful effect on the young soul. *Epos*, *drama* and *melos* are all[625] harshly criticized, because they do not comply with Plato's criteria for the suitable representation of the gods (Pl. *Rep*. 379a):

οἷος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὤν, ἀεὶ δήπου ἀποδοτέον, ἐάντέ τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἔπεσιν ποιῇ ἐάντε ἐν μέλεσιν ἐάντε ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ.

The true quality of God we must always surely attribute to him whether we compose in epic, melic, or tragic verse.

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[621] See Skouteropoulos (2002) 900-901.
[622] Pl. *Rep*. 402a: ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τῶν τοιούτων ἕνεκα ἐν μουσικῇ εἶναι ἡ τροφή. // Pl. Rep**.**403c: μετὰ δὴ μουσικὴν γυμναστικῇ θρεπτέοι οἱ νεανίαι.
[623] Pl. *Rep*. 377b-c
[624] Pl. *Rep*. 377d-378e
[625] Only the comic poetry will be rejected later, in 606c: ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ γελοίου; ὅτι, ἂν αὐτὸς αἰσχύνοιο γελωτοποιῶν, ἐν μιμήσει δὲ κωμῳδικῇ ἢ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἀκούων σφόδρα χαρῇς καὶ μὴ μισῇς ὡς πονηρά, ταὐτὸν ποιεῖς ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις; ὃ γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ αὖ κατεῖχες ἐν σαυτῷ βουλόμενον γελωτοποιεῖν, φοβούμενος δόξαν βωμολοχίας, τότ᾽ αὖ ἀνιεῖς, καὶ ἐκεῖ νεανικὸν ποιήσας ἔλαθες πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις ἐξενεχθεὶς ὥστε κωμῳδοποιὸς γενέσθαι.

A little later in the dialogue the conversation turns to *melic* poetry. The discussion of this kind of poetry is extensive, since its association with *mousikê* is stronger than that of any other kind of poetry (Pl. *Rep*. 398c: οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὸ περὶ ᾠδῆς τρόπου καὶ μελῶν λοιπόν; transl. “After this, then,” said I, “comes the manner of song and tunes?”). In 398d Socrates gives a definition of *melos* (Pl. *Rep*. 398d: τὸ μέλος ἐκ τριῶν ἐστιν συγκείμενον, λόγου τε καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ. transl. “the song is composed of three things, the words, the tune, and the rhythm.”)

The ultimate aim of the correct musical education is the κάλλιστον θέαμα (the most beautiful spectacle), which Socrates emphasizes in 402d. At this point, it is plausible to wonder what *kalliston theama* is, and who is able to see and appreciate it as such (Pl. *Rep*. 402d-e):

> οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτου ἂν συμπίπτῃ ἔν τε τῇ ψυχῇ καλὰ ἤθη ἐνόντα καὶ ἐν τῷ εἴδει ὁμολογοῦντα ἐκείνοις καὶ συμφωνοῦντα, τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοντα τύπου, τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη κάλλιστον θέαμα τῷ δυναμένῳ θεᾶσθαι; πολύ γε. καὶ μὴν τό γε κάλλιστον ἐρασμιώτατον; πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; τῶν δὴ ὅτι μάλιστα τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ὅ γε μουσικὸς ἐρῴη ἄν· εἰ δὲ ἀσύμφωνος εἴη, οὐκ ἂν ἐρῴη. οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γέ τι, ἔφη, κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλλείποι· εἰ μέντοι τι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ὑπομείνειεν ἂν ὥστε ἐθέλειν ἀσπάζεσθαι.
>
> “Then,” said I, “when there is a coincidence of a beautiful disposition in the soul and corresponding and harmonious beauties of the same type in the bodily form – is not this the fairest spectacle for one who is capable of its contemplation?” “Far the fairest.” “And surely the fairest is the most lovable.” “Of course.” “The true musician, then, would love by preference persons of this sort; but if there were disharmony he would not love this.” “No,” he said, “not if there was a defect in the soul; but if it were in the body he would bear with it and still be willing to bestow his love.”

The most beautiful spectacle requires the harmonic combination of a fair soul with a beautiful body and its importance can only be assessed by the true musician, who is a perfectly educated man. Kersting expounds on the mutuality that exists between the internal and the external reality, between the soul and the material world,

concluding that the harmony between the internal and external expressions of the human personality is the key for the vision of the *kalliston theama*.[626]

The true musician is the true philosopher, who is distinguished from the rest of the citizens because he not only sees, hears, and admires the beautiful spectacles, but is also able to contemplate them (Pl. *Rep*. 476a-b):

> ταύτῃ τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, διαιρῶ, χωρὶς μὲν οὓς νυνδὴ ἔλεγες φιλοθεάμονάς τε καὶ φιλοτέχνους καὶ πρακτικούς, καὶ χωρὶς αὖ περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, οὓς μόνους ἄν τις ὀρθῶς προσείποι φιλοσόφους. πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις; οἱ μέν που, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, φιλήκοοι καὶ φιλοθεάμονες τάς τε καλὰς φωνὰς ἀσπάζονται καὶ χρόας καὶ σχήματα καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων δημιουργούμενα, αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ ἀδύνατος αὐτῶν ἡ διάνοια τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀσπάσασθαι. ἔχει γὰρ οὖν δή, ἔφη, οὕτως. οἱ δὲ δὴ ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν δυνατοὶ ἰέναι τε καὶ ὁρᾶν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἆρα οὐ σπάνιοι ἂν εἶεν;

> “Right,” he said. “This, then,” said I, “is my division. I set apart and distinguish those of whom you were just speaking, the lovers of spectacles and the arts, and men of action, and separate from them again those with whom our argument is concerned and who alone deserve the appellation of philosophers or lovers of wisdom.” “What do you mean?” he said. “The lovers of sounds and sights,” I said, “delight in beautiful tones and colors and shapes and in everything that art fashions out of these, but their thought is incapable of apprehending and taking delight in the nature of the beautiful in itself.” “Why, yes,” he said, “that is so.” “And on the other hand, will not those be few who would be able to approach beauty itself and contemplate it in and by itself?”

A little later in the sixth book, Socrates visualizes the perfect nature of the true philosopher with the help of an unusual metaphor (Pl. *Rep*. 490c):

> ἡγουμένης δὴ ἀληθείας οὐκ ἄν ποτε οἶμαι φαμὲν αὐτῇ χορὸν κακῶν ἀκολουθῆσαι. πῶς γάρ; ἀλλ᾽ ὑγιές τε καὶ δίκαιον ἦθος, ᾧ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἕπεσθαι. ὀρθῶς, ἔφη. καὶ δὴ τὸν ἄλλον τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως χορὸν τί δεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀναγκάζοντα τάττειν; μέμνησαι γάρ που ὅτι συνέβη προσῆκον τούτοις ἀνδρεία, μεγαλοπρέπεια, εὐμάθεια, μνήμη·

[626] See Kersting (1999) 129.

"When truth led the way, no chorus of evils, we, I fancy, would say, could ever follow in its train." "How could it?" "But rather a sound and just character, which is accompanied by temperance." "Right," he said. "What need, then, of repeating from the beginning our proof of the necessary order of the chorus that attends on the philosophical nature? You surely remember that we found pertaining to such a nature courage, grandeur of soul, aptness to learn, memory;

Socrates imagines the Truth as the leader of a chorus that is composed of moral virtues: health, justice, temperance, courage, moral grandeur, aptness to learn, and memory. This chorus is contrasted to the chorus of vice. Thus, the philosopher's nature is compared with an eight-member chorus that is led by Truth – which is, by association, the chorus-leader. *Choreia* is moralized in this passage, or else Plato imagines and presents morality in terms of *choreia*. Moreover, despite his negative attitude towards poetry,[627] with the exception of the hymns to the gods and the praises for the virtuous men,[628] he decides to end the dialogue with the narration of the myth of Er. This eschatological myth is full of poetic motifs. What does Plato actually pursue with this myth in the end of the dialogue? And what is this explosion of poetic sensitivity and creativity at the very end of his *Republic*?

The myth of Er gives an account of the *cosmos* and of the destiny of souls after their physical death. As Cornford remarks, "A new feature, interpolated by Plato, is the vision of the structure of the universe, in which the 'pattern set up in the heaven' (592b) is revealed to the souls before they choose a new life."[629] (Pl. *Rep*. 616b-c):

ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῷ <u>λειμῶνι</u> ἑκάστοις ἑπτὰ ἡμέραι γένοιντο, ἀναστάντας ἐντεῦθεν δεῖν τῇ ὀγδόῃ πορεύεσθαι, καὶ ἀφικνεῖσθαι τεταρταίους ὅθεν καθορᾶν ἄνωθεν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς τεταμένον <u>φῶς</u> εὐθύ, οἷον κίονα, μάλιστα τῇ ἴριδι προσφερῆ, λαμπρότερον δὲ καὶ καθαρώτερον· εἰς ὃ ἀφικέσθαι προελθόντες ἡμερησίαν ὁδόν, καὶ ἰδεῖν αὐτόθι κατὰ μέσον τὸ φῶς ἐκ τοῦ

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[627] In the 10th book the mimetic poetry is rejected with few exceptions though. However, the term mimetic is vague. See Pl. *Rep*. 595a: τὸ μηδαμῇ παραδέχεσθαι αὐτῆς ὅση μιμητική· παντὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον οὐ παραδεκτέα νῦν καὶ ἐναργέστερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, φαίνεται […]
[628] Pl. *Rep*. 607a: εἰδέναι δὲ ὅτι ὅσον μόνον ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν· εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην Μοῦσαν παραδέξῃ ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεσιν, ἡδονή σοι καὶ λύπη ἐν τῇ πόλει βασιλεύσετον ἀντὶ νόμου τε καὶ τοῦ κοινῇ ἀεὶ δόξαντος εἶναι βελτίστου λόγου.
[629] Cornford (1945) 349.

οὐρανοῦ τὰ ἄκρα αὐτοῦ τῶν δεσμῶν τεταμένα – εἶναι γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ φῶς σύνδεσμον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, οἷον τὰ ὑποζώματα τῶν τριήρων, οὕτω πᾶσαν συνέχον τὴν περιφοράν – ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἄκρων τεταμένον Ἀνάγκης ἄτρακτον, δι᾽ οὗ πάσας ἐπιστρέφεσθαι τὰς περιφοράς· [...]

But when each group had spent seven days in the meadow, they had to move on and continue their journey on the eighth day. After three more days they came to a place where they beheld stretching from above, through the whole heaven and earth, a straight beam of light, like a column, closely resembling a rainbow though of a brighter and purer gleam. They reached this point after progressing a further day's travelling, and there they saw down the centre of the light the ends of its bonds attached from the sky (for this light was the binding of the sky, holding the whole revolution together in the way that a trireme's under-cables do), and from these ends was suspended the spindle of Necessity, through which all the heavenly rotations turned. [...]

The first station of the souls is the 'meadow' (λειμών). After leaving the cosmic meadow, the souls on the journey see a light that runs through heaven and earth. The light bridges the two worlds and has three distinct characteristics that are presented through the use of three similes: it is straight like a column, it is bright like a rainbow, and it holds the ends of the sky together as a trireme's under-cables do. The first two similes concern its form and its quality, respectively,[630] while the third one defines its functional role. Where the earth touches the sky we can see Necessity, who holds on her knees the spindle around which the circles of the world turn.[631] As we will see later in this chapter, a siren is seated on each of these colorful circles.

In the meantime the souls listen to the Siren's melody. Each Siren sings a single note, forming a musical octave.[632] Their song is called *harmonia.* The Sirens are led by the superior Necessity in this peculiar audiovisual spectacle (Pl. *Rep*. 617b-d):

ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κύκλων αὐτοῦ ἄνωθεν ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου βεβηκέναι Σειρῆνα συμπεριφερομένην, φωνὴν μίαν ἱεῖσαν, ἕνα τόνον· ἐκ πασῶν δὲ ὀκτὼ οὐσῶν μίαν ἁρμονίαν συμφωνεῖν. ἄλλας δὲ καθημένας πέριξ δι᾽ ἴσου τρεῖς, ἐν θρόνῳ

[630] Halliwell (1988) 178: "[…] the rainbow comparison refers to the quality of the light, while the preceding image of a column defines its form and direction."
[631] Pl. *Rep*. 616c-617b.
[632] Barker (1989) 58: 'Fairly clearly the sense of *harmonia* here is "octave scale."'

ἑκάστην, θυγατέρας τῆς ἀνάγκης, Μοίρας, λευχειμονούσας, στέμματα ἐπὶ τῶν κεφαλῶν ἐχούσας, Λάχεσίν τε καὶ Κλωθὼ καὶ Ἄτροπον, ὑμνεῖν πρὸς τὴν τῶν Σειρήνων ἁρμονίαν, Λάχεσιν μὲν τὰ γεγονότα, Κλωθὼ δὲ τὰ ὄντα, Ἄτροπον δὲ τὰ μέλλοντα. καὶ τὴν μὲν Κλωθὼ τῇ δεξιᾷ χειρὶ ἐφαπτομένην συνεπιστρέφειν τοῦ ἀτράκτου τὴν ἔξω περιφοράν, διαλείπουσαν χρόνον, τὴν δὲ Ἄτροπον τῇ ἀριστερᾷ τὰς ἐντὸς αὖ ὡσαύτως· τὴν δὲ Λάχεσιν ἐν μέρει ἑκατέρας ἑκατέρᾳ τῇ χειρὶ ἐφάπτεσθαι.

and up above on each of the rims of the circles a Siren stood, borne around in its revolution and uttering one sound, one note, and from all the eight there was the concord of a single harmony. And there were another three who sat round about at equal intervals, each one on her throne, the Fates, daughters of Necessity, clad in white vestments with filleted heads, Lachesis, and Clotho, and Atropos, who sang in unison with the music of the Sirens, Lachesis singing the things that were, Clotho the things that are, and Atropos the things that are to be. And Clotho with the touch of her right hand helped to turn the outer circumference of the spindle, pausing from time to time. Atropos with her left hand in like manner helped to turn the inner circles, and Lachesis alternately with either hand lent a hand to each.

Seated at equal distances, each upon her throne, the Fates, who are the daughters of Necessity, sing on the Sirens' melody. The Sirens' *harmonia* is the melody of the Fates' song. The cosmic space that hosts this peculiar cosmic audiovisual spectacle might be seen as a cosmic locus amoenus. Or at least, this would be an attractive idea.

Much of the tradition of Sirens in song and art assumes that there were three of them, while Plato talks about eight Sirens. Pythagorean influence is evident here. Among the Pythagoreans, the number eight, which shaped a musical octave scale, was esteemed as the first actual cube (2x2x2). It is the center of geometrical and musical harmony, and hence the source of the balance of the universe. Proclus explains the number of the Sirens using technical terminology.[633] The eight Sirens allude to the

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[633] Proclus (Kroll (1899-1901 (1965)) comments on Pl. *Rep*. 2.237: καὶ τέλος ὀκτὼ τῶν κύκλων καὶ τῶν Σειρήνων οὐσῶν μίαν ἁρμονίαν ἐκ πάντων ἀποτελεῖσθαί φησιν, οἷον τὴν διὰ πασῶν, ἐν ὅροις μὲν ὀκτὼ θεωρουμένην, ἑπτὰ δὲ διαστήμασιν, ὡς τῶν Σειρήνων τὰς ἐνεργείας εἰκάσθαι φθόγγοις, ἐξ ὧν ἡ διὰ πασῶν ἡ κατακορεστάτη τῶν συμφωνιῶν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν τάξιν αὐτῶν εἶναι τὰ διαστήματα τῶν φθόγγων, ἀρχόμενα ἀπὸ τῆς νήτης κάτωθεν καὶ τελευτῶντα εἰς τὴν ὑπάτην ἀνωτάτω οὖσαν· δεῖ γὰρ τὰ ἀνωτέρω κινεῖσθαι θᾶττον, κἂν δοκῶσιν αἱ ἀποκαταστάσεις εἶναι πολυχρονιώτεραι τῷ μείζονα λόγον ἔχειν τοὺς κύκλους

eight spheres, which surround the earth (seven for the planets and the last for the 'fixed stars'). Thus, "Plato uses eight celestial Sirens producing the harmony of the spheres."[634] So what we are listening to is the famous 'music of the spheres': each has one note, so we end up with a scale: a full octave of two tetrachords.

The Sirens are mentioned in four Platonic dialogues. In the remaining three dialogues they are associated with the charm that their song exerts on people.[635] In the *Republic*, however, there is no characterization of the quality of their 'musical uttering.'

One might wonder why Plato chooses the Sirens rather than the Muses,[636] who the major poets and prose writers in the antiquity describe as the mythical divine performers par excellence. Plato himself points out in the *Phaedrus* that the birth of the Muses signifies the birth of the song.[637] In the *Laws*, the Muses bestow upon men the gifts of rhythm and harmony, together with Apollo and Dionysus.[638] In the *Republic*, however, there is no reference to them. Instead, we see the Sirens participating in the particular choral performance that takes place beyond Heaven. The key point here is possibly death. The Sirens are traditionally linked with death, therefore they seem to be placed with good reason within this Platonic context. In

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αὐτοὺς τοῖς μεγέθεσι πρὸς τοὺς κύκλους ἢ τὰς κινήσεις αὐτῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας· τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ συμπεφωνῆσθαι παρὰ πᾶσιν.

[634] OCD 1413 s.v. (Richardson)

[635] Pl. *Phaedr.* 259ab: ἐὰν δὲ ὁρῶσι διαλεγομένους καὶ παραπλέοντάς σφας ὥσπερ Σειρῆνας <u>ἀκηλήτους</u>, ὃ γέρας παρὰ θεῶν ἔχουσιν ἀνθρώποις διδόναι, τάχ' ἂν δοῖεν ἀγασθέντες.|| Pl. *Symp*. 216a: βίᾳ οὖν ὥσπερ ἀπὸ / τῶν Σειρήνων ἐπισχόμενος τὰ ὦτα οἴχομαι φεύγων, ἵνα μὴ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος παρὰ τούτῳ καταγηράσω.|| Pl. *Crat.* 403de: Διὰ ταῦτα ἄρα φῶμεν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, οὐδένα δεῦρο ἐθελῆσαι ἀπελθεῖν τῶν ἐκεῖθεν, οὐδὲ αὐτὰς τὰς Σειρῆνας, ἀλλὰ <u>κατακεκηλῆσθαι</u> ἐκείνας τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας· οὕτω καλούς τινας, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπίσταται λόγους λέγειν ὁ Ἅιδης, καὶ ἔστιν, ὥς γ' ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τούτου, ὁ θεὸς [οὗτος] τέλεος σοφιστής τε καὶ μέγας εὐεργέτης.

[636] For a comparison between the Sirens and the Muses see the discussion in Murray (2002) esp. pp 35-36.

[637] Pl. *Phaedr*. 259b: λέγεται δ' ὥς ποτ' ἦσαν οὗτοι ἄνθρωποι τῶν πρὶν μούσας γεγονέναι, γενομένων δὲ Μουσῶν καὶ φανείσης ᾠδῆς […]

[638] Pl. *Laws* 653e-654a:τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ζῷα οὐκ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσιν τάξεων οὐδὲ ἀταξιῶν, οἷς δὴ ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα καὶ ἁρμονία· ἡμῖν δὲ οὓς εἴπομεν τοὺς θεοὺς συγχορευτὰς δεδόσθαι, τούτους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς δεδωκότας τὴν ἔνρυθμόν τε καὶ ἐναρμόνιον αἴσθησιν μεθ' ἡδονῆς, ᾗ δὴ κινεῖν τε ἡμᾶς καὶ χορηγεῖν ἡμῶν τούτους, ᾠδαῖς τε καὶ ὀρχήσεσιν ἀλλήλοις συνείροντας, χορούς τε ὠνομακέναι παρὰ τὸ τῆς χαρᾶς ἔμφυτον ὄνομα. πρῶτον δὴ τοῦτο ἀποδεξώμεθα; θῶμεν παιδείαν εἶναι πρώτην διὰ Μουσῶν τε καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος, ἢ πῶς; || Pl. *Laws* 672c-d: οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι τὴν ῥυθμοῦ τε καὶ ἁρμονίας αἴσθησιν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡμῖν ἐνδεδωκέναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην ἔφαμεν, Ἀπόλλωνα δὲ καὶ μούσας καὶ Διόνυσον θεῶν αἰτίους γεγονέναι;

addition, it seems that Plato adapts a non-traditional, reformed *choreia* to a particular context. Sirens serve his purpose.[639]

Since the Sirens' melody contributes to the balance of the universe, it has to be faultless, and therefore mathematically perfect. Barker argues that,

> Plato seeks principles that constitute harmonic order at a mathematical and metaphysical level: if the musical systems of actual human practice fail to exhibit this order, that merely shows their imperfection and the inadequacy of human perception to judge what is truly harmonious.[640]

Consequently, since this universe is based on mathematics and harmonics, Sirens are not musical divinities, but are goddesses of mathematics and astronomy or harmonics. They thereforere present the complete education suitable for the philosopher rulers, which includes the five subjects of numerical theory, plane geometry, solid geometry, astronomy, and harmonics.[641] As Barker has shown, "the principal aim of each branch is the removal from reliance on sense perception towards the intelligible understanding of the immaterial Forms, leading to the final *theôria* of the perfectly Good."[642] There is no reason to claim that the Sirens' voices have lost their enchanting power[643] and excellence, but there is no hint of their destructive

[639] The argument included in Plutarch's *Table-Talk* 745 that Plato "gives the name of Sirens to the Muses because they speak (eirousas) the divine truth to the realm of death" is not persuasive.
[640] Barker (1989) 54.
[641] Pl. *Rep*. 522c-534d.
[642] Barker (1978) 337-341. I owe the reference to Petraki (2009) 162, n. 48.
[643] For a discussion of the characteristics of the Sirens, see Bowie (2011) 33-65 and Power (2011) 67-113. I have included a short overview of the description of the Sirens' song in Homeric and melic poetry: In Pindar the song of the Sirens calms the winds and the sea: Pindar *Parth.* 2. 13-23:

ὑμνήσω στεφάνοισι θάλ-
λοισα παρθένιον κάρα,
σειρῆνα δὲ κόμπον αὐλίσκων ὑπό λωτίνων
μιμήσομ' αοιδαῖς

κεῖνον, ὃς Ζεφύρου τε σιγάζει πνοὰς
αἰψηράς, ὁπόταν τε χειμῶνος σθένει
φρίσσων Βορέας ἐπι-
σπέρχης' ὠκύαλον +τε πόντου+
[ῥ]ιπὰν +ἐτάραξε καὶ+

Alcman stresses the perfection of the Sirens' voice: Alcman 1. 96-7:

ἁ δὲ τᾶν Σηρην[ί]δων

charm. The Sirens are no longer the harmful, deceitful creatures we find in Homer. Their meadow is not full of corpses; on the contrary, their vital contribution to the harmony of the *cosmos* is beyond doubt. Platonic Sirens reminds us of Pindar's *kêlêdones*. And it is certainly important that song binds the universe together into a kind of *harmonia.*[644]

In 617b-d (p. 44-45) the verb βαίνω is usually translated as 'to walk, to step'[645] and in the present perfect tense as 'to stand, to be in a place.'[646] The verb is used in the present tense (βαίνω) in the *Laws* 670b with the meaning of 'to dance': ὅσοι προσᾴδειν αὐτῶν καὶ βαίνειν ἐν ῥυθμῷ γεγόνασι διηναγκασμένοι. In the *Timaeus* 62c the verb is used in both the present and in the present perfect tense, meaning 'to be, to stand on a base': (Pl. *Tim*. 62c: ὑπείκει δὲ ὅσον ἐπὶ σμικροῦ βαίνει· τὸ δὲ ἐκ τετραγώνων ὂν βάσεων, ἅτε βεβηκὸς σφόδρα, ἀντιτυπώτατον εἶδος.) The adverbial modifier ἐπὶ σμικροῦ restricts the motion. Later Greek writers and mathematicians use the term combined with prepositional phrases in the form of ἐπί+noun, with the meaning 'to stand.'[647] These include Aristotle (Arist. *IA* 709a24), the geometer and astronomer Apollonius of Perga, (Apollon. Perg. *Con*. 3.3.), the mathematician and engineer Hero(n) of Alexandria (Hero *Stereom*. 1.31.), and Euclid, the father of geometry (Euc. 3. *Def.* 9). Therefore, the combination of βαίνω with the adverbial modifier of place ἐπί+noun makes the verb a terminus technicus, with the meaning 'to

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ἀοιδοτέρα μ[ὲν] οὐχί

In another fragment attributed to Alcman, the Muse is equated with the Siren: PMG 30 = 86 Calame: ἁ Μῶσα κέκλαγ', ἁ λίγηα Σηρήν
The Sirens' song is so charming that it leads every human being to destruction. See Hom. *Od*. 12.39-46:

Σειρῆνας μὲν πρῶτον ἀφίξεαι, αἵ ῥά τε πάντας
ἀνθρώπους θέλγουσιν, ὅτις σφεας εἰσαφίκηται.
ὅς τις ἀιδρείῃ πελάσῃ καὶ φθόγγον ἀκούσῃ
Σειρήνων, τῷ δ' οὔ τι γυνὴ καὶ νήπια τέκνα
οἴκαδε νοστήσαντι παρίσταται οὐδὲ γάνυνται,
ἀλλά τε Σειρῆνες λιγυρῇ θέλγουσιν ἀοιδῇ
ἥμεναι ἐν λειμῶνι, πολὺς δ' ἀμφ' ὀστεόφιν θὶς
ἀνδρῶν πυθομένων, περὶ δὲ ῥινοὶ μινύθουσι.

[644] Cf. Zeus' creation of the Muses as the final step in universal cosmogony in Pindar's so-called 'Theban Hymn' (fr. 1ff Snell-Maehler).

[645] *LSJ* s.v.

[646] *LSJ* s.v.

[647] See Aristotle (Arist. *IA* 709a24), the geometer and astronomer Apollonius of Perga, (Apollon. Perg. *Con*. 3.3.), the mathematician and engineer Hero(n) of Alexandria (Hero *Stereom*. 1.31.), and Euclid, the father of geometry (Euc. 3. *Def.* 9).

stand, to be.' The verb βαίνω in the description of the *Republic* is accompanied by the prepositional phrase ἐπὶ τῶν κύκλων. Since the verb is not entirely void of motion, Plato perhaps means that he watches the Sirens come and stand on the circles of the spindle. In this way, motion and lack of motion are neatly combined.

The Sirens do not move, however, but are actually carried around (συμπεριφερομένην) in this revolving motion, which seems to be a kind of circular dance. At the same time, they produce their melody (ἁρμονία).[648] The Fates chant the past, the present, and the future events to the Sirens' melody, just as the Muses do. Peponi states that "Plato's conception of an antiphonal singing of two distinctive choruses, performing each its own vocal routine while one modulates the kinetics of the other, is an extraordinary piece of orchestration and choreography compared to that we otherwise know from that era."[649]

In the *Republic*, Plato evidently imagines the universe in choral terms. Certainly, the spectacle of the Sirens, the Fates, and the Necessity is described as a choral performance. The divinities sing (ἁρμονία, ὑμνεῖν) and are moved in a circular way by the spindle of Necessity. The audience, namely the human souls, sees the spectacle and hears the harmony of the Sirens and the songs of the Fates. Barker argues persuasively that,

> Commentators have often remarked that a 'harmony' consisting of the eight notes of a scale, sounded together, would be better described as a cosmic cacophony. Plato makes a distinction. Though the scalar harmonia is indeed sounded, it is not itself the celestial music, but constitutes the permanent framework, the reservoir of elements and relations, on which that music is based. Melody itself is moving, dynamic; the melodies of the Fates are not eternally self-same, but are musical representations of events in time. The harmonia, by contrast, is eternal. It stands to the melodies rather as a preordained syntax, grammar and vocabulary might stand to the sentences of a language.[650]

The Platonic Sirens do not sing, but they function as the musical accompaniment of the Fates' song. Necessity causes the revolving motion, with the hooks of the spindle creating homocentric circles with different velocities. The spindle itself moves around. The Sirens are moved around and simultaneously create the cosmic melody to

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[648] On harmony (the science is called Harmonics) as the web of numerical relations, see Barker (2007) 316-7.
[649] Peponi (2013c) 19-20.
[650] Barker (1989) 58 n.11.

which the Fates sing of the past, present, and future events. The daughters of Necessity move the spindle with their hands while seated. This results in circular movements, melody, and song. The movement is forced and mechanical. It is said in the *Timaeus* (47d) that the harmony encompasses revolving motions that correspond to the orbits of the soul and seek to order its movement.

Plato describes the distinctive roles of each member of the divine spectacle, encouraging the souls to perceive it as a unity. This will be accomplished through the knowledge of truth, and therefore through the dialectic. The cosmic structure,[651] arranged in perfect order and harmony, is based primarily on the numerical relations of its parts. The souls see and hear something that exceeds their cognitive abilities and goes beyond time and space. The Sirens' harmony is mathematical, and is based on numerical relations. It is not connected with the usual, perceptible sounds of earthly music. But the soul that has already been initiated into the dialectic and has approached the truth is able to understand and interpret it correctly. In modern terms, we would say that Plato opens up a realistic possibility of understanding the intelligible spectacle.

If the Sirens' harmony is Plato's musical prototype for the performances presented on earth, as Petraki persuasively argues,[652] then the whole spectacle can be considered as an archetypal performance, a model for human choral performances. In this case, this audiovisual event is the original, true spectacle and is not a 'phantom' (εἴδωλον). It addresses the spirited rather than the appetitive part of the soul.[653] It might be the *kalliston theama*, the ultimate purpose of musical education that is discussed throughout the dialogue. The description points to corporeal entities, with the colorful circles, the white cloths and the crowns of the Fates, the Sirens' voice, and the Fates' singing. The absence of mortals in the divine *choreia* excludes the possibility of mistakes. The human souls serve only as spectators.

In addition, there is no sense of time. Past, present, and future coexist in the Fates' song, delineating the eternal recycling of life. The place is filled with light and

[651] Petraki (2009) 164-5: "The structure of the universe, recalling the construction of the Demiurge in *Timaeus*, is the supreme archetype of harmonia. The philosopher's aspiration for a uniquely coherent mode of organisation is met in the harmonious 'musical' uttering of the Sirens and the Fates.'
[652] Petraki (2009) 165.
[653] On the contrary, poetry represents 'phantoms far removed from reality,' Pl. *Rep.* 605c: […] εἴδωλα εἰδωλοποιοῦντα, τοῦ δὲ ἀληθοῦς πόρρω πάνυ ἀφεστῶτα.

color. The Sirens sing a cosmic, eternal melody and the context is appropriate for the reincarnation of the soul.

The philosophical discussion of the *Republic* culminates in the description of this unusual divine *choreia*, which is replete with poetic motifs. In this way, Plato fills the literary gap, because no poet has ever offered such a description.[654] The sweetened Muse of *melic* and epic poetry[655] must be replaced by the true Muse of philosophy,[656] who alone is able to rule the city (πόλεως ἐγκρατής).[657]

IV.3. *Laws*. The civic choral performances[658]

With the *Laws*, the scene changes and Plato makes the whole city sing and dance, as we shall see below. The centrality of *choreia* in this dialogue has already been discussed in the first chapter.[659] It is generally admitted, that the choral performances in the Cretan city are essential tools for the construction of civic identity based on virtue.[660]

In the second book, Plato focuses on three choruses in honor of the Muses, Apollo, and Dionysus. Unfortunately, there is no detailed description of the choruses or of their performance. Yet, it is important to consider what makes them so significant (Pl. *Laws* 653c-654b):

> {ΑΘ} […] θεοὶ δὲ οἰκτίραντες τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπίπονον πεφυκὸς γένος, ἀναπαύλας τε αὐτοῖς τῶν πόνων ἐτάξαντο τὰς τῶν ἑορτῶν ἀμοιβὰς τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ μούσας Ἀπόλλωνά τε μουσηγέτην καὶ Διόνυσον συνεορταστὰς ἔδοσαν, ἵν᾽ ἐπανορθῶνται, τάς τε τροφὰς γενομένας ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς μετὰ θεῶν. […] ἡμῖν δὲ οὓς εἴπομεν τοὺς θεοὺς συγχορευτὰς δεδόσθαι, τούτους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς δεδωκότας τὴν ἔνρυθμόν τε καὶ ἐναρμόνιον αἴσθησιν μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς, ᾗ δὴ κινεῖν

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[654] Halliwell (1988) 3: "Plato sets out his reasons for rejecting the finest Greek poetry, before offering his own philosophical, yet quasi-poetic, vision of a cosmic order of which the poets themselves had never spoken."

[655] Pl. *Rep*. 607a.

[656] Pl. *Rep*. 548b-c.

[657] See Pl. *Rep*. 499d.

[658] See Prauscello's (2014) detailed discussion on how choral performances in Magnesia contribute to the creation of the best civic identity.

[659] See Chapter I, pp. 43-63.

[660] Prauscello (2014) 107.

τε ἡμᾶς καὶ χορηγεῖν ἡμῶν τούτους, ᾠδαῖς τε καὶ ὀρχήσεσιν ἀλλήλοις συνείροντας, χορούς τε ὠνομακέναι παρὰ τὸ τῆς χαρᾶς ἔμφυτον ὄνομα. πρῶτον δὴ τοῦτο ἀποδεξώμεθα; θῶμεν παιδείαν εἶναι πρώτην διὰ Μουσῶν τε καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος, ἢ πῶς; {ΚΛ.} οὕτως. {ΑΘ.} οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν ἀπαίδευτος ἀχόρευτος ἡμῖν ἔσται, τὸν δὲ πεπαιδευμένον ἱκανῶς κεχορευκότα θετέον; {ΚΛ.} τί μήν; {ΑΘ.} <u>χορεία γε μὴν ὄρχησίς τε καὶ ᾠδὴ τὸ σύνολόν ἐστιν</u>. {ΚΛ.} ἀναγκαῖον. {ΑΘ.} ὁ καλῶς ἄρα πεπαιδευμένος ᾄδειν τε καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι δυνατὸς ἂν εἴη καλῶς. {ΚΛ.} ἔοικεν.

{ATH} […] so the gods, in pity for the human race thus born to misery, have ordained the feasts of thanksgiving as periods of respite from their troubles; and they have granted them as <u>companions in their feasts</u> the Muses and <u>Apollo the master of Muses</u>, and Dionysus, that they may at least set right again their modes of discipline by associating <u>in their feasts with gods</u>. […] Now, whereas all other creatures are devoid of any perception of the various kinds of order and disorder in movement (which we term rhythm and harmony), to men the very gods, who were given, as we said, to be our <u>companions in the dance</u>, have granted the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony, whereby they cause us to move and lead our choruses, linking us one with another by means of songs and dances; and to the chorus they have given its name from the "cheer" implanted therein. Shall we accept this account to begin with, and postulate that education owes its origin to Apollo and the Muses? {CL} Yes. {ATH} Shall we assume that the uneducated man is without chorus-training, and the educated man fully chorus-trained? {CL} Certainly. {ATH} <u>Choreia, as a whole, embraces of course both dancing and song</u>. {CL} Undoubtedly. {ATH} So the well-educated man will be able both to sing and dance well. {CL} Evidently.

In this previous passage, "the choruses have authority derived from their unmediated interaction with gods in ritual worship," as Athanassaki persuasively argues.[661] The interaction and affinity between the gods and humans is obvious. The gods are described as 'companions in feasts' (συνεορταστάς) and 'companions in dancing' (συγχορευτάς). They convey their musical knowledge and their emotion of joy to the mortal members of the choruses. Such choral performances under divine guidance are approved by Plato.

[661] Athanassaki "Ritual Interaction" (ICS paper), in progress.

Each of these gods leads one *chorus*. The age of the chorus-members and the kind of songs that they will perform are discussed in the following passage (Pl. *Laws* 664c-d):

> {ΑΘ.} πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ὁ Μουσῶν χορὸς ὁ παιδικὸς ὀρθότατ᾽ ἂν εἰσίοι πρῶτος τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὸ μέσον ᾀσόμενος ἁπάσῃ σπουδῇ καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει, δεύτερος δὲ ὁ μέχρι τριάκοντα ἐτῶν, τόν τε Παιᾶνα ἐπικαλούμενος μάρτυρα τῶν λεγομένων ἀληθείας πέρι καὶ τοῖς νέοις ἵλεων μετὰ πειθοῦς γίγνεσθαι ἐπευχόμενος. δεῖ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἔτι τρίτους τοὺς ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα ἔτη μέχρι τῶν ἑξήκοντα γεγονότας ᾄδειν· τοὺς δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα – οὐ γὰρ ἔτι δυνατοὶ φέρειν ᾠδάς – μυθολόγους περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἠθῶν διὰ θείας φήμης καταλελεῖφθαι.
>
> {ATH} First, then, the right order of procedure will be for the Muses' chorus of children to come forward first to sing these things with the utmost vigor and before the whole city; second will come the chorus of those under thirty, invoking Apollo Paian as witness of the truth of what is said, and praying him of grace to persuade the youth. The next singers will be the third chorus, of those over thirty and under sixty; and lastly, there were left those who, being no longer able to uplift the song, shall handle the same moral themes in stories and by oracular speech.

The criterion that differentiates these three choruses is age.[662] Plato divides the whole city into four age groups. The first chorus of young boys is the chorus of the Muses. It takes the central position (εἰς τὸ μέσον ᾀσόμενος), so that all the other citizens are able to view their performance. The second chorus is that of men in the prime of life – until thirty years old – and is Apollo's chorus. The third chorus is of elders – thirty to sixty years of age[663] – and is the chorus of Dionysus, and it turns out that this group only sings[664] and probably does not dance.[665] The fourth group – of

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[662] These are male choruses. However, Plato also mentions the need to establish female choruses too. See Pl. *Laws* 802d-e: Ἔτι δὲ θηλείαις τε πρεπούσας ᾠδὰς ἄρρεσί τε χωρίσαι που δέον ἂν εἴη τύπῳ τινὶ διορισάμενον, καὶ ἁρμονίαισιν δὴ καὶ ῥυθμοῖς προσαρμόττειν ἀναγκαῖον

[663] The age boundaries of this group are problematic. Are they between 30 and 60 years old (664d, 665b), over 40 (666b), over 50 (670b), or over 60 years old (812b-c)? I agree with Morrow (1960) 318: "These varieties of expression are evidence not of uncertainty or confusion in Plato's mind, but rather of the exploratory character of the inquiry."

[664] In Pl. *Laws* 665c-666d the group of elders is characterized by the Athenian as a "chorus" and they are encouraged to sing but not dance. In addition, in 812b they are called singers of

men over sixty – is not able to sing or dance at all, so they narrate didactic stories for the virtuous men (*mythologoi*). Plato's statement in the seventh book (812b-c) on the role of the fourth group is not consistent with the description of this group in passage 664c-d. More specifically, in passage 812 b-c, the group of sixty-year old singers of Dionysus chooses the good representations and reproduces them in public in order to charm the souls of the young. Therefore, the role of this group is broadened in the end; these older men charm the young souls through singing and show them how to attain virtue (Pl. *Laws* 812c: τὰ δὲ προφέρων εἰς μέσον ὑμνῇ καὶ ἐπᾴδῃ ταῖς τῶν νέων ψυχαῖς, προκαλούμενος ἑκάστους εἰς ἀρετῆς ἕπεσθαι κτῆσιν συνακολουθοῦντας διὰ τῶν μιμήσεων.)

But what kind of songs do the choruses perform? The chorus of the Muses sings mythical narratives with moral content[666] (τὰ τοιαῦτα, refers to ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ ψεύδεσθαι in 663d). The chorus of Apollo invokes Apollo/Paean as a witness of the truth of what is said (τόν τε Παιᾶνα ἐπικαλούμενος μάρτυρα τῶν λεγομένων ἀληθείας πέρι). In this, the chorus might be said to perform a paean in praise of the god. *Paean* was thought to have originated from the invocation to Apollo.[667] In it the god is invoked as a witness of the truth of the song. Since the god is present, the chorus acquires its

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Dionysus: τοὺς τοῦ Διονύσου τοὺς ἑξηκοντούτας ᾠδοὺς. cf. Belfiore's (1986) 426 argument, who seems to have a different opinion: "Only when thus "melted" will those over forty be ready to play their role as Chorus of Dionysus (Pl. *Laws* 2.666a2-dl), for only then will they be as easily trainable as the young (2.671b8-c2). Plato means quite literally that older people must dance and sing, in a renewal of the education they received as children. The whole community, divided into the three Choruses of the Muses, Apollo and Dionysus, he writes, must "enchant" (ἐπᾴδειν) the children with noble and true accounts of virtue and of the gods (664a-b). Because older people are ashamed to sing and dance, Plato gives an argument (λόγου) to prove that it is reasonable for them to do so (εὔλογον) (665b7)."

[665] Sosibios' description of choral performance at a festival for the Spartan victory at Thyrea is preserved in Athenaeus' *Deipn*. 15.687b-c. As Stehle (1997) 55-6 argues, this description "has been correlated with one in Plutarch which describes three choruses singing in turn at a Spartan celebration (870 PMG)." A chorus of old men sings first, "We once were vigorous youths." A chorus of men in their prime answers, "And we are now, in truth; if you wish, look!" Then a chorus of boys announces, "And we indeed will be stronger by far." Reflection and model are linked by a third term, so that past, present and future are represented. Although nothing specific connects Plutarch's quotations with celebration of the victory at Therea, both organize celebration in the same way: the boys' chorus is in the center in Sosibios' description and forms the climax of the threee boasts in Plutarch. This arrangement of choruses is thought by some scholars to be the model for Plato's three choruses in the *Laws* 664b-665b.

[666] Pl. *Laws* 663c-664c.

[667] Calame (2001) 78.

authority directly from him.[668] The third chorus may sing a dithyramb for Dionysus, but the lack of textual evidence means that this is mere speculation.

In general, choral performances grant psychological and therefore also social harmony to their participants.[669] Apollo and the Muses are wisely chosen by Plato, as they are traditionally considered to be the mythical singers and dancers par excellence.[670] But what about Dionysus? Why does Plato choose this god as chorus-leader, especially for the group of elders who cannot possibly dance? Given that "musical harmony represents political harmony"[671] and secures social cohesion, the presence of Dionysus, who bestows Bacchic frenzy on his followers, seems odd.

It is widely known that Homer marginalizes Dionysus because, as Seaford argues, he does not express the aristocratic view of the world, but is associated with the land.[672] Dionysus is for all. In Euripides' *Bacchae*, for example, Dionysus calls everyone to dance (Eur. *Bac*. v. 114):

αὐτίκα γᾶ πᾶσα χορεύσει

at once all the earth will dance

In Demosthenes' *Against Meidias* it is said that the worship of Bacchus requires the participation of the entire city ἀνάμιγα / ἄμμῖγα (Dem. *Or*. 21.52):

μεμνῆσθαι Βάκχοιο, καὶ εὐρυχόρους κατ᾽ ἀγυιὰς ἱστάναι ὡραίων Βρομίῳ χάριν ἄμμιγα πάντας

See you forget not Bacchus, and joining in the dances down your broad-spaced streets, in thanks for the gifts of the season, all mixed together

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[668] Athanassaki 'ἐν ζαθέῳ χρόνῳ: Ritual Interaction of Mortals and Immortals in Pindaric Choral Performance' in progress.

[669] Prauscello (2013) 320-1: "The resulting harmony between emotions and reason required a form of control that must be situated beyond the strictly individual sphere: it is here that the socializing and educative role of choral performances, a divine gift, becomes an essential tool. Social solidarity and cohesion is grounded in the collective experience of dancing and singing together: rhythmic bodily agreement generates affective bonds, a shared perception of life and its 'social time.'" Kowalzig (2013) 171-211 also discusses the relationship between chorality and rhythm as a means for achieving social and political order.

[670] See n. 613, p. 248.

[671] Scully (2009) 105.

[672] Seaford (2006) 27.

Dionysus' inclination towards communality[673] may explain his important role for the third group of elders in the *Laws*. These aged men are not able to dance like the first two groups, but they can sing and drink thanks to Dionysus' presence (Pl. *Laws* 664d-665b):

> {ΚΛ.} λέγεις δέ, ὦ ξένε, τίνας τούτους τοὺς χοροὺς τοὺς τρίτους; οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συνίεμεν σαφῶς ὅτι ποτὲ βούλει φράζειν αὐτῶν πέρι.{ΑΘ.} καὶ μὴν εἰσίν γε οὗτοι σχεδὸν ὧν χάριν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἐρρήθησαν λόγων. {ΚΛ.} οὔπω μεμαθήκαμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι σαφέστερον πειρῶ φράζειν. {ΑΘ.} εἴπομεν, εἰ μεμνήμεθα, κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἡ φύσις ἁπάντων τῶν νέων διάπυρος οὖσα ἡσυχίαν οὐχ οἵα τε ἄγειν οὔτε κατὰ τὸ σῶμα οὔτε κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν εἴη, φθέγγοιτο δ᾽ ἀεὶ ἀτάκτως καὶ πηδῷ, τάξεως δ᾽ αἴσθησιν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων, τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ζῴων οὐδὲν ἐφάπτοιτο, ἡ δὲ ἀνθρώπου φύσις ἔχοι μόνη τοῦτο· τῇ δὴ τῆς κινήσεως τάξει ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα εἴη, τῇ δὲ αὖ τῆς φωνῆς, τοῦ τε ὀξέος ἅμα καὶ βαρέος συγκεραννυμένων, ἁρμονία ὄνομα προσαγορεύοιτο, χορεία δὲ τὸ συναμφότερον κληθείη. θεοὺς δὲ ἔφαμεν ἐλεοῦντας ἡμᾶς <u>συγχορευτάς</u> τε καὶ <u>χορηγοὺς</u> ἡμῖν δεδωκέναι τόν τε Ἀπόλλωνα καὶ μούσας, καὶ δὴ καὶ τρίτον ἔφαμεν, εἰ μεμνήμεθα, Διόνυσον. {ΚΛ.} πῶς δ᾽ οὐ μεμνήμεθα; {ΑΘ.} ὁ μὲν τοίνυν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ τῶν Μουσῶν χορὸς εἴρηνται, τὸν δὲ τρίτον καὶ τὸν λοιπὸν χορὸν ἀνάγκη τοῦ Διονύσου λέγεσθαι. {ΚΛ.} πῶς δή; λέγε· μάλα γὰρ ἄτοπος γίγνοιτ᾽ ἂν ὥς γε ἐξαίφνης ἀκούσαντι Διονύσου πρεσβυτῶν χορός, εἰ ἄρα οἱ ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα καὶ πεντήκοντα δὲ γεγονότες ἔτη μέχρι ἑξήκοντα αὐτῷ χορεύσουσιν.
>
> {CL} Whom do you mean, Stranger, by these third chorus members? For we do not grasp very clearly what you intend to convey about them. {ATH} Yet they are in fact the very people to whom most of our previous discourse was intended to lead up. {CL} We are still in the dark: try to explain yourself more clearly still. {ATH} At the commencement of our discourse we said, if we recollect, that since all young creatures are by nature fiery, they are unable to keep still either body or voice, but are always crying and leaping in disorderly fashion; we said also that none of the other creatures attains a sense of order,

[673] Seaford (2006) 26: "The overwhelming power to inspire communality, whether in the whole *polis* or in a small group, was ascribed in particular to *Dionysos*. And because communality breaks down individual self-containment and may replace it with a sense of wholeness."

bodily and vocal, and that this is possessed by man alone; and that the order of motion is called "rhythm," while the order of voice (in which acute and grave are blended together) is termed "harmony," and to the combination of these two the name "*choreia*" is given. We stated also that the gods, in pity for us, have granted to us as companions in the dance and chorus-leaders Apollo and the Muses, – besides whom we mentioned, if we recollect, a third, Dionysus. {CL} Certainly we recollect. {ATH} The chorus of Apollo and that of the Muses have been described, and the third and remaining chorus must necessarily be described, which is that of Dionysus. {CL} How so? Tell us; for at the first mention of it, a Dionysiac chorus of old men sounds mighty strange, – if you mean that men over thirty, and even men over fifty and up to sixty, are really going to dance in his honor.

The souls of the aged men are rough. But Dionysus encourages them to rebuild their lost harmony by softening their souls and by bringing back their joy and self-confindence. This group can participate in meals (συσσίτια),[674] which are described as *symposia*, because they include singing, wine drinking,[675] and a sense of intimacy due to their private character. Dionysus is invited to join these convivial gatherings, where the elders sing in front of a small and familiar group of people (Pl. *Laws* 666b-c):

{ΑΘ} τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐπιβαίνοντα ἐτῶν, ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις εὐωχηθέντα, καλεῖν τούς τε ἄλλους θεοὺς καὶ δὴ καὶ Διόνυσον παρακαλεῖν εἰς τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τελετὴν ἅμα καὶ παιδιάν, ἣν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπίκουρον τῆς τοῦ γήρως αὐστηρότητος ἐδωρήσατο τὸν οἶνον φάρμακον, ὥστε ἀνηβᾶν ἡμᾶς, καὶ δυσθυμίας λήθῃ γίγνεσθαι μαλακώτερον ἐκ σκληροτέρου τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος, καθάπερ εἰς πῦρ σίδηρον ἐντεθέντα γιγνόμενον, καὶ οὕτως εὐπλαστότερον εἶναι; πρῶτον μὲν δὴ διατεθεὶς οὕτως ἕκαστος ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοι προθυμότερόν γε, ἧττον αἰσχυνόμενος, οὐκ ἐν πολλοῖς ἀλλὰ ἐν μετρίοις, καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἀλλοτρίοις ἀλλ᾽ ἐν οἰκείοις, ᾄδειν τε καὶ ὃ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν ἐπᾴδειν;

[674] The term here does not denote the public meals, since it is addressed only to a small group of older men.

[675] Wine drinking is forbidden for the younger men, Pl. *Laws* 666a-b: πῶς οὖν αὐτοὺς παραμυθησόμεθα προθύμους εἶναι πρὸς τὰς ᾠδάς; ἆρ᾽ οὐ νομοθετήσομεν πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς παῖδας μέχρι ἐτῶν ὀκτωκαίδεκα τὸ παράπαν οἴνου μὴ γεύεσθαι, διδάσκοντες ὡς οὐ χρὴ πῦρ ἐπὶ πῦρ ὀχετεύειν εἴς τε τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, πρὶν ἐπὶ τοὺς πόνους ἐγχειρεῖν πορεύεσθαι, τὴν ἐμμανῆ εὐλαβουμένους ἕξιν τῶν νέων μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἴνου μὲν δὴ γεύεσθαι τοῦ μετρίου μέχρι τριάκοντα ἐτῶν, μέθης δὲ καὶ πολυοινίας τὸ παράπαν τὸν νέον ἀπέχεσθαι· […]

> {ATH} But when a man has reached the age of forty, he may join in the convivial gatherings and invoke Dionysus, above all other gods, inviting his presence at the rite, which is also the recreation, of the elders, which he bestowed on mankind wine as a medicine potent against the crabbedness of old age, that thereby we men may renew our youth, and that, through forgetfulness of care, the temper of our souls may lose its hardness and become softer and more ductile, even as iron when it has been forged in the fire. Will not this softer disposition, in the first place, render each one of them more ready and less ashamed to sing chants and "incantations" (as we have often called them), in the presence, not of a large company of strangers, but of a small number of intimate friends?

In this we see that the appropriate context for the singing activity of the group of the elders is the common meals (συσσίτια), the importance of which is repeatedly stressed in the dialogue.[676] As already pointed out, Dionysus is present in these meals, wine drinking is accepted, and songs are performed by the elders. These songs will serve as incantations for their souls and help them to regain their lost joy. Belfiore argues that these small gatherings are parts of the festival in honor of Dionysus.[677]

Dionysus' position is enhanced in the *Laws*. In the passages discussed, he is associated with major gods and goddesses, such as Apollo and the Muses. Moreover, he allows his followers a great sense of direct involvement; there is no need for the poets, at least from what one can deduce from the bacchic mystery rites.

The significant role of the gods in the choral performances can be deduced from their characterizations, as already seen. The characterizations ascribed to Apollo are 'leader of the Muses' (μουσηγέτης), 'companion to the feast' (συνεορταστής), 'companion to dancing' (συγχορευτής), and 'chorus-leader' (χορηγός).[678] The Muses are also named as συνεορτασταί, συγχορευταί, and χορηγοί, while Dionysus is only συνεορταστής. These features of the gods help us to discern their distinctive role in

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[676] See Pl. *Laws* 666b2-c6; 780bc; 780d9-a2; 806e2-4.

[677] Belfiore (1986) 434: "Plato leaves us in no doubt that his *symposia* are part of a festival of Dionysus. In the daily sussitia, common meals in which everyone takes part, people pour a libation to the gods to whom that day is dedicated (807al-2). They do not get drunk, for this is forbidden except in the festivals of the wine god (Eoprais: 775b). Throughout Book 2, Plato's main concern is with festivals (653d2-3). Thus, the *sussitia* at which the *symposia* take place are not ordinary common meals but a part of the festivals of Dionysus, at which the older people 'invoke the other gods and especially Dionysus' (666b2-5)."

[678] In archaic melic poetry Apollo is also described as: *ὀρχηστής* (Pind. Frg. 125 Bgk.), ἁγησίχορος (Ar. *Lys*. 1281), χοροποιός (Orph. *Hymn*. 34, 6).

the human performances. The gods celebrate with the mortals and lead their choruses, but the quantity and the quality of the adjectives attributed to each one clearly shows a distinction between them. Apollo's multiple roles are contrasted to Dionysus' restricted, but still valuable, contribution.

The gods' presence and their active participation in the citizens' feasts makes the presence of the poets unnecessary. In the following passage, the role of the poets is explicitly downgraded, whereas that of the aged men is expanded (Pl. *Laws* 670c-671a):

> {ΑΘ.} τοῦτ᾽ οὖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνευρίσκομεν αὖ τὰ νῦν, ὅτι τοῖς ᾠδοῖς ἡμῖν, οὓς νῦν παρακαλοῦμεν καὶ ἑκόντας τινὰ τρόπον ἀναγκάζομεν ᾄδειν, μέχρι γε τοσούτου πεπαιδεῦσθαι σχεδὸν ἀναγκαῖον, μέχρι τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι συνακολουθεῖν ἕκαστον ταῖς τε βάσεσιν τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ ταῖς χορδαῖς ταῖς τῶν μελῶν, ἵνα καθορῶντες τάς τε ἁρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς, ἐκλέγεσθαί τε τὰ προσήκοντα οἷοί τ᾽ ὦσιν ἃ τοῖς τηλικούτοις τε καὶ τοιούτοις ᾄδειν πρέπον, καὶ οὕτως ᾄδωσιν, καὶ ᾄδοντες αὐτοί τε ἡδονὰς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀσινεῖς ἥδωνται καὶ τοῖς νεωτέροις ἡγεμόνες ἠθῶν χρηστῶν ἀσπασμοῦ προσήκοντος γίγνωνται· μέχρι δὲ τοσούτου παιδευθέντες ἀκριβεστέραν ἂν παιδείαν τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος φερούσης εἶεν μετακεχειρισμένοι καὶ τῆς περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς αὐτούς. τὸ γὰρ τρίτον οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη ποιητῇ γιγνώσκειν, εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε μὴ καλὸν τὸ μίμημα, τὸ δὲ ἁρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ σχεδὸν ἀνάγκη, τοῖς δὲ πάντα τὰ τρία τῆς ἐκλογῆς ἕνεκα τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ δευτέρου, ἢ μηδέποτε ἱκανὸν ἐπῳδὸν γίγνεσθαι νέοις πρὸς ἀρετήν. καὶ ὅπερ ὁ λόγος ἐν ἀρχαῖς ἐβουλήθη, τὴν τῷ τοῦ Διονύσου χορῷ βοήθειαν ἐπιδεῖξαι καλῶς λεγομένην, εἰς δύναμιν εἴρηκεν· σκοπώμεθα δὴ εἰ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτω γέγονεν.
>
> We are now once more, as it appears, discovering the fact that these singers of ours (whom we are now inviting and compelling, so to say, of their own free will to sing) must almost necessarily be trained up to such a point that every one of them may be able to follow both the steps of the rhythms and the chords of the tunes, so that, by observing the harmonies and rhythms, they may be able to select those of an appropriate kind, which it is seemly for men of their own age and character to sing, and may in this wise sing them, and in the singing may not only enjoy innocent pleasure themselves at the moment, but also may serve as leaders to the younger men in their seemly adoption of noble manners. If they were trained up to such a point, their training would be more thorough than that

of the majority, or indeed of the poets themselves. For although it is almost necessary for a poet to have a knowledge of harmony and rhythm, it is not necessary for him to know the third point also – namely, whether the representation is noble or ignoble; but for our older singers a knowledge of all these three points is necessary, to enable them to determine what is first, what second in order of nobility; otherwise none of them will ever succeed in attracting the young to virtue by his incantations. The primary intention of our argument, which was to demonstrate that our defense of the Dionysiac chorus was justifiable, has now been carried out to the best of our ability. Let us consider if that is really so.

The first responsibility of the elders is to observe the harmonies and the rhythms (καθορῶντες τάς τε ἁρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς) and to choose (ἐκλέγεσθαί) the most suitable ones for them. Their second responsibility is to sing them (ᾄδωσιν) and in this way to find pleasure (ἥδωνται) and to transmit moral values to the youth (ἡγεμόνες ἠθῶν χρηστῶν). They therefore need to be cultivated in distinguishing between good and bad representations, an ability that a poet is not obliged to acquire. The role of the third chorus is therefore broader and more important than that of the poets. In fact the elders assume responsibility for teaching the youth, a task traditionally assigned to poets. The education of the elders must therefore be better than that of the poets or at least better than the education of the 'choral Muse' (Pl. *Laws* 670a-b):

{ΑΘ} […] τόδε μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν δοκεῖ μοι σημαίνειν ἤδη, τῆς γε χορικῆς Μούσης ὅτι πεπαιδεῦσθαι δεῖ βέλτιον τοὺς πεντηκοντούτας ὅσοισπερ ἂν ᾄδειν προσήκῃ. τῶν γὰρ ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς ἐστιν εὐαισθήτως ἔχειν καὶ γιγνώσκειν. ἢ πῶς τις τὴν ὀρθότητα γνώσεται τῶν μελῶν;

{ATH} [...] Our argument already indicates, I think, this result from our discussion, – that all men of over fifty that are fit to sing ought to have a training that is better than that of the choral Muse. For they must of necessity possess knowledge and a quick perception of rhythms and harmonies; else how shall a man know which tunes are correct?

Apart from the rhythm and harmony that all these gods bestow on people, and despite the fact that only the adjective συνεορταστής is attributed to him, Dionysus offers an extra gift, namely wine, which is considered a medicine for both body and soul (Pl. *Laws* 672c-d):

> {ΑΘ.} οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι τὴν ῥυθμοῦ τε καὶ ἁρμονίας αἴσθησιν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡμῖν ἐνδεδωκέναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην ἔφαμεν, Ἀπόλλωνα δὲ καὶ μούσας καὶ Διόνυσον θεῶν αἰτίους γεγονέναι; {ΚΛ.} πῶς γὰρ οὔ; {ΑΘ.} καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν οἶνόν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ τῶν ἄλλων λόγος, ἵνα μανῶμεν, φησὶν ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δεδόσθαι· ὁ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενος ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν φάρμακον ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον φησὶν αἰδοῦς μὲν ψυχῆς κτήσεως ἕνεκα δεδόσθαι, σώματος δὲ ὑγιείας τε καὶ ἰσχύος.

> {ATH} Do we not also remember how we said that from this origin there was implanted in us men the sense of rhythm and harmony, and that the joint authors thereof were Apollo and the Muses and the god Dionysus? {CL} Certainly we remember. {ATH} Moreover, as to wine, the account given by other people apparently is that it was bestowed on us men as a punishment, to make us mad; but our own account, on the contrary, declares that it is a medicine given for the purpose of securing modesty of soul and health and strength of body.

Wine reminds the older men of the sense of rhythm and harmony and makes them happier. In other words, it heals the weakness of their body and the reluctance of their soul.

However, participation in these common meals presupposes the enactment of sympotic laws on behalf of the 'legislators' (νομοθέτες) and the 'supervisors of the laws' (νομοφύλακες) (Pl. *Laws* 671b-e):

> {ΑΘ.} οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν, ὅταν γίγνηται ταῦτα, καθάπερ τινὰ σίδηρον τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν πινόντων διαπύρους γιγνομένας μαλθακωτέρας γίγνεσθαι καὶ νεωτέρας, ὥστε εὐαγώγους συμβαίνειν τῷ δυναμένῳ τε καὶ ἐπισταμένῳ παιδεύειν τε καὶ πλάττειν, καθάπερ ὅτ᾽ ἦσαν νέαι; τοῦτον δ᾽ εἶναι τὸν πλάστην τὸν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ τότε, τὸν <u>ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην</u>, οὗ <u>νόμους</u> εἶναι δεῖ <u>συμποτικούς</u>, δυναμένους τὸν εὔελπιν καὶ θαρραλέον ἐκεῖνον γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀναισχυντότερον τοῦ δέοντος, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντα τάξιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος σιγῆς καὶ λόγου καὶ πόσεως καὶ

μούσης ὑπομένειν, ἐθέλειν ποιεῖν πάντα τούτοις τἀναντία, καὶ εἰσιόντι τῷ μὴ καλῷ θάρρει τὸν κάλλιστον διαμαχόμενον φόβον εἰσπέμπειν οἵους τ᾽ εἶναι μετὰ δίκης, ὃν αἰδῶ τε καὶ αἰσχύνην θεῖον φόβον ὠνομάκαμεν; {ΚΛ.} ἔστιν ταῦτα. {ΑΘ.} τούτων δέ γε τῶν νόμων εἶναι νομοφύλακας καὶ συνδημιουργοὺς αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἀθορύβους καὶ νήφοντας τῶν μὴ νηφόντων στρατηγούς, ὧν δὴ χωρὶς μέθῃ διαμάχεσθαι δεινότερον ἢ πολεμίοις εἶναι μὴ μετὰ ἀρχόντων ἀθορύβων, καὶ τὸν αὖ μὴ δυνάμενον ἐθέλειν πείθεσθαι τούτοις καὶ τοῖς ἡγεμόσιν τοῖς τοῦ Διονύσου, τοῖς ὑπὲρ ἑξήκοντα ἔτη γεγονόσιν, ἴσην καὶ μείζω τὴν αἰσχύνην φέρειν ἢ τὸν τοῖς τοῦ Ἄρεως ἀπειθοῦντα ἄρχουσιν.

{ATH} And did we not say that when this takes place, the souls of the drinkers turn softer, like iron, through being heated, and younger too; whence they become ductile, just as when they were young, in the hands of the man who has the skill and the ability to train and mould them. And now, even as then, the man who is to mould them is the good legislator; he must lay down banqueting laws, able to control that banqueter who becomes confident and bold and unduly shameless, and unwilling to submit to the proper limits of silence and speech, of drinking and of music, making him consent to do in all ways the opposite, – laws able also, with the aid of justice, to fight against the entrance of such ignoble audacity, by bringing in that most noble fear which we have named "modesty" and "shame." {CL} That is so. {ATH}And as law-wardens of these laws and cooperators therewith, there must be sober and sedate men to act as commanders over the un-sober; for to fight drunkenness without these would be a more formidable task than to fight enemies without sedate leaders. Any man who refuses willingly to obey these men and the officers of Dionysus, who are over sixty years of age, shall incur as much disgrace as the man who disobeys the officers of Ares, and even more.

The application of sympotic laws provides a safety valve for controlling of the elderly drunk symposiasts. Together with the officers of Dionysus,[679] these two groups are the intermediaries between Dionysus and the group of elders. Their

[679] This group of officers is not clearly described. The Athenian only informs us only of their age, which is more than sixty years old.

authority derives from the god, or rather from his imagined presence, as Athanassaki states.[680] There is therefore no room for the poets.

Until this point, the gods assume the role of the poets-*chorêgoi* and there is a direct communication between mortals and immortals. As Athanassaki remarks, “the Platonic and dramatic representations feature choruses who, like the poets, claim unmediated interaction with the gods who are their χορηγοί and συγχορευταί.”[681] This is exactly the case here, where each god is responsible for one group. The chorus, which acts in an environment in which the gods predominate, becomes a companion of the god in singing and dancing and obtains choral authority. Song and dance are welcome in the city of the *Laws*. However, there is no use of the term *melos* in this instance.

In the third book of the *Laws*, Plato discusses the bad behavior of poets and spectators in the system of democracy that was established after the end of the Persian wars. The ignorance and the bacchic uncontrollable frenzy of the poets led to the mixing of the poetic genres[682] and hence to the transformation of the spectators into noisy, fearless, and shameless persons.[683] Plato wants to avoid such a situation of unmusical illegality or ‘theatrocracy’ in Magnesia (Pl. *Laws* 701a: θεατροκρατία τις πονηρὰ). Therefore, as already noted, he prefers a private and small *symposium* in the case of the third chorus, in which the relationships between the attendants can be easily regulated and controlled. He also imposes specific criteria, such as the application of strict laws and their supervision.

Until this point, song and dance seem to be treated equally. Both are essential to the youths’ education and the healing of the elders’ sadness.[684] *Mousikê*, which

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[680] Athanassaki, “ἐν ζαθέῳ χρόνῳ...” in progress: “As in the case of the three choruses, the authority of the legislator and the drinking ritual he prescribes derives from Dionysos *συνεορταστής*.” [...] “... the mortal leader of the chorus and the ritual ceremony acquires his authority from the <u>imagined presence of the god</u>.”

[681] Athanassaki “ἐν ζαθέῳ χρόνῳ: Ritual Interaction of Mortals and Immortals in Pindaric Choral Performance” in progress.

[682] Pl. *Laws* 700d: ταῦτ᾽ οὖν οὕτω τεταγμένως ἤθελεν ἄρχεσθαι τῶν πολιτῶν τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ μὴ τολμᾶν κρίνειν διὰ θορύβου· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, προϊόντος τοῦ χρόνου, ἄρχοντες μὲν τῆς ἀμούσου παρανομίας ποιηταὶ ἐγίγνοντο φύσει μὲν ποιητικοί, ἀγνώμονες δὲ περὶ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς Μούσης καὶ τὸ νόμιμον, βακχεύοντες καὶ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος κατεχόμενοι ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς, κεραννύντες δὲ θρήνους τε ὕμνοις καὶ παίωνας διθυράμβοις, καὶ αὐλῳδίας δὴ ταῖς κιθαρῳδίαις μιμούμενοι, καὶ πάντα εἰς πάντα συνάγοντες

[683] Pl. *Laws* 701a: θέατρα ἐξ ἀφώνων <u>φωνήεντ</u>᾽ ἐγένοντο […] <u>ἄφοβοι</u> γὰρ ἐγίγνοντο ὡς εἰδότες, ἡ δὲ ἄδεια <u>ἀναισχυντίαν</u> ἐνέτεκεν […]

[684] Pl. *Laws* 666bc.

consists of *melos* and sch*êma*, is the main part of this education, and aims at the evolution and refreshment of the spirit (Pl. *Laws* 655a):

> {ΑΘ} ἀλλ᾽ ἐν γὰρ μουσικῇ καὶ σχήματα μὲν καὶ μέλη ἔνεστιν, περὶ ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἁρμονίαν οὔσης τῆς μουσικῆς […]
>
> {ATH} But in, fact, while postures and tunes do exist in music, which deals with rhythm and harmony [...]

Mousikê consists of *schêmata* and *melê.* However, *schêma*, and dancing activity as a whole, is also part of *gymnastikê*. Dance therefore has a double function: as part of *mousikê*, it cultivates the spirit and the soul, and as part of *gymnastikê*, it contributes to the preparation of the body for war (Pl. *Laws* 795d-e):

> {ΑΘ} τὰ δὲ μαθήματά που διττά, ὥς γ᾽ εἰπεῖν, χρήσασθαι συμβαίνοι ἄν, τὰ μὲν ὅσα περὶ τὸ σῶμα γυμναστικῆς, τὰ δ᾽ εὐψυχίας χάριν μουσικῆς. τὰ δὲ γυμναστικῆς αὖ δύο, τὸ μὲν ὄρχησις, τὸ δὲ πάλη. τῆς ὀρχήσεως δὲ ἄλλη μὲν Μούσης λέξιν μιμουμένων, τό τε μεγαλοπρεπὲς φυλάττοντας ἅμα καὶ ἐλεύθερον, ἄλλη δέ, εὐεξίας ἐλαφρότητός τε ἕνεκα καὶ κάλλους, τῶν τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ μελῶν καὶ μερῶν τὸ προσῆκον καμπῆς τε καὶ ἐκτάσεως, καὶ ἀποδιδομένης ἑκάστοις αὐτοῖς αὐτῶν εὐρύθμου κινήσεως, διασπειρομένης ἅμα καὶ συνακολουθούσης εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν ὄρχησιν ἱκανῶς.
>
> {ATH} The lessons may, for practical convenience, be divided under two heads – the gymnastical, which concern the body, and the musical, which aim at goodness of soul. Of gymnastic there are two kinds, dancing and wrestling. Of dancing there is one branch in which the style of the Muse is imitated, preserving both freedom and nobility, and another which aims at physical soundness, agility and beauty by securing for the various parts and members of the body the proper degree of flexibility and extension and bestowing also the rhythmical motion which belongs to each, and which accompanies the whole of dancing and is diffused throughout it completely.

A little later, the Athenian explains the origin and the basic function of the art of dancing (Pl. *Laws* 815d-816a):

{ΑΘ} τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπολέμου μούσης, ἐν ὀρχήσεσιν δὲ τούς τε θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν παῖδας τιμώντων, ἓν μὲν σύμπαν γίγνοιτ᾽ ἂν γένος ἐν δόξῃ τοῦ πράττειν εὖ γιγνόμενον, τοῦτο δὲ διχῇ διαιροῖμεν ἄν, τὸ μὲν ἐκ πόνων τινῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ κινδύνων διαπεφευγότων εἰς ἀγαθά, μείζους ἡδονὰς ἔχον, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἀγαθῶν σωτηρίας οὔσης καὶ ἐπαύξης, πρᾳοτέρας τὰς ἡδονὰς κεκτημένον ἐκείνων. ἐν δὲ δὴ τοῖς τοιούτοις που πᾶς ἄνθρωπος τὰς κινήσεις τοῦ σώματος μειζόνων μὲν τῶν ἡδονῶν οὐσῶν μείζους, ἐλαττόνων δὲ ἐλάττους κινεῖται, καὶ κοσμιώτερος μὲν ὢν πρός τε ἀνδρείαν μᾶλλον γεγυμνασμένος ἐλάττους αὖ, δειλὸς δὲ καὶ ἀγύμναστος γεγονὼς πρὸς τὸ σωφρονεῖν μείζους καὶ σφοδροτέρας παρέχεται μεταβολὰς τῆς κινήσεως· <u>ὅλως δὲ φθεγγόμενος, εἴτ᾽ ἐν ᾠδαῖς εἴτ᾽ ἐν λόγοις, ἡσυχίαν οὐ πάνυ δυνατὸς τῷ σώματι παρέχεσθαι πᾶς. διὸ μίμησις τῶν λεγομένων σχήμασι γενομένη τὴν ὀρχηστικὴν ἐξηργάσατο τέχνην σύμπασαν</u>. ὁ μὲν οὖν <u>ἐμμελῶς</u> ἡμῶν, ὁ δὲ <u>πλημμελῶς</u> ἐν τούτοις πᾶσι κινεῖται.

That of the unwarlike Muse, in which men pay honor to the gods and the children of the gods by dances, will consist, broadly speaking, of all dancing performed under a sense of prosperity: of this we may make two subdivisions – the one being of a more joyful description, and proper to men who have escaped out of toils and perils into a state of bliss, – and the other connected rather with the preservation and increase of pre-existent blessings, and exhibiting, accordingly, joyousness of a less ardent kind. Under these conditions every man moves his body more violently when his joys are greater, less violently when they are smaller; also, he moves it less violently when he is more sedate and better trained in courage, but when he is cowardly and untrained in temperance, he indulges in greater and more violent changes of motion; and in general, no one who is using his voice, whether in song or in speech, is able to keep his body wholly at rest. <u>Hence, when the representation of things spoken by means of gestures arose, it produced the whole art of dancing</u>. In all these instances, one man of us moves <u>in tune</u> with his theme, another <u>out of tune</u>.

Dancing is described as the reflexive consequence of vocal activity. Plato offers a key for interpreting *melos* in this instance. The central part of *melos* is song and dance is the natural supplement that keeps the unity of the *choreia* intact.[685] It expresses

[685] Peponi (2009) 59: "[...] the general view formulated in this passage about the relationship between vocal and kinetic activity seems to reflect a pervasive conception of Greek chorality: that the movement of the body is the natural consequence of the mobilized voice. In other words, dance is the body's language accompanying and complementing the spoken one."

emotions and qualities that concern both body and soul. The absence of song will influence the identity of the entire *choreia*. The passage ends with the use of two adverbs: ἐμμελῶς (in tune) and its opposite πλημμελῶς (out of tune). The turn from musical to moral issues is primarily reflected in the diction.

Peponi argues persuasively that, "One practicing *choreia* is principally involved in vocal activity (φθεγγόμενος), while kinetic acts visually codify the attitudes and emotions expressed through the uttered words. Thus, body is an extension to voice."[686] Body and dance are secondary compared with voice and song.[687] The strong influence of the voice or sound on the body is also attested to at the end of Xenophon's *Symposium*. The moment Ariadne hears the bacchic music, she can hardly resist dancing (Xen. *Symp*. 9.3):

> ἐκ τούτου πρῶτον μὲν ἡ Ἀριάδνη ὡς νύμφη κεκοσμημένη παρῆλθε καὶ ἐκαθέζετο ἐπὶ τοῦ θρόνου. οὔπω δὲ φαινομένου τοῦ Διονύσου ηὐλεῖτο ὁ βακχεῖος ῥυθμός. ἔνθα δὴ ἠγάσθησαν τὸν ὀρχηστοδιδάσκαλον. εὐθὺς μὲν γὰρ ἡ Ἀριάδνη ἀκούσασα τοιοῦτόν τι ἐποίησεν ὡς πᾶς ἂν ἔγνω ὅτι ἀσμένη ἤκουσε· καὶ ὑπήντησε μὲν οὒ οὐδὲ ἀνέστη, δήλη δ' ἦν μόλις ἠρεμοῦσα.

> Then, to start proceedings, in came Ariadne, appareled as a bride, and took her seat in the chair. Dionysus being still invisible, there was heard the Bacchic music played on a flute. Then it was that the assemblage was filled with admiration of the dancing master. For as soon as Ariadne heard the strain, her action was such that every one might have perceived her joy at the sound; and although she did not go to meet Dionysus, nor even rise, yet it was clear that she kept her composure with difficulty.[688]

The word ἐμμέλεια (ἐν + μέλος) denotes harmony in *choreia*, which is between song and dance, or between voice and bodily gestures in their representation. However, ἐμμέλεια is attributed to all fair dances (Pl. *Laws* 816b-c):

> {ΑΘ} πολλὰ μὲν δὴ τοίνυν ἄλλα ἡμῖν τῶν παλαιῶν ὀνομάτων ὡς εὖ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν κείμενα δεῖ διανοούμενον ἐπαινεῖν, τούτων δὲ ἓν καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς ὀρχήσεις

[686] Ibid.
[687] Cf. Lucian's *On Dance*, where the superiority of dance over song is stressed.
[688] The translation is that of Heinemann (1979).

τὰς τῶν εὖ πραττόντων, ὄντων δὲ μετρίων αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, ὡς ὀρθῶς ἅμα καὶ μουσικῶς ὠνόμασεν ὅστις ποτ᾽ ἦν, καὶ κατὰ λόγον αὐταῖς θέμενος ὄνομα συμπάσαις ἐμμελείας ἐπωνόμασε, καὶ δύο δὴ τῶν ὀρχήσεων τῶν καλῶν εἴδη κατεστήσατο, τὸ μὲν πολεμικὸν πυρρίχην, τὸ δὲ εἰρηνικὸν ἐμμέλειαν, ἑκατέρῳ τὸ πρέπον τε καὶ ἁρμόττον ἐπιθεὶς ὄνομα [...]

{ATH} Many of the names bestowed in ancient times are deserving of notice and of praise for their excellence and descriptiveness: one such is the name given to the dances of men who are in a prosperous state and indulge in pleasures of a moderate kind: how true and how musical was the name so rationally bestowed on those dances by the man (whoever he was) who first called them all "*Emmeleiai*," and established two species of fair dances – the warlike, termed "pyrrhiche," and the pacific, termed "*emmeleia*" – bestowing on each its appropriate and harmonious name.

It is unclear whether Plato gives an accurate description of *emmeleia*[689] because, as Lawler shows, there is little information on this kind of dance in the ancient sources or in Greek art.[690] Plato may be playing with the term *emmeleia* here, which is generally associated with the genre of tragedy.[691] However, in the *Laws emmeleia* is associated with *melos*. The importance of *melos* – as choral song in the *Laws* – gives its name to the fair dances in the first place. And it becomes associated, in the second place, with the peaceful dance of *emmeleia,* which is opposed to the warlike pyrrhic.

[689] Ley (2007) 158 believes that Plato does not give a description of actual dances, but rather creates 'an artificial scheme here.'

[690] Lawler (1964b): 59; Ley gives two references on *emmeleia* from Aristophanes and Herodotus, see Ley (2007) 158-9: "Two slight references can be added, one from Aristophanes' Wasps where the threat of a "knuckle *emmeleia*" is directed at a comical vision of a tragic (solo) dancer (Wasps 1503). The second reference also dates from the fifth century, although it is applied to an earlier period and comes from the historian Herodotus. In a remarkable anecdote about a member of a prestigious Athenian family, which is almost certainly derived from the oral traditions of the Athenian aristocracy, Herodotus uses both the term *emmeleia* and the verbal form of cheironomia, another term that later commentaries on dancing deploy. The anecdote concerns the lavish arrangements made by the tyrant of Sicyon in the sixth century BCE for the marriage of his daughter. Suitors arrived from around the Greek world, and trials were made of them. On the final day, the tyrant Cleisthenes laid on a banquet, and at its conclusion the suitors continued to compete with each other in speaking and in mousike, which presumably suggests singing to the lyre as an accomplishment. As the drinking advance, the young Athenian aristocrat Hippocleides ordered the auletes to play emmeleia and performed a solo dance. (Herod. *Hist*. 6.126-130)."

[691] Lawler (1964a) 83.

Although Plato gives prominence to the choruses of the Muses, Apollo, and Dionysus, in the eighth book he briefly stresses the need for numerous choruses in honor of the gods.[692] The religious, and hence also the political and social cohesion, should never be at stake, and people therefore need to always remember to show their respect to the gods through feasts and sacrifices (Pl. *Laws* 809d):

> {ΑΘ} τίνων δὴ πέρι λέγομεν; ἡμερῶν τάξεως εἰς μηνῶν περιόδους καὶ μηνῶν εἰς ἕκαστον τὸν ἐνιαυτόν, ἵνα ὧραι καὶ θυσίαι καὶ ἑορταὶ τὰ προσήκοντ' ἀπολαμβάνουσαι ἑαυταῖς ἕκασται τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἄγεσθαι, ζῶσαν τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἐγρηγορυῖαν παρεχόμεναι, θεοῖς μὲν τὰς τιμὰς ἀποδιδῶσιν, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους περὶ αὐτὰ μᾶλλον ἔμφρονας ἀπεργάζωνται [...]
>
> {ATH} What I allude to is this – the arranging of days into monthly periods, and of months into a year, in each instance, so that the seasons, with their respective sacrifices and feasts, may each be assigned its due position by being held as nature dictates, and that thus they may create fresh liveliness and alertness in the State, and may pay their due honors to the gods, and may render the citizens more intelligent about these matters. [...]

Engaging the citizens in such activities, which also include song and dance, makes them sensible (ἔμφρονας). The citizens will moreover receive the favor of the gods and will be able to defeat their enemies in the case of war.[693] Therefore, the whole city should be seen as lively and active, and in a constantly celebratory atmosphere.

As already noted, *choreia* is central in the city of the *Laws*, whereas the poets are subtly marginalized. What is the role of the poets in the new city, since every important task has been taken away from them?

Firstly, the poets will be the advisors of the judges in the selecting the appropriate songs and dances from the past and rejecting the bad ones (Pl. *Laws* 802a-b):

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[692] Pl. *Laws* 828b-d.

[693] Pl. *Laws* 803d7-e4: δεῖ δὴ τὸν κατ' εἰρήνην βίον ἕκαστον πλεῖστόν τε καὶ ἄριστον διεξελθεῖν. τίς οὖν ὀρθότης; παίζοντά ἐστιν διαβιωτέον τινὰς δὴ παιδιάς, θύοντα καὶ ᾄδοντα καὶ ὀρχούμενον, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἵλεως αὐτῷ παρασκευάζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ νικᾶν μαχόμενον·[…]

{ΑΘ} πολλὰ ἔστιν παλαιῶν παλαιὰ περὶ μουσικὴν καὶ καλὰ ποιήματα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ὀρχήσεις ὡσαύτως, ὧν οὐδεὶς φθόνος ἐκλέξασθαι τῇ καθισταμένῃ πολιτείᾳ τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἁρμόττον· δοκιμαστὰς δὲ τούτων ἑλομένους τὴν ἐκλογὴν ποιεῖσθαι μὴ νεωτέρους πεντήκοντα ἐτῶν, καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἂν ἱκανὸν εἶναι δόξῃ τῶν παλαιῶν ποιημάτων, ἐγκρίνειν, ὅτι δ᾽ ἂν ἐνδεὲς ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἀνεπιτήδειον, τὸ μὲν ἀποβάλλεσθαι παντάπασιν, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπανερόμενον ἐπιρρυθμίζειν, ποιητικοὺς ἅμα καὶ μουσικοὺς ἄνδρας παραλαβόντας, χρωμένους αὐτῶν ταῖς δυνάμεσιν τῆς ποιήσεως [...]

{ATH} Among the compositions of the ancients there exist many fine old pieces of music, and likewise dances, from which we may select without scruple for the constitution we are founding such as are fitting and proper. To examine these and make the selection, we shall choose out men not under fifty years of age; and whichever of the ancient songs are approved we shall adopt, but whichever fail to reach our standard, or are altogether unsuitable, we shall either reject entirely or revise and remodel. For this purpose we shall call in the advice of poets and musicians, and make use of their poetical capacities [...]

Secondly, the poets' role is to compose choral songs (Pl. *Laws* 812d):

{ΑΘ} τούτων τοίνυν δεῖ χάριν τοῖς φθόγγοις τῆς λύρας προσχρῆσθαι, σαφηνείας ἕνεκα τῶν χορδῶν, τόν τε κιθαριστὴν καὶ τὸν παιδευόμενον, ἀποδιδόντας πρόσχορδα τὰ φθέγματα τοῖς φθέγμασι· τὴν δ᾽ ἑτεροφωνίαν καὶ ποικιλίαν τῆς λύρας, ἄλλα μὲν μέλη τῶν χορδῶν ἱεισῶν, ἄλλα δὲ τοῦ τὴν μελῳδίαν συνθέντος ποιητοῦ [...]

{ATH} So, to attain this object, both the lyre-master and his pupil must use the notes of the lyre, because of the distinctness of its strings, assigning to the notes of the song notes in tune with them; but as to divergence of sound and variety in the notes of the harp, when the strings sound the one tune and the composer of the choral song another [...]

Thirdly, the chorus-trainers, namely the poets, are responsible for the teaching of the melodies and words (Pl. *Laws* 812e-813a):

> {ΑΘ} τὰ δὲ μελῶν αὐτῶν αὖ καὶ ῥημάτων, οἷα τοὺς χοροδιδασκάλους καὶ ἃ δεῖ διδάσκειν, καὶ ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν διείρηται πάντα [...]

> {ATH} As regards the character of the actual tunes and words, which the chorus-trainers ought to teach, all this we have already explained at length [...]

Despite the auxiliary role of the poets, in the seventh book the Athenian attributes the discussions that have been made up to this point to divine inspiration.[694] I quote part of the passage here again in order to discuss it from another perspective (Pl. *Laws* 811c-d):

> {ΑΘ.} τοῦ μὴ παντάπασι παραδείγματος ἀπορεῖν. νῦν γὰρ ἀποβλέψας πρὸς τοὺς λόγους οὓς ἐξ ἕω μέχρι δεῦρο δὴ διεληλύθαμεν ἡμεῖς – ὡς μὲν ἐμοὶ φαινόμεθα, οὐκ ἄνευ τινὸς ἐπιπνοίας θεῶν – ἔδοξαν δ᾽ οὖν μοι παντάπασι ποιήσει τινὶ προσομοίως εἰρῆσθαι. καί μοι ἴσως οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν πάθος ἐπῆλθε, λόγους οἰκείους οἷον ἁθρόους ἐπιβλέψαντι μάλα ἡσθῆναι· τῶν γὰρ δὴ πλείστων λόγων οὓς ἐν ποιήμασιν ἢ χύδην οὕτως εἰρημένους μεμάθηκα καὶ ἀκήκοα, πάντων μοι μετριώτατοί γε εἶναι κατεφάνησαν καὶ προσήκοντες τὰ μάλιστα ἀκούειν νέοις. τῷ δὴ νομοφύλακί τε καὶ παιδευτῇ παράδειγμα οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι, ὡς οἶμαι, τούτου βέλτιον φράζειν […]

> {ATH} In the fact that I am not wholly at a loss for a pattern. For in looking back now at the discussions which we have been pursuing from dawn up to this present hour – and that, as I fancy, not without some divine inspiration – it appeared to me that they were framed exactly like a poem. And it was not surprising, perhaps, that there came over me a feeling of marvelous passion when I gazed thus on our discourses all marshalled, as it were, in close array; for of all the many discourses which I have listened to or learnt about, whether in poems or in a loose flood of speech like ours, they struck me as being not only the most adequate, but also the most suitable for the ears of the young. Nowhere, I think, could I find a better pattern than this to put before the Law-warden who is educator […]

[694] See the discussion in Chapter III, pp. 205-7.

The Athenian reveals that he was trying to create a 'pattern' (παράδειγμα). When he looked back on the discourse, he realized that what he and his interlocutors had discussed under divine inspiration (ἐπιπνοίας θεῶν) is the pattern he was looking for. This observation leads him to experience an 'extraordinary passion' (θαυμαστόν πάθος). The motifs of divine inspiration and amazement echo the description of the melic composition in the *Ion,*[695] thus bringing *melos* close to philosophy. But instead of melic composition, what we witness in the *Laws* is the construction of philosophy. This philosophy, in which *choreia* is central, is considered to provide an exemplary lesson in the education of the youths.

Conclusions

The discussion in this chapter has placed particular emphasis on how *melos* is reformed and, thus, reintegrated into the Platonic dialogues. The adaptations of *melos* to Plato's philosophical standards can be seen in the *Phaedo*, the *Republic*, and the *Laws.*

In the *Phaedo*, Socrates' composition of a *prooimion* to Apollo and his association with Apollo and Orpheus through the motifs of song, swans, and death, creates a space for reintegrating song in the philosophical discourse.

In the eschatological myth of the *Republic*, the cosmic spectacle of the Sirens, the Fates, and Necessity is imagined as a particular *choreia*, confirming the centrality of *choreia* in Plato's thought. Despite the mathematical structure of the universe and the corresponding melody of the Sirens, Plato imagines the universe by resorting to the framework and diction of *choreia*.

In the *Laws*, the description of the choruses of Apollo, the Muses, and Dionysus, and the significant position of *choreia* in the new Cretan city, are parts of the 'pattern' that Plato creates. *Melos* and *schêma* originate from the gods and embody the mental, emotional, and physical skills that all the citizens must acquire if the city is to be well-ordered on a social and political level. The constant play between musical and political *nomoi,* and the description of the philosophical discourses in musical terms,

[695] See Chapter I, pp. 10-21.

shows the neat interweaving of *melos* with philosophy in the discussion about the formation of the citizens and the foundation of the new city.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

In the preceding chapters I sought to offer a systematic examination of *melos*, melic composition, and performance in Plato's dialogues. Although I did not engage in equally extensive discussion of all the Platonic passages that contain the term *melos*, all the occurrences of the word can be found either in the main text or in the footnotes.

The emphasis on the semantics of *melos* required an investigation of the web of relations between *melos* and other kinds of poetry, arts of knowledge or themes. More precisely, the first chapter focuses on the association between *melos* and *epos* (*Ion*, *Protagoras, Republic*), on the relationship between *melos* and the art of rhetoric (*Gorgias*), on the use of *melos* in matters of *eros* (*Lysis*, *Symposium*), and on the combination of *melos* and *schêma* in the *choreia* (*Laws*). The main paths of investigation of the aforementioned relations are the Platonic discussion regarding the composition and the performance of *melos*, which have broadened the scope of my analysis concerning the position and significance of *melos* in Plato's works. The most important thing that I can safely deduce from this discussion is Plato's tendency to deftly marginalize, displace, and generally undermine *melos*. The close association of *melos* with epic poetry and the art of rhetoric, and the negative effects that the enactments of *melos* have on the audience, confirm this opinion. However, to some extent in the *Republic* and mainly in the *Laws*, one encounters significant divergence as regards Plato's treatment of *melos*. Here *melos,* as part of *choreia,* is central to the foundation of the new city and essential for the education of the citizens. The wide semantic range of *melos* – melody/tunes, musical mode (harmonia), song, melic poetry, choral song – is grounded on the use of the term in a broad variety of contexts and illustrates Plato's flexibility of thinking, his ability to reinterpret the words in the light of the different themes he discusses, the new (philosophical) problems he has to face and, of course, his playful spirit.

The second chapter emphasizes Plato's explicit references to the melic genres that are mentioned to or discussed in his dialogues. The first part of this chapter presents Plato's explicit references to *epos* and *drama* in order to compare it with his comments on melic poetry. My first remark is that Plato's attitude towards epic and dramatic poetry is largely negative. Regarding the forms of melic poetry, although the

identity of the melic forms is ambiguous in many Platonic passages and dialogues, his criticism of *thrênos* and that of dithyramb is shown to be extremely severe. By contrast, the paeans, the *encômia*, the hymns and the *kitharôidikos nomos* are widely accepted and welcomed in the Platonic cultural and political models of the *Republic* and, as expected, of the *Laws*, where Plato is proposing "an alternative mode of culture."[696] The way Plato (re)shapes the identity of the melic genres and the way he plays with the traditions of *melos*, basically as song, are the most important questions that this chapter raises.

The third chapter turns from these explicit references to *melos* and the various melic genres, to the tacit displacement of *melos*, by examining the contexts of the dialogues, in other words the locations where the Platonic dialogues occur and where philosophy unexpectedly intrudes. The interpretation of these locations follows a tripartite distinction between private residences, *palaistrai* and *gymnasia,* and the natural landscapes of the countryside. In the *Symposium* and the *Protagoras* Plato reformulates the traditional *symposium* in order to present philosophical discourses, whilst in the *Republic* he is extremely careful in describing the meeting in Polemarchus' house: he discusses the *symposium* only in the theoretical development of the ideal city. In the *palaistrai* of the *Lysis* and the *Charmides* the engagement in song and poetry is replaced by philosophical discussions and in the *Euthydemus* the sophists and the place itself are described as chorus-members. In the locus amoenus of the *Phaedrus melos* in prose is accepted and in the similar context of the *Laws* the traditional *theôria* is converted into a philosophical one. In these two dialogues, philosophy invades the *erotic* sacred places, which are filled with melic motifs, and colors every aspect of them.

By focusing mainly on 'song in context' through the comparative analysis of the *Symposium* and the *Protagoras* I attempted to show that the marginalization or tacit displacement of song/dance is a pattern that can be traced in many other dialogues and takes various forms: Plato's mention of songs that have been omitted in descriptions of festivals/*theoriae* (*Lysis*, *Republic*, *Laws*), his severe criticism of and his ironic references to erotic songs (*Lysis*, *Charmides*), his preference for prose encomia of mortals and gods (*Lysis*, *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*), the presentation of sophists as chorodidaskaloi (chorus leaders/masters) and their followers (students) as choruses

[696] Peponi (2013c) 18.

(*Protagoras*, *Euthydemus*), the reformulation of the traditional symposium (*Symposium*, *Protagoras*, *Republic*).

The discussion in the *Axiochus* was developed by an author who, based mainly on Plato's form and style of writing, underlines the importance of location as a context for philosophical discussion. In this dialogue, however, the relation between song and philosophy are restored in the eschatological myth narrated by Socrates. Yet philosophy has the lead role in the dialogue.

On the whole, the third chapter shows that *melos* is not explicitly and entirely exiled from the locations of the dialogues, but is tacitly and deftly displaced. Philosophy's intrusion into these locations and the acceptance of *melos* occurs after the reformulation of the places that traditionally included song and dance and the adaptation of *melos* and its elements to meet the standards that Plato sets for his philosophical enquiries.

The fourth and final chapter emphasizes the reformation and reintegration of *melos* in the *Phaedo*, the *Republic,* and the *Laws*. In the *Phaedo*, the occasion of the Delia and of Socrates' death were combined with the eschatological myth in order to give Plato the unique opportunity to present Socrates as a melic composer and singer and to link him with Apollo and Orpheus. Hence song is subtly and implicitly admitted to the philosophical conversation by association. The dialogue, however, forms the theoretical basis of Plato's tendency to displace traditional song from Socrates' gatherings, for as Socrates points out "philosophy is the best kind of *mousikê*." The centrality of *choreia* in the eschatological myth of the *Republic* is attested in the depiction of the cosmic *choreia* of the Sirens, the Fates, and Necessity at the end of a dialogue dedicated to the formation of the guardian rulers of the fair city. In the *Laws*, the centrality of *choreia* is obvious. In this dialogue, the formation of the whole society in order to achieve virtue necessitates the undoubtedly popular cultural practice of *choreia.* However, everything has to be circumscribed by strict laws. The main points of my discussion of the *Laws* are: the description of the paradigmatic choruses of Apollo, the Muses, and Dionysus, the significant role of *choreia* in Magnesia, the role of the poets, the constant shift between musical and political *nomoi* and the description of the philosophical discourses in musical terms. It is within this framework that all moral, social, and political issues are extensively discussed. Perhaps, as it has been suggested, this is Plato's last attempt to reestablish

mousikê in the city.[697] However, the unmediated interaction between the gods and the citizens, and the expanded role of the elders in the education of the youths, restrict the role of the poets to that of advisors of the judges of songs and dances and to the teaching of already composed songs and speeches. Nevertheless, it appears that *melos* as the core of *mousikê*, and hence of *paideia*, has a decisive role in the transmission of the appropriate knowledge in the pursuit of virtue and happiness in the *Laws*.

It seems clear though that the *melos* Plato is talking about, particularly in the *Laws*, is a kind of anachronism that never existed and can never have existed at any point in the song-culture, at least in 5th-century Athens, and which is consciously positioned in opposition to the actual 'theatrocratic' cultural forms of his own time. Of course the old kind of choral song continued in the culture, tied most often to ritual occasions. It might also be argued then that Plato's project with *melos* in this dialogue is an exercise in what we might call 'cultural memory.'

As the fifth century progresses, the performance culture at Athens comes increasingly to focus on the 'theatrical' genres (including of course the nome and the 'New Dithyramb'): but Plato hates that culture and wants to replace it with his own ideal of song-culture imported from the past. And Plato's dialogues are often set against the background of a festival or a *theôria*, (although this 'occasion' is only briefly mentioned) and it is interesting that the *Phaedrus*, perhaps in some ways the most 'musical' Platonic dialogue, has no such festival/ritual background.

The Platonic dialectic's struggle with the tradition, and its use of basic elements and established conventions from the poetic realm, makes Plato's philosophy a melting pot, in which the boundaries of tradition are broken and new, reformed ideas and 'genres' emerge. Plato keeps what is useful to him, modifies or replaces what he considers false, and always searches for new challenges that excite him and stimulate his thought.

I hope that this work has made a significant step towards elucidating the complex Platonic approach to *melos* in both the internal and external contexts of his dialogues. What I attempted to do is to present *melos* in a systematic way, discovering Plato's patterns and strategies for the better understanding of his kaleidoscopic philosophical theories pertaining to *melos*. The thesis argues that *melos*, and most frequently choral *melos*, is an essentially constituent of *mousikê*, and hence of *paideia* and, therefore

[697] Peponi (2013) 4.

central to his philosophy. The frequent use of the term, Plato's constant struggle and play with its meaning and form and his ambivalence toward it reveals *melos* as a major philosophical and philological challenge. Indeed, *melos* is defined, redefined, reshaped and expanded, illuminating the nature of the Platonic philosophy itself. The comprehensive study of *melos* creates a new basis for discussion shedding more light on the complex issue of *mousikê* in Plato. In the end,

> "Only this I know: The philosopher's soul dwells in his head, the poet's soul is in the heart […]."

[Khalil Gibran, *The Wanderer (The Dancer)*]

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APPENDIX I

Plato’s *Ion*

i. 533d-e

{ΣΩ} […] ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τέχνη μὲν οὐκ ὂν παρὰ σοὶ περὶ Ὁμήρου εὖ λέγειν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, θεία δὲ δύναμις ἥ σε κινεῖ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ λίθῳ ἣν Εὐριπίδης μὲν Μαγνῆτιν ὠνόμασεν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ Ἡρακλείαν. καὶ γὰρ αὕτη ἡ λίθος οὐ μόνον αὐτοὺς τοὺς δακτυλίους ἄγει τοὺς σιδηροῦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν ἐντίθησι τοῖς δακτυλίοις ὥστ᾽ αὖ δύνασθαι ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὅπερ ἡ λίθος, ἄλλους ἄγειν δακτυλίους, ὥστ᾽ ἐνίοτε ὁρμαθὸς μακρὸς πάνυ σιδηρίων καὶ δακτυλίων ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἤρτηται· πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις ἐξ ἐκείνης τῆς λίθου ἡ δύναμις ἀνήρτηται.

{SO} […] For, as I was saying just now, this is not an art in you, whereby you speak well on Homer, but a divine power, which moves you like that in the stone which Euripides named a magnet, but most people call “Heraclea stone.” For this stone not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts to them a power whereby they in turn are able to do the very same thing as the stone, and attract other rings; so that sometimes there is formed quite a long chain of bits of iron and rings, suspended one from another; and they all depend for this power on that one stone.

ii. 533e-534b

{ΣΩ} οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ Μοῦσα ἐνθέους μὲν ποιεῖ αὐτή, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἐνθέων τούτων ἄλλων ἐνθουσιαζόντων ὁρμαθὸς ἐξαρτᾶται. πάντες γὰρ οἵ τε τῶν ἐπῶν ποιηταὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὐκ ἐκ τέχνης ἀλλ᾽ ἔνθεοι ὄντες καὶ κατεχόμενοι πάντα ταῦτα τὰ καλὰ λέγουσι ποιήματα, καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὡσαύτως, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες οὐκ ἔμφρονες ὄντες ὀρχοῦνται, οὕτω καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ οὐκ ἔμφρονες ὄντες τὰ καλὰ μέλη ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὰν ἐμβῶσιν εἰς τὴν ἁρμονίαν καὶ εἰς τὸν ῥυθμόν, βακχεύουσι καὶ κατεχόμενοι, ὥσπερ αἱ βάκχαι ἀρύονται ἐκ τῶν ποταμῶν μέλι καὶ γάλα κατεχόμεναι, ἔμφρονες δὲ οὖσαι οὔ, καὶ τῶν μελοποιῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦτο ἐργάζεται, ὅπερ αὐτοὶ λέγουσι. λέγουσι γὰρ δήπουθεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς οἱ ποιηταὶ ὅτι ἀπὸ κρηνῶν μελιρρύτων ἐκ Μουσῶν κήπων τινῶν καὶ ναπῶν δρεπόμενοι τὰ μέλη ἡμῖν φέρουσιν ὥσπερ αἱ μέλιτται, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτω πετόμενοι· καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγουσι. κοῦφον γὰρ χρῆμα ποιητής ἐστιν καὶ πτηνὸν καὶ ἱερόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον οἷός τε ποιεῖν πρὶν ἂν ἔνθεός τε γένηται καὶ ἔκφρων καὶ ὁ νοῦς μηκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνῇ· ἕως δ᾽ ἂν τουτὶ ἔχῃ τὸ κτῆμα, ἀδύνατος πᾶς ποιεῖν ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν καὶ χρησμῳδεῖν.

{SO} In the same manner also the Muse inspires men herself, and then by means of these inspired persons the inspiration spreads to others, and holds them in a connected chain. For all the good epic poets utter all those fine poems not from art, but as inspired and possessed, and the good lyric poets likewise; just as the Corybantian worshippers do not dance when in their senses, so the lyric poets do not indite those fine songs in their senses, but when they have started on the melody and rhythm they begin to be frantic, and it is under possession – as the bacchants are possessed, and not in their senses, when they draw honey and milk from the rivers – that the soul of the lyric poets does the same thing, by their own report. For the poets tell us, I believe, that the songs they bring us are the sweets they cull from honey-dropping founts in certain gardens and glades of the Muses – like the bees, and winging the air as these do. And what they tell is true. For a poet is a light and winged and sacred thing, and is unable ever to indite until he has been inspired and put out of his senses, and his mind is no longer in him: every man, whilst he retains possession of that, is powerless to indite a verse or chant an oracle.

iii. 534b-535a

{ΣΩ} ἅτε οὖν οὐ τέχνῃ ποιοῦντες καὶ πολλὰ λέγοντες καὶ καλὰ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, ὥσπερ σὺ περὶ Ὁμήρου, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ, τοῦτο μόνον οἷός τε ἕκαστος ποιεῖν καλῶς ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἡ Μοῦσα αὐτὸν ὥρμησεν, ὁ μὲν διθυράμβους, ὁ δὲ ἐγκώμια, ὁ δὲ ὑπορχήματα, ὁ δ᾽ ἔπη, ὁ δ᾽ ἰάμβους· τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα φαῦλος αὐτῶν ἕκαστός ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ τέχνῃ ταῦτα λέγουσιν ἀλλὰ θείᾳ δυνάμει, ἐπεί, εἰ περὶ ἑνὸς τέχνῃ καλῶς ἠπίσταντο λέγειν, κἂν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων· διὰ ταῦτα δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἐξαιρούμενος τούτων τὸν νοῦν τούτοις χρῆται ὑπηρέταις καὶ τοῖς χρησμῳδοῖς καὶ τοῖς μάντεσι τοῖς θείοις, ἵνα ἡμεῖς οἱ ἀκούοντες εἰδῶμεν ὅτι οὐχ οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες οὕτω πολλοῦ ἄξια, οἷς νοῦς μὴ πάρεστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ θεὸς αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ λέγων, διὰ τούτων δὲ φθέγγεται πρὸς ἡμᾶς. μέγιστον δὲ τεκμήριον τῷ λόγῳ Τύννιχος ὁ Χαλκιδεύς, ὃς ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν πώποτε ἐποίησε ποίημα ὅτου τις ἂν ἀξιώσειεν μνησθῆναι, τὸν δὲ παίωνα ὃν πάντες ᾄδουσι, σχεδόν τι πάντων μελῶν κάλλιστον, ἀτεχνῶς, ὅπερ αὐτὸς λέγει, ‘εὕρημά τι Μοισᾶν.’ ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ δὴ μάλιστά μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐνδείξασθαι ἡμῖν, ἵνα μὴ διστάζωμεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνθρώπινά ἐστιν τὰ καλὰ ταῦτα ποιήματα οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ θεῖα καὶ θεῶν, οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἑρμηνῆς εἰσιν τῶν θεῶν, κατεχόμενοι ἐξ ὅτου ἂν ἕκαστος κατέχηται. ταῦτα ἐνδεικνύμενος ὁ θεὸς ἐξεπίτηδες διὰ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου ποιητοῦ τὸ κάλλιστον μέλος ᾖσεν· ἢ οὐ δοκῶ σοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὦ Ἴων;

{SO} Seeing then that it is not by art that they compose and utter so many fine things about the deeds of men – as you do about Homer – but by a divine dispensation, each is able only to compose that to which the Muse has stirred him, this man dithyrambs, another laudatory odes, another dance-songs, another epic or else iambic verse; but each is at fault in any other kind.

For not by art do they utter these things, but by divine influence; since, if they had fully learnt by art to speak on one kind of theme, they would know how to speak on all. And for this reason God takes away the mind of these men and uses them as his ministers, just as he does soothsayers and godly seers, in order that we who hear them may know that it is not they who utter these words of great price, when they are out of their wits, but that it is God himself who speaks and addresses us through them. A convincing proof of what I say is the case of Tynnichus, the Chalcidian, who had never composed a single poem in his life that could deserve any mention, and then produced the paean which is in everyone's mouth, almost the finest song we have, simply – as he says himself – “an invention of the Muses.” For the god, as it seems to me, intended him to be a sign to us that we should not waver or doubt that these fine poems are not human or the work of men, but divine and the work of gods; and that the poets are merely the interpreters of the gods, according as each is possessed by one of the heavenly powers. To show this forth, the god of set purpose sang the finest of songs through the meanest of poets· or do you not think my statement true, Ion?

iv. 535e-536b
{ΣΩ} οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ θεατὴς τῶν δακτυλίων ὁ ἔσχατος, ὧν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον ὑπὸ τῆς Ἡρακλειώτιδος λίθου ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων τὴν δύναμιν λαμβάνειν; ὁ δὲ μέσος σὺ ὁ ῥαψῳδὸς καὶ ὑποκριτής, ὁ δὲ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητής· ὁ δὲ θεὸς διὰ πάντων τούτων ἕλκει τὴν ψυχὴν ὅποι ἂν βούληται τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀνακρεμαννὺς ἐξ ἀλλήλων τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς λίθου ἐκείνης ὁρμαθὸς πάμπολυς ἐξήρτηται χορευτῶν τε καὶ διδασκάλων καὶ ὑποδιδασκάλων, ἐκ πλαγίου ἐξηρτημένων τῶν τῆς Μούσης ἐκκρεμαμένων δακτυλίων. καὶ ὁ μὲν τῶν ποιητῶν ἐξ ἄλλης Μούσης, ὁ δὲ ἐξ ἄλλης ἐξήρτηται – ὀνομάζομεν δὲ αὐτὸ κατέχεται, τὸ δέ ἐστι παραπλήσιον· ἔχεται γάρ – ἐκ δὲ τούτων τῶν πρώτων δακτυλίων, τῶν ποιητῶν, ἄλλοι ἐξ ἄλλου αὖ ἠρτημένοι εἰσὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζουσιν, οἱ μὲν ἐξ Ὀρφέως, οἱ δὲ ἐκ Μουσαίου· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐξ Ὁμήρου κατέχονταί τε καὶ ἔχονται.

{SO} And are you aware that your spectator is the last of the rings which I spoke of as receiving from each other the power transmitted from the Heraclean lodestone? You, the rhapsode and actor, are the middle ring; the poet himself is the first; but it is the god who through the whole series draws the souls of men whithersoever he pleases, making the power of one depend on the other. And, just as from the magnet, there is a mighty chain of choric performers and masters and under-masters suspended by side-connections from the rings that hang down from the Muse. One poet is suspended from one Muse, another from another: the word we use for it is “possessed,” but it is much the same thing, for he is held. And from these first rings – the poets – are suspended various others, which are thus inspired, some by Orpheus and others by Musaeus; but the majority are possessed and held by Homer.

v. 536b-c

{ΣΩ} […] οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐξ Ὁμήρου κατέχονταί τε καὶ ἔχονται. ὧν σύ, ὦ Ἴων, εἷς εἶ καὶ κατέχῃ ἐξ Ὁμήρου, καὶ ἐπειδὰν μέν τις ἄλλου του ποιητοῦ ᾄδῃ, καθεύδεις τε καὶ ἀπορεῖς ὅτι λέγῃς, ἐπειδὰν δὲ τούτου τοῦ ποιητοῦ φθέγξηταί τις μέλος, εὐθὺς ἐγρήγορας καὶ ὀρχεῖταί σου ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ εὐπορεῖς ὅτι λέγῃς· οὐ γὰρ τέχνῃ οὐδ᾽ ἐπιστήμῃ περὶ Ὁμήρου λέγεις ἃ λέγεις, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ καὶ κατοκωχῇ, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες ἐκείνου μόνου αἰσθάνονται τοῦ μέλους ὀξέως ὃ ἂν ᾖ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξ ὅτου ἂν κατέχωνται, καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέλος καὶ σχημάτων καὶ ῥημάτων εὐποροῦσι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐ φροντίζουσιν·

{SO} […] but the majority are possessed and held by Homer. Of whom you, Ion, are one, and are possessed by Homer; and so, when anyone recites the work of another poet, you go to sleep and are at a loss what to say; but when some one utters a strain of your poet, you wake up at once, and your soul dances, and you have plenty to say; for it is not by art or knowledge about Homer that you say what you say, but by divine dispensation and possession; just as the Corybantian worshippers are keenly sensible of that strain alone which belongs to the god whose possession is on them, and have plenty of gestures and phrases for that tune, but do not heed any other.

Plato's *Lysis*

205a-b

οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἔφη, ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιεῖν εἰς τὰ παιδικὰ μηδὲ συγγράφειν.
οὐχ ὑγιαίνει, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, ἀλλὰ ληρεῖ τε καὶ μαίνεται.
καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, οὔ τι τῶν μέτρων δέομαι ἀκοῦσαι οὐδὲ μέλος εἴ τι πεποίηκας εἰς τὸν νεανίσκον, ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας, ἵνα εἰδῶ τίνα τρόπον προσφέρῃ πρὸς τὰ παιδικά.

Not I, he replied; but I do deny that I compose poems and write in prose about my favorite.
He is in a bad way, said Ctesippus; why, he raves like a madman!
Then I remarked: Hippothales, I do not want to hear your verses, or any ode that you may have indited to the youth; I only ask for their purport, that I may know your manner of dealing with your beloved.

Plato’s *Gorgias*

i. 449d

{ΣΩ} […] ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει οὖσα; ὥσπερ ἡ ὑφαντικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἱματίων ἐργασίαν· ἦ γάρ; {ΓΟ} ναί. {ΣΩ} οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν μελῶν ποίησιν; {ΓΟ} ναί.

{SO} […] tell me with what particular thing rhetoric is concerned: as, for example, weaving is concerned with the manufacture of clothes, is it not? {GO} Yes. {SO} And music, likewise, with the making of tunes? {GO} Yes.

ii. 502c

{ΣΩ} φέρε δή, εἴ τις περιέλοι τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό τε μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον, ἄλλο τι ἢ λόγοι γίγνονται τὸ λειπόμενον;

{SO} Pray then, if we strip any kind of poetry of its melody, its rhythm and its meter, we get mere speeches as the residue, do we not?

Plato’s *Symposium*

187c-d

καὶ ἔστιν αὖ μουσικὴ περὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἐρωτικῶν ἐπιστήμη. καὶ ἐν μέν γε αὐτῇ τῇ συστάσει ἁρμονίας τε καὶ ῥυθμοῦ οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν τὰ ἐρωτικὰ διαγιγνώσκειν, οὐδὲ ὁ διπλοῦς ἔρως ἐνταῦθά πω ἔστιν· ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὰν δέῃ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καταχρῆσθαι ῥυθμῷ τε καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ ἢ ποιοῦντα, ὃ δὴ μελοποιίαν καλοῦσιν, ἢ χρώμενον ὀρθῶς τοῖς πεποιημένοις μέλεσί τε καὶ μέτροις, ὃ δὴ παιδεία ἐκλήθη, ἐνταῦθα δὴ καὶ χαλεπὸν καὶ ἀγαθοῦ δημιουργοῦ δεῖ.

Hence in its turn music is found to be a knowledge of love-matters relating to harmony and rhythm. In the actual system of harmony or rhythm we can easily distinguish these love-matters; as yet the double Love is absent: but when we come to the application of rhythm and harmony to social life, whether we construct what are called ‘melodies' or render correctly, by what is known as ‘training,’ tunes and measures already constructed, we find here a certain difficulty and require a good craftsman.

Plato's *Protagoras*

326a-b

{ΠΡΩ} πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἐπειδὰν κιθαρίζειν μάθωσιν, ἄλλων αὖ ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα διδάσκουσι μελοποιῶν, εἰς τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνοντες, καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς τε καὶ τὰς ἁρμονίας ἀναγκάζουσιν οἰκειοῦσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν παίδων, ἵνα ἡμερώτεροί τε ὦσιν, καὶ εὐρυθμότεροι καὶ εὐαρμοστότεροι γιγνόμενοι χρήσιμοι ὦσιν εἰς τὸ λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν· πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται.

{PRO} moreover, once they have learned to play the lyre, they teach them the poems of other good poets, lyric poets in this case, which they set to music and make the children's souls habituated to the rhythms and the melodies, so that they become gentler, more graceful, and better adjusted, and so better in word and action. For every aspect of human life requires grace and proper adjustment.

Plato's *Republic*

i. 392c

Τὰ μὲν δὴ λόγων πέρι ἐχέτω τέλος· τὸ δὲ λέξεως, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, καὶ ἡμῖν ἅ τε λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον παντελῶς ἐσκέψεται. Καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, τοῦτο, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ μανθάνω ὅτι λέγεις.

"So this concludes the topic of tales. That of diction, I take it, is to be considered next. So we shall have completely examined both the matter and the manner of speech."
And Adeimantus said, "I don't understand what you mean by this."

ii. 398b-c

νῦν δή, εἶπον ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, κινδυνεύει ἡμῖν τῆς μουσικῆς τὸ περὶ λόγους τε καὶ μύθους παντελῶς διαπεπεράνθαι· ἅ τε γὰρ λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον εἴρηται. καὶ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ περὶ ᾠδῆς τρόπου καὶ μελῶν λοιπόν; δῆλα δή. ἆρ' οὖν οὐ πᾶς ἤδη ἂν εὕροι ἃ ἡμῖν λεκτέον περὶ αὐτῶν οἷα δεῖ εἶναι, εἴπερ μέλλομεν τοῖς προειρημένοις συμφωνήσειν; καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων ἐπιγελάσας, ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, κινδυνεύω ἐκτὸς τῶν πάντων εἶναι· οὔκουν ἱκανῶς γε ἔχω ἐν τῷ παρόντι συμβαλέσθαι ποῖα ἄττα δεῖ ἡμᾶς λέγειν· ὑποπτεύω μέντοι.

“And now, my friend,” said I, “we may say that we have completely finished the part of music that concerns speeches and tales. For we have set forth what is to be said and how it is to be said.” “I think so too,” he replied. “After this, then,” said I, “comes the manner of song and tunes?” “Obviously.” “And having gone thus far, could not everybody discover what we must say of their character in order to conform to what has already been said?” “I am afraid that 'everybody' does not include me,” laughed Glaucon; “I cannot sufficiently divine off-hand what we ought to say, though I have a suspicion.”

iii. 398c-399e

πάντως δήπου, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τόδε ἱκανῶς ἔχεις λέγειν, ὅτι τὸ μέλος ἐκ τριῶν ἐστιν συγκείμενον, λόγου τε καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ. ναί, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε. οὐκοῦν ὅσον γε αὐτοῦ λόγος ἐστίν, οὐδὲν δήπου διαφέρει τοῦ μὴ ᾀδομένου λόγου πρὸς τὸ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δεῖν τύποις λέγεσθαι οἷς ἄρτι προείπομεν καὶ ὡσαύτως; ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. καὶ μὴν τήν γε ἁρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖ τῷ λόγῳ. πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; ἀλλὰ μέντοι θρήνων γε καὶ ὀδυρμῶν ἔφαμεν ἐν λόγοις οὐδὲν προσδεῖσθαι. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. τίνες οὖν θρηνώδεις ἁρμονίαι; λέγε μοι· σὺ γὰρ μουσικός.
μειξολυδιστί, ἔφη, καὶ συντονολυδιστὶ καὶ τοιαῦταί τινες. οὐκοῦν αὗται, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀφαιρετέαι; ἄχρηστοι γὰρ καὶ γυναιξὶν ἃς δεῖ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, μὴ ὅτι ἀνδράσι. πάνυ γε. ἀλλὰ μὴν μέθη γε φύλαξιν ἀπρεπέστατον καὶ μαλακία καὶ ἀργία. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; τίνες οὖν μαλακαί τε καὶ συμποτικαὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν; ἰαστί, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, καὶ λυδιστὶ αὖ τινες χαλαραὶ καλοῦνται. ταύταις οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ἐπὶ πολεμικῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔσθ᾽ ὅτι χρήσῃ; οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ κινδυνεύει σοι δωριστὶ λείπεσθαι καὶ φρυγιστί. οὐκ οἶδα, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὰς ἁρμονίας, ἀλλὰ κατάλειπε ἐκείνην τὴν ἁρμονίαν, ἣ ἔν τε πολεμικῇ πράξει ὄντος ἀνδρείου καὶ ἐν πάσῃ βιαίῳ ἐργασίᾳ πρεπόντως ἂν μιμήσαιτο φθόγγους τε καὶ προσῳδίας, καὶ ἀποτυχόντος ἢ εἰς τραύματα ἢ εἰς θανάτους ἰόντος ἢ εἴς τινα ἄλλην συμφορὰν πεσόντος, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις παρατεταγμένως καὶ καρτερούντως ἀμυνομένου τὴν τύχην· καὶ ἄλλην αὖ ἐν εἰρηνικῇ τε καὶ μὴ βιαίῳ ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἑκουσίᾳ πράξει ὄντος, ἢ τινά τι πείθοντός τε καὶ δεομένου, ἢ εὐχῇ θεὸν ἢ διδαχῇ καὶ νουθετήσει ἄνθρωπον, ἢ τοὐναντίον ἄλλῳ δεομένῳ ἢ διδάσκοντι ἢ μεταπείθοντι ἑαυτὸν ἐπέχοντα, καὶ ἐκ τούτων πράξαντα κατὰ νοῦν, καὶ μὴ ὑπερηφάνως ἔχοντα, ἀλλὰ σωφρόνως τε καὶ μετρίως ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις πράττοντά τε καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ἀγαπῶντα. ταύτας δύο ἁρμονίας, βίαιον, ἑκούσιον, δυστυχούντων, εὐτυχούντων, σωφρόνων, ἀνδρείων ἁρμονίας αἵτινες φθόγγους μιμήσονται κάλλιστα, ταύτας λεῖπε. ἀλλ᾽, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, οὐκ ἄλλας αἰτεῖς λείπειν ἢ ἃς νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον. οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πολυχορδίας γε οὐδὲ παναρμονίου ἡμῖν δεήσει ἐν ταῖς ᾠδαῖς τε καὶ μέλεσιν. οὔ μοι, ἔφη, φαίνεται. τριγώνων ἄρα καὶ πηκτίδων καὶ πάντων ὀργάνων ὅσα πολύχορδα καὶ πολυαρμόνια, δημιουργοὺς οὐ θρέψομεν. οὐ φαινόμεθα. τί δέ; αὐλοποιοὺς ἢ αὐλητὰς παραδέξῃ εἰς τὴν πόλιν; ἢ οὐ τοῦτο πολυχορδότατον, καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ παναρμόνια αὐλοῦ τυγχάνει ὄντα μίμημα; δῆλα δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. λύρα δή σοι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ κιθάρα λείπεται καὶ κατὰ πόλιν χρήσιμα· καὶ αὖ κατ᾽ ἀγροὺς τοῖς νομεῦσι σῦριγξ ἄν τις εἴη.

ὡς γοῦν, ἔφη, ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν σημαίνει. οὐδέν γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καινὸν ποιοῦμεν, ὦ φίλε, κρίνοντες τὸν Ἀπόλλω καὶ τὰ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄργανα πρὸ Μαρσύου τε καὶ τῶν ἐκείνου ὀργάνων. μὰ Δία, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, οὔ μοι φαινόμεθα. καὶ νὴ τὸν κύνα, εἶπον, λελήθαμέν γε διακαθαίροντες πάλιν ἣν ἄρτι τρυφᾶν ἔφαμεν πόλιν. σωφρονοῦντές γε ἡμεῖς, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.

"You certainly, I presume," said I, "have sufficient a understanding of this – that the song is composed of three things, the words, the tune, and the rhythm?" "Yes," said he, "that much." "And so far as it is words, it surely in no manner differs from words not sung in the requirement of conformity to the patterns and manner that we have prescribed?" "True," he said. "And again, the music and the rhythm must follow the speech." "Of course." "But we said we did not require dirges and lamentations in words." "We do not." "What, then, are the dirge-like modes of music? Tell me, for you are a musician." "The mixed Lydian," he said, "and the tense or higher Lydian, and similar modes." "These, then," said I, "we must do away with. For they are useless even to women who are to make the best of themselves, let alone to men." "Assuredly." "But again, drunkenness is a thing most unbefitting guardians, and so is softness and sloth." "Yes." "What, then, are the soft and convivial modes?" "There are certain Ionian and also Lydian modes that are called lax." "Will you make any use of them for warriors?" "None at all," he said; "but it would seem that you have left the Dorian and the Phrygian." "I don't know the musical modes," I said, "but leave us that mode that would fittingly imitate the utterances and the accents of a brave man who is engaged in warfare or in any enforced business, and who, when he has failed, either meeting wounds or death or having fallen into some other mishap, in all these conditions confronts fortune with steadfast endurance and repels her strokes. And another for such a man engaged in works of peace, not enforced but voluntary, either trying to persuade somebody of something and imploring him—whether it be a god, through prayer, or a man, by teaching and admonition—or contrariwise yielding himself to another who petitioning or teaching him or trying to change his opinions, and in consequence faring according to his wish, and not bearing himself arrogantly, but in all this acting modestly and moderately and acquiescing in the outcome. Leave us these two modes—the forced and the voluntary – that will best imitate the utterances of men failing or succeeding, the temperate, the brave – leave us these." "Well," said he, "you are asking me to leave none other than those I just spoke of." "Then," said I, "we shall not need in our songs and airs instruments of many strings or whose compass includes all the harmonies." "Not in my opinion," said he. "Then we shall not maintain makers of triangles and harps and all other many stringed and poly-harmonic instruments." "Apparently not." "Well, will you admit to the city flute-makers and flute-players? Or is not the flute the most 'many-stringed' of instruments and do not the pan-harmonics themselves imitate it?" "Clearly," he said. "You have left," said I, "the lyre and the *kithara*. These are useful in the

city, and in the fields the shepherds would have a syrinx to pipe on." "So our argument indicates," he said. "We are not innovating, my friend, in preferring Apollo and the instruments of Apollo to Marsyas and his instruments." "No, by heaven!" he said, "I think not." "And by the dog," said I, "we have all unawares purged the city which a little while ago we said was wanton." "In that we show our good sense," he said.

iv. 399e-401a

ἴθι δή, ἔφην, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ καθαίρωμεν. ἑπόμενον γὰρ δὴ ταῖς ἁρμονίαις ἂν ἡμῖν εἴη τὸ περὶ ῥυθμούς, μὴ ποικίλους αὐτοὺς διώκειν μηδὲ παντοδαπὰς βάσεις, ἀλλὰ βίου ῥυθμοὺς ἰδεῖν κοσμίου τε καὶ ἀνδρείου τίνες εἰσίν· οὓς ἰδόντα τὸν πόδα τῷ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγῳ ἀναγκάζειν ἕπεσθαι καὶ τὸ μέλος, ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγον ποδί τε καὶ μέλει. οἵτινες δ᾽ ἂν εἶεν οὗτοι οἱ ῥυθμοί, σὸν ἔργον, ὥσπερ τὰς ἁρμονίας, φράσαι. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί᾽, ἔφη, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τρί᾽ ἄττα ἐστὶν εἴδη ἐξ ὧν αἱ βάσεις πλέκονται, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις τέτταρα, ὅθεν αἱ πᾶσαι ἁρμονίαι, τεθεαμένος ἂν εἴποιμι· ποῖα δὲ ὁποίου βίου μιμήματα, λέγειν οὐκ ἔχω. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ μετὰ Δάμωνος βουλευσόμεθα, τίνες τε ἀνελευθερίας καὶ ὕβρεως ἢ μανίας καὶ ἄλλης κακίας πρέπουσαι βάσεις, καὶ τίνας τοῖς ἐναντίοις λειπτέον ῥυθμούς· οἶμαι δέ με ἀκηκοέναι οὐ σαφῶς ἐνόπλιόν τέ τινα ὀνομάζοντος αὐτοῦ σύνθετον καὶ δάκτυλον καὶ ἡρῷόν γε, οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως διακοσμοῦντος καὶ ἴσον ἄνω καὶ κάτω τιθέντος, εἰς βραχύ τε καὶ μακρὸν γιγνόμενον, καί, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἴαμβον καί τιν᾽ ἄλλον τροχαῖον ὠνόμαζε, μήκη δὲ καὶ βραχύτητας προσῆπτε. καὶ τούτων τισὶν οἶμαι τὰς ἀγωγὰς τοῦ ποδὸς αὐτὸν οὐχ ἧττον ψέγειν τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἢ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς αὐτούς – ἤτοι συναμφότερόν τι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχω λέγειν – ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν, ὥσπερ εἶπον, εἰς Δάμωνα ἀναβεβλήσθω· διελέσθαι γὰρ οὐ σμικροῦ λόγου. ἢ σὺ οἴει; μὰ Δί᾽, οὐκ ἔγωγε. ἀλλὰ τόδε γε, ὅτι τὸ τῆς εὐσχημοσύνης τε καὶ ἀσχημοσύνης τῷ εὐρύθμῳ τε καὶ ἀρρύθμῳ ἀκολουθεῖ, δύνασαι διελέσθαι; πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ εὔρυθμόν γε καὶ τὸ ἄρρυθμον τὸ μὲν τῇ καλῇ λέξει ἕπεται ὁμοιούμενον, τὸ δὲ τῇ ἐναντίᾳ, καὶ τὸ εὐάρμοστον καὶ ἀνάρμοστον ὡσαύτως, εἴπερ ῥυθμός γε καὶ ἁρμονία λόγῳ, ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο, ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγος τούτοις.ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ταῦτά γε λόγῳ ἀκολουθητέον. τί δ᾽ ὁ τρόπος τῆς λέξεως, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ὁ λόγος; οὐ τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἤθει ἕπεται; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; τῇ δὲ λέξει τὰ ἄλλα; ναί. εὐλογία ἄρα καὶ εὐαρμοστία καὶ εὐσχημοσύνη καὶ εὐρυθμία εὐηθείᾳ ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐχ ἣν ἄνοιαν οὖσαν ὑποκοριζόμενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐήθειαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς τὸ ἦθος κατεσκευασμένην διάνοιαν. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐ πανταχοῦ ταῦτα διωκτέα τοῖς νέοις, εἰ μέλλουσι τὸ αὑτῶν πράττειν; διωκτέα μὲν οὖν. ἔστιν δέ γέ που πλήρης μὲν γραφικὴ αὐτῶν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη δημιουργία, πλήρης δὲ ὑφαντικὴ καὶ ποικιλία καὶ οἰκοδομία καὶ πᾶσα αὖ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων σκευῶν ἐργασία, ἔτι δὲ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων φύσις καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων φυτῶν· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις ἔνεστιν εὐσχημοσύνη ἢ ἀσχημοσύνη. καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀσχημοσύνη καὶ ἀρρυθμία καὶ ἀναρμοστία κακολογίας καὶ κακοηθείας ἀδελφά, τὰ δ᾽

ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου, σώφρονός τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἤθους, ἀδελφά τε καὶ μιμήματα. παντελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

“Come then, let us complete the purification. For upon harmonies would follow the consideration of rhythms: we must not pursue complexity nor great variety in the basic movements, but must observe what are the rhythms of a life that is orderly and brave, and after observing themrequire the foot and the air to conform to that kind of man's speech and not the speech to the foot and the tune. What those rhythms would be, it is for you to tell us as you did the musical modes.” “Nay, in faith,” he said, “I cannot tell. For that there are some three forms from which the feet are combined, just as there are four in the notes of the voice whence come all harmonies, is a thing that I have observed and could tell. But which are imitations of which sort of life, I am unable to say.” “Well,” said I, “on this point we will take counsel with Damon, too, as to which are the feet appropriate to illiberality, and insolence or madness or other evils, and what rhythms we must leave for their opposites; and I believe I have heard him obscurely speaking of a foot that he called the enoplios, a composite foot, and a dactyl and an heroic foot, which he arranged, I know not how, to be equal up and down in the interchange of long and short, and unless I am mistaken he used the term iambic, and there was another foot that he called the trochaic, and he added the quantities long and short. And in some of these, I believe, he censured and commended the tempo of the foot no less than the rhythm itself, or else some combination of the two; I can’t say. But, as I said, let this matter be postponed for Damon’s consideration. For to determine the truth of these would require no little discourse. Do you think otherwise?” “No, by heaven, I do not.” “But this you are able to determine—that seemliness and unseemliness are attendant upon the good rhythm and the bad.” “Of course.” “And, further, that good rhythm and bad rhythm accompany, the one fair diction, assimilating itself thereto, and the other the opposite, and so of the apt and the unapt, if, as we were just now saying, the rhythm and harmony follow the words and not the words these.” “They certainly must follow the speech,” he said. “And what of the manner of the diction, and the speech?” said I. “Do they not follow and conform to the disposition of the soul?” “Of course.” “And all the rest to the diction?” “Yes.” “Good speech, then, good accord, and good grace, and good rhythm wait upon good disposition, not that weakness of head which we euphemistically style goodness of heart, but the truly good and fair disposition of the character and the mind.” “By all means,” he said.

v. 401b-e

Ἆρ’ οὖν τοῖς ποιηταῖς ἡμῖν μόνον ἐπιστατητέον καὶ προσαναγκαστέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰκόνα ἤθους ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἢ μὴ παρ’ ἡμῖν ποιεῖν, ἢ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς ἐπιστατητέον καὶ διακωλυτέον τὸ κακόηθες τοῦτο καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ

ἄσχημον μήτε ἐν εἰκόσιζῴων μήτε ἐν οἰκοδομήμασι μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ δημιουργουμένῳ ἐμποιεῖν, ἢ ὁ μὴ οἷός τε ὢν οὐκ ἐατέος παρ' ἡμῖν δημιουργεῖν, ἵνα μὴ ἐν κακίας εἰκόσι τρεφόμενοι ἡμῖν οἱ φύλακες ὥσπερ ἐν κακῇ βοτάνῃ, πολλὰ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀπὸ πολλῶν δρεπόμενοί τε καὶ νεμόμενοι, ἕντι συνιστάντες λανθάνωσιν κακὸν μέγα ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν ψυχῇ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνους ζητητέον τοὺς δημιουργοὺς τοὺς εὐφυῶς δυναμένους ἰχνεύειν τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ εὐσχήμονος φύσιν, ἵνα ὥσπερ ἐν ὑγιεινῷ τόπῳ οἰκοῦντες οἱ νέοι ἀπὸ παντὸς ὠφελῶνται, ὁπόθεν ἂν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων ἢ πρὸς ὄψιν ἢ πρὸς ἀκοήν τι προσβάλῃ, ὥσπερ αὔρα φέρουσα ἀπὸ χρηστῶν τόπων ὑγίειαν, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων λανθάνῃ εἰς ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ συμφωνίαν τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ ἄγουσα; πολὺ γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, κάλλιστα οὕτω τραφεῖεν. ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, τούτων ἕνεκα κυριωτάτη ἐν μουσικῇ τροφή, ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἁρμονία, καὶ ἐρρωμενέστατα ἅπτεται αὐτῆς φέροντα τὴν εὐσχημοσύνην, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐσχήμονα, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς τραφῇ, εἰ δὲ μή, τοὐναντίον;

But we must look for those craftsmen who by the happy gift of nature are capable of following the trail of true beauty and grace, that our young men, dwelling as it were in a salubrious region, may receive benefit from all things about them, whence the influence that emanates from works of beauty may waft itself to eye or ear like a breeze that brings from wholesome places health, and so from earliest childhood insensibly guide them to likeness, to friendship, to harmony with beautiful reason." "Yes," he said, "that would be far the best education for them." "And is it not for this reason, Glaucon," said I, "that education in music is most sovereign, because more than anything else rhythm and harmony find their way to the inmost soul and take strongest hold upon it, bringing with them and imparting grace, if one is rightly trained, and otherwise the contrary?

vi. 601a-b

οὕτω δὴ οἶμαι καὶ τὸν ποιητικὸν φήσομεν χρώματα ἄττα ἑκάστων τῶν τεχνῶν τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασιν ἐπιχρωματίζειν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐπαΐοντα ἀλλ' ἢ μιμεῖσθαι, ὥστε ἑτέροις τοιούτοις ἐκ τῶν λόγων θεωροῦσι δοκεῖν, ἐάντε περὶ σκυτοτομίας τις λέγῃ ἐν μέτρῳ καὶ ῥυθμῷ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ, πάνυ εὖ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι, ἐάντε περὶ στρατηγίας ἐάντε περὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν· οὕτω φύσει αὐτὰ ταῦτα μεγάλην τινὰ κήλησιν ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ γυμνωθέντα γε τῶν τῆς μουσικῆς χρωμάτων τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν, αὐτὰ ἐφ' αὑτῶν λεγόμενα, οἶμαί σε εἰδέναι οἷα φαίνεται. τεθέασαι γάρ που. Ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔοικεν τοῖς τῶν ὡραίων προσώποις, καλῶν δὲ μή, οἷα γίγνεται ἰδεῖν ὅταν αὐτὰ τὸ ἄνθος προλίπῃ; Παντάπασιν, ἦ δ' ὅς.

And similarly, I suppose, we shall say that the poet himself, knowing nothing but how to imitate, lays on with words and phrases the colours of the several arts in such fashion that

others equally ignorant, who see things only through words, will deem his words most excellent, whether he speak in rhythm, metre and harmony about cobbling or general ship or anything whatever. So mighty is the spell that these adornments naturally exercise; though when they are stripped bare of their musical colouring and taken by themselves, I think you know what sort of a showing these sayings of the poets make. For you, I believe, have observed them. I have, he said. Do they not, said I, resemble the faces of adolescents, young but not really beautiful, when the bloom of youth abandons them? By all means, he said.

vii. 607a-608b

φιλεῖν μὲν χρὴ καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι ὡς ὄντας βελτίστους εἰς ὅσον δύνανται, καὶ συγχωρεῖν Ὅμηρον ποιητικώτατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν, εἰδέναι δὲ ὅτι ὅσον μόνον ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν· εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην Μοῦσαν παραδέξῃ ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεσιν, ἡδονή σοι καὶ λύπη ἐν τῇ πόλει βασιλεύσετον ἀντὶ νόμου τε καὶ τοῦ κοινῇ ἀεὶ δόξαντος εἶναι βελτίστου λόγου. ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. ταῦτα δή, ἔφην, ἀπολελογήσθω ἡμῖν ἀναμνησθεῖσιν περὶ ποιήσεως, ὅτι εἰκότως ἄρα τότε αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀπεστέλλομεν τοιαύτην οὖσαν· ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ᾕρει. προσείπωμεν δὲ αὐτῇ, μὴ καί τινα σκληρότητα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀγροικίαν καταγνῷ, ὅτι παλαιὰ μέν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ ποιητικῇ· καὶ γὰρ ἡ "λακέρυζα πρὸς δεσπόταν κύων" ἐκείνη "κραυγάζουσα" καὶ "μέγας ἐν ἀφρόνων κενεαγορίαισι" καὶ ὁ "τῶν διασόφων ὄχλος κρατῶν" καὶ οἱ "λεπτῶς μεριμνῶντες", ὅτι ἄρα "πένονται", καὶ ἄλλα μυρία σημεῖα παλαιᾶς ἐναντιώσεως τούτων. ὅμως δὲ εἰρήσθω ὅτι ἡμεῖς γε, εἴ τινα ἔχοι λόγον εἰπεῖν ἡ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ποιητικὴ καὶ ἡ μίμησις, ὡς χρὴ αὐτὴν εἶναι ἐν πόλει εὐνομουμένῃ, ἄσμενοι ἂν καταδεχοίμεθα, ὡς σύνισμέν γε ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς κηλουμένοις ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς οὐχ ὅσιον προδιδόναι. ἦ γάρ, ὦ φίλε, οὐ κηλῇ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς καὶ σύ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν δι᾽ Ὁμήρου θεωρῇς αὐτήν; πολύ γε. οὐκοῦν δικαία ἐστὶν οὕτω κατιέναι, ἀπολογησαμένη ἐν μέλει ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ μέτρῳ; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. δοῖμεν δέ γέ που ἂν καὶ τοῖς προστάταις αὐτῆς, ὅσοι μὴ ποιητικοί, φιλοποιηταὶ δέ, ἄνευ μέτρου λόγον ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν, ὡς οὐ μόνον ἡδεῖα ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμη πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὸν βίον τὸν ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν· καὶ εὐμενῶς ἀκουσόμεθα.κερδανοῦμεν γάρ που ἐὰν μὴ μόνον ἡδεῖα φανῇ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμη. πῶς δ᾽ οὐ μέλλομεν, ἔφη, κερδαίνειν; εἰ δέ γε μή, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ὥσπερ οἱ ποτέ του ἐρασθέντες, ἐὰν ἡγήσωνται μὴ ὠφέλιμον εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα, βίᾳ μέν, ὅμως δὲ ἀπέχονται, καὶ ἡμεῖς οὕτως, διὰ τὸν ἐγγεγονότα μὲν ἔρωτα τῆς τοιαύτης ποιήσεως ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν καλῶν πολιτειῶν τροφῆς, εὖνοι μὲν ἐσόμεθα φανῆναι αὐτὴν ὡς βελτίστην καὶ ἀληθεστάτην, ἕως δ᾽ ἂν μὴ οἵα τ᾽ ᾖ ἀπολογήσασθαι, ἀκροασόμεθ᾽ αὐτῆς ἐπᾴδοντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὃν λέγομεν, καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐπῳδήν, εὐλαβούμενοι πάλιν ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς τὸν παιδικόν τε καὶ τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἔρωτα. ᾀσόμεθα δ᾽ οὖν ὡς οὐ σπουδαστέον ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ποιήσει ὡς ἀληθείας τε ἁπτομένῃ καὶ σπουδαίᾳ, ἀλλ᾽ εὐλαβητέον αὐτὴν ὂν τῷ ἀκροωμένῳ, περὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείας δεδιότι, καὶ νομιστέα ἅπερ εἰρήκαμεν περὶ ποιήσεως.

we must love and salute them as doing the best they can, and concede to them that Homer is the most poetic of poets and the first of tragedians, but we must know the truth, that we can admit no poetry into our city save only hymns to the gods and the praises of good men. For if you grant admission to the honeyed muse in lyric or epic, pleasure and pain will be lords of your city instead of law and that which shall from time to time have approved itself to the general reason as the best. Most true, he said. Let us, then, conclude our return to the topic of poetry and our apology, and affirm that we really had good grounds then for dismissing her from our city, since such was her character. For reason constrained us. And let us further say to her, lest she condemn us for harshness and rusticity, that there is from of old a quarrel between philosophy and poetry. For such expressions as the yelping hound barking at her master and mighty in the idle babble of fools, and the mob that masters those who are too wise for their own good, and the subtle thinkers who reason that after all they are poor, and countless others are tokens of this ancient enmity. But nevertheless let it be declared that, if the mimetic and dulcet poetry can show any reason for her existence in a well-governed state, we would gladly admit her, since we ourselves are very conscious of her spell. But all the same it would be impious to betray what we believe to be the truth. Is not that so, friend? Do not you yourself feel her magic and especially when Homer is her interpreter? Greatly. Then may she not justly return from this exile after she has pleaded her defence, whether in lyric or other measure? By all means. And we would allow her advocates who are not poets but lovers of poetry to plead her cause in prose without metre, and show that she is not only delightful but beneficial to orderly government and all the life of man. And we shall listen benevolently, for it will be clear gain for us if it can be shown that she bestows not only pleasure but benefit. How could we help being the gainers? said he. But if not, my friend, even as men who have fallen in love, if they think that the love is not good for them, hard though it be, nevertheless refrain, so we, owing to the love of this kind of poetry inbred in us by our education in these fine polities of ours, will gladly have the best possible case made out for her goodness and truth, but so long as she is unable to make good her defence we shall chant over to ourselves as we listen the reasons that we have given as a counter-charm to her spell, to preserve us from slipping back into the childish loves of the multitude; for we have come to see that we must not take such poetry seriously as a serious thing that lays hold on truth, but that he who lends an ear to it must be on his guard fearing for the polity in his soul and must believe what we have said about poetry.

i. 654a-e

{ΑΘ} οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν ἀπαίδευτος ἀχόρευτος ἡμῖν ἔσται, τὸν δὲ πεπαιδευμένον ἱκανῶς κεχορευκότα θετέον; {ΚΛ} τί μήν; {ΑΘ} χορεία γε μὴν ὄρχησίς τε καὶ ᾠδὴ τὸ σύνολόν ἐστιν. {ΚΛ} ἀναγκαῖον. {ΑΘ} ὁ καλῶς ἄρα πεπαιδευμένος ᾄδειν τε καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι δυνατὸς ἂν εἴη καλῶς. {ΚΛ} ἔοικεν. {ΑΘ} ἴδωμεν δὴ τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ νῦν αὖ λεγόμενον. {ΚΛ} τὸ ποῖον δή; {ΑΘ} 'καλῶς ᾄδει,' φαμέν, 'καὶ καλῶς ὀρχεῖται'· πότερον 'εἰ καὶ καλὰ ᾄδει καὶ καλὰ ὀρχεῖται' προσθῶμεν ἢ μή; {ΚΛ} προσθῶμεν. {ΑΘ} τί δ᾽ ἂν τὰ καλά τε ἡγούμενος εἶναι καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ αἰσχρὰ οὕτως αὐτοῖς χρῆται; βέλτιον ὁ τοιοῦτος πεπαιδευμένος ἡμῖν ἔσται τὴν χορείαν τε καὶ μουσικὴν ἢ ὃς ἂν τῷ μὲν σώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ τὸ διανοηθὲν εἶναι καλὸν ἱκανῶς ὑπηρετεῖν δυνηθῇ ἑκάστοτε, χαίρῃ δὲ μὴ τοῖς καλοῖς μηδὲ μισῇ τὰ μὴ καλά; ἢ 'κεῖνος ὃς ἂν τῇ μὲν φωνῇ καὶ τῷ σώματι μὴ πάνυ δυνατὸς ᾖ κατορθοῦν, ἢ διανοεῖσθαι, τῇ δὲ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ κατορθοῖ, τὰ μὲν ἀσπαζόμενος, ὅσα καλά, τὰ δὲ δυσχεραίνων, ὁπόσα μὴ καλά; {ΚΛ} πολὺ τὸ διαφέρον, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις τῆς παιδείας. {ΑΘ} οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν τὸ καλὸν ᾠδῆς τε καὶ ὀρχήσεως πέρι γιγνώσκομεν τρεῖς ὄντες, ἴσμεν καὶ τὸν πεπαιδευμένον τε καὶ ἀπαίδευτον ὀρθῶς· εἰ δὲ ἀγνοοῦμέν γε τοῦτο, οὐδ᾽ εἴ τις παιδείας ἐστὶν φυλακὴ καὶ ὅπου διαγιγνώσκειν ἄν ποτε δυναίμεθα. ἆρ᾽ οὐχ οὕτως; {ΚΛ} οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

{ATH} Shall we assume that the uneducated man is without chorus-training, and the educated man fully chorus-trained? {CL} Certainly. {ATH} Chorus-training, as a whole, embraces of course both dancing and song. {CL} Undoubtedly. {ATH} So the well-educated man will be able both to sing and dance well. {CL} Evidently. {ATH} Let us now consider what this last statement of ours implies. {CL} Which statement? {ATH} Our words are, – " he sings well and dances well": ought we, or ought we not, to add, – "provided that he sings good songs and dances good dances"? {CL} We ought to add this. {ATH} How then, if a man takes the good for good and the bad for bad and treats them accordingly? Shall we regard such a man as better trained in choristry and music when he is always able both with gesture and voice to represent adequately that which he conceives to be good, though he feels neither delight in the good nor hatred of the bad, – or when, though not wholly able to represent his conception rightly by voice and gesture, he yet keeps right in his feelings of pain and pleasure, welcoming everything good and abhorring everything not good. {CL} There is a vast difference between the two cases, Stranger, in point of education. {ATH} If, then, we three understand what constitutes goodness in respect of dance and song, we also know who is and who is not rightly educated but without this knowledge we shall never be able to discern

whether there exists any safeguard for education or where it is to be found. Is not that so? {CL} It is.

ii. 656cd

{ΑΘ.} Ὅπου δὴ νόμοι καλῶς εἰσι κείμενοι ἢ καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ἔσονται τὴν περὶ τὰς Μούσας παιδείαν τε καὶ παιδιάν, οἰόμεθα ἐξέσεσθαι τοῖς ποιητικοῖς, ὅτιπερ ἂν αὐτὸν τὸν ποιητὴν ἐν τῇ ποιήσει τέρπῃ ῥυθμοῦ ἢ μέλους ἢ ῥήματος ἐχόμενον, τοῦτο διδάσκοντα καὶ τοὺς τῶν εὐνόμων παῖδας καὶ νέους ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς, ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ ἀπεργάζεσθαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ μοχθηρίαν; {ΚΛ.} Οὔτοι δὴ τοῦτό γε λόγον ἔχει· πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

{ATH} Now where laws are, or will be in the future, rightly laid down regarding musical education and recreation, do we imagine that poets will be granted such licence that they may teach whatever form of rhythm or tune they best like themselves to the children of law-abiding citizens and the young men in the choruses, no matter what the result may be in the way of virtue or depravity? {CL} That would be unreasonable, most certainly.

iii. 656d-657b

{ΑΘ.} Νῦν δέ γε αὐτὸ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔξεστι δρᾶν, πλὴν κατ' Αἴγυπτον. {ΚΛ.} Ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ δὲ δὴ πῶς τὸ τοιοῦτον φῂς νενομοθετῆσθαι; {ΑΘ.} Θαῦμα καὶ ἀκοῦσαι. πάλαι γὰρ δή ποτε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγνώσθη παρ' αὐτοῖς οὗτος ὁ λόγος ὃν τὰ νῦν λέγομεν ἡμεῖς, ὅτι καλὰ μὲν σχήματα, καλὰ δὲ μέλη δεῖ μεταχειρίζεσθαι ταῖς συνηθείαις τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν νέους· ταξάμενοι δὲ ταῦτα, ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖ' (ὁμοῖ') ἅττα ἀπέφηναν ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτ' οὐκ ἐξῆν οὔτε ζωγράφοις, οὔτ' ἄλλοις ὅσοι σχήματα καὶ ὁποῖ' ἅττα ἀπεργάζονται, καινοτομεῖν οὐδ' ἐπινοεῖν ἄλλ' ἅττα ἢ τὰ πάτρια, οὐδὲ νῦν ἔξεστιν, οὔτε ἐν τούτοις οὔτε ἐν μουσικῇ συμπάσῃ. σκοπῶν δὲ εὑρήσεις αὐτόθι τὰ μυριοστὸν ἔτος γεγραμμένα ἢ τετυπωμένα – οὐχ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν μυριοστὸν ἀλλ' ὄντως – τῶν νῦν δεδημιουργημένων οὔτε τι καλλίονα οὔτ' αἰσχίω, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ τέχνην ἀπειργασμένα. {ΚΛ.} Θαυμαστὸν λέγεις. {ΑΘ.} Νομοθετικὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ πολιτικὸν ὑπερβαλλόντως. ἀλλ' ἕτερα φαῦλ' ἂν εὕροις αὐτόθι· τοῦτο δ' οὖν τὸ περὶ μουσικὴν ἀληθές τε καὶ ἄξιον ἐννοίας, ὅτι δυνατὸν ἄρ' ἦν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων νομοθετεῖσθαι βεβαίως θαρροῦντα μέλη τὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα φύσει παρεχόμενα. τοῦτο δὲ θεοῦ ἢ θείουτινὸς ἀνδρὸς ἂν εἴη, καθάπερ ἐκεῖ φασιν τὰ τὸν πολὺν τοῦτον σεσωμένα χρόνον μέλη τῆς Ἴσιδος ποιήματα γεγονέναι ὥσθ', ὅπερ ἔλεγον, εἰ δύναιτό τις ἑλεῖν αὐτῶν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν τὴν ὀρθότητα, θαρροῦντα χρὴ εἰς νόμον ἄγειν καὶ τάξιν αὐτά· ὡς ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ζήτησις τοῦ καινῇ ζητεῖν ἀεὶ μουσικῇ χρῆσθαι σχεδὸν οὐ μεγάλην τινὰ δύναμιν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ διαφθεῖραι τὴν καθιερωθεῖσαν χορείαν ἐπικαλοῦσα ἀρχαιότητα. τὴν γοῦν ἐκεῖ οὐδαμῶς ἔοικε δυνατὴ γεγονέναι διαφθεῖραι, πᾶν δὲ τοὐναντίον.

{ΚΛ.} Φαίνεται οὕτως ἂν ταῦτα ἔχειν ἐκ τῶν ὑπὸ σοῦ τὰ νῦν λεχθέντων. {ΑΘ.} Ἆρ' οὖν θαρροῦντες λέγομεν τὴν τῇ μουσικῇ καὶ τῇ παιδιᾷ μετὰ χορείας χρείαν ὀρθὴν εἶναι τοιῷδέ τινι τρόπῳ;

{ATH} But at present this licence is allowed in practically every State, with the exception of Egypt. {CL} How, then, does the law stand in Egypt? {ATH} It is marvellous, even in the telling. It appears that long ago they determined on the rule of which we are now speaking, that the youth of a State should practice in their rehearsals postures and tunes that are good: these they prescribed in detail and posted up in the temples, and outside this official list it was, and still is, forbidden to painters and all other producers of postures and representations to introduce any innovation or invention, whether in such productions or in any other branch of music, over and above the traditional forms. And if you look there, you will find that the things depicted or graven there 10,000 years ago (I mean what I say, not loosely but literally 10,000) are no whit better or worse than the productions of today, but wrought with the same art. {CL} A marvellous state of affairs! {ATH} Say rather, worthy in the highest degree of a statesman and a legislator. Still, you would find in Egypt other things that are bad. This, however, is a true and noteworthy fact, that as regards music it has proved possible for the tunes which possess a natural correctness to be enacted by law and permanently consecrated. To effect this would be the task of a god or a godlike man, – even as in Egypt they say that the tunes preserved throughout all this lapse of time are the compositions of Isis. Hence, as I said, if one could by any means succeed in grasping no principle of correctness in tune, one might then with confidence reduce them to legal form and prescription, since the tendency of pleasure and pain to indulge constantly in fresh music has, after all, no very great power to corrupt choric forms that are consecrated, by merely scoffing at them as antiquated. In Egypt, at any rate, it seems to have had no such power of corrupting,– in fact, quite the reverse.

iv. 659d-660a

{ΑΘ} ἵν' οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ παιδὸς μὴ ἐναντία χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐθίζηται τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου πεπεισμένοις, ἀλλὰ συνέπηται χαίρουσά τε καὶ λυπουμένη τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις οἷσπερ ὁ γέρων, τούτων ἕνεκα, ἃς ᾠδὰς καλοῦμεν, ὄντως μὲν ἐπῳδαὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὗται νῦν γεγονέναι, πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἣν λέγομεν συμφωνίαν ἐσπουδασμέναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ σπουδὴν μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχάς, παιδιαί τε καὶ ᾠδαὶ καλεῖσθαι καὶ πράττεσθαι, καθάπερ τοῖς κάμνουσίν τε καὶ ἀσθενῶς ἴσχουσιν τὰ σώματα ἐν ἡδέσι τισὶν σιτίοις καὶ πώμασι τὴν χρηστὴν πειρῶνται τροφὴν προσφέρειν οἷς μέλει τούτων, τὴν δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν ἐν ἀηδέσιν, ἵνα τὴν μὲν ἀσπάζωνται, τὴν δὲ μισεῖν ὀρθῶς ἐθίζωνται. ταὐτὸν δὴ καὶ τὸν ποιητικὸν ὁ ὀρθὸς νομοθέτης ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς ῥήμασι καὶ ἐπαινετοῖς πείσει τε, καὶ ἀναγκάσει μὴ πείθων, τὰ τῶν

σωφρόνων τε καὶ ἀνδρείων καὶ πάντως ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔν τε ῥυθμοῖς σχήματα καὶ ἐν ἁρμονίαισιν μέλη ποιοῦντα ὀρθῶς ποιεῖν.

{ATH} So in order that the soul of the child may not become habituated to having pains and pleasures in contradiction to the law and those who obey the law, but in conformity thereto, being pleased and pained at the same things as the old man, – for this reason we have what we call "chants," which evidently are in reality incantations seriously designed to produce in souls that conformity and harmony of which we speak. But inasmuch as the souls of the young are unable to endure serious study, we term these "plays" and "chants," and use them as such, – just as, when people suffer from bodily ailments and infirmities, those whose office it is try to administer to them nutriment that is wholesome in meats and drinks that are pleasant, but unwholesome nutriment in the opposite, so that they may form the right habit of approving the one kind and detesting the other. Similarly in dealing with the poet, the good legislator will use noble and laudable phrases to persuade him – and, failing persuasion, he will compel him – to portray by his rhythms the gestures, and by his harmonies the tunes, of men who are temperate, courageous, and good in all respects, and thereby to compose poems aright.

v. 664b

{ΑΘ} φημὶ γὰρ ἅπαντας δεῖν ἐπᾴδειν τρεῖς ὄντας τοὺς χοροὺς ἔτι νέαις οὔσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ ἁπαλαῖς τῶν παίδων [...]

{ATH} I maintain that all the three choruses must enchant the souls of the children, while still young and tender [...]

vi. 664e-665a

{ΑΘ} Εἴπομεν, εἰ μεμνήμεθα, κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἡ φύσις ἁπάντων τῶν νέων διάπυρος οὖσα ἡσυχίαν οὐχ οἵα τε ἄγειν οὔτε κατὰ τὸ σῶμα οὔτε κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν εἴη, φθέγγοιτο δ' ἀεὶ ἀτάκτως καὶ πηδῷ, τάξεως δ' αἴσθησιν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων, τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ζῴων οὐδὲν ἐφάπτοιτο, ἡ δὲ ἀνθρώπου φύσις ἔχοι μόνη τοῦτο· τῇ δὴ τῆς κινήσεως τάξει ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα εἴη, τῇ δὲ αὖ τῆς φωνῆς, τοῦ τε ὀξέος ἅμα καὶ βαρέος συγκεραννυμένων, ἁρμονία ὄνομα προσαγορεύοιτο, χορεία δὲ τὸ συναμφότερον κληθείη [...]

{ATH} At the commencement of our discourse we said, if we recollect, that since all young creatures are by nature fiery, they are unable to keep still either body or voice, but are always crying and leaping in disorderly fashion; we said also that none of the other creatures attains a sense of order, bodily and vocal, and that this is possessed by man alone; and that the order of

motion is called “rhythm,” while the order of voice (in which acute and grave are blended together) is termed “harmony,” and to the combination of these two the name “choristry” is given.

vii. 669a-669b

{ΑΘ} Ὀρθότατα λέγεις. ἆρ’ οὖν οὐ περὶ ἑκάστην εἰκόνα, καὶ ἐν γραφικῇ καὶ ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ πάντῃ, τὸν μέλλοντα ἔμφρονα κριτὴν ἔσεσθαι δεῖ ταῦτα τρία ἔχειν, ὅ τέ ἐστι πρῶτον γιγνώσκειν, ἔπειτα ὡς ὀρθῶς, ἔπειθ’ ὡς εὖ, τὸ τρίτον, εἴργασται τῶν εἰκόνων ἡτισοῦν [ῥήμασί τε καὶ μέλεσι καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς];

{ATH} You are quite right. In regard, then, to every representation – whether in painting, music or any other art – must not the judicious critic possess these three requisites: first, a knowledge of the nature of the original; next, a knowledge of the correctness of the copy; and thirdly, a knowledge of the excellence with which the copy is executed [with words, tunes and rhythms/gestures]?

viii. 669b-670a

{ΚΛ.} Ἔοικε γοῦν. {ΑΘ.} Μὴ τοίνυν ἀπείπωμεν λέγοντες τὸ περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν ᾗ χαλεπόν· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὑμνεῖται περὶ αὐτὴν διαφερόντως ἢ τὰς ἄλλας εἰκόνας, εὐλαβείας δὴ δεῖται πλείστης πασῶν εἰκόνων. ἁμαρτών τε γάρ τις μέγιστ’ ἂν βλάπτοιτο, ἤθη κακὰ φιλοφρονούμενος, χαλεπώτατόν τε αἰσθέσθαι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ποιητὰς φαυλοτέρους εἶναι ποιητὰς αὐτῶν τῶν Μουσῶν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖναί γε ἐξαμάρτοιέν ποτε τοσοῦτον ὥστε ῥήματα ἀνδρῶν ποιήσασαι τὸ σχῆμα (χρῶμα) γυναικῶν καὶ μέλος ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ μέλος ἐλευθέρων αὖ καὶ σχήματα συνθεῖσαι ῥυθμοὺς δούλων καὶ ἀνελευθέρων προσαρμόττειν, οὐδ’ αὖ ῥυθμοὺς καὶ σχῆμα ἐλευθέριον ὑποθεῖσαι μέλος ἢ λόγον ἐναντίον ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς, ἔτι δὲ θηρίων φωνὰς καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὀργάνων καὶ πάντας ψόφους εἰς ταὐτὸν οὐκ ἄν ποτε συνθεῖεν, ὡς ἕν τι μιμούμεναι· ποιηταὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπινοι σφόδρα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐμπλέκοντες καὶ συγκυκῶντες ἀλόγως, γέλωτ’ ἂν παρασκευάζοιεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσους φησὶν Ὀρφεὺς λαχεῖν ὥραν τῆς τέρψιος. ταῦτά γε γὰρ ὁρῶσι πάντα κυκώμενα, καὶ ἔτι διασπῶσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ ῥυθμὸν μὲν καὶ σχήματα μέλους χωρίς, λόγους ψιλοὺς εἰς μέτρατιθέντες, μέλος δ’ αὖ καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἄνευ ῥημάτων, ψιλῇ κιθαρίσει τε καὶ αὐλήσει προσχρώμενοι, ἐν οἷς δὴ παγχάλεπον ἄνευ λόγου γιγνόμενον ῥυθμόν τε καὶ ἁρμονίαν γιγνώσκειν ὅτι τε βούλεται καὶ ὅτῳ ἔοικε τῶν ἀξιολόγων μιμημάτων· ἀλλὰ ὑπολαβεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὅτι τὸ τοιοῦτόν γε πολλῆς ἀγροικίας μεστὸν πᾶν, ὁπόσον τάχους τε καὶ ἀπταισίας καὶ φωνῆς θηριώδους σφόδρα φίλον ὥστ’ αὐλήσει γε χρῆσθαι καὶ κιθαρίσει πλὴν ὅσον ὑπὸ ὄρχησίν τε καὶ ᾠδήν, ψιλῷ δ’ ἑκατέρῳ πᾶσά τις ἀμουσία καὶ θαυματουργία γίγνοιτ’ ἂν τῆς χρήσεως.

{CL} It would seem so, certainly. {ATH} Let us not hesitate, then, to mention the point wherein lies the difficulty of music. Just because it is more talked about than any other form of representation, it needs more caution than any. The man who blunders in this art will do himself the greatest harm, by welcoming base morals; and, moreover, his blunder is very hard to discern, inasmuch as our poets are inferior as poets to the Muses themselves. For the Muses would never blunder so far as to assign a feminine tune and gesture to verses composed for men, or to fit the rhythms of captives and slaves to gestures framed for free men, or conversely, after constructing the rhythms and gestures of free men, to assign to the rhythms a tune or verses of an opposite style. Nor would the Muses ever combine in a single piece the cries of beasts and men, the clash of instruments, and noises of all kinds, by way of representing a single object; whereas human poets, by their senselessness in mixing such things and jumbling them up together, would furnish a theme for laughter to all the men who, in Orpheus phrase, “have attained the full flower of joyousness.” For they behold all these things jumbled together, and how, also, the poets rudely sunder rhythm and gesture from tune, putting tuneless words into meter, or leaving time and rhythm without words, and using the bare sound of harp or flute, wherein it is almost impossible to understand what is intended by this wordless rhythm and harmony, or what noteworthy original it represents. Such methods, as one ought to realize, are clownish in the extreme in so far as they exhibit an excessive craving for speed, mechanical accuracy, and the imitation of animals’ sounds, and consequently employ the pipe and the harp without the accompaniment of dance and song; for the use of either of these instruments by itself is the mark of the mountebank or the boor.

ix. 670a-d

{ΑΘ} τόδε μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν δοκεῖ μοι σημαίνειν ἤδη, τῆς γε χορικῆς Μούσης ὅτι πεπαιδεῦσθαι δεῖ βέλτιον τοὺς πεντηκοντούτας ὅσοισπερ ἂν ᾄδειν προσήκῃ. τῶν γὰρ ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς ἐστιν εὐαισθήτως ἔχειν καὶ γιγνώσκειν· ἢ πῶς τις τὴν ὀρθότητα γνώσεται τῶν μελῶν ᾧ προσῆκεν ἢ μὴ προσῆκεν τοῦ δωριστί, καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ ὃν ὁ ποιητὴς αὐτῷπροσῆψεν, ὀρθῶς ἢ μή; {ΚΛ.} Δῆλον ὡς οὐδαμῶς. {ΑΘ.} Γελοῖος γὰρ ὅ γε πολὺς ὄχλος ἡγούμενος ἱκανῶς γιγνώσκειν τό τε εὐάρμοστον καὶ εὔρυθμον καὶ μή, ὅσοι προσᾴδειν αὐτῶν καὶ βαίνειν ἐν ῥυθμῷ γεγόνασι διηναγκασμένοι, ὅτι δὲ δρῶσιν ταῦτα ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτῶν ἕκαστα, οὐ συλλογίζονται. τὸ δέ που προσήκοντα μὲν ἔχον πᾶν μέλος ὀρθῶς ἔχει, μὴ προσήκοντα δὲ ἡμαρτημένως. {ΚΛ.} Ἀναγκαιότατα. {ΑΘ.} Τί οὖν ὁ μηδ’ ὅτι ποτ’ ἔχει γιγνώσκων; ἆρα, ὅπερ εἴπομεν, ὡς ὀρθῶς γε αὐτὸ ἔχει, γνώσεταί ποτε ἐν ὁτῳοῦν; {ΚΛ.} καὶ τίς μηχανή; {ΑΘ.} τοῦτ’ οὖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνευρίσκομεν αὖ τὰ νῦν, ὅτι τοῖς ᾠδοῖς ἡμῖν, οὓς νῦν παρακαλοῦμεν καὶ ἑκόντας τινὰ τρόπον ἀναγκάζομεν ᾄδειν, μέχρι γε τοσούτου πεπαιδεῦσθαι σχεδὸν ἀναγκαῖον, μέχρι τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι συνακολουθεῖν ἕκαστον ταῖς τε

βάσεσιν τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ ταῖς χορδαῖς ταῖς τῶν μελῶν, ἵνα καθορῶντες τάς τε ἁρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς, ἐκλέγεσθαί τε τὰ προσήκοντα οἷοί τ᾽ ὦσιν ἃ τοῖς τηλικούτοις τε καὶ τοιούτοις ᾄδειν πρέπον, καὶ οὕτως ᾄδωσιν, καὶ ᾄδοντες αὐτοί τε ἡδονὰς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀσινεῖς ἥδωνται καὶ τοῖς νεωτέροις ἡγεμόνες ἠθῶν χρηστῶν ἀσπασμοῦ προσήκοντος γίγνωνται

{ATH} Our argument already indicates, I think, this result from our discussion, – that all men of over fifty that are fit to sing ought to have a training that is better than that of the choric Muse. For they must of necessity possess knowledge and a quick perception of rhythms and harmonies; else how shall a man know which tunes are correct? {CL} Obviously he cannot know this at all. {ATH} It is absurd of the general crowd to imagine that they can fully understand what is harmonious and rhythmical, or the reverse, when they have been drilled to sing to the flute or step in time; and they fail to comprehend that, in doing each of these things, they do them in ignorance. But the fact is that every tune which has its appropriate elements is correct, but incorrect if the elements are inappropriate. {CL} Undoubtedly. {ATH} What then of the man who does not know in the least what the tune's elements are? Will he ever know about any tune, as we said, that it is correct? {CL} There is no possible means of his doing so. {ATH} We are now once more, as it appears, discovering the fact that these singers of ours (whom we are now inviting and compelling, so to say, of their own free will to sing) must almost necessarily be trained up to such a point that every one of them may be able to follow both the steps of the rhythms and the chords of the tunes, so that, by observing the harmonies and rhythms, they may be able to select those of an appropriate kind, which it is seemly for men of their own age and character to sing, and may in this wise sing them, and in the singing may not only enjoy innocent pleasure themselves at the moment, but also may serve as leaders to the younger men in their seemly adoption of noble manners.

x. 790d-e

{ΑΘ} ἡνίκα γὰρ ἄν που βουληθῶσιν κατακοιμίζειν τὰ δυσυπνοῦντα τῶν παιδίων αἱ μητέρες, οὐχ ἡσυχίαν αὐτοῖς προσφέρουσιν ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον κίνησιν, ἐν ταῖς ἀγκάλαις ἀεὶ σείουσαι, καὶ οὐ σιγὴν ἀλλά τινα μελῳδίαν, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς οἷον καταυλοῦσι τῶν παιδίων, καθαπερεί (καθάπερ ἡ / αἱ) τῶν ἐκφρόνων βακχειῶν ἰάσει (ἰάσεις), ταύτῃ τῇ τῆς κινήσεως ἅμα χορείᾳ καὶ μούσῃ χρώμεναι.

{ATH} Thus when mothers have children suffering from sleeplessness, and want to lull them to rest, the treatment they apply is to give them, not quiet, but motion, for they rock them constantly in their arms; and instead of silence, they use a kind of crooning noise; and thus they literally cast a spell upon the children, like the victims of Bacchic frenzy, by employing the combined movements of dance and song as a remedy.

xi. 798e-799b

{ΑΘ} οὐκοῦν, φαμέν, ἅπασαν μηχανητέον μηχανὴν ὅπως ἂν ἡμῖν οἱ παῖδες μήτε ἐπιθυμῶσιν ἄλλων μιμημάτων ἅπτεσθαι κατὰ ὀρχήσεις ἢ κατὰ μελῳδίας, μήτε τις αὐτοὺς πείσῃ προσάγων παντοίας ἡδονάς; {ΚΛ} ὀρθότατα λέγεις. {ΑΘ} ἔχει τις οὖν ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα βελτίω τινα τέχνην τῆς τῶν Αἰγυπτίων; {ΚΛ} ποίας δὴ λέγεις; {ΑΘ} τοῦ καθιερῶσαι πᾶσαν μὲν ὄρχησιν, πάντα δὲ μέλη, τάξαντας πρῶτον μὲν τὰς ἑορτάς, συλλογισαμένους εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἅστινας ἐν οἷς χρόνοις καὶ οἷστισιν ἑκάστοις τῶν θεῶν καὶ παισὶ τούτων καὶ δαίμοσι γίγνεσθαι χρεών, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν θεῶν θύμασιν ἑκάστοις ἣν ᾠδὴν δεῖ ἐφυμνεῖσθαι, καὶ χορείαις ποίαισιν γεραίρειν τὴν τότε θυσίαν, τάξαι μὲν πρῶτόν τινας, ἃ δ᾽ ἂν ταχθῇ, Μοίραις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι θεοῖς θύσαντας κοινῇ πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, σπένδοντας καθιεροῦν ἑκάστας τὰς ᾠδὰς ἑκάστοις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἂν δὲ παρ᾽ αὐτά τίς τῳ θεῶν ἄλλους ὕμνους ἢ χορείας προσάγῃ, τοὺς ἱερέας τε καὶ τὰς ἱερείας μετὰ νομοφυλάκων ἐξείργοντας ὁσίως ἐξείργειν καὶ κατὰ νόμον, τὸν δὲ ἐξειργόμενον, ἂν μὴ ἑκὼν ἐξείργηται, δίκας ἀσεβείας διὰ βίου παντὸς τῷ ἐθελήσαντι παρέχειν.

{ATH} We assert, then, that every means must be employed, not only to prevent our children from desiring to copy different models in dancing or singing, but also to prevent anyone from tempting them by the inducement of pleasures of all sorts. {CL} Quite right. {ATH} To attain this end, can any one of us suggest a better device than that of the Egyptians? {CL} What device is that? {ATH} The device of consecrating all dancing and all music. First, they should ordain the sacred feasts, by drawing up an annual list of what feasts are to be held, and on what dates, and in honor of what special gods and children of gods and daemons; and they should ordain next what hymn is to be sung at each of the religious sacrifices, and with what dances each such sacrifice is to be graced; these ordinances should be first made by certain persons, and then the whole body of citizens, after making a public sacrifice to the Fates and all the other deities, should consecrate with a libation these ordinances – dedicating each of the hymns to their respective gods and divinities. And if any man proposes other hymns or dances besides these for any god, the priests and priestesses will be acting in accordance with both religion and law when, with the help of the Law-wardens, they expel him from the feast; and if the man resists expulsion, he shall be liable, so long as he lives, to be prosecuted for impiety by anyone who chooses.

xii. 812b-c

{ΑΘ} ἔφαμεν, οἶμαι, τοὺς τοῦ Διονύσου τοὺς ἑξηκοντούτας ᾠδοὺς διαφερόντως εὐαισθήτους δεῖν γεγονέναι περί τε τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς καὶ τὰς τῶν ἁρμονιῶν συστάσεις, ἵνα τὴν τῶν μελῶν μίμησιν τὴν εὖ καὶ τὴν κακῶς μεμιμημένην, ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν ὅταν ψυχὴ γίγνηται, τά τε τῆς

ἀγαθῆς ὁμοιώματα καὶ τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας ἐκλέξασθαι δυνατὸς ὢν τις, τὰ μὲν ἀποβάλλῃ, τὰ δὲ προφέρων εἰς μέσον ὑμνῇ καὶ ἐπᾴδῃ ταῖς τῶν νέων ψυχαῖς, προκαλούμενος ἑκάστους εἰς ἀρετῆς ἕπεσθαι κτῆσιν συνακολουθοῦντας διὰ τῶν μιμήσεων.

{ATH} We said, I fancy, that the sixty-year-old singers of hymns to Dionysus ought to be exceptionally keen of perception regarding rhythms and harmonic compositions, in order that when dealing with musical representations of a good kind or a bad, by which the soul is emotionally affected, they may be able to pick out the reproductions of the good kind and of the bad, and having rejected the latter, may produce the other in public, and charm the souls of the children by singing them, and so challenge them all to accompany them in acquiring virtue by means of these representations.

xiii. 840b-c
{ΑΘ} […] ἡμεῖς καλλίστην ἐκ παίδων πρὸς αὐτοὺς λέγοντες ἐν μύθοις τε καὶ ἐν ῥήμασιν καὶ ἐν μέλεσιν ᾄδοντες, ὡς εἰκός, κηλήσομεν;

{ATH} […] that which is the noblest of all victories, as we shall tell them from their childhood's days, charming them into belief, we hope, by tales and sentences and songs.

APPENDIX II

How does the whole system of musical education work in Plato's Cretan city?

Plato distributes roles, sets safety valves and creates a totally controlled and organized framework within which the successful musical education of the citizens will take place.
Educators/composers/performers par excellence: gods
Educators/composers/performers par imitation: poets (chorus masters), older citizens.
Students/performers par imitation: all citizens (the training principally aimed at young people).
Medium: singing and dancing (*choreia*)
Method: *mimêsis*
Aim: joyousness and virtue
Safeguard: laws
Supervisors: legislators of music (νομοθέται), supervisor of education (ἐπιμελητής παιδείας), priests and priestesses (ἱερεῖς, ἱέρειαι), Law-wardens (νομοφύλακαι), judges of the games (ἀθλοθέται).

ΜΟΥΣΙΚΗΣ ΝΟΜΟΙ

1st: The **content of the songs** must be auspicious. (In 800d he had already rejected the tragic choruses because of their extremely dolorous songs).

800e

Εὐφημία, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ τῆς ᾠδῆς γένος εὔφημον

2nd: Kind of songs that should be composed: prayers in honor of the gods.

801a

Τίς δὴ μετ' εὐφημίαν δεύτερος ἂν εἴη νόμος μουσικῆς; ἆρ' οὐκ εὐχὰς εἶναι τοῖς θεοῖς οἷς θύομεν ἑκάστοτε

3rd: **Supervision** of the poets' compositions. The poets through their prayers have to request something good from the divinity, but they are not always capable of discerning the good

from the bad. Thus, the poetic composition has to be supervised and approved by the legislators of music and the supervisor of the education.

Melos is used in the following passage (801c2) as an unmarked term, in other words it denotes the specific melody on which the song is composed.

801a-b

{ΑΘ} Τρίτος δ' οἶμαι νόμος, ὅτι γνόντας δεῖ τοὺς ποιητὰς ὡς εὐχαὶ παρὰ θεῶν αἰτήσεις εἰσίν, δεῖ δὴ τὸν νοῦν αὐτοὺς σφόδρα προσέχειν μή ποτε λάθωσιν κακὸν ὡς ἀγαθὸν αἰτούμενοι· γελοῖον γὰρ δὴ τὸ πάθος οἶμαι τοῦτ' ἂν γίγνοιτο, εὐχῆς τοιαύτης γενομένης [...]

801b-d

{ΑΘ} […] τίνος οὖν ποτε παράδειγμα εἰρῆσθαι φῶμεν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον; ἆρ' οὐ τοῦδε, ὅτι τὸ τῶν ποιητῶν γένος οὐ πᾶν ἱκανόν ἐστι γιγνώσκειν σφόδρα τά τε ἀγαθὰ καὶ μή; ποιήσας οὖν δήπου τὶς ποιητὴς ῥήμασιν ἢ καὶ **κατὰ μέλος** τοῦτο ἡμαρτημένον, εὐχὰς οὐκ ὀρθάς, ἡμῖν τοὺς πολίτας περὶ τῶν μεγίστων εὔχεσθαι τἀναντία ποιήσει· καίτοι τούτου, καθάπερ ἐλέγομεν, οὐ πολλὰ ἁμαρτήματα ἀνευρήσομεν μείζω. θῶμεν δὴ καὶ τοῦτον τῶν περὶ μοῦσαν νόμων καὶ τύπων ἕνα; {ΚΛ} τίνα; σαφέστερον εἰπὲ ἡμῖν. {ΑΘ} τὸν ποιητὴν παρὰ τὰ τῆς πόλεως νόμιμα καὶ δίκαια ἢ καλὰ ἢ ἀγαθὰ μηδὲν ποιεῖν ἄλλο, τὰ δὲ ποιηθέντα μὴ ἐξεῖναι τῶν ἰδιωτῶν μηδενὶ πρότερον δεικνύναι, πρὶν ἂν αὐτοῖς τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα ἀποδεδειγμένοις κριταῖς καὶ τοῖς νομοφύλαξιν δειχθῇ καὶ ἀρέσῃ· σχεδὸν δὲ ἀποδεδειγμένοι εἰσὶν ἡμῖν οὓς εἱλόμεθα νομοθέτας περὶ τὰ μουσικὰ καὶ τὸν τῆς παιδείας ἐπιμελητήν. τί οὖν; ὃ πολλάκις ἐρωτῶ, κείσθω νόμος ἡμῖν καὶ τύπος ἐκμαγεῖόν τε τρίτον τοῦτο;

The elders are responsible for the selection of the good old *pieces of music* and the legislators of music make the final decision for every dance and song and for the whole choristry.[698] The legislators must also adapt each song to harmony and rhythm and appoint it to a specific *schêma*. *Melos* is a synonym to ode in this case.

802d-e

{ΑΘ} […] ἔτι δὲ θηλείαις τε πρεπούσας ᾠδὰς ἄρρεσί τε χωρίσαι που δέον ἂν εἴη τύπῳ τινὶ

[698] Pl. *Laws* 802a-c: πολλὰ ἔστιν παλαιῶν παλαιὰ περὶ μουσικὴν καὶ καλὰ ποιήματα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ὀρχήσεις ὡσαύτως, ὧν οὐδεὶς φθόνος ἐκλέξασθαι τῇ καθισταμένῃ πολιτείᾳ τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἁρμόττον· δοκιμαστὰς δὲ τούτων ἑλομένους τὴν ἐκλογὴν ποιεῖσθαι μὴ νεωτέρους πεντήκοντα ἐτῶν, καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἂν ἱκανὸν εἶναι δόξῃ τῶν παλαιῶν ποιημάτων, ἐγκρίνειν, ὅτι δ' ἂν ἐνδεὲς ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἀνεπιτήδειον, τὸ μὲν ἀποβάλλεσθαι παντάπασιν, τὸ δ' ἐπανερόμενον ἐπιρρυθμίζειν, ποιητικοὺς ἅμακαὶ μουσικοὺς ἄνδρας παραλαβόντας, χρωμένους αὐτῶν ταῖς δυνάμεσιν τῆς ποιήσεως, ταῖς δὲ ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις μὴ ἐπιτρέποντας ἀλλ' ἤ τισιν ὀλίγοις, ἐξηγουμένους δὲ τὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου βουλήματα, ὅτι μάλιστα ὄρχησίν τε καὶ ᾠδὴν καὶ πᾶσαν χορείαν συστήσασθαι κατὰ τὸν αὐτῶν νοῦν.

διορισάμενον, καὶ ἁρμονίαισιν δὴ καὶ ῥυθμοῖς προσαρμόττειν ἀναγκαῖον· δεινὸν γὰρ ὅλῃ γε ἁρμονίᾳ ἀπᾴδειν ἢ ῥυθμῷ ἀρρυθμεῖν, μηδὲν προσήκοντα τούτων ἑκάστοις ἀποδιδόντα τοῖς μέλεσιν. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ τούτων τὰ σχήματά γε νομοθετεῖν.

In addition, the judges of the games should be separated in two groups: the first group will be responsible for the solo performances and the second with the choral ones. It is remarkable that although Plato is definitely inclined towards *choreia* in the *Laws*, he does not exclude solo performances. This is, however, the only instance in the whole dialogue that the monodic performances seem to have a place – even though a restricted one – in Plato's city.

764d-e

{ΑΘ} […] μουσικῆς δὲ ἑτέρους μὲν τοὺς περὶ μονῳδίαν τε καὶ μιμητικήν, οἷον ῥαψῳδῶν καὶ κιθαρῳδῶν καὶ αὐλητῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ἀθλοθέτας ἑτέρους πρέπον ἂν εἴη γίγνεσθαι, τῶν δὲ περὶ χορῳδίαν ἄλλους.

{ATH} […] but in the case of music it will be proper to have separate umpires for solos and for mimetic performances, I mean, for instance, one set chosen for rhapsodists, harpers, flute-players, and all such musicians, and another set for choral performers.

In general, the judges of the games have the power to expel any comic, iambic or other poet if he does not behave in accordance with the rules during a festival. The supervisor of the whole education of the young is charged with the control of the concord between the sound of the strings with the sound of the voice and with the distinction between the songs written to ridicule others in jest and without passion and the songs composed to do so seriously and passionately.[699] Only the former songs are allowed to be performed in public.

4th: **Kinds of songs** that should be sung: hymns and praises to the gods, deamons and heroes combined with prayers.

801e

{ΑΘ} Μετά γε μὴν ταῦτα ὕμνοι θεῶν καὶ ἐγκώμια κεκοινωνημένα εὐχαῖς ᾄδοιτ’ ἂν ὀρθότατα, καὶ μετὰ θεοὺς ὡσαύτως περὶ δαίμονάς τε καὶ ἥρωας μετ’ ἐγκωμίων εὐχαὶ γίγνοιντ’ ἂν τούτοις πᾶσιν πρέπουσαι

5th: **Kinds of songs** that should be sung: hymns and praises for the virtuous deceased people.

[699] Pl. Laws 812de; 935e-936b

801e

{ΑΘ} Μετά γε μὴν ταῦτ’ ἤδη νόμος ἄνευ φθόνων εὐθὺς γίγνοιτ’ ἂν ὅδε· τῶν πολιτῶν ὁπόσοι τέλος ἔχοιεν τοῦ βίου, κατὰ σώματα ἢ κατὰ ψυχὰς ἔργα ἐξειργασμένοι καλὰ καὶ ἐπίπονα καὶ τοῖς νόμοις εὐπειθεῖς γεγονότες, ἐγκωμίων αὐτοὺς τυγχάνειν πρέπον ἂν εἴη

The Athenian says in the following and last passage of this section that he has discussed everything concerning *choreia* and its basic parts, songs (***μέλη***) and dance, but he has not dealt with prose. As the passage suggests, he seems to consider *metre* the only differentiating point between songs and prose. If the translation of γράμματα as literature/pieces of writing is correct Plato focuses on the difference between singing (-dancing) and reading. However, both are important for the child’s education.

809b-c

{ΑΘ} τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ χορείας πέρι **μελῶν** τε καὶ ὀρχήσεως ἐρρήθη, τίνα τύπον ἔχοντα ἐκλεκτέα τέ ἐστιν καὶ ἐπανορθωτέα καὶ καθιερωτέα· τὰ δὲ ἐν γράμμασι μὲν ὄντα, ἄνευ δὲ μέτρων, ποῖα καὶ τίνα μεταχειρίζεσθαι χρή σοι τρόπον, ὦ ἄριστε τῶν παίδων ἐπιμελητά, τοὺς ὑπὸ σοῦ τρεφομένους, οὐκ εἰρήκαμεν.

{ATH} Matters of choristry of tunes and dancing, and what types are to be selected, remodelled, and consecrated – all this has already been dealt with; but with regard to the kind of literature that is written but without meter we have never put the question.