

FOOTBALL AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REUNIFICATION IN CYPRUS

by
Nikolaos Lekakis

A thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science,
University of Crete,
in fulfilment of the Requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

July 2018

Doctoral Committee:

Associate Professor Demetrios Xenakis (Chairman-Supervisor)

Professor Nikolaos Papadakis (Internal Member)

Emeritus Professor Barrie Houlihan (External Member-Examiner)

Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree in Political Science of the University of Crete, Gallos Campus Rethymno 74100, GR is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others. The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

I further declare that my thesis consists of 217 one-and-a-half spaced pages and 67,500 words.

Abstract

The Greek-Cypriot (G/C) and Turkish-Cypriot (T/C) communities in Cyprus have been ruthlessly separated by Turkey's military invasion of the island in 1974. The subsequent proclamation of the occupied land as the independent state of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which was recognized only by Turkey has placed the T/Cs into an international political exclusion. The T/C football Association (TCFA) and its member-clubs too are denied participation in international football matches. The sport's international governing agency, FIFA, has attempted twice to end the TCFA's international isolation through provisional football reunification agreements. The agreements require of TCFA to apply and become member of the G/C Football Association (CFA), which remains the sole representative of Cypriot football in international football governance and affairs. The two sides have attempted to resolve the problem, which has political ramifications. This thesis goes beyond 'sport for peace' programmes in divided societies and places the problem within an international relations (IR) framework, using mainly the lens of the *neoclassical realist* paradigm assisted by the *neo-liberal* approach. In this framework which combines sport, nationalism and IR, FIFA's initiatives represent the signals sent to TRNC's leaders, who need to take their turn to decipher them and endorse or reject the provisional football reunification agreements. Their decisions constitute in essence foreign policy outcomes because endorsement of the agreement would mean an end to TCFA's isolation and a greater TRNC international visibility with accompanying hopes for political recognition as well. Also, the agreements and their effects might be interfering with TRNC's strategic policies and plans for international political recognition. These opportunities appeared in a *permissive* environment where material resources were not required in order for TRNC's leaders to respond it. Domestic level actors such as political parties and civil society organisations should play a role in influencing the leaders' image of these opportunities.

Following a comprehensive review of the literature, carving an appropriate conceptual framework and using the case study method, the thesis presents a historical account of the Cyprus Problem and the Football Problem. Then, relying on data from the Public Information Office (PIO), Turkish and T/C media reviews

Department of the Cypriot government as well as other digital sources and semi-structured interviews, it traces the foreign policy outcomes of two football reunification initiatives by FIFA. The first initiative which emerged in 2008 was dealt with by a leader from the progressive left. Although with a positive image of the initiative, he did not endorse it, anticipating a forthcoming solution to the overall Cyprus problem, which never materialised. The second initiative followed in 2013 and was dealt with by an extreme nationalist leader who immediately treated it as a threat to TRNC's national policy. The role of domestic state actors including political parties and civil society organisations was inept and incapable of influencing the leader's decision. TRNC's national security issue as well as Turkey's strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean helped stall the football reunification process and hopes for a successful outcome are now very dim. The evidence from this case supports contentions by similar research that in many divided societies political reunification must precede reunification in sport.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It has been four years since I began my research on the issue of football reunification in Cyprus, which has taken me through new and unexpected intellectual grounds. I had come across warnings by several people that writing a PhD thesis is a slow and excruciating process and endeavour. Indeed, waiting to receive the daily Turkish and Turkish Cypriot (T/C) media reports on the hope that bilateral talks would appear in their columns with an optimistic tone, was a real test of patience. While these warnings were right to some extent, I would not have been able to complete this work without the help of many people, who have contributed in various ways, shapes or form towards the completion of this project, offering me their unconditional support. It is understood, however, that any mistakes in this thesis are solely mine.

First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to the members of my Doctoral committee. The committee's chairman and my thesis supervisor, Associate Professor *Demetrios Xenakis* always challenged me in many ways, from urging my participation to international conferences to assisting in teaching international relations courses in our Department and pushing me to produce my best work. Professor *Nikolaos Papadakis* helped with advice and continuous moral support throughout my PhD years. Emeritus Professor at Loughborough University *Barrie Houlihan*, was always a source of inspiration with his insightful and productive comments during various stages of my research. With his advice and help, I was able to enhance my understanding of the sports' political dimensions.

Sincere thanks to those people who provided me with valuable insight and assistance at different stages in my research. I am referring to Professors *Norrin Ripsman* of Lehigh University, and *Jeffrey Taliaferro* of Tufts University who willingly replied to some critical questions and kept the channels of communication open, as well as to the people who were so gracious to consent to be interviewed for my thesis. Due to the nature of this study, the latter must remain anonymous, but I would like to say that their contribution was essential. They all shared a deep love for Cyprus and a strong desire to see it united, even though they acknowledged the difficulties. Mr. *Iacovos Tsaggaris*, Director of PIO's Turkish and

T/C media reports section and his staff always responded with pleasure to various queries regarding the section, the way it processed media reports and problems with my subscription. Mr. *Michalis Iacovides* of Cyprus Mail willingly permitted reproduction of the material in Appendix E.

Thanks also due to several other people for their help. Professor *Theofanis Mamouneas* of the University of Cyprus, helped by providing an office during a visit to the island. A few friends I met there took me around and helped me contact people for the interviews and held free discussions on the studied topic with me. Ms *Ourania Kornaraki* and Ms *Georgia Koukouraki*, the secretaries in our Department, have been a great help with their effective processing of administrative matters. My good friend and colleague, Elias Pappas, was so cooperative in class-sharing responsibilities, during the last three years, offering his unconditional support and ears.

The University of Crete's Special Account for Research (ELKE) was one of the sources for funding my PhD studies, through a small postgraduate scholarship and itemised reimbursements towards my expenses regarding presentations at international conferences.

Finally, I dedicate this PhD thesis to my parents *Joseph* and *Maria*, for it could not have been possible without their financial support but most importantly their priceless moral support.

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1: Current and Future ‘Sport & IR’ Research.....	40
Table 5.1: Parliamentary Parties in TRNC, 2005-2018 (key leaders & seats).....	90
Table 5.2: Football reunification milestones & actor positions, 2008-2009.....	111
Table 6.1: Football reunification milestones & actor positions, 2013-2014.....	127
Table 6.2: Football reunification milestones & actor positions, 2015.....	147

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: A conceptual framework for 'sport & IR' research.....	39
Figure 2.2: A Modified Neoclassical Realist Model.....	45
Figure 4.1: Divided Cyprus.....	73
Figure 5.1: The relative position of G/CS and T/CS and their motherlands in international politics.....	86
Figure 5.2: T/C & Turkish media mentions to the Cyprus problem and the football problem, 2005-2012.....	110
Figure 6.1: T/C media mentions to the Cyprus problem and the Football problem, 2013-2017.....	124

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix A: Interview questions.....	194
Appendix B: The 2013 Zurich agreement.....	197
Appendix C: TCFA open letter.....	200
Appendix D: Photo of the parties signing the Provisional Zurich Agreement.....	202
Appendix E: The French Ambassador with the protagonists of football reunification in Cyprus	203

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKEL	Progressive Party of Working People
APOEL	Athletic Club of Nicosia's Greeks
CE	Council of Europe
CFA	Cyprus Football Association
CTP	Republican Turkish Party
DHSY	Democratic Alarm Party
DOM	Doves Olympic Movement
DP	Democratic Party
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organisation
EOKA	Greek Organisation of Cypriot Fighters
EU	European Union
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FPE	Foreign Policy Executive
G/C	Greek-Cypriots
HP	Peoples Party
IATA	International Air Transport Association
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IOC	International Olympic Committee
IR	International Relations
ITO	International Tourism Organisation
KTAMS	Turkish Civil Servants Trade Union
KTÖS	Turkish-Cypriot Primary School Teachers' Association
KTSYD	Turkish-Cypriot Sport Writers Association
KTTO	Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce

LTSK	Nicosia Turkish Sports Club
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-government organisations
PD	Public Diplomacy
PIO	Public Information Office
RoC	Republic of Cyprus
SD	Sports Diplomacy
SfDP	Sport for Development and Peace
T/C	Turkish-Cypriots
TCFA	Turkish Cypriot Football Association
TDP	Communal Democracy Party
TESK	Federation of Greek Athletic Associations
TFF	Turkish Football Federation
TMT	Turkish Resistance Organization
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UBP	National Union Party
UEFA	Union for European Football Associations
UN	United Nations
UPU	Universal Postal Union
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
YDP	Rebirth Party

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION.....	ii
ABSTRACT.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	v
LIST OF TABLES.....	vii
LIST OF FIGURES.....	viii
LIST OF APPENDICES.....	ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	x

CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION: SPORT TO REUNITE A DIVIDED SOCIETY?.....	1
1.1 Actors and levels of analysis.....	9
1.2 The choice of IR paradigms and thesis structure.....	17
2. LITERATURE REVIEW: SPORT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.....	19
2.1. Actors in IR Theories.....	19
2.2. Sport and IR	28
2.3. A conceptual framework for Sport and IR research.....	37
2.3.1. Algeria vs Egypt.....	41
2.3.3. The two Koreas.....	42
2.3.4. Kosovo.....	43
2.4. The approach followed by this thesis.....	44
3. METHODOLOGY: A CASE-STUDY APPROACH.....	47
3.1. Case study methods.....	48
3.1.1 Unobtrusive methods.....	49
3.1.2 Interviews.....	54

3.2. The research design for this thesis.....	55
3.2.1 Selected unobtrusive measures.....	56
3.2.2 Interviews conducted.....	60
4. CYPRUS BEFORE THE <i>ANNAN PLAN</i> :	
COMMUNITY CREATION AND DIVISION.....	62
4.1 Nationalism, Politics and External Patrons	62
4.2 Football in Cyprus: Genesis and conflict	75
4.2.1 The foundation of Cypriot football.....	76
4.2.2 The football schism: 1955-1974.....	79
4.2.3 TCFA's international isolation: 1974 –.....	82
5. THE <i>ANNAN PLAN</i> PERIOD: OPPORTUNITIES FOR POLITICAL AND FOOTBALL REUNIFICATION.....	85
5.1. The RoC and TRNC in IR.....	85
5.2. TRNC's Political Power Structure.....	88
5.2.1. The President.....	88
5.2.2. Political parties and government.....	89
5.2.3. Civil society.....	93
5.3. The <i>Annan Plan</i>	96
5.4. The post-Annan plan period and the first football reunification plan....	100
5.4.1 The state of football in Cyprus.....	101
5.4.2 The first football reunification plan.....	103
6. NEW INITIATIVES TO REUNITE CYPRUS AND CYPRIOT FOOTBALL...	117
6.1. International developments.....	117
6.2. A new <i>Annan Plan</i> in football.....	121
6.2.1 Early signs of a possible TCFA retreat.....	130
6.2.2 Game change: Support from Turkey	135
6.2.3 Return to 'business as usual'.....	138
6.2.4 A final game change.....	143

7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS.....	158
7.1. Summary of the evidence.....	158
7.2. Discussion.....	160
7.2.1. Leader images.....	163
7.2.2. Domestic state power.....	165
 BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	 168
APPENDICES.....	194

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION:

SPORT TO REUNITE A DIVIDED SOCIETY?

Cyprus is a divided society, and the so-called “Cyprus Problem” has its roots in Greek and Turkish nationalism nourished by external actors. The cornerstones of the Greek national identity were the Greek language and the orthodox Christian religion that survived during the 400-year occupation of the country by the Ottoman Empire. The process of developing the Modern Greek state since 1830, following continuous rise against the Ottomans, was characterised by the idea that the nation was a single organic whole with a historical continuity – from ancient Greece to the Byzantine Empire. Thus, Greece moved from a ‘nation’ to a ‘state’. Turkish nationalism followed an opposite path, as the Turkish Republic, which was created in 1923, became a new secular state, its language based on the Latin alphabet and without the Ottoman-Islamic legacy. Nevertheless, the exchange of Greeks living in Turkey and Turks living in Greece in 1923 and subsequent administrative measures such as deportations etc. marked the struggle of the two nationalisms to maintain their populations unmixed, i.e. achieve a national homogeneity. In Cyprus where the Greek cultural element is predominant, external actors have assisted or even exacerbated nationalism to the point that the Greek-Cypriot (G/C) and Turkish-Cypriot (T/C) communities of the island had aspired to follow the processes of state formation by joining their motherlands.

In its most recent form, the Cyprus problem arose as a result of a violent separation of the two communities by a Turkish military invasion in the summer of 1974. Subsequently, the unilateral declaration of a T/C canton in 1976 and an independent state in 1983 in the Northern part of the island – known as the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) – has made the problem worse. Thus far, only Turkey has officially recognised that state which remains internationally isolated. Solving the Cyprus Problem through the birth of a single new Cypriot state

amounts metaphorically speaking to untying a 'Gordian knot'.¹ In the wake of the 21st century, the international community has vowed to undertake robust efforts to tackle this problem under the auspices of the United Nations (UN).

In the field of sports, the separation of the two communities has negated any interaction between T/C and G/C football clubs. Moreover, even worse for the T/C football clubs, they are not permitted to participate in international matches, as their federation is not a member of international sport governance organisations such as UEFA (Union for European Football Associations) and FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association). Both FIFA and UEFA have been working with both the G/C and T/C football associations towards reuniting football on the island. Therefore, to apprehend the relative value of these sports initiatives in the reunification process, the thesis needs to delineate the theoretical context within which a solution to the Cyprus Problem is evolving.

The research community has confirmed sports as a tool for reconciliation and peacebuilding in countries that are continually plagued by poverty and conflict. Attempting to find peaceful solutions to societal divisions that often emerge around the world due to political and cultural strife, Sport for Development and Peace (SfDP) programmes encourage positive outcomes beyond the field where sport is played. Such programmes have become an acknowledged strategy in disadvantaged communities not only in the developing but also the already developed world.

Brighton scholar Sugden has studied positive changes at the civil society level, where sport plays a potentially connective role. However, this is a *bottom-up* approach, as sport is used as a vehicle to bring divided groups together in non-hostile spaces and environments. Consequently, it lacks the necessary size to engage some people who might otherwise remain selfish and aggressive towards others. Researchers are also interested in the potential of sports events, acting as vehicles towards reconciliation of lifelong differences. Schulenkorf recognises the limited scale and scope of sport-for-reconciliation initiatives in countries such Sri-

¹ Heraclides, A. 2011. The Cyprus Gordian Knot: An Intractable Ethnic Conflict *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 17(2), 17-139; Also, Lekakis, N. 2015. Can football loosen the 'Gordian Knot' in Cyprus? *International Journal of Sports Policy and Politics* 7(2), 255-282.

Lanka. He admits that “the legacy of a single event is complicated to ascertain repetition of community-based rituals makes their message of togetherness more likely to collide among devoted followers”.²

In the Middle East, where tensions are high, ‘Football 4 Peace’ programmes aim to bring together young people from across ethnic, national, geographical and religious divides into an ideologically ‘neutral’ space. Teams comprise a mixture of players from across the social range – Arab, Israeli, Muslim, Jew, Christian, etc. Current SfDP initiatives operate in: Sierra Leona (*Football festival in Bo*), Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Open fun schools*), Israel, Jordan and Northern Ireland (*Football 4 peace*), Goles por la Paz (*Project goals for peace international*), as well as Worldwide (*Football for hope movement*). However, these programmes cannot guarantee conflict resolution. It appears that many SfDP actors, be they NGOs, multinationals, governments or intergovernmental organisations, often strengthen the very problems they are trying to resolve.³ Examples can be found in countries like Israel and Palestine, Yemen, Kenya, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leon and the Catalan and Basque areas in Spain.

In Cyprus itself, the *Doves Olympic Movement* (DOM), which was founded in 2003 and its philosophy has grounds on the principles of the Olympic Movement, aims to engage young people in sports for building trust and cooperation among the two communities. From 2005 the DOM participants have been more than 700 Youth and 50 instructors from both the G/C and the T/C communities. They were brought together in a friendly environment in which they engaged in sports and other social activities, developed bonds and formed a small community of active citizens from both sides, thus increasing the belief that they can contribute in the reconciliation process of their island. This Bi-communal Programme is funded by the UN Development Programme and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). However, this sport for conflict resolution programme has

² Schulenkorf, N. 2010. Sport events and ethnic reconciliation: Attempting to create social change between Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim sportspeople in war-torn Sri Lanka. *International review for the sociology of sport* 45(3), 273-294.

³ Sanders, B. 2016. An own goal in sport for development: Time to change the playing field. *Journal of Sport Development* 4(6), 1-5.

limitations as an instrument of re-unifying football symbolically and thereby the island's two communities politically.

In order to fully understand whether and how sport (football) could help the two communities make a positive step towards reunification, the case of Cyprus needs to be examined from an IR perspective. Two studies are close to the theme of this thesis. However, they do not follow different approaches. The first study by G/C researchers Nicos Kartakoullis and Christina Loizou examined FIFA's first (2008) initiative to relieve the T/C Football Association (TCFA) of its international isolation and attributed the initiative's failure to prejudice and ethnocentrism on the T/C side.⁴ The analysis of that study was conducted in the theoretical context of "socialisation through sport". The second study, by Menary, attempts to address the T/C's efforts to establish the idea of a T/C nation through football but it fails to place its analysis in any theoretical framework.⁵

Studying football reunification in Cyprus under an IR approach requires outlining and acknowledging the similarities and differences of Cyprus compared to other divided societies around the world where sport plays a role in their IR. The comparison will unveil to an extent the uniqueness and originality of this thesis. Let us look briefly at Palestine-Israel, the two Yemens, Northern Ireland, the two Koreas and Kosovo, keeping in mind that a common feature of many divided countries where sport enables their rapprochement, is the invisible presence of external actors or guarantors.⁶

Palestine and Israel are divided ethnically and nationally, just like G/Cs and T/Cs. However, Israel is a UN member, and Palestine sits in the UN's General Assembly under an observer member status with an internationally recognised Palestinian authority. In Cyprus, only the RoC is a UN and European Union member state, with TRNC a non-internationally recognised state. Palestine and Israel have football associations with full membership in FIFA. Palestine and Israel had signed the

⁴ Kartakoullis, N. L. and Loizou, C. 2009. Is Sport (Football) a Unifying Force or a Vehicle to Further Separation? The Case of Cyprus. *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 26(11), 1652-1667.

⁵ Menary, S. 2010. Football and the Cyprus conflict. *Soccer & Society* 11(3), 253-260.

⁶ Fuller accounts for some of these countries will appear in the next chapter 2.

1993 “Oslo Accord” at the White House in Washington DC, which foresaw the establishment of a Palestinian Authority to represent Palestinians internationally on the proviso that they would accept Israel’s existence. Five years later, FIFA granted Palestine nationhood status and accepted its football association as a full member. Using the power conferred to it by its FIFA membership and aiming to support Palestine’s nation-building campaign, the Palestinian Football Association (PFA) has been campaigning to suspend Israel’s Football Association (IFA) from both FIFA and UEFA.⁷ TRNC is also on the course of a nation-building campaign – either as a separate independent state or as part of a federal Cypriot state - but the only way to achieve this through sport is to have its football association, the TCFA, become a member of the G/C-controlled CFA.

The two Yemens are also different from that of Cyprus although football offered itself as a bridge towards their reunification. In Yemen, there was only a political ideology guided division, as the North followed a capitalist model and the South a Marxist ideology. In Cyprus, the island’s division in two regions is religious-ethnic and not political. Indeed, looking at their domestic political power structures, one could argue that both regions follow more or less left-leaning ideologies. In Yemen, sport was always a means for opening institutional contacts between the two governments and a venue for conveying important socio-political and historical messages to each other. In Cyprus, that option might emerge only once TCFA becomes a member of CFA. The process of uniting the two Yemens was through the formation of a Yemeni national football team in 1988, representing a nation that derived from pre-Islamic kingdoms.⁸ In Cyprus, such an option is either irrelevant or way too far from reaching.

Northern Ireland is similar to Cyprus regarding their ethnoterritorial conflicts where the role of external actors is crucial. External actors separated both countries whose division rests on ethnic and religious differences, not necessarily political. In Northern Ireland, Britain remains the guarantor that influences one of the country’s rival communities, the Protestant descendants of the British colonialists.

⁷ Xenakis, D. and Lekakis, N. 2018. From *Hasbara* to the Palestine-Israel Sport Conflict. *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 28(2): 328-351.

⁸ Stevenson, T. B. and Aloug, A. K. 2008. Sports Diplomacy and Emergent Nationalism Football Links between the Two Yemens, 1970–1990. *Anthropology of the Middle East* 3(2), 1–19.

However, Northern Ireland is one divided country with formal IR, while Cyprus consists of two 'countries', one of which, TRNC, does not have formal IR. Northern Ireland has one football league and is a FIFA member, while Cyprus has two separate and non-cooperative leagues, one of them a FIFA member but the other one not. Whereas sport is often used in the nation-building process, research indicates that, in N. Ireland, nation-building should perhaps precede football unification.⁹

The two Koreas and Cyprus exhibit several differences and similarities. Nationalism characterises both Korea's and Cyprus' division. However, whereas both North and South Korea are internationally recognised states, Northern Cyprus is not. Unlike Cyprus', Korea's division is political-ideological and not religious-ethnic, the sole ethnic identity being the Korean. Both of these countries were separated by external actors that continue to influence their international political behaviour. Korea's separation was the result of a civil war while Cyprus suffered a direct external military invasion by the Turkish army. The two Koreas are full members of FIFA and other international sports governance organisations, but in Cyprus, that privilege rests only with the RoC. South Korea has made several attempts to approach the North through sport, but their attempts stumbled into bureaucracies.¹⁰ For TRNC and the RoC, there are no events of this sort at the moment. In South Korea, guaranteeing its security against North Korea's threats, the US influences to an extent its international political behaviour. That reality emerged in the field of sports, during the latest North Korean initiative to participate in the 2018 Winter Olympics hosted by Seoul when South Korea consulted with the US on this challenge. The US has its own policy agenda against North Korea's regime.¹¹

⁹ Bairner, A. 2013. Sport, the Northern Ireland peace process, and the politics of identity. *Journal of aggression, conflict and peace research* 5(4), 220–229.

¹⁰ Merkel, U., 2008. The politics of sport diplomacy and reunification in divided Korea: one nation, two countries and three flags. *International review for the sociology of sport* 43 (3), 289–311.

¹¹ Kelly, R. 2018. Have the Winter Olympics repaired North-South Korea relations? Available online at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43063399> [Accessed 3 March 2018].

Finally, Kosovo was formed in the Balkans following the ethno-nationalist war of the 1990s and is one geographically undivided country with a grand Albanian majority and a Serbian minority, while Cyprus is divided into the RoC and TRNC.¹² Following its separation from the former state of Yugoslavia, Kosovo received partial international recognition from more than one states, unlike TRNC which was recognised only by Turkey. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) has admitted Kosovo as a full member¹³ when the TRNC remains entirely isolated from international organisations, hoping that it may be lucky to follow a similar course. Under these realities, Cyprus shares few similarities with other divided societies and constitutes a distinct case for research.

As stated earlier, this thesis presents the case of Cyprus' symbolic football reunification problem in an IR theoretic framework. This symbolic reunification in football might act catalytically in the political reunification of the island as well, i.e. possibly help towards a solution to the "Cyprus Problem". Naturally, the thesis does not aspire to offer a solution to either problem. It attempts to shed some light into their dimensions and add to the scarce literature on the topic, by carving a new conceptual framework within which sport, nationalism and IR are intertwined.

The studied case is worthy for several reasons, starting with the most important ones that centre on the theoretical development of the subfield. For the past forty years, 'sport and IR' has re-emerged for at least three times as a new research theme. The theme 'sport, conflict/rapprochement and IR', especially is of paramount importance. Firstly, it is a re-emerging topic on new premises. Secondly, it is relevant to the bulk of IR research that focuses on issues of national security. Most importantly, it remains an under-researched theme. Contemporary research addresses mostly the role of mega-sporting events as avenues to improving the host country's international image, using the *neo-liberal* paradigm's concept *soft power*. In doing so, it fails to recognise the importance of sport in

¹² See also, Kasim, K. and Kasim E. R. 2017. Taiwan-Cyprus-Kosovo Cases: Differences and Similarities. *Yönetim Bilimleri Dergisi/Journal of Administrative Sciences* 15(30), 553-572. Available online at: <http://ybd.dergi.comu.edu.tr/dosyalar/Ybd/taiwan-cyprus-kosovo-cases-differences-and-similarities.pdf> [Accessed 17 May 2018].

¹³ Giulianotti, R., Collison, H., Darnell, S. and Howe, D. 2017. Contested states and the politics of sport: the case of Kosovo – division, development, and recognition. *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics* 9(1), 121-136, 122.

conflicts and rapprochements among nations and flouts the opportunity to fully employ theories on nationalism and IR, as well as cross-theoretic IR approaches.

Beyond its theoretical merit, the studied problem concerns an important opportunity in the sphere of rapprochement among the two communities, given TRNC's current international isolation. In addition to states, international organisations refuse to deal with members of the T/C community directly. For instance, at the 1979 *Universal Postal Union* (UPU) conference in Rio de Janeiro, the Republic of Cyprus secured a declaration that stated that T/C stamps were illegal and invalid.¹⁴ The *International Civil Aviation Organization* (ICAO), the *International Air Transport Association* (IATA) and the *International Tourism Organisation* (ITO) also do not collaborate with TRNC. At the same time, judicial rulings against T/C interests have further complicated the situation. In 2007, a Turkish company, operating for over 35 years in holiday tours, sued UK's Ministry of Transport for refusing to issue an operator certificate allowing it to run direct flights from UK to Turkey via *Ercan* International Airport in TRNC. Flights from UK airports to Ercan via Turkey and *vice-versa* are possible but the itinerary UK-TRNC-Turkey is not allowed. In July 2009, UK's High Court of Justice rejected the claim of the Turkish company and closed the case.¹⁵ Thus, all flights and exports from TRNC take place only via Turkey. During the period 1983-1994, T/C producers had traded their goods abroad using the official stamp of the RoC. When, in 1992, they decided to use the TRNC stamp, a suit by a group of G/C citrus producers against UK's Ministry of Agriculture followed in the ECJ. The Court ruled that T/C goods – when sold directly by T/Cs – are unacceptable for the European Union.¹⁶ Compared to all these negative developments for TRNC, football reunification is encouraged by an international organisation, FIFA, it offers economic benefits rather than costs and constitutes a vehicle towards TRNC's international recognition in football. Ease of other restrictions might follow, e.g. in aviation, FIFA could mediate so that T/C

¹⁴ Pegg, S. 1998. *International Society and the de Facto State*. London: Ashgate Publishing.

¹⁵ High Court of Justice. 2009. Case No: CO/3512/2007. Available online at: <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sann2029/Judgment%20-%20Kibris%20Turk%20Hava%20Yollari%20v%20SS%20for%20Transport%20and%20The%20Republic%20of%20Cyprus.pdf> [Accessed 18 May 2018].

¹⁶ Talmon, S. 2001. The Cyprus Question before the European Court of Justice. *European Journal of International Law* 12 (4): 727–750.

football teams would be the first to start flying to international destinations directly out of Ercan.

Before presenting what might be the power of sport in international politics and the justification of this thesis, laying out the specific research agenda, its assumptions, questions and limitations, there are two inevitable questions awaiting answers. The first question is whether the actors (state or non-state) involved in the Cypriot football reunification process fit into any level of analysis carried out in IR research, i.e., the *individual*, the *state* and the *international* or *system* levels.¹⁷ At the individual level, research focuses on how the traits of individual leaders alter their response to the international problems they face. At the state level, the interest lies in characteristics of the state such as the type of government, the type of economic system and interest groups. At the system level, finally, the focus is on those interactions of states and non-state actors at the international level that affect IR.¹⁸ The second question concerns the choice of the IR paradigms to follow so as to fully comprehend the developments that mediated during the past decade or more in the Cypriot football reunification arena. These two questions along with a brief presentation of the structure of this thesis' are dealt with in the sections that follow.

1.1 Actors and levels of analysis

Before addressing the first question, it is worth noting that latest research on football and the IR of another partially recognised state, Kosovo, has engaged a gamut of IR theories.¹⁹ As already mentioned, in Cyprus, international sport governance organisations such as FIFA and UEFA along with the G/C and T/C football associations are involved in the football reunification negotiations. FIFA and UEFA are non-state actors and are also considered non-political

¹⁷ See, Kacowicz, A. M. 2007. Case Study Methods in International Security Studies. In: Sprinz, D. F. and Wolinsky-Nahmias, Y. (eds.) *Cases, Numbers, Models: International Relations Research Methods*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 4th edn.).

¹⁸ The three levels of analysis are complementary, not exclusive. According to Waltz: "The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images, there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy", see, Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, p. 238).

¹⁹ Giulianotti, R., Collison, H., Darnell, S. and Howe, D. 2017, *op. cit.*

organisations. However, they do not act in a political vacuum, and they may influence or be influenced by other global actors and organisations.

FIFA is an NGO, actually one of the oldest and largest NGOs in the world. It was founded in 1904 on a voluntary membership basis by a group of Frenchmen who sought to form an umbrella organisation for various national bodies engaged in football. At that time, NGO's of this sort were rare. A couple of decades following its foundation, FIFA entered into a rivalry with the IOC, which led it to organize its first World Cup in Uruguay in 1930. That tournament was small and by invitation only, but it was the first milestone in its evolution as a global actor. After WWII, FIFA became politically significant, as newly independent nations in the decolonizing world were seeking recognition by this organisation. FIFA took the opportunity and approved the formation of confederations in Europe, Asia and Africa in the 1950s, and North/Central Americas and Oceania in the 1960s.²⁰ The arrival of television, marketing and commercialization of all aspects of social life along with the unparalleled global obsession with football, enabled FIFA to rise from a small European amateur club to both, a multibillion-dollar industry and the governing body of world football. Its Congress counts more members than the UN's General Assembly. FIFA's main decision-making body – the Executive Committee – is located in the organisation's headquarters in Zurich, Switzerland. It oversees its six regional confederations and convenes the Congress annually. It is also responsible for deciding by vote which country gets to host the next World Cup. Three judicial bodies assist FIFA's work: the Disciplinary Committee, the Ethics Committee and the Appeals Committee.²¹ The Disciplinary Committee oversees issues such as doping, racism and corruption, which states also deal with, as well as misconducts against players and officials. Penalties include fines and bans and any objections are submitted to the Appeals Committee. The Ethics Committee gives attention to all cases which are related to FIFA's rules and regulations.

²⁰ Tomlinson, A. 2014. The supreme leader sails on: leadership, ethics and governance in FIFA. *Sport in Society* 17(9), 1155-1169.

²¹ Szwajdler, P. J. 2015. The Disciplinary Committee and the Ethics Committee: Main Judicial Bodies of FIFA. *Journal of Education, Health and Sport* 5(5), 510-515. Available online at: <http://www.ojs.ukw.edu.pl/index.php/johs/article/view/2015%3B5%285%29%3A510-515>.

The international political dimensions of FIFA's decisions begin with sanctions of the Disciplinary Committee, which may impact on a country's international image. For example, FIFA considered banning Turkey from the 2010 World Cup, following the violence that marred the end of a World Cup play-off game in Istanbul between Turkey and Switzerland in November 2005. It finally punished Turkey to play their next six official home matches behind closed doors and on neutral ground. A fine of approximately \$154,000 accompanied the ban.²² The Palestine vs Israel case shows how serious for a country's international image would be its suspension from this organisation. In support of Palestine's nation-building campaign, the Palestinian Football Association (PFA) has been accusing Israel's Football Association (IFA) for using Apartheid methods that violate FIFA's charter.²³

On other fronts, the UN collaborates with FIFA to operate "sport for peace programmes".²⁴ The European Parliament has legal powers over the transfer of foreign football players in the EU, and there is evidence that FIFA has been able to force national governments to abandon legislation and interference in football's matters.²⁵ In the past, FIFA's actions were vividly political. For example, it awarded the 2002 World Cup Games to be co-hosted by the rival candidates Korea and Japan. Also, South Africa's hosting of the 2010 Cup was FIFA's move to help it integrate the benefits of previous achievements in the Rugby and Cricket World Cups into easing its Apartheid ethnic divisions. Armstrong sees football as 'a game that has become increasingly central to... the politics and universalism of FIFA...'²⁶ And, the international media have portrayed FIFA's former head, Sepp Blatter, as

²² SWI. 2006. Fifa hands six-match penalty to Turkey. <https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/fifa-hands-six-match-penalty-to-turkey/55256> [Accessed 22 May 2018].

²³ Xenakis, D. and Lekakis, N. 2018, *op. cit.*

²⁴ Gardenas, A. 2013. Peace Building through Sport? An Introduction to Sport for Development and Peace. *Journal of Conflictology* 4(1), 24-33.

²⁵ Meier, H. E. and García, B. 2015. Protecting Private Transnational Authority Against Public Intervention: FIFA's Power Over National Governments', *Public Administration* 9(4), 890-906.; Also, García, B. and Meier, H. E. 2016. Global Sport Power Europe? The Efficacy of the European Union in Global Sport Regulation", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12512.

²⁶ Armstrong, G. 2007. The global footballer and the local war-zone: George Weah and transnational networks in Liberia. *Global Networks* 7(2), 230–247 (p.230, bolds by author).

a powerful actor who can meet with any head of state, bypassing the usual diplomatic routes and protocols.²⁷ Football associations in Cyprus are considered sub-national political actors since they can affect domestic power relations and possibly state relations. The G/C football association, the CFA, does qualify both as a domestic and an international actor, as a FIFA member operating in an internationally recognised state. The role of the T/C football association, the TCFA, is only domestic but its actions could have an international impact, as this thesis will show.

Regarding TRNC, from a purely legal point of view, it would not have satisfied all four Montevideo Convention criteria necessary for statehood on its declaration of independence in 1983.²⁸ TRNC had a permanent population, a border following its *de facto* partition from the RoC and a functional government, but lacked the capacity to enter relations with other states. TRNC's sovereignty over a given geographic space is guaranteed by a 'national' army and a large Turkish military force. The UN recognizes the TRNC only as the territory of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) under Turkish occupation and considers its declaration of independence as legally invalid.²⁹ Also, the European Union (EU) views the area not under effective control of the RoC and thus as EU territory, but under Turkish military occupation and therefore indefinitely exempt from EU legislation until a settlement has been reached. Thus, TRNC appears to be a *de facto* state that is capable of controlling territory with clear boundaries and enjoys legitimacy through the support of its

²⁷ Borden, S. and Montague, J. 2013. In FIFA Politics, Blatter Is the Consummate Player. Available online at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/02/sports/soccer/in-fifa-politics-blatter-is-the-consummate-player.html? r=0> [Accessed 24 October 2015].

²⁸ This was a hypothetical contention by Goldman, M. H. 2016. Turkey, Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Oxford Centre for the Study of Law & Public Policy, Research Paper No. 15-8. Available online at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2781735 [Accessed 17 May 2018].

²⁹ Resolution 541 of 18 November 1983 deplores the declaration of TRNC's creation, considers it legally invalid and calls upon all states to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Cyprus. Countering the Security Council's language on legal terms, the TCs argued that "the Security Council is concerned with peace and security and not a judicial organisation competent to judge the 'legality' or 'validity' of states. So, there are, in effect, two states on the island today, one internationally recognised, the other recognised only by Turkey. Both are democratic and conduct their **international relations** separately. But only the Greek-Cypriot state is recognised by international and regional organisations such as those of the UN and the EU" (bolds by author). For more details, see the T/C response available online at: <http://cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/history/trnc/index.html> (accessed 24 June 2014). See also, Ronen, Y. 2011. *Transition from Illegal Regimes under International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 61.

citizens, yet, its lack of recognition by other states and international organisations sets it apart in world politics. However, International law and international politics do not necessarily go hand in hand, the act of state recognition itself resting in the discretionary power of every state based on its interests. In addition, *de facto* states are capable of acting in ways that may influence relations with other states. Adrian Florea argues that, although lacking an international legal status, *de facto* states do exercise authority and may be treated as non-state actors in IR.³⁰

Several developments have changed TRNC's political status following its 'independence'. Since 1985, this political entity operates under a constitution, which means that there is no higher authority that can bind its actions.³¹ TRNC has been organised as a 'state' with three levels of authority: administrative, legal and judicial. By popular vote, it elects a 'President of the Republic' (an individual national actor), as well as a 50-seat parliament in which more than one political parties (sub-national political actors).are represented.³² The 2010-2016 period witnessed trends towards an increase in the quality of democracy, as civil society has accused political parties of incompetence, so they had to include 'good governance' on their agendas.³³ Currently, TRNC conducts its relations with countries other than Turkey via its *Representation Offices*. These foreign missions located in major western countries including Belgium, Canada, UK, France, Germany and the US, as well as in Arab ones such as Saudi Arabia do not have formal diplomatic status but serve as *de facto* embassies and consulates.

In 2004, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) gave observer status to the TRNC representatives, and since then, they have actively participated in all PACE activities without voting rights. In 2005, on the occasion of a non-stop, first-ever chartered flight between another country, other than Turkey

³⁰ Florea, A. 2014. De facto States in International Politics (1945-2011): A New Data Set. *International Interactions* 40, 788–811.

³¹ James, A. 1986. *Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society*. London: Allen and Unwin.

³² Lansford, T. (ed.) 2015. *Political handbook of the World 2015*. New York: CQ Press.

³³ Kanol, D. and Köprülü, N. 2017. Quality of democracy in unrecognized states: lessons from Northern Cyprus. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 17(3), 389-402. ⁷ Isachenko, D. 2012. *The Making of Informal States: State-building in Northern Cyprus and Transdnjestria*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

and TRNC, Azerbaijan started accepting T/C passports.⁷ Also, although requiring pre-arrival visas, Australia, France, Pakistan, UK and the US do accept T/C passports for entrance to their territories.³⁴ In 2012, TRNC was indirectly recognised by Pakistan and Iran, when it became an observer member of the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) under the name "Turkish Cypriot State".³⁵ Some high profile meetings have taken place between former heads of TRNC and foreign leaders and great powers figures, such as the US secretary of state and the UK minister of foreign affairs and the UN Secretary-General.³⁶ Both the US and the EU have adopted the known policy of "engagement without recognition".³⁷

In May 2014, the then US vice-president *Joe Biden* visited Cyprus, in symbolic support of a US-led initiative to resume reunification talks among the two communities. TRNC became inevitably one of his trip's destinations to meet with the then T/C leader *Dervis Eroglu*. Both, the US embassy in Nicosia and Joe Biden himself, upon his arrival, emphasised that this trip did not constitute an act of TRNC's recognition by the US.³⁸ More importantly, the leaders of the two communities are engaged in the negotiations on solving the Cyprus Problem with or without the presence of foreign actors and institutions. Transnational actors that are involved in the most recent negotiations under the UN include Turkey, Greece and the UK as guarantors and the EU as an observer. TRNC's principal foreign policy objective, as a *de facto* state, is of course its formal international recognition.

³⁴ Krasniqi, G. 2018. Contested territories, liminal polities, performative citizenship: A comparative analysis. EUI Working Papers, ARCAS 13. Available online at: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/52225/RSCAS_2018_13.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [Accessed 18 May 2018].

³⁵ ECO is an inter-governmental regional organization established in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey to promote economic, technical and cultural cooperation among its members.

³⁶ IBP. 2013. *Cyprus: Country Study Guide: Strategic Information and Developments*. Washington DC: International Business Publications, 155.

³⁷ Cooley, A. and Mitchell, L. A. 2010. Engagement without Recognition: A New Strategy toward Abkhazia and Eurasia's Unrecognized States. *The Washington Quarterly* 33(4), 59-73.

³⁸ Ker-Lindsay, J. 2015. Engagement without recognition: the limits of diplomatic interaction with contested states. *International Affairs* 91(2), 267–285. One would need to decide here whether it is the words or the acts that count! ¹² Kanol, D. and Köprülü, N. 2017. Quality of democracy in unrecognized states: lessons from Northern Cyprus. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 17(3), 389-402.

The degree of Turkey's influence on TRNC's domestic and international politics is real but not given and does not constitute a reason for treating it separately in international politics.³⁹ De facto states tend to form their own agendas, which are often not in line with those of their patrons, so it is natural that tensions characterise their relations.⁴⁰ *Freedom House* considers TRNC free, giving it in 2017 an overall score of 80 (close to Greece's 84), compared to just 38 for Turkey. This shows that the T/C society is more open and it is difficult to force its government to adopt specific policies, unless they concern its survival.⁴¹ Indeed, given its isolation, TRNC is economically depended on Turkey. However, as T/C researchers note, similar phenomena are observable in the international system, especially in unions of weaker and stronger states.⁴² For example, Greece's public debt limited the country's sovereign power, and it had to bow to EU's demands for public sector reforms. Such phenomena also occur naturally among weak and strong states in other existing international spheres of influence. TRNC does not always bow to its patron's desires. In his April 2018 meeting with TRNC's leader *Akinci*, Turkish foreign minister *Çavuşoğlu* reinstated Turkey's proposal to focus either on a confederation or a two-state solution to the Cyprus Problem. The T/C leader replied he would not bring such an issue to the negotiating table. The reason behind *Akinci's* response may have been TRNC's declaration of independence, which prohibits unification with any other state except the RoC, reserving the T/Cs' right to form a future federation with the G/Cs.⁴³ Also, while the conservative T/C parties agreed with Turkey's proposition, the reformist political parties reacted negatively arguing that the matter would be decided by TRNC's institutions.⁴⁴ All of the above,

³⁹ This type of influence is usually referred to as *tutelage*.

⁴⁰ Caspersen, N. 2009. Playing the Recognition Game: External Actors and De Facto States. *The International Spectator* 44(4), 47-60. 58.

⁴¹ Freedom House. 2017. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/fiw-2017-table-country-scores> [Accessed 19 May 2018].

⁴² Kanol, D. and Köprülü, N. 2017. Quality of democracy in unrecognized states: lessons from Northern Cyprus. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 17(3), 389-402.

⁴³ See Pegg, S. 1998. De Facto States in the International System. Institute of International Relations. The University of British Columbia, Working Paper No. 21. Available online at: <http://www.liu.xplorex.com/sites/liu/files/Publications/webwp21.pdf> [Accessed 17 May 2018].

⁴⁴ RCB. 2018. Disagreement between Cavusoglou-Akinci. Available online in Greek at: <http://dialogos.com.cy/blog/diafonia-tsavousoglou-akintzi-gia-kipriako/#.Wt7O5RuFPKU> [Accessed 22 April 2018].

at least partially attest to TRNC's suitability as subject to all three levels of analysis in IR.

TRNC's foreign policy problems include foremost its international recognition via a solution to the Cyprus Problem. Beyond helping it drop its tag as a *de facto* or 'contested state', this would bring in potential economic benefits. Like RoC, the TRNC will be able to receive aid from other states and international bodies, such as the UN Development Programme, the World Bank and the EU.⁴⁵ Its inclusion in the international financial system and international organisations would place it in an accessible position to welcome foreign investment.⁴⁶ A solution to the Cyprus Problem requires the direct involvement of the T/C leader in the negotiations under the UN's auspices.

The opportunity of football reunification also emerges as part of TRNC's foreign policy agenda for two reasons. First, beyond adding to its international status and image, it would take its football association - the TCFA - out of its international isolation with all the implied economic benefits this bears. These benefits include TCFA's financial support by the international sport governance organisations FIFA and UEFA, and money gains in the international football players market – through the lending or sale of players to foreign teams. The present T/C leader *Mustafa Akinci* has stated that the prevention of the "right of holding [international] sports in the TRNC is one of the biggest problems faced on the embargoes issue" and that it is "a crime against humanity".⁴⁷ Most importantly, football reunification could act as a precursor to the island's political unification, preparing the ground for TRNC entrance to the international system as a constituent state entity of a federal Cypriot state. As noted earlier, Kosovo has secured IOC membership and currently striving to become a FIFA member, hoping to eventually earn its full international

⁴⁵ Bahcheli, T. 2004. Under Turkey's wings: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the struggle for international acceptance. In: Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann and Henry Srebrnik (eds.) *De Facto States: The quest for sovereignty*. London: Routledge.

⁴⁶ Gokcekus O. 2009. A Novel Approach in Calculating the Costs of Economic Isolation. *SosyalBilimlerDergisi/ Journal of Social Sciences* [online]. http://works.bepress.com/omer_gokcekus/2 [Accessed 15 April 2013].

⁴⁷ LGC News. 2017. KTFF asks for lifting of embargo in sports. Available online at: <https://www.lgcnews.com/ktff-asks-for-lifting-of-embargo-on-sports/> [Accessed 17 May 2018].

recognition. However, unlike the case of the Cyprus Problem, football reunification does not require the direct involvement of the T/C leader in the negotiations that two NGO's - TCFA and CFA – need to carry under a mediating FIFA agreement.

1.2 The choice of IR paradigms and thesis structure

Addressing the second question, the thesis maintains that an appropriate choice of IR theories can shed light into the football reunification problem, without ignoring the influence of the regional political environment dynamics in the overall solution of the Cyprus Problem. In other words, focusing on just football politics shall not draw a comprehensive picture of football's contribution to the reunification process. The choice of an IR theoretical approach must consider including as many as external and domestic level actors that might influence the decision of TRNC's leaders to endorse or reject FIFA's initiatives towards football reunification on the island. As the thesis' next chapter elaborates in detail, the employed theoretical framework benefits from a merger of the *neo-liberal* and the *neoclassical realist* approaches.

The remainder of this thesis is organised into the following chapters. Chapter 2 presents the literature review, which briefly unveils the roles of actors under different IR theories. Then, it reviews the literature on "sport and IR" to-date, also providing a critical assessment. Subsequently, taking into account the fact that nationalism stands between sport and IR, the chapter proposes a new conceptual framework within which to conduct new research. Finally, the chapter presents the choice of specific IR models suitable for the analysis of the thesis. Therefore, it explains how sport can be used as an IR tool to bring divided societies closer.

Chapter 3 presents the methodological approach followed. The thesis uses the case study approach which includes unobtrusive measures such as content analysis of various digital material in G/C and T/C newspaper websites, the main ones accessed through RoC government's Turkish and TC media section of PIO (Public Information Office). Secondary data analysis and anonymous transcripts from semi-structured interviews with key actors from both sides are part also of the methodology.

Chapter 4 highlights the “Cyprus Problem” using a historical background of Cyprus, its foundation as a sovereign nation-state in 1960, its forceful division into north and south by a Turkish military invasion in 1974 and the local political developments prior to the landmark year 2004, when the international community attempted to reunify the island through a UN-drafted plan known as the *Annan Plan*. The chapter’s second section is divided into three subsections, elaborating in detail upon the history of football in Cyprus: Its introduction by the British; the 1955 football schism between the two communities; and, TRNC’s international isolation.

Chapter 5 constitutes the first segment of the empirical section of the thesis. It examines the *Annan Plan* period, which covers two significant developments in Cyprus’ modern history. The first one was the elite-based negotiations under the UN and the 2004 referendum that took place across the two communities for a political reunification of the island. The second development followed three years later, in 2007, when FIFA began to contemplate its first initiative to reunify the island’s two football associations and thus terminate the international isolation of the T/Cs.

Chapter 6, the second empirical segment of the thesis, presents the politics around two more significant developments in politics and football. The first one was a new 2013 FIFA initiative to symbolically reunify the two divided communities through football. The second one was a fresh UN initiative in 2014 to reunify Cyprus into a new international political entity.

Chapter 7, finally, sums up all the evidence with a discussion explaining that evidence, the theoretical value of the thesis, and the prospect of football as an agent of the island’s reunification.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ The idea for this thesis was conceived while the author was serving in the Greek armed forces as reservist first lieutenant. At that time the international media were publicizing the issue and there were high hopes that it would have a positive conclusion. The thesis proposal was approved by the General Assembly of the Department of Political Science in May 2014.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW: SPORT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The 'Sport and IR' theme has been wavering in the academic circles for the past almost forty years, carving its path as a re-emerging, almost new theme. Given this reality and the fact that IR research continues its focus primarily on national security issues, this topic attracts attention. To understand the role of sport in the reunification of Cyprus, a modest review of IR theories is indispensable. IR theories have emerged almost exclusively as reflections of changes in state relations over time and constitute a very controversial subject. There are many theories, characterized by internal sub-divisions, overlaps as well as critiques since various social sciences have entered the subfield. Following the review of IR theories, this chapter assesses sport and IR research and proposes a conceptual framework within which to examine the case of Cyprus.

2.1. Actors in IR Theories

Initially, the field of IR theories produced two competing schools of thought, the *realist* and the *liberalist*. Until the late 1960s, the field was dominated by the so-called *classical realist* paradigm, which focused on the competitive behaviour of states, acting as single agents in world politics. *Classical realism* emerged due to the incapability of the European nations to secure the preservation of peace after WWI. In response to that catastrophic war, an idealist/liberalist movement was developed, calling upon countries to collaborate and adopt the principles of morality and democracy. In 1928 the *Kellogg-Briand Pact*, signed in Paris, renounced the use of war as an instrument of national policy. However, when Germany and Japan violated this Pact, the idealistic movement was described as both naïve and dangerous, for if the countries had resorted to *realpolitik* (power politics), World War II could have been prevented.⁴⁹ This reaction was portrayed

⁴⁹ Baylis, J., Smith, S. and Owens, P. 2011. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

in the writings of two scholars, *Edward H. Carr* and *Hans Morgenthau*, who are considered to be the founding fathers of *classical realism*.⁵⁰

The relapse from *realpolitik* to idealism and back to *realpolitik*, assigned classical realism an additional feature - pessimism, i.e. the belief that nations are unable to preserve peace and eliminate conflict. This pessimism was a product of the belief that state leaders as actors with a lust for power would always try to dominate others, in an 'anarchic' international system. All in all, *classical realism* was and remains a state-centred approach with the heads of states acting as the sole agents in international politics. As time was passing, the realist camp emerged with new ideas, known as *neo-realist*. American scholar *Kenneth Waltz* proposed that the fundamental mistake of classical realists was their treatment of the state as the sole unit of analysis.⁵¹ The correct method should be the systems-level. Waltz had noticed that, unlike the structure of a country's domestic system, the structure of the international system was 'anarchic' i.e., not characterised by organising principles, specific functions and distribution of capabilities. In the absence of a world authority that could provide security and order, states try to secure their own interests by having their own laws, norms and values.⁵² Thus, while for classical realists' anarchy is a 'permissive force', allowing states to follow their competitive behaviour, for neo-realism anarchy is a "causal force" that explains rivalries among states. Unlike classical realists, neo-realists believe that countries are "rational actors" and they will react presumably to power realities in a given situation, regardless of who is the person in charge. The common thing that classical realists and neo-realists have is that they both question whether there can be any escape from conflict.⁵³

⁵⁰ Carr, E. H. 1946. *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. London: Macmillan; Morgenthau, H. 1948. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Knopf. (Some writers falsely distinguish between "classical" and "neoclassical" realism, viewing the Carr and Morgenthau ideas as "neoclassical" and those of ancient thinkers as "classical". See e.g. Jackson, R. and Sorensen, G. 2007. *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*. Oxford: Oxford University Press).

⁵¹ Waltz, K. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*, Boston: McGraw-Hill.

⁵² Rourke, J. T. 2004. *International Politics on the World Stage*. Boston: McGraw Hill.

⁵³ The neo-realists have split into *defensive* and *offensive* realists. See. Elman, C. and Jensen, M. A. 2014. *The Realism Reader*. London: Routledge.

In the 1970s, the idealist movement of the 1930s resurfaced as a reflection of the times – essentially due to the decline of the cold war. This counter-view to the realist camp became known as the *pluralist* paradigm, resting on the ideas of liberalism. The main idea of pluralism, which emerged initially as *classical liberalism*, is that countries can work together and pursue their goals peacefully. Rivalries among them lead to *zero-sum* games, i.e., games where you have both winners and losers. Cooperation avoids the creation of zero-sum outcomes, so that countries may win without causing negative impacts on others. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye underlined the creation of the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) claiming that realism could not explain those developments. A main contention of pluralists is that the state cannot be the sole unit of analysis in world politics. Instead, it acts as a unifying agent for various interest groups, with the final decisions labelled as its own.⁵⁴

In the 1980s, those two scholars accepted the realist proposition of an ‘anarchic’ international system and repositioned themselves as representatives of a new paradigm, *neo-liberalism*. Neo-liberals expect states to develop strategies and forums for co-operation and collaboration across a whole set of new issues and areas, something that is facilitated by the multiplicity of regimes, treaties and institutions. This notion of co-operation is a distinguishing element among these two camps. *Neo-realists* countered that co-operation and collaboration between states are either risky or non-existent because anarchy leads to a continuous struggle for power. *Neo-liberals* insisted that co-operation and collaboration can be increased through negotiation, establishment of international regimes and exchange of information.⁵⁵ Most importantly, *neo-liberals* argued that international institutions (e.g. the UN) could exert causal ‘force’ on IR to shape state preferences, locking states into co-operative and collaborative arrangements. In co-operation, international institutions shape the expectations of actors, while in collaboration they specify an appropriate behaviour and then make sure that it is

⁵⁴ Keohane, R. O. and Nye Jr., J. S. 1973. *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

⁵⁵ Keohane, R. O. 1984. *After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

actually observed.⁵⁶ Liberal theorist Andrew Moravcsik has criticised the *neo-liberal* paradigm as being submissive to *neo-realism* and argued for a '*non-utopian*' *liberal* approach in which individuals and private groups comprise the set of fundamental actors in international politics, with states and other political institutions being only a subset.⁵⁷

The orthodox Marxist and the neo-Marxist paradigms also focus almost exclusively on state behaviour which they attribute solely to economic interests. Orthodox Marxists saw capitalism as the central cause of international conflict between capitalist and socialist states, while neo-Marxists criticized the unholy alliance between advanced capitalist powers and the ruling elites of the developing world who ought to be overthrown.⁵⁸ However, as the intellectual appeal of Marxism began to decline after the cold war era, a new approach called *constructivism* emerged as a promising critique of both neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Constructivism argued that anarchy is a concept socially constructed and that, despite the fact that there is no objective international system, a conceptualized international order does exist in ideas which are mutually shared among the public. In comparison to realists and liberals, constructivists reject the belief that actors of world politics, states, structures and the anarchical international system are a stable given. Another difference from liberals and realists centres on the way constructivists perceive the goals of the agents. According to them, non-material factors such as ideology, morality and other values play a significant role on a country's perception of the world and its interactions with it.⁵⁹ Thus, for constructivists, it is also the individuals of a country with their ideational attributes and norms that drive IR, the non-government organisations (NGOs) holding a

⁵⁶ Stein A. 1982. Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World. *International Organization* 36(2), 299-324.

⁵⁷ Moravcsik, A., 2003a. Liberal International Relations Theory: A Scientific Assessment. In: Elman, C. and Elman, M. F. (eds.) *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 159-204.

⁵⁸ Walt S. M. 1998. International Relations: One World, Many Theories. *Foreign Policy* 110, 29-32 & 34-46.

⁵⁹ Constructivists have been divided into *modernists*, *critical* and *radical*, mainly on the basis of their treatment of material reality. See, Adler E. 2013. Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, contributions and debates. In: Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T. and Simons, B. A. (eds.) *Handbook of International Relations*. London: Sage.

significant role in the diffusion of these ideas and norms to the population. For some writers⁶⁰ constructivism appears more like a state-centric approach and although there is some disagreement, excluding its radical form, constructivism considers the mutual constitution of agents and structures to be part of its ontology.

In the 1960s, prior to the emergence of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, the idea that an international society driven by norms and identity can co-exist with anarchy was forged and finally surfaced as an IR paradigm under the name *The English School*. This theory was initially published in 1977.⁶¹ The international society is a collectivity of nations working for their common good, as the absence of rules does not necessitate the absence of order. The English School's contemporary version advances three key concepts: *International system*, *international society* and *world society*.⁶² The first one incorporates the realist's view of anarchy, while the second approximates the neo-liberal approach, by stressing the importance of norms, rules and institutions for maximum shared interests among states. And, like constructivism, the third concept, *world society*, places individuals, the global population, and non-state actors at the centre of analysis.

Around 2013, IR theoretical debates were showing signs of saturation and fatigue. Constructivism was accused of its, in essence, convergence with realism.⁶³ Constructivism and other approaches including post-structuralism, critical theory and feminism - all of which are reluctant to endorse the mainstream rationalist conception of how to study world politics – became known as *reflectivist*.⁶⁴ Dunne *et al.* concluded that there seemed to be a truce between the various IR theory camps, and that new ideas would shape the future of the field.⁶⁵

⁶⁰ Jackson P. T. 2004. Bridging the Gap: Toward A Realist-Constructivist Dialogue. *International Studies Review* 6, 337-352.

⁶¹ Bull, H. 2012. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

⁶² Murray, R. W. (ed.) 2015. *System, society and the world: Exploring the English School of international relations*. Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing.

⁶³ Jackson P. T. 2004, *op. cit.*

⁶⁴ Kurki, M. 2008. *Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁶⁵ Dunne T., Hansen, L. and Wight, C. 2013. The end of IR theory? *European Journal of International Relations* 19(3), 405-425.

Since the late 1990s a new realist paradigm, *neoclassical realism*, emerged but it soon began to revitalise and become known for its attempt to overcome the shortcomings of mainstream theories including neo-realism.⁶⁶ Neoclassical realists seek to explain a state's foreign policy outcomes, while neo-realists try to explain recurrent patterns in international outcomes. Neo-realists ignore the importance of domestic differences between countries, arguing that pressures from the international system are so strong that they force similarly situated states to behave alike. In contrast, neoclassical realists pay significant attention to domestic – or unit-level - variables.

In the neoclassical realist model, the *independent variable* is the 'anarchic' international system. However, within that system, the strategic environment can be either *permissive* or *restrictive*, depending on how imminent and intense are the threats and opportunities that states face. In a permissive environment, threats and opportunities are more remote and less intense, compared to a restrictive environment. In restrictive environments, material factors determine the policy choices of regimes, as national security may be in imminent threat. In permissive environments, however, it is domestic political circumstances, ideology and ideas that have priority over material resources and national security is not threatened imminently.

The 'anarchic' structure of the system may also be affected by various resources, called "structural modifiers" and include geography, technology, and the offence-defence military balance. The *dependent* variable is the outcome of a state's given foreign policy. Between the independent and the dependent variable are situated the model's *intervening* variables, the most important one being *leader images*. Schweller observes four more intervening variables that constrain leaders: *elite consensus*, *elite cohesion*, *social cohesion* and *regime vulnerability*⁶⁷, while

⁶⁶ Ripsman, N. M., Taliaferro, J. W. and Lobell, S. E. 2016. *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

⁶⁷ Schweller, R. L. 2006. *Political Constraints on the Balance of Power*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Ripsman *et al.* propose *strategic culture, state-society relations* and *domestic political institutions*.⁶⁸

The leader is conceived as the 'foreign policy executive' (FPE) and includes the *president, prime minister, key cabinet members, ministers and* presidential and government *advisors* responsible for the conduct of foreign and defence policies. This conception stems from the neorealist belief that the perceptions of leaders on relative power must be analyzed because the primary actors in IR are statesmen, not states. Leaders are held accountable for reading systemic pressures as well as preparing for and responding to threats and opportunities. A leader's own "operational codes", stemming from beliefs about politics, best strategies to one's interests as well as images of the enemy, may also affect the national foreign policy responses. Leaders tend to be unwilling to accept losses in their state's relative power, status, or prestige and often continue to invest in failed foreign policy initiatives.

The other intervening variables can also shape the leader's images. The second intervening variable that Ripsman *et al.* propose, *strategic culture*, may refer to various things including a state's organisational culture (e.g. bureaucracy) or a broader notion of culture, e.g., a society's beliefs, expectations and worldviews. Strategic culture components that can affect the leader's attitudes toward international affairs are *dominant ideologies* and *degrees of nationalism*. Taliaferro emphasizes the degree of *state-sponsored nationalism* and the existence of a *statist (or anti-statist)* ideology.⁶⁹ A nationalist culture, can aid the leader mobilise resources in support of a national security policy. Often, leaders become trapped by strategic culture even when the strategic environment they face is permissive.

The third intervening variable, *state-society relations*, concerns the interactions between state institutions and various social groups. These relations are critical as regards a leader's ability to "extract, mobilise, and harness the nation's

⁶⁸ Ripsman, N. M., Taliaferro, J. W. and Lobell, S. E. 2016, *op. cit.*

⁶⁹ Taliaferro, J. W. 2009. Neoclassical Realism and Resource Extraction: State Building for Future War. In: Lobell, S. E., Ripsman, N. M. and Taliaferro, J. W. (eds.) *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 215-222.

power”.⁷⁰ Lastly, *domestic political institutions* determine who can contribute to policy formation and may, therefore, exert an important impact on a leader’s ability to respond to systemic pressures.

A critical dimension of the neoclassical realist model concerns the interaction and influence among the leader and the other intervening variables. The model proponents’ views are as follows.⁷¹

Professor Ripsman: Over time, individual leaders may be able to influence the shape of domestic institutions and strategic culture. Leaders may try to influence public attitudes, although the public might also try to influence leader attitudes, so the influence is not necessarily unidirectional. But: 1) that is only over time. At any given snapshot in time, one has to deal with the institutions, actors and attitudes that exist, as it takes much time for them to change; and 2) the leader is only one of many potential influences on institutions, actors and attitudes. Therefore, to assume that, even in a dictatorship, the leader can completely control other actors/forces, is problematic.

Professor Taliaferro: There are some states in which the FPE is highly insulated from state-society relations and where the *mobilization and extractive capacity* of central institutions are quite robust. In liberal democracies, however, the circumstances under which this could happen are more limited. The conditions under which the FPE of a liberal democracy can simply override strategic culture or state-society relations, will likely be confined to international crises. The windows of opportunity to remake or substantially reform domestic institutions and strategic culture will likely be narrow ones.

This brief review of IR theories is better understood when supplemented with the notion of *power*, which is embedded in all IR paradigms in different and various forms. Barnett and Duval identify four types of power in international politics: *compulsory, institutional, structural* and *productive*.⁷² *Compulsory* power refers to the ability of actor A to get actor B do what B is unwilling to do. States may use material resources, such as weapons and economic sanctions – known as ‘hard power’ - but non-state actors (e.g. NGOs) may use symbolic and normative resources, such as the strategy of ‘shaming’ to make states change their policies.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 71.

⁷¹ Personal communication with Professors Norin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro.

⁷² Barnett, M. and Duvall, R. 2005. Power in International Politics. *International Organization* 59(1), 39-75.

Institutional power refers to the control of others by formal and informal institutions that mediate between the actors and work through the rules that define them, e.g. the UN's General Assembly and Security Council. Hall attaches a distinctive element to institutional power by redefining it as "the options available to state actors according to their membership and relative position within specific international organisations which enable those states to exercise influence with them".⁷³

Structural power is an outcome of the structural positions of the actors, e.g. a master-slave relation. *Productive* power relates to the labelling of the actors to generate asymmetries and exert pressure. For example, states are often labelled either positively as "civilized" and "democratic" or negatively as "rogue" or "unstable".⁷⁴ *Reputational* power confers a state to achieve desired outcomes through influence because of its reputation. Finally, *representational* power refers to the ability of a state that enjoys a high representation in the international community, to coerce other states and make surrender their subjectivity.⁷⁵

Since the early 1990s, Joseph Nye, a neo-liberal theorist, has distinguished between "hard power" and "soft power", i.e., between compulsory or coercive and non-compulsory or non-coercive forms of power. Nye's definition of 'soft power' is:⁷⁶

"A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it".

America's soft power, according to Nye, is rooted in such cultural values as world cinema (Hollywood), *ivy-league* education (Harvard University), high technology (Microsoft) and professional sport (Michael Jordan). This admiration, however, is not sufficient to warrant a positive policy outcome. Soft power involves the ability of an actor (e.g., a country) to obtain preferred outcomes through means such as

⁷³ Hall, T. 2010. An Unclear Attraction: A Critical Examination of Soft Power as an Analytical Category. *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3, 189-211, 208.

⁷⁴ Barnett, M. and Duvall, R. 2005, *op. cit.*

⁷⁵ Hall, T. 2010, *op. cit.*

⁷⁶ Nye Jr. J. S. 2004. *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics*. NY: Public Affairs, 5.

agenda-setting, persuasion and co-optation or attraction that do not draw upon force. As Nye put it: ⁷⁷

“...the types of resources associated with hard power include tangibles such as force [military force] and money [economic sanctions]. The types of resources associated with soft power often include intangible factors such as institutions, ideas, values, culture, and the perceived legitimacy of policies”.

“Soft power” has become a rather controversial concept. Nye himself admits that even if followed closely and instrumentally, this power can be used effectively, only if other countries acknowledge it. Since soft power resources are not self-activated, Nye attempted to delineate the concept in terms of public diplomacy (PD). In a 2008 work, he states: ⁷⁸

“Public diplomacy is an instrument that **governments** use to mobilize these resources [culture, values, policies] to communicate with and attract the publics of other countries, rather than merely their governments. Public diplomacy tries to attract by drawing attention to these potential resources through broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports, arranging exchanges, and so forth. But if the content of a country’s culture, values, and policies are not attractive, public diplomacy that “broadcasts” them cannot **produce** soft power. It may **produce** just the opposite [bolds by author].

2.2. Sport and IR

‘Sport and IR’ research has a ruttled contemporary history. The first work addressing the topic was a 1978 collection of papers edited by Lowe *et al.*⁷⁹The collection attempted to synthesise knowledge on sport, culture and political institutions, but its handicap was the lack of clear theoretical foundations. Eight years later, Taylor pointed out that sport and IR research had mutually neglected each other.⁸⁰ Another eight years later, Houlihan laid the theoretical premises of

⁷⁷ Nye Jr., J. S. 2011. *The Future of Power*. New York: Public Affairs (p. 21).

⁷⁸ Nye Jr., J. S. 2008. Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, 94–109, 95).

⁷⁹ Lowe, B, Kanin, D B. and Strenk, A. (eds.) 1978. *Sport and International Relations*. Champaign, IL: Stipes Publishing Co.

⁸⁰ Taylor, T. 1986. Sport and international relations: A case of mutual neglect. In: Allison, L. *The Politics of Sport*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 27-48.

the field, in his 1994 pioneer study on *Sport and International Politics*.⁸¹ Much later, Levermore and Budd and Allison and Monnington pointed out the rare inclusion of sports in IR research.⁸² Subsequently, others took over to fill in the gap, the relevant literature beginning to analyse sport in the frame of IR theories. Research on sport and IR has now proceeded with detailed and often salient analyses focusing on various case-studies. The journal *Sport in Society* hosted two special issues, along with a few other issues with closely connected themes.⁸³ *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, the journal *Diplomacy and Statecraft*⁸⁴ and the *Public Diplomacy* magazine also devoted special issues on “Sports Diplomacy”,⁸⁵ while the research community continues to cast its views in other publication outlets.⁸⁶

As mentioned above, the first analytic study of sport in international politics was conducted by Houlihan.⁸⁷ He placed this study under three groups of theories, *the realist*, *the pluralist* and *the globalist*. In casting the last group, his focus was on the international system, fearing that multinationals would eventually weaken the state’s ability to use sport for diplomatic purposes. His central thesis was that a theory could evaluate and explain the diplomatic value of sport only if it includes the role of non-state actors. This applies regardless of the status of sport, whether directly state-controlled, state-supported merely or left entirely in the hands of non-state actors.

The neo-liberal argument that social, economic and cultural issues are also the subject of IR, not only national (in)security issues - that imply the use of military force – was also an inspiring source. Any international actor’s attempt to enhance

⁸¹ Houlihan, B. 1994. *Sport and International Politics*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

⁸² Levermore, R. and Budd, A. (eds.) 2004. *Sport and International Relations: An Emerging Relationship*. London: Routledge; Allison, L. and Monnington, T. 2005. Sport, prestige and international relations. In: Allison, L. (ed.) *The Global Politics of Sport*. London: Routledge, 5–25.

⁸³ *Sport in Society*. 2008. Sport and foreign policy in a globalizing world 11(4); *Sport in Society*. 2014. Sport and diplomacy 17(9).

⁸⁴ *Diplomacy & Statecraft*. 2016. Diplomacy & Sport 27:2.

⁸⁵ *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*. 2013. Sports Diplomacy 8(3-4); *Public Diplomacy* - a magazine of the Association of Public Diplomacy Scholars at the University of Southern California. 2013. Sports Diplomacy, Winter.

⁸⁶ The research community includes all these scholars who study sport and politics.

⁸⁷ Houlihan, B. 1994, *op. cit.*

its socio-economic and cultural status within the international community was in effect using it as an IR tool. As part of culture, sport could be used as a *soft power* resource, in international politics. Thus, that single tenet of the *neo-liberal* paradigm enabled the further connection of sport and IR theories and Nye's PD has been christened *cultural diplomacy*.⁸⁸

The 'soft power' of sport and 'sports diplomacy' templates appeared in the sports literature of the late 2000s and early 2010s.⁸⁹ However, a group of researchers, in which Houlihan is heavily involved, have used them systematically ever since. This group believes that if cultural resources are part of the new 'politics of attraction' or 'new diplomacy', mega-sporting events can be understood as campaigns that constitute parts of a *soft power* strategy.⁹⁰ While this approach is appreciated, its weaknesses include its inability to measure the impact of specific mega-sporting event campaigns on a country's total soft power and the fact that it remains 'one-dimensional' - from the point of view that it relies only on one of the neo-liberal paradigm's tenets.

The work of the second group of researchers, led by Stuart Murray, is grounded squarely on PD, yet without any mention of IR theories.⁹¹ State sports diplomacy, geared towards using sports people to assist a state's standard diplomatic corps

⁸⁸ See e.g., Lane, P. 2013. *French Scientific and Cultural Diplomacy*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. Also, 'Cultural Diplomacy: The Lynchpin of Public Diplomacy', Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy U.S. Department of State, 2005. Available online at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/54374.pdf> [Accessed 28 May 2016].

⁸⁹ Manzenreiter, W., 2008. Football diplomacy, post-colonialism and Japan's quest for normal state Status. *Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics* 1(4), 414-428; Manzenreiter, W., 2010. The Beijing Games in the Western Imagination of China: The Weak Power of Soft Power. *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* 34(1), 29-48.

⁹⁰ Grix, J. and Lee, D., 2013. Soft Power, Sports Mega-Events and Emerging States: The Lure of the Politics of Attraction. *Global Society* 27(4), 521-536; Grix, J. and Houlihan, B., 2014. Sports Mega-Events as Part of a Nation's Soft Power Strategy: The Cases of Germany (2006) and the UK (2012). *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 16, 572-596; Grix, J., Brannagan, P.M. and Houlihan, B., 2015. Interrogating States' Soft Power Strategies: A Case Study of Sports Mega-Events in Brazil and the UK. *Global Society* 29(3), 463-479; Grix, J. and Brannagan, P. M., 2016. Of Mechanisms and Myths: Conceptualising States' "Soft Power" Strategies through Sports Mega-Events. *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 27(2), 251-272.

⁹¹ Murray, S. 2012. The two halves of sports diplomacy. *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 23, 576-592; Murray, S. 2013a. Moving Beyond the Ping-Pong Diplomacy in the Modern Diplomatic Environment. *Public Diplomacy Magazine*, Winter, 11-16; Murray, S. 2013b. Sports diplomacy in the Australian context: A case study of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *Sports Law eJournal*. Available online at: <http://epublications.bond.edu.au/slej/18> [accessed 14 February 2015].

and IR needs, is Murray's favourite research topic. Murray laments Australia's outdated and inadequate diplomatic service, which could acquire potential power if it opted to include sports diplomacy, given that the people of Australia's neighbours such as Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and the Solomon Islands are sports crazy.⁹²In the cold war era, the US State Department utilised the famous African-American basketball team *Harlem Globetrotters* as goodwill ambassadors to promote positive images of the American capitalist system, democracy and race relations. Starting their tour from Panama City on 19 April 1952, to celebrate the team's 25th anniversary, the Harlem Globetrotters played in 85 cities and 32 countries across South America, Europe, Asia, and Australia.⁹³

Beyond studies on mega-sporting event campaigns, a significant body of research has focused on the intended or unintended consequences of sport on a country's IR and multicultural community co-existence. Sports could unite but also divide countries and multi-ethnic communities. Football, for example, was often referred to as "war minus the shooting".⁹⁴ Sports researchers have dealt with such issues, yet only a few of them have followed an IR theoretic approach.

The classic example of how sport can severely hurt IR is the so-called "Football War" between El Salvador and Honduras.⁹⁵ On 8 June 1969, playing for the 1970 World Cup, Honduras beat El Salvador 1-0. The return match took place in El Salvador in a highly tense and threatening atmosphere. The Honduran team was brought to the stadium in an armoured vehicle, the Honduran flag was torn apart, and the team lost 3-0. Two Honduran supporters were killed, and as a result, the border was closed, and the army arrested El Salvadorian farmers living in Honduras. On the 29th of June, El Salvador won the decisive match in Mexico by 3-2. The Honduran army again attacked El Salvadorian expatriates. On 14 July, the El Salvadorian army attacked Honduras beginning a war that lasted four days,

⁹² Murray, S. 2013b, *op. cit.*

⁹³ Damion, T. 2011. Around the world: problematizing the Harlem Globetrotters as cold war warriors. *Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics* 14(6), 778-791.

⁹⁴ Beck, P. J. 2013. 'War Minus the Shooting': George Orwell on International Sport and the Olympics. *Sport in History* 33(1), 72-94.

⁹⁵ Cable V. 1969. The 'Football War' and the Central American Common Market. *International Affairs* 45(4), 658-671.

before the Organisation of American States (OAS) obtained a cease-fire and the Salvadorian troops withdrew.

The case of Algeria and Egypt portrays a similar, yet milder, image. Both countries were drawn to play in the same Group for the qualifying matches of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. When the Algerian football team arrived in Cairo for a return match against Egypt, their bus was attacked by Egyptian fans who threw stones and rocks at them. After Egypt won the match by 2-0, Egyptian company offices in Algiers were attacked by angry Algerian mobs. The playoff match took place in a neutral country, Sudan. Algerian fans had been purchasing daggers and knives to take revenge, but Egyptian fans also attempted to attack the Algerian team. The Egyptian President *Hosni Mubarak* bluntly told the Sudanese government that he was ready to send in the army if necessary, because “Egypt does not tolerate those who hurt the dignity of its sons”.⁹⁶ After Egypt lost 1-0, hundreds of Egyptians attacked the Algerian Embassy in Cairo vandalising cars, stores and burning Algerian flags. FIFA charged the Egyptian Football Association over attacks on the Algerian team and in response they threatened to pull out of international competition for two years.⁹⁷ Subsequently, the Presidents of the two countries ordered the media to discontinue their negative reporting on the events and tensions gradually subsided.

Several country study examples involve the use of sport for the reunification of ethnically or politically divided countries, outside SfDP programmes. A well-known example is an international campaign and Nelson Mandela’s campaign against apartheid in South Africa, and a lesser-known case was *George Weah*, a

⁹⁶ Benghida, S. 2014. World Cup Football in International Relations: The 2009 Algerian-Egyptian football conflict. *International Journal of Innovation and Applied Studies* 9(1), 234-238, 237.

⁹⁷ FIFA’s final punishment of Egypt was to play their first two home 2014 World Cup qualifiers at least 100 km outside the capital Cairo accompanied by 100,000 Swiss francs (\$88,570) fine for the breach of security which led to the injury of four Algerian delegation members. See, REUTERS. 2010. Soccer-Egypt get Cairo World Cup ban over Algeria trouble. Available online at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/soccer-world-egypt/soccer-egypt-get-cairo-world-cup-ban-over-algeria-trouble-idUSLDE64H2BK20100518> [Accessed 15 March 2015].

Liberian football player, whose catalytic role in making peace a symbol of the national team signified an end of the first Liberian civil war of 1989-1996.⁹⁸

In the two Yemens' case, a 1968 military coup led to the formation of *North Yemen* and a 1967 revolution against the British in the south formed *South Yemen*. Until 1990, when economic disaster plagued both countries, they followed opposing policies based on their political ideologies; the North followed a capitalist model and the South a Marxist ideology. Sport, however, was always a means for opening institutional contacts between the two governments and a venue for conveying important socio-political and historical messages. Cross-border football contests reinforced the idea of the imagined community, but the preliminary step in the process of merging the two Yemens was the formation of a Yemeni national football team in 1988. Thus, sport appears to have helped Yemen reunite into one nation deriving from pre-Islamic kingdoms.⁹⁹

The case of N. Ireland is an example where sport is organised along sectarian and religious lines, reinforcing the existing ethnic division. Some positive changes have been observed to the *status quo* there relatively recently, originating mainly from people's remarks on the necessity for 'peace' and from external developments which have influenced sport in other societies.¹⁰⁰ Even so, while sport is often used in the nation-building process, in this case, it may need to be the other way around.¹⁰¹ This seems to be a key question in sport and politics research.

In the Balkans, Bosnia-Herzegovina remains a politically fractured country, but football has made strides towards ethnic integration. It has even attracted Croats and Serbs, who are eager to play in European football matches, to its multi-ethnic

⁹⁸ Armstrong, G. 2007, *op. cit.*

⁹⁹ Stevenson T. B. and Aloug, A. K. 2008. Sports Diplomacy and Emergent Nationalism Football Links between the Two Yemens, 1970–1990. *Anthropology of the Middle East* 3(2), 1–19.

¹⁰⁰ Bairner, A. 2002. Sport, sectarianism and society in a divided Ireland revisited. In Sugden, J. and Tomlinson, A. (eds.) *Power games: a critical sociology of sport*. London: Routledge.

¹⁰¹ Bairner, A. 2013. Sport, the Northern Ireland peace process, and the politics of identity. *Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research* 5(4), 220-229.

national team.¹⁰² As Dedovic, a development assistant at the European Council on Foreign Relations, noted:¹⁰³

“While Bosnian political figures were disagreeing over the minor complexities of canton boundaries and ID numbers during the first half of the 2013, the Bosnian national team defeated former Euro 2004 champions and group favourites Greece at the *Biljno Polje* stadium in *Zenica* with a score of 3-1”.

Merkel’s study of the two Koreas is one of the few that have followed an IR theoretic framework.¹⁰⁴ Merkel examines three paradigms; the *realist*, the *pluralist* and the *Marxist*. Then, following a qualitative research approach, he follows the *pluralist* paradigm. Merkel notes that since 1990 there have been positive developments in the field of sports among the two countries. At the 2000 Sydney, 2004 Athens and 2006 Turin Winter Olympic opening ceremonies, all Korean athletes marched together under the same flag used in the 1991 World Tennis Championship. In the opening ceremonies, the name ‘Korea’ was used to represent the two countries, but the heads of the two Olympic committees followed with two separate flags. South Korea has made several attempts to approach the North through sports reunification, but their attempts have failed, stumbling in bureaucracies. Efforts to organise sports events and exchanges between the two countries have met with success, and all these attempts have seemed to bring North Korea out of its isolation - yet without a visible improvement in the sphere of national politics.

Merkel attributes this outcome to the structure of the international system which constrains the behaviour of states, and, he argues that is an implied element of the *Pluralist* paradigm. As Merkel put it:¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² Hough, P. 2008. Make Goals Not War: The Contribution of International Football to World Peace, *International Journal of the History of Sport* 25(10), 1287-1305.

¹⁰³ Dedovic E. 2013. The Bosnian national football team: a case study in post-conflict institution building. Available online at: <http://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/edin-dedovic/bosnian-national-football-team-case-study-in-post-conflict-instituti> [Accessed 25 October 2013].

¹⁰⁴ Merkel, U. 2008. The Politics of Sport Diplomacy and Reunification in Divided Korea, One Nation Two Countries and Three Flags. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport* 43(3), 289-311

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 294.

“In general, the status quo of two co-existing Korean states is beneficial to all parties concerned, most of all the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as well as the two superpowers of China and the USA who have a vested interest in the political events on the divided peninsula”.

Additionally, Merkel brings forth an important political-economic dimension of an eventual unification of Korea: a sudden collapse of North Korea would place a severe economic burden on South Korea that are estimated to be ten times greater than those of Germany’s reunification. In a later work Merkel provides a comparison of the Koreas and Germany. Co-operation between North and the South Korea in the world of sport is multi-dimensional, it occurs at various levels and appears to be an important diplomatic tool, whereas East and West Germany used sport to establish distinctive national identities and to fight ideological battles, even if it stressed differences and consolidated the existing political division.¹⁰⁶ Van Tassell and Terry revisit the case of Korean unification via sport, without adding any new information to Merkel’s work.¹⁰⁷

An interesting theme in sport & IR research is that of sports rivalries in the form of mega-sporting event boycotts. Sports boycotts have a long history and appear as signs of state behaviour under *classical realism*. Thus far, the single academic work on this theme used a *classical realist* approach to study US Olympic boycotts of the period 1936-2008.¹⁰⁸ Very recently, as the 2018 FIFA World Cup finals had been scheduled to take place in Moscow, the confrontation between pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian regime as well as the US-Russia conflict over Ukraine revived memories of the cold war. Ukraine had asked western countries to boycott the Games and, were this to occur it could intensify international friction. This rivalry was finally resolved in a *neo-liberal* style, as FIFA’s former head Joseph Blatter, staging himself as a broker on behalf of the international sport’s governing

¹⁰⁶ Merkel U. 2009. Sport, Politics and Reunification – A Comparative Analysis of Korea and Germany. *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 26(3), 406-428.

¹⁰⁷ Van Tassell, D. H. and Terry, D. E. 2012. An overlooked path to peace and stability: sport, the state and the case of the Koreas. *Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics* 15(6), 814-822.

¹⁰⁸ Berg, B. K., Kessler, S. E. and Hunt, T. M., 2012. A realist perspective of sport and international relations: US government perceptions of the Olympic boycott movements, 1936-2008. *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics* 4(3), 1-14.

agency, insisted on keeping the Games in Russia because they would help solve regional disputes.¹⁰⁹

Finally, it should not escape our attention that occasionally rapprochements among nations through sport originate directly from heads of states. This theme could be treated as one belonging to an *inverted classical realist* approach. Such initiatives may have an unpredictable fate as three example cases, US-Iran, India-Pakistan and Turkey-Armenia, indicate. At the initiative of the two countries' leaders, the national football teams of Iran and the US had played against each other in France in 1998 for the World Cup Games. They met again on 16 January 2000 in Pasadena, California, in front of an enthusiastic crowd but that never produced any positive outcome at the diplomatic level.¹¹⁰ In the Armenia-Turkey case, during a visit to Moscow in June 2008, Armenian President *Sarkisian* invited Turkey's President *Abdulah Gül* to travel to Armenia's capital Yerevan and watch a World Cup qualifying football match between the two countries. *Gül* accepted *Sarkisian's* invitation, but two years later, the relevant accords that had been signed between the two countries died due to public pressure and their territorial disputes.¹¹¹ In the India-Pakistan case, the outcome was different, despite their conflict over the disputed area of *Kashmir*. The two countries fought three wars since their independence from Britain in 1947. In 1987, as both countries were amassing troops on their borders, to defuse tension Pakistan's President launched a "cricket diplomacy", watching a cricket test match with India's President. In 2002 the two countries were again on the brink of war, this time possessing nuclear weapons. After declaring a ceasefire and launching a formal peace process in 2004, Pakistan's President toured India, and in 2005 the Indian Prime Minister invited Pakistan's President in New Delhi to watch a cricket match. It was after the match that they declared the peace process as irreversible, which turned into the summit where both countries agreed to open up the militarized frontier dividing the

¹⁰⁹ Gibson, O. 2015. Fifa's Sepp Blatter says 2018 World Cup in Russia will stabilise region. Available online at: <http://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/mar/20/fifa-sepp-blatter-2018-world-cup-russia-peace-region> [accessed 2 April 2015].

¹¹⁰ Chehabi, H. E. 2001. Sport Diplomacy between the United States and Iran. *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 12(1), 89-106.

¹¹¹ Kalpakian, J. and Ipek, V. 2011. The Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement Processes: A Case Study Approach. *Digest of Middle East Studies* 20(2), 291–321. Available online at: <http://baltvilks.livejournal.com/106450.html> [Accessed 18 November 2013].

disputed Kashmir region. Likewise, in 2008, following an Islamist attack in *Mumbai* that killed dozens of people, peace talks were suspended until 2011 when the Indian Prime Minister invited Pakistan's President to watch with him the Cricket World Cup finals in *Mohali*.¹¹²

2.3. A conceptual framework for 'Sport and IR' research

The study of football reunification in Cyprus requires setting up an appropriate conceptual IR framework, the main reason being that 'nationalism' emerges as a significant unit-level variable for analysis. The mainstream nationalism discourse, which involves three main approaches – *modernism*, *primordialism*, and *ethno-symbolism* – has provided great assistance to the study of 'sport and nationalism'.¹¹³ Along modernist lines, Cashman has shown how and why sport as a form of culture contributed to the "imagined nation" in recent centuries, using Australia's example.¹¹⁴ Bairner looked at the primordial formation of national identities through cases where sport and landscape were seen together as a whole.¹¹⁵ And, along ethno-symbolist lines, Hargreaves saw sport and nationalism interconnected because they harbour the same cultural traditions.¹¹⁶ The mainstream nationalism discourse also incorporates the "submerged" nationalism – of nations without states¹¹⁷ – and distinguishes "civic" from "ethnic" nationalism.¹¹⁸ The case of football reunification in multi-ethnic Bosnia-

¹¹² Showkat, N. 2013. Cricket Diplomacy between India and Pakistan: A Case Study of Leading National Dailies of Both the Countries (The Hindu & Dawn). *Journal of Mass Communication Journalism* 3(1): <http://dx.doi.org/10.4172/2165-7912.1000142> .

¹¹³ For *modernism*, the foundations of a nation rest on cultural, not biological, premises. *Primordialism* holds that nationalism is a natural phenomenon, for it has historical roots that go back centuries to the beginning of human civilisation. *Ethno-symbolism*, finally, follows a mixed approach, viewing nationalism as a modern phenomenon with pre-modern roots.

¹¹⁴ Cashman, R. 2002. *National Imagination: Australian Sport in the Federation Decades*, Sydney: Walla Walla Press.

¹¹⁵ Bairner, A. 2009. National sports and national landscapes: In defence of primordialism. *National Identities* 11(3), 223-239.

¹¹⁶ Hargreaves, J. 2000. *Freedom for Catalonia: Catalan nationalism, Spanish identity and the Barcelona Olympic Games*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹¹⁷ The UK, for example, includes the submerged nations of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, all FIFA members.

¹¹⁸ Civic nationalism is based on ideals and history, with claims and actions for territorial sovereignty made in the name of a citizenry that set aside their cultural and ethnic differences to

Herzegovina in the Balkans constitutes an example of civic nationalism – although external actors played a decisive role towards that end.¹¹⁹ The Palestinian campaign to oust Israel’s football association from FIFA bears the budge of ethnic nationalism.¹²⁰ Finally, “submerged nationalism” uses sporting events as opportunities to stimulate self-awareness and political mobilisation, often pushing towards the creation of a nation-state.¹²¹

Since nationalism stands between sport and IR, a robust conceptual framework for future research needs to interlink the three, as shown in Figure 2.1. As regards the three sides of the schema in Figure 2.1, this thesis has briefly presented and criticised the mega-sporting events ‘one-dimensional’ approach. Similarly, the link between sport and nationalism appears in existing sports literature, although Bairner cautions that:¹²²

...the extent to which sociologists of sport have contributed to our understanding of the various relationships that exist between the ‘nation’ and sport has been rather limited. This is due to the ‘tendency in the sociology of sport to take for granted such concepts as nation, nation-state, nationality, national identity and nationalism and to ignore debates about these concepts within mainstream nationalism studies.

Deriving the link between nationalism and IR is a more contentious task. Research conducted already indicates that sporting nationalism has had particularly adverse consequences to the positioning of nations and national populations against each other. There have been cases where sports triggered severe conflict, but the

forge nationhood and statehood. The origins of ethnic nationalism are rooted in the belief along *primordialist* lines of a real kinship and myth of shared ancestry

¹¹⁹ Cooley, L. 2018. The governance of sport in deeply divided societies: Actors and institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus and Northern Ireland. *In*: Rofe, J.S. and Dichter, H.L. (eds.) *Sport and Diplomacy: Games within Games*, Manchester: Manchester University Press (forthcoming).


¹²⁰ Dorsey, J. M. 2015. Contours of future Israeli-Palestinian battles emerge on the soccer pitch. Available online at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-dorsey/contours-of-future-israel_b_6966574.html [accessed 30 March 2015].

¹²¹ Bairner, A. 2008. Sport, Nationalism and Globalization: Relevance, Impact, Consequences. *Hitotsubashi Journal of Arts and Sciences* 49, 43-53.

¹²² Bairner, A. 2015. Assessing the sociology of sport: On national identity and nationalism. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport* 50(4-5), 375-379.

relevant research was not within an IR theoretic framework. Consulting the relevant mainstream discourse provides some useful orientation.

Figure 2.1: A conceptual framework for ‘sport and IR’ research’ *



*Drafted by the author of this thesis.

Bloom and Paul *et al.* offer an intuitive view of the link between nationalism and IR. Bloom asserts that nation-building is a dynamic process, which occurs so long as the mass of citizens, directly or indirectly, actually experience both the domestic and international actions of the state.¹²³ Nationalism does not create a national identity, but it can harness an existing one. Non-governmental actors, however, can influence a state’s foreign policy choices by triggering the national identity dynamic. Paul *et al.*, while not rejecting the national identity dynamic, consider nation-building as a process aiming either to integrate a society internationally or to secure its international political *status*.¹²⁴

More importantly, in light of actor roles under the IR paradigms presented earlier, both *neo-realism* and *neo-liberalism* favour systemic over the unit-level investigation. Only *neoclassical realism* and ‘*non-utopian*’ *liberalism* can problematize nationalism as a variable that mediates the external environment and

¹²³ Bloom, W. 1993. *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bloom’s approach is compatible with the *constructivist* and the *neoclassical realism* paradigms.

¹²⁴ Paul, T. V., Welch Larson, D. and Wohlforth, W. C. 2014. *Status in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ‘Status’ refers to a set of collective beliefs about a given state’s ranking of valued attributes such as wealth, coercive capabilities, culture, demographic position, socio-political organization, and diplomatic strength.

influences the domestic political process and the perceptions of foreign policy-makers. The next two paradigms, *constructivism*, and the *English School* can also help explain nationalism. *Constructivism* derives its strength from the emphasis it places on the constitutive and discursive role of domestic unit factors that shape world affairs, e.g., identity and culture. Finally, since the English School's concept of *world society* puts individuals, the global population, and non-state actors at the centre of its analysis it can also accommodate nationalism. Table 2.1 portrays a preliminary schedule for current and proposed future research.

Table 2.1: Current and Future 'Sport & IR' Research

IR THEORIES EMPLOYED IN CURRENT RESEARCH	IR THEORIES WITH POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE RESEARCH *
<p><i>Classical realism</i> (boycotting mega-sporting events)</p> <p><i>Neo-liberalism</i> (hosting mega-sporting events, reunification through sport)</p>	<p><i>'Non-utopian' liberalism</i> (sport for nation-building, reunification through sport)</p> <p><i>Constructivism</i> (sports rivalries, reunification through sport, sport for nation-building)</p> <p><i>Neoclassical realism</i> (boycotting mega-sporting events, sports rivalries, sport for nation-building, reunification through sport)</p> <p><i>English School</i> (sport for nation building, reunification through sport)</p>

* Supportive evidence: Sharp (2009), *English School*; Cho (2012), *Constructivism*; Giulianotti *et al.* (2017), a synthesis of IR theories. Indicative themes in parentheses.

The proposed framework in Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1 points also to the direction that synthetic approaches are appropriate, not to say necessary, a dimension that well-known theorists fully support. In his pioneer study, Houlihan had argued for the inclusion of constructivist principles in IR theorising, particularly with regards to *pluralism* and *globalism*, although *constructivism* was only beginning to gain a

foothold as a legitimate IR paradigm at the time.¹²⁵ Neo-realist scholar Walt claimed that we could not capture the complexity of contemporary international affairs using a single theoretic approach.¹²⁶ Liberal theoriser Moravcsik contended that *synthesis* is straightforward so long as it comprises a set of discrete IR theories intertwined coherently at some fundamental level (e.g. some overarching assumptions) but not the full range of each theory's fundamental ontology.¹²⁷ And most recent sports research has begun to adopt this idea.¹²⁸ Three case-study examples also support the proposed conceptual framework: Algeria vs Egypt, the two Koreas, and Kosovo.

2.3.1. Algeria vs Egypt

The study of the football conflict between the two countries, mentioned earlier, was a media-history exercise,¹²⁹ but it would fit well into a *neo-liberal* frame of analysis, under which international institutions can guarantee positive-sum games. However, to fully understand the Egypt-Algeria conflict we would need to see it synthetically, also using the *constructivist's* lens. Historical records show that the Algerian team players were the heirs of those who had given up professional careers in France in 1958 to participate in Algeria's war of independence. Algeria's resistance movement, the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) had created the national football team, and when the country won its independence in 1962, that team composed the core of the new national side.¹³⁰ The match between Algeria and Egypt, therefore, may have been socially constructed as a battle over Arab international representation, i.e. a conflict over which of the two countries had the

¹²⁵ Houlihan, B. 1994, *op. cit.*

¹²⁶ Walt S. M. 1998, *op. cit.*

¹²⁷ Moravcsik, A. 2003b. Theory Synthesis in International Relations: Real Not Metaphysical. *International Studies Review* 5, 131-136.

¹²⁸ Giulianotti, R., Collison, H., Darnell, S. and Howe, D. 2017. Contested states and the politics of sport: the case of Kosovo – division, development, and recognition. *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics* 9(1), 121-136, 122.

¹²⁹ Benghida, S., 2014, *op.cit.*

¹³⁰ Dorsey, J. M. 2015b. Soccer moulding in the Middle East and North Africa. RSIS working paper No. 286. Available online at: <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/WP286.pdf>. [Accessed 2 June 2016].

historical and cultural credentials to represent the Arab world on the global pitch. Would it be Egypt, as the world's most populous Arab country or Algeria whose struggle for freedom became a model for Egypt's independence?

2.3.3. *The two Koreas*

As seen also earlier, Merkel's study of sport for their reunification follows a *pluralist* approach.¹³¹ Had Merkel carried out his research employing also the *constructivist* approach, placing the matter as one of competing for national representation or divided nationhood, a much clearer picture of sport's role in inter-Korean relations might have surfaced. Following a *constructivist* approach, Cho unveils the role of sport in the competing discourse between North and South for national representation across more than three decades since 1978.¹³² Following the Korean War, both countries considered themselves as legitimate powers in the Korean peninsula, but neither of them recognised the other as such. With negative projections of each other, the issue of unification was unimaginable. During the Moscow-led 1980's Olympics, the social construction by the South of its invitation by the North was as an attempt to block its independent participation. In 1984, when the Olympics were US-led, it was the North's turn to develop a similar conception. In the second period, the 1988 Seoul Olympics were an opportunity for non-state actors to intervene. The IOC brokered talks between the North and South with the direct involvement of its President, Juan Antonio Samaranch. In the last period, sporting events created an opportunity for all participants – players, coaching staff and spectators – to experience a sense of belonging to a larger family. Material realities have changed the form of sports diplomacy as the South has now emerged as a strong Asian economy. Other non-state actors, such as the car manufacturer *Hyundai*, have entered the sports' diplomatic process by building a large stadium in North Korea's capital, Pyongyang, funding various regional sports meetings and even supporting needy people. The experience of the last

¹³¹ Merkel, U. 2008, *op.cit.*

¹³² Cho, H. 2012. International sporting events, nationalism and sport diplomacy. Doctoral Thesis, Loughborough University, UK. Available from: <https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/dspace-jspui/handle/2134/12565>, [accessed 29 March 2015].

period does not imply the dismissal of the role which social construction can play in the framing of IR. Instead, the space for constructing that reality is mediated, framed and, to a certain extent, structured by the fact of international relations, and the efforts of the wider sporting community.

2.3.4. Kosovo

The study of Kosovo by Giulianotti *et al.* is the first work of its kind in direct support of the proposed conceptual framework, especially the need for synthetic approaches. Kosovo is a country that was formed in the Balkans following the ethno-nationalist war of the 1990s, with the help of the notorious ethnic-Albanian paramilitary organisation “*Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës* (UÇK). After its separation from the former state of Yugoslavia, Kosovo received partial international recognition. The IOC has also admitted it as a full member, and the country is now striving to become a UEFA and FIFA member, which may assist its full international recognition. Having researched Kosovo’s case, Giulianotti *et al.* state:¹³³

We situate our overall analysis within international relations theories, more specifically within the selective usage and integration of four main perspectives: realist, liberal, constructivist, and critical. Our overall emphasis is on a mix of critical¹³⁴ and constructivist approaches. While this synthesis may appear excessively diverse for some scholars, we consider this to be essential in order to register conceptually both the complexity of Kosovo’s national and international position, and the depth of our data...

Giulianotti *et al.* comfortably employ both mainstream and non-mainstream IR paradigms in their study. They use *classical realism* to explore the ‘power politics’ around Kosovo, [neo]-*liberalism* to examine the role of international institutions and *constructivism* to understand both, the way in which international politics are socially constructed by political actors, and the role of NGOs.

¹³³ Giulianotti, R., Collison, H., Darnell, S. and Howe, D. 2017, *op. cit.*

¹³⁴ *Critical theory* is both an academic approach and a project seeking to explain why it is difficult to form a more equal and just world. It embraces different approaches including feminism, post-structuralism, critical geopolitics and security studies, critical international political economy, post-colonialism, and international historical sociology, radically contending mainstream IR theories.

2.4. The approach followed by this thesis


As mentioned in the Introduction, studying the case of football reunification in Cyprus outside the frame of international political dynamics for the solution of the 'Cyprus Problem' would unveil a one-sided picture of the theme. Both problems require rapprochements between the two communities aiming at similar goals. Also, international institutions and powerful global actors are involved in both cases. The thesis, therefore, cannot ignore the valuable input of the *neo-liberal* paradigm. However, that paradigm remains largely state-centric, its essential difference from neo-realism being the role of international institutions within the 'anarchic' international system and the aggregation of societal preferences in explaining the neo-liberal state's behaviour. For Ripsman *et al.* this aggregation ignores the central role of the foreign policy executive, i.e., the ministers and officials who are tasked with making foreign and security policy and who stand at the intersection of domestic politics and the international system. Therefore, as neo-liberalism does not account for domestic level variables, it needs to be intertwined with a paradigm that reserves a role for such variables. Both *constructivism* and the *English School* are suitable theories but the *neoclassical realist* approach supersedes them in one fundamental dimension. That is, it can provide a testable ground for TRNC's 'foreign policy' decisions. In the specific case of football reunification, TRNC is in essence facing a 'foreign policy' dilemma. The opportunity of football reunification, which is facilitated by the international system may have political ramifications hinging upon the country's international strategic plans.

Figure 2.2 presents a synthesis of neo-liberal and neoclassical realist ideas into a simple model to unveil the dynamics around football reunification in Cyprus. In this model, the independent variable is the 'anarchic' international system as neo-liberals and not as neoclassical realists view it, i.e. with international institutions mediating to avoid anarchy. For instance, elaborating on the signals sent by the international system, Ripsman *et al.* present the case of the 1967 Israel-Egypt war. Egyptian leader Nasser had sent three clear signals that forced Israel to act. He had blockaded the Straits of Tiran, secured the removal of UN peacekeeping forces

in the Sinai Peninsula, and mobilized Egyptian forces along the border.¹³⁵In the proposed model the signal originates from FIFA, an international organisation aiming to bridge a cultural gap between two states.¹³⁶

The dependent variable is football reunification as a ‘foreign policy’ outcome that requires the consent of the leader. In the neoclassical realist model, the range of the dependent variable can expand along two dimensions: time (days, weeks, etc.) and the level-of-analysis (single-state, more than one states). In the studied case, the time dimension begins with rumours about a forthcoming reunification plan under FIFA, ending with a final agreement between the two football associations. Should the T/C leader decide to endorse TCFA’s desire to accept FIFA’s initiative towards football reunification, TRNC’s football clubs would become CFA members and thus be allowed to ‘open to the world’ by playing international matches. This decision, however, might have wider implications in TRNC’s power at the negotiations table for a solution to the Cyprus Problem. The level of analysis remains, of course, at the single-state level.

Figure 2.2: A Modified Neoclassical Realist Model *



* Drafted by the author of this thesis.

The strategic environment for TRNC is *permissive* (non-restrictive) because the signal sent by the international system for football reunification - a culture-cased

¹³⁵ Ripsman N. M., Taliaferro, J. W. and Lobell, S. E. 2016, *op. cit.*

¹³⁶ The *neoclassical realist* approach has very little to say about the behaviour of international NGOs.

affair - does not require a response using material resources. Given that *strategic culture* in a small state such as TRNC is undeveloped and *state-society relations* are mirrored in societal mobilisations, as recorded in the media, there are three intervening variables between the independent and the dependent ones: *leader images*, *political parties/elites* and *civil society organisations*.¹³⁷ The *leader* – not an FPE – refers to TRNC’s President and his spokesperson, the Prime Minister and the Sports Minister.¹³⁸ *Political parties* and political elites include the major political parties in a 50-seat parliament and retired known political figures, while *civil society organisations* embrace trade unions and other private entities. The thesis tests this model over two periods in time, following two football reunification initiatives by FIFA, one in 2008 (chapter 5) and the other in 2013 (chapter 6).

Searching for a ‘foreign policy outcome’ – in essence a T/C leader decision approving or rejecting the details of the FIFA initiatives for football reunification – there two intertwined research questions. The first question is “how interpretive can the selected *neo-liberal/neoclassical realist* model be as regards both that policy outcome and the role of the intervening variables”. The second question derives from the empirical findings. Failure of the two communities to reunite in football would imply that solving the political reunification problem is the only alternative and it should precede football reunification.

¹³⁷ The neoclassical realist approach underlines the opportunity of selecting appropriate dependent and intervening variables as well as identifying pertinent research questions.

¹³⁸ The Foreign Ministry does not play an autonomous role in policy development or implementation, given that the central foreign policy target – the solution to the Cyprus problem – is formally negotiated through the President’s office (see Goldman, M. H. 2016, *op. cit.*)

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY: A CASE-STUDY APPROACH

There are three main issues that arise in social science research. The first relates to the set of empirical phenomena and the questions that are being studied. The second is about the state of theoretical development. The third and final issue is about the methodology that is used to form theoretical claim and test their empirical implications. “Methodology refers to systematically structured or codified ways to test theories”.¹³⁹

Since the topic of football reunification in Cyprus in the last decade or so unfolds under an IR frame, as mentioned in chapter 1, an immediate concern is the employment of three levels of analysis, i.e. the individuals, the state and the international system levels. Also, unveiling the role of domestic and external actors is crucial. But any IR researcher should bear in mind that in international politics competing actors are often involved at multiple levels, whose behaviour is not necessarily cooperative and may be characterised by strong incentives to bluff or deceive the opponent. Furthermore, IR issues are complex, and the phenomena that follow them can be *sui generis*, intricate, relatively unstructured, and infrequent.¹⁴⁰

Due to the significant changes in the international system in the last decades, IR research has expanded into three main methodological domains: the *case study*, the *quantitative*, and *formal* methods.¹⁴¹ These may also be used in combination, given the importance of both knowledge accumulation and cross-methods research. The case study method, which this thesis relies upon, has substantial advantages when setting out to explore complex, unstructured and rare

¹³⁹ Sprinz D. F. and Wolinsky-Nahmias Y. (eds.) *Cases, Numbers, Models: International Relations Research Methods*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, p. 4.

¹⁴⁰ Bennett, A., and Elman, C. 2007. Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield. *Comparative Political Studies* 40(2), 170-195.

¹⁴¹ Hyde, S. D. 2010. The Future of Field Experiments in International Relations. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 628, 72-84.

phenomena such as those that emerge in IR research.¹⁴² Combining various approaches allows for an enriched orientation to the study of IR issues, so the case study methodology illustrates improvements in apprehending various international phenomena.¹⁴³

3.1 Case study methods

There are two key approaches that guide case-study methods. The first one was proposed by Robert Stake¹⁴⁴ and the second by Robert Yin.¹⁴⁵ Both scholars try to confirm that the topic of interest is well explored and that the essence of the phenomenon is revealed. Stake and Yin also claim that the truth is relative and that it is dependent on one's perspective. This approach has the potential to deal with simple yet complex situations and as John Odell argues "...case study methods have dominated the study of IR over the last three decades".¹⁴⁶ According to Yin, a case study design should be considered when: a) the focus of the study is to answer "how" and "why" questions, b) if there is belief that contextual conditions are relevant to the problem under study, c) the boundaries between the problem and the context are not clear.¹⁴⁷ More importantly, case study research is not simply about researching a single individual or situation.¹⁴⁸ Sometimes, case studies lack in accuracy and reliability, and they do not address the issue of generalizability in contrast to quantitative methods. According to Yin, "...the distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex

¹⁴² Bennett, A., and Elman, C. 2006. Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Study Methods. *Annual Review of Political Science* 9, 455-476; Mahoney, J., and Goertz, G. 2006. A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research Political Analysis (Summer 2006) 14 (3): 227-249.

¹⁴³ The IR subfield includes several outstanding case studies that have contributed, together with statistical and formal work, to improve understandings of world politics work. See, Bennet, A. 2004. Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantages. In: Sprinz D. F. and Wolinsky-Nahmias Y. (eds.) *Cases, Numbers, Models: International Relations Research Methods*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

¹⁴⁴ Stake, R. E. 1995. *The art of case study research*. London: Sage.

¹⁴⁵ Yin, R. K. 2003. *Case study research: Design and methods*. London: Sage; Yin, R. K. 2009. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. London: Sage

¹⁴⁶ Odell, J. S. 2004. *How to Negotiate Over Trade: A summary of new research for developing countries*. Available at SSRN 1803489, p. 56.

¹⁴⁷ Yin, R. K. 2003, *op. cit.*

¹⁴⁸ Baxter, P., and Jack, S. 2008. Qualitative case study methodology: Study design and implementation for novice researchers. *The Qualitative Report* 13(4), 544-559.

social phenomena” because “the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events,” such as organisational and managerial processes.¹⁴⁹ According to Hartley, “Case study research is a heterogeneous activity covering a range of research methods and techniques, a range of coverage, varied levels of analysis, and differing lengths and levels of involvement in organisational functioning”.¹⁵⁰ By its very nature, the case study approach assumes a descriptive format with emphasis on exploration and content, thus offering flexibility and freedom to discovering issues as they arise in everyday political reality.¹⁵¹ Although the case study approach lacks objectivity and rigour, it does examine the interplay of all visible variables to provide a comprehensive understanding of the studied problem.¹⁵² A unique component of the case–study method is that of *process-tracing* which allows the assessment of specific causal mechanisms in a sequence of historical events.¹⁵³ More often than not, case-study research involves the use of participant observation, unobtrusive measures and interviewing.

3.1.1 Unobtrusive measures

Whereas participant observation requires that the researcher is physically present to observe developments around the phenomenon under study, unobtrusive measures are aiming, in essence, to reduce any biases that might result from the intrusion of the researcher or the measurement instrument. However, unobtrusive measures reduce the researcher’s ability to control the type of data to be collected and for some constructs such methods may simply not be available or appropriate.¹⁵⁴ The unobtrusive research relies on *indirect measures*, *content analysis*, and *secondary source analysis*.

¹⁴⁹ Yin, R. K. 2003, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

¹⁵⁰ Hartley, J. 2004. Case Study Research. Essential guide to qualitative methods in organizational research”. In: Cassell, Catherine and Symon, Gillian eds. *Essential Guide to Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research*. London: Sage, pp. 323–333.

¹⁵¹ Yin, R. K. 2012. *Applications of Case Study Research*. London: Sage

¹⁵² Bennet, A. 2004, *op. cit.*

¹⁵³ George, A. and Bennett, A. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 214.

¹⁵⁴ Bryman, A. 2012. *Social research methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

An indirect measure is an unobtrusive measure of research, which allows data collection without introducing any official measurement process.¹⁵⁵ The types of indirect measures that might be accessible are narrowed only by the researcher's imagination and resourcefulness. Initially, Webb *et al.* had clarified four main types of observation:¹⁵⁶ a) physical traces, which are signs left behind by a group and include things such as graffiti and trash, b) archive materials that include statistics collected by governmental and non-governmental organisation diaries, the mass media and historical records, c) simple observation refers to situations in which the observer has no control over the behaviour or sign in question and plays an unobserved, passive and non-intrusive role in the research situation, d) Contrived observation where the observer either actively varies the setting in some way or employs hidden hardware to record observations such as video cameras. Lee established a different class of unobtrusive methods that diverges slightly from that of Webb *et al.*:¹⁵⁷ a) found data that corresponds to physical traces, b) captured data that comprises both simple observation and contrived observation, c) retrieved data that are running records that can be examined over quite long periods so that changes can be explored. Retrieved data that are personal and episodic records, in this category there are three kinds of data: personal documents, visual images and documents produced through institutional discovery procedures. Finally, Lee distinguished between these types of data and records produced through the internet and especially the various forms of computer-mediated communication.¹⁵⁸ However, such data do reflect the type of news that is available to the public.

In political research, the popular press – particularly newspapers, television and radio broadcasts – is a well-known source of documents, but researchers are worrisome of the so-called *reliability* and *validity issues* as the popular press tends

¹⁵⁵ Denzin, N. K. 2017. *The research act: A theoretical introduction to sociological methods*. London: Routledge.

¹⁵⁶ Webb, E. J., Campbell, D. T., Schwartz, R. D., Sechrest, L. 1966. *Unobtrusive measures: Nonreactive research in the social sciences*. Oxford, England: Rand McNally.

¹⁵⁷ Lee, R. M. 2000. *Unobtrusive Methods in Social Research*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

¹⁵⁸ As regards this last type of data, in many cases, basic software packages readily available are used to conduct basic key word searches, which can be done by using Word, or even most Web browsers.

to be politically partisan and does not always resort to just reporting plain facts.¹⁵⁹ Researchers using these types of data are often called ‘soft scientists’, and their work is labelled unscientific, exploratory or subjective.¹⁶⁰ In these situations, *validity* and *reliability* constitute issues that need to be addressed.¹⁶¹ For some researchers, “...the concept of reliability is even misleading in qualitative research. If a study is discussed with reliability as a criterion, the consequence is rather that the study is no good”.¹⁶² However, reliability is crucial to the accuracy, dependability, and credibility of the information depend on it. Reliability denotes the ability to replicate the results of a study. To ensure reliability, the researcher must look for trustworthiness, as “trustworthiness of a research report lies at the heart of issues conventionally discussed as validity and reliability”.¹⁶³ Thus, it is customary, instead of reliability and validity to talk about *dependability* and *rigour* or *trustworthiness* respectively. There are various ways to address validity and reliability the most popular ones including *triangulation of data sources*, *feedback from informants* and *expert review*. Patton presents the use of triangulation, arguing that it strengthens a study by combining methods, which means using several kinds of methods or data.¹⁶⁴ Triangulation is also defined to be “a validity procedure where researchers search for convergence among multiple and different sources of information to form themes or categories in a study”.¹⁶⁵ Feedback from informants offers the chance to correct errors of fact or errors of interpretation, while the expert review is used in both *formative* and *summative* styles, e.g. “how

¹⁵⁹ Harrison, J., MacGibbon, L., Morton, M. 2001. Regimes of trustworthiness in qualitative research: The rigors of reciprocity. *Qualitative inquiry* 7(3), 323-345.

¹⁶⁰ Kohlbacher, F. 2006. The use of qualitative content analysis in case study research. In Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: *Qualitative Social Research* 7(1). Available online at: <http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/75/154>.

¹⁶¹ Golafshani, N. 2003. Understanding reliability and validity in qualitative research. *The Qualitative Report* 8(4), 597-606; Simon, M. K. 2011. *Dissertation and scholarly research: Recipes for success*. Seattle, WA: Dissertation Success, LLC.

¹⁶² Stenbacka, C. 2001. Qualitative research requires quality concepts of its own. *Management decision* 39(7), 551-556.

¹⁶³ Seale, C. 1999. Quality in qualitative research. *Qualitative inquiry* 5(4), 465-478.

¹⁶⁴ Patton, M. Q. 2002. *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

¹⁶⁵ Creswell, J. W., and Miller, D. L. 2000. Determining validity in qualitative inquiry. *Theory into practice* 39(3), 124-130.

the study could be improved” and “how the data helped answer the research questions”, respectively.

IR scholar Andrew Moravcsik contends that contemporary researchers need to provide evidence in a rigorous, precise, and transparent way. Otherwise, their fellow researchers will be unable to evaluate both the proper application of the basic methodological techniques and the empirical value of evidence. As he notes:

Current practice in some areas of political science permits citations to be imprecise, vague, and secondary, rather than precise, annotated, and primary. It is still acceptable, even common, for citations to lack page numbers or any other reference to any specific elements. As scientific citations spread and word limits tighten, references increasingly lack any precise annotation describing how the evidence supports the textual claim. Such scientific footnotes overtly discriminate against qualitative work.¹⁶⁶

To overcome the unsatisfactory state of current research practices and assure transparency, replicability in selection, presentation and preservation of the evidence, while fully exploiting new IT technologies, Moravcsik proposes a replicable research approach through the establishment of a universal standard that he terms *active citation*. The standard’s two vital components are *rigour* and *transparency*. To secure rigour, a case study needs to back the substantive empirical points it makes with one or more primary sources, e.g. a government or private document from an archive, an oral history, an interview transcript, notes from participant observation and a published primary source. Transparency requires that citations contain a hypertext link to reproduction or transcript of some part of the source. The benefits of *active citation* include a higher-quality scholarship, wider criticism from peers, richer secondary and meta-analysis, and more intensive interdisciplinary engagement. Active citation may result in research

¹⁶⁶ Moravcsik, A. 2010. Active Citation: A Precondition for Replicable Qualitative Research. *Political Science and Politics* 43(1), 29-35. See also, Moravcsik, A. 2015. One Norm, Two Standards: Realizing Transparency in Qualitative Political Science. Available online at: <https://thepoliticalmethodologist.com/2015/01/01/one-norm-two-standards-realizing-transparency-in-qualitative-political-science/>

work that may not exhibit very high quality, but it promises to boost the ability of the research community to identify high-quality scholarship.

Content analysis involves the analysis of texts and has a wide application flexibility. The analysis can be quantitative or qualitative or both; its main aim is to identify patterns in the text. The qualitative data sought may be interview transcripts from the participants of research, or text documents obtained from all kinds of sources.¹⁶⁷Qualitative studies have the opportunity to continuously categorise and analyse their data until theoretical capacity is achieved, that is until theories can be proven, supported and developed.¹⁶⁸Thus, content analysis allows the researcher to test theoretical issues to have a better understanding of the data. As a research method, it is a systematic and objective means of describing and quantifying phenomena as well as for making replicable and valid implications from data to their context, with the purpose of providing new insights. The aim is to attain a condensed and broad description of the phenomenon, and the outcome of the analysis of concepts or categories describing the phenomenon. Content analysis is very useful when it comes to analysing multifaceted and sensitive social phenomena, when no other methods are applicable. Its main disadvantage is that it is related to research questions that are relatively unclear on the part of the researcher and poses a threat to the analysis to be successful. Secondary sources analysis can be used to shed light on the topic being studied and is similar to content analysis that uses existing sources. However, a weakness of secondary sources analysis is that it depends on already collected and used data.

In secondary data analysis, the researcher has not been involved in the collection of the data contained in those sources for purposes that in all likelihood were not envisaged by those responsible for the data collection. Secondary sources analysis may involve the analysis of either quantitative data or qualitative data. There are several reasons why secondary data analysis should be considered a serious

¹⁶⁷ Bryman, A. 2012, *op. cit.*

¹⁶⁸ Krippendorff, K. 2012. *Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology*, London: Sage.

alternative to collecting new data, the main ones being advantages such as cost and time as well as opportunities for a longer and in-depth analysis.¹⁶⁹

3.1.2 Interviews

Many aspects of social interaction remain invisible to the researcher. Even after a detailed document review, whether media or archival, the researcher might be left with questions about how a certain outcome came about or how a decision-making process worked. In those instances, interviews can be a valuable tool for expanding one's knowledge on a given topic.¹⁷⁰ Interviews can also be an advantage, as they provide information on participants with relation to their past and shed light on events that could not have been noticed by the researcher.¹⁷¹ According to Ritchie *et al* "A research interview is an interaction between participant and researcher, and this interaction will shape the form and features of the data generated". However, caution is required, as "The interview is not a forum for the researcher to make a show of their own knowledge: their credibility comes from asking relevant questions which are meaningful to the participant and based on an understanding of the research topic".¹⁷²

Interviews can be *structured*, *semi-structured*, and *unstructured*. The structured interview, produces quantitative data but it is also related to the other two sub-categories of interviews, and sometimes is combined with other qualitative data collection methods, such as focus groups. In many respects, a structured interview is analogous to a questionnaire delivered orally rather than in written form and include a menu of responses from which the participant selects a response that is recorded by the interviewer. The semi-structured interview is what we conceive as an interview when discussing interview techniques. Given the research topics that are of interest to many scholars of IR are related to explaining international political

¹⁶⁹ Bryman, A. 2008. The end of the paradigm wars. In: Alasuutari, P., Bickman, L., Brannen, J. (eds.) *The Sage Handbook of Social Research Methods*. London: Sage, 13-25.

¹⁷⁰ Lamont, M., and Swidler, A. 2014. Methodological pluralism and the possibilities and limits of interviewing. *Qualitative sociology* 37(2), 153-171.

¹⁷¹ Creswell, J. W. 2013. *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches*. London: Sage.

¹⁷² Ritchie, J., Lewis, J., Nicholls, C. M., Ormston, R. (eds.) 2013. *Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science students and researchers*. London: Sage, pp. 180 and 185.

events, the foreign policies of states, the behaviour of international organisations, multi-national corporations, or non-governmental and civil society organisations, most semi-structured interviews target elites, and are therefore also referred to as elite interviews. Semi-structured interviews are frequently used because there is a degree of structure that allows for cross-referencing across interview participants, but there is also scope for more in-depth probing on issues of interest to the researcher. Semi-structured interviews are the most common interview format used in IR research.¹⁷³ Although elite interviewing is common, the question is who qualifies as an elite, so the matter is highly subjective. The unstructured interview is less known in IR research and is fundamentally an unscripted free conversation with the person being interviewed aimed at eliciting the unfiltered perspectives of interview participants, usually beginning with simple, but broad, open-ended questions.

3.2 The research design for this thesis

As stated in the previous chapter, the thesis applies a case-study approach to examine football reunification in Cyprus within a neoclassical realist model, following two initiatives by FIFA. The employment of the neoclassical realist model strongly suggests the usage of a methodology involving a longitudinal approach to examine the influence of FIFA's on football reunification, in a complex causal *process* that cannot be easily quantified. This applies equally well to the 'intervening variables'. Thus, the central component within the case-study methodological approach of this thesis is that of the theoretically-informed historical *process-tracing*. Process-tracing allows the examination and assessment of specific causal mechanisms within the evolution, development, and outcome of a policy initiative in a specific time period.¹⁷⁴ As George and Bennet state: "The process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable."¹⁷⁵ More specifically, this

¹⁷³ Lamont, M., and Swidler, A. 2014, *op. cit.*

¹⁷⁴ George, A. and Bennett, A. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 214.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 206.

thesis utilises the ‘analytic explanation’ variety of process-tracing, in which a historical account (or narrative) is adapted into “an *analytical* causal explanation couched in explicit theoretical forms.”¹⁷⁶

The historical narrative extends over three time periods, as stated in the introductory chapter. The first period begins with the Ottoman invasion of Cyprus in 1571, extending over the modern history of the island up to the year 2004, when the two communities had their first major rapprochement through the so-called *Annan Plan* to reunite politically. The second period starts with the above landmark year and covers the developments around the first unsuccessful FIFA initiative of 2007 to reunite the two communities culturally through football. More specifically, the analysis spans the years from 2004 to 2013 when FIFA’s second football reunification initiative emerged. The third and final period spans the years from 2013 to date. It includes FIFA’s second initiative in 2013 to symbolically reunify the two divided communities through football and a fresh UN initiative in 2014 to reunify Cyprus into a new international political entity. Both of these initiatives failed to bring the two communities together.

3.2.1 Selected unobtrusive measures

To offer a composite historical background account on Cyprus’ two communities, the thesis uses secondary data analysis, drawing from an extensive and rich body of literature by G/C, T/C and other scholars that provide historical accounts of the Cyprus problem and the communal division in football.

To conduct the empirical part, i.e. to trace the impact of political institutions and civil society on leader images and his final decision on the opportunity of football reunification, the bulk of the material used draws from digital press sources. As mentioned earlier, the popular press – particularly newspapers, television and radio broadcasts – is a well-known source of valuable documents. Researchers are worrisome of the *reliability* and *validity issues* as the popular press tends to be politically partisan and does not always resort to just reporting plain facts. However, this does not constitute a concern to the thesis. Firstly, political researchers

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, 211.

endorse consultation of the press, especially when it is the only source for current and vital information on political players and events.¹⁷⁷ Secondly, the true meaning of the terms *validity* and *reliability* is such a highly controversial issue that qualitative researchers propose alternative criteria including *credibility*, *transferability*, *dependability* and *confirmability*.¹⁷⁸ Thirdly, and most importantly, the digital press reports collected for this thesis are valid documents (internal validity), as they include statements released to the press by the negotiating parties, so their authenticity is not questioned.¹⁷⁹ IT technological changes provide access to these materials and allows sceptics and critics to assess the interpretations of the selected qualitative sources.¹⁸⁰ The reports are also taken to be representative of an unknown totality of relevant documents as there are no signs that the reported progress in the negotiations diverges from reality.

The press reports, used in this case study as documents, have only practical advantages and no practical disadvantages. They are the only accessible source of information of the ongoing negotiations process, accessible and free. Given the prevailing conditions in divided Cyprus, there is suspicion on both sides, hidden agendas of parties engaged in bilateral talks, local political dynamics and other invisible or unknown domestic and international involvements. Nevertheless, whatever the outcomes of these processes, they always end up in press reports. Press coverage of the negotiations process in the Cyprus case is mostly in the form of official announcements and event reporting. Also, both G/C and T/C officials appear to use the popular press as an instrument to shape public opinion and essentially draw the limits of bilateral talks. International sport governing bodies also appear capable of taking essential initiatives to assist the negotiation process, but these too must necessarily be released in the press. These facts make

¹⁷⁷See, e.g. Harrison, L. 2001. *Political Research: An Introduction*. London: Routledge

¹⁷⁸ Bryman, A. 2012, *op. cit.*;

¹⁷⁹ *Validity* refers to whether the findings accurately reflect the situation and are supported by the evidence. Internal validity is concerned with whether the investigation claimed is indeed that, while external validity exists when the investigation can be applicable to other groups. The latter is often referred to as *reliability*.

¹⁸⁰ Bennett, A., and Elman, C. 2006, *op. cit.*

press reports important information sources, also considering that they both G/C and T/C media always reproduce reports from the other side.

The main source of digital media reports was the Turkish Press Section of the G/C government Press and Information Office (PIO) website, <www.moi.gov.cy>. ¹⁸¹ As the sole agency of the Republic of Cyprus responsible with press and information matters, PIO publishes daily briefs of major digital T/C media reports. The agency's main criterion for media report selection and review is that these reports relate to the Cyprus problem. T/C media report contents designated by PIO start with either negotiations to solve the problem or efforts to promote the recognition and consolidation of the occupation regime through various domestic actions. Such actions include the founding of new universities, population transfers, granting citizenships, granting work permits to foreign workers, construction of mosques, consolidation of Islam, etc. as well as foreign policy initiatives, e.g., opening delegations, participation in tourism, trade and educational exhibitions, etc. The activities of the T/C political parties and efforts to the rapprochement of the two communities are also included in the review to the extent that they demonstrate the possibility of their coexistence and constitute main arguments disproving the official Turkish policy. Economic developments both in the occupied territories as well as Turkey (e.g. budgetary issues, investment, the balance of trade, tourism, etc.) are also matters of interest. Internal developments in Turkey itself, but also relations with its neighbours (and not only) are issues that PIO attempts to cover so long as they affect Cyprus directly or indirectly.

For this thesis, not just a sample, but all PIO media reports were selected that relate to the Cyprus problem and the football reunification problem. Additionally, as much information as possible was extracted from additional sources, in order to present the cognition of the football reunification issue by the two sides and appreciate the current situation. From June 2013 to March 2018, on a regular basis, the thesis screened digital media reports in three languages – Greek, English and Turkish - with the more inclusive and/or complementary ones

¹⁸¹ Since 2014 the online service has been discontinued and all PIO media reports are available at the *HR-Group's* site, a service of the *Hellenic Resources Institute, Inc.* in Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA (<http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/tcpr/>).

collected. Inclusiveness was determined by the depth of event coverage and complementarity, i.e., by identifying press reports that covered an event more fully when read together. This was achieved using keywords, such as *Cyprus Football Association* (CFA), *Turkish Cypriot Football Association* (TCFA), *Fédération Internationale de Football Association* (FIFA), *Sertoglu* (the head of TCFA), *Koutsokoumnis* (the head of CFA), *Eroglou* (head of TRNC), *Denktash* (T/C 'minister for sports'). Newspaper and other websites screened, include: *Simerini* and *Alithia* (G/C newspapers), *To Vima* (Greek political newspaper), *iKypros* (G/C news online website), *Newsit* (Greek news online website), *Anadolu Agency* (Turkish news agency) and *Star Kibris* and *Yeniduzen* (T/C newspapers), TCFA News and Press releases, FIFA's website and the European Commission's website.

Coding was carried out at two levels on these above material, for the periods under study. First a simple coding was done counting the mentions to the Cyprus Problem and the football problem over time, as illustrated in the related figures of the empirical chapters. Secondly coding was done on the important events (milestones) and their period, as well as the involved actors, including the international ones, the leader, political actors and civil society actors, as seen in the related tables of the empirical chapters.

In addition to the above, multiple readings and summary presentations of media reports and material from all the above supplementary digital sources were organized and placed in a proper chronological sequence and context to narrate and explain the case.¹⁸²

Finally, the thesis follows Moravcsik's proposed standard of active citation closely. To satisfy the standard's first component, *rigour*, it backs its substantive empirical points with both archival sources and interview transcripts (where appropriate). The *transparency* component applies only to internet sources, with hypertext links for reproduction.¹⁸³As noted by Moravcsik, *active citation* may not appear to result in

¹⁸² Flick, U. 2009. *An introduction to qualitative research*. London: Sage.

¹⁸³ This research began in 2013 and website operators have since then discontinued some of their URLs. Any non-traceable hypertext information is readily available from the author of this thesis.

research work exhibiting very high quality, but it allows the reader to identify whether there is quality scholarship.

3.2.2 Interviews conducted

The interviews conducted for this research were *semi-structured*, i.e. they included both open ended and close ended questions. The reason behind such an approach was because unexpected valuable data might arise regarding the political Cyprus problem as well.

Preparation of the interview questions and informed consent forms for the interviewees were carried out during February and March 2016, a time when the football reunification discourse among political actors in TRNC was already ‘frozen’ and had supposedly given way to the fresh political negotiations under the UN auspices that began in May 2015. The interview period was determined on the availability of key respondents, based on communication prior to entering the field. The only time period suitable for the interviews was in the first two weeks of June 2016, as determined by a key informant who was willing to offer advice on and establish contact with interviewees. A purposive snowball sample was followed for the needs of the research. Upon arrival in Cyprus, the process began by approaching two potential contacts that would be willing to answer the questionnaire, through the key informant with knowledge on the issues. Subsequently, after discussing the problem with these first interviewees, seven more persons were identified and completed the list on nine interviewees on the G/C side. There were two government officials, three sports media related persons, two academicians, one CFA official and one politician.

Only one person was available for interview on the T/C side at the time, through mediation of a common acquaintance, a former FIFA official. Nevertheless, his interview was an invaluable one, because he was an official with knowledge on FIFA’s both initiatives for the solution of the football problem in Cyprus. A second contact, an academic with knowledge on the topic, pointed out by the TCFA official was unavailable at the time. All interviews were conducted using a digital tape recorder. Most interviews lasted less than an hour.

There were no complications with the recording of the interviews. Translation of the data commenced only for the G/Cs, whose interviews were conducted in Greek. The T/C interview was in English and was transcribed immediately. The design of the interview questions had been so as to offer information on the more difficult stages of the football reunification discourse in TRNC. The full interview questions and guidelines appear analytically in *Appendix A*. Lastly, the interview process had the approval of the University of Crete' *Research Ethics Committee*.

CHAPTER 4

CYPRUS BEFORE THE *ANNAN PLAN*: COMMUNITY CREATION AND DIVISION

This chapter aims to give some background information on the division of the two communities in the political and football arenas and comprises two main sections. The first section presents a brief history of the 'Cyprus Problem' up to the landmark developments of 2004 when a United Nations initiative - known as *Annan Plan* - attempted to reunify its two divided communities which had been brutally separated following the Turkish military invasion of the island in 1974. The focus is on international and local political developments during that period. The second section recasts a composite historical account of inter-communal encounters in football that were interrupted with the break out of the G/C armed campaign against the colonial British rule in 1955.

4.1 Nationalism, Politics and External Patrons

Cyprus is the third largest island, after Sicily and Sardinia, in the Mediterranean Sea, located in a strategic position in its eastern part at the crossroads of three continents, 40 miles to the south of Turkey and 600 miles to the southeast of Greece. It has an area of 9,521 square kilometres and a population of approximately 800,000. Its strategic location, long exposed coastline and small size always made it an attractive and easy target for outsiders. Its location, size and the fact that it is an island constitute the geographic characteristics that have determined much of its fate thus far. With the grand majority of its population bearing the Greek culture, the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) emerged as an independent state in 1960. It became a member of the United Nations the same year, of the Council of Europe (CE) in 1961 and the European Union (EU) in 2004. Cyprus has a complex history that continues to shape present-day events. Before its independence, since the classical times, many rulers including Hittites,

Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, Romans, Byzantines, Lusignans, Venetians, Ottomans and the British had controlled Cyprus, so its story is one of domination.¹⁸⁴

The creation of two different ethnic groups in Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots (G/Cs) and the Turkish Cypriots (T/Cs), has its roots in a 1571 invasion of the island by the Ottoman Empire that seized it from the Venetians.¹⁸⁵ The new rulers brought about the first significant demographic change to the island's population, by subsequently bringing in a large number of settlers from across the Empire. By the end of the 17th century, the Turkish community that was formed comprised about 18 percent of the island's total population.¹⁸⁶ Unlike the Venetians, the occupiers favoured the aims of the Greek Orthodox Church, so Bishops became political leaders of the G/Cs and tax collection agents for the Turkish occupiers.¹⁸⁷ In the 19th century, the Turks imported the Ottoman Empire's political system *millet* and established councils made up of local leaders and elites, who exercised duties approximating those of mayor.¹⁸⁸ The *millet* system engendered a tendency toward community separation. Thus, Greek and Turkish populations on the island were organised as distinct *cemaats* (communities), electing their own administrative and judicial officials. Ultimately, this system crystallised a reality of two separate ethnic identities which tended to identify with their respective motherlands, Greece and Turkey - at a time that the latter was the ruler by force of the former.

¹⁸⁴ Hannay, L. 2005. Cyprus: not yet a problem solved. In: Lake, M. (ed.) *The EU and Turkey: A Glittering Prize or a Millstone*, London: Federal Trust for Education Research, 165-170.

¹⁸⁵ More than a hundred years earlier, in 1453, the Ottomans had conquered Greece.

¹⁸⁶ See: Sozen, A. 2002. The Role of the European Union as a Third Party in Resolution of external Conflicts: The Case of the Cyprus Problem. In: *IACM 15th Annual Conference*;

Biswas A. R., 2010. The Cyprus Issue: Reflection on TRNC. *The Arts Faculty Journal*, July 2010, 139-146;

Yilmaz, M. E. 2010. Capturing the Complexity of the Cyprus Conflict. *Turkish Journal of Politics* 1(1), 1-27 Available online at: <http://tjp.fatih.edu.tr/docs/articles/66.pdf>. [Accessed 30 October 2015].

¹⁸⁷ Boatswain, T. 2005. *A traveller's history of Cyprus*. Northampton: Interlink Books.

¹⁸⁸ Coufoudakis, V. 1976. *Essays on the Cyprus conflict*. New York: Pella Publishing Co.

Nur Köprülü, Professor and head of the political science department in TRNC's Near East University of Nicosia, and his co-author vividly explain ethnic divisions between G/Cs and T/Cs in institutional terms: ¹⁸⁹

Ethnic divisions in Cyprus originated as the product of an institutional design that dates back to the Ottoman *millet* system, which organized communities along religious lines. Political regimes on the island to this day preserve this delineating majority and minority populations. As a result, Cypriot political systems have been resistant to societal demands for recognition of greater diversity within and among various societal groups, for example, the effort to increase interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims...The Ottoman legacy had been the peaceful coexistence of semi-autonomous communities, including limited interaction across communities within the same villages, rather than a common life based on shared social, judicial and moral grounds or hostility with potential violent conflicts. Therefore, the ability of Turkish and Greek Cypriots to cultivate a shared cultural heritage from which a unified national narrative could emerge had been suppressed historically.

In 1878, while formally remaining under the Ottoman sovereignty, the island was subjected to British administration, following the terms of the Congress of Berlin under which the Empire leased it to Britain in exchange for its protection from the Russians. The obvious aim of the British was to make the island a base station in the Eastern Mediterranean as another big strategic investment after India and the Suez Canal in Egypt. In fact, acquiring Cyprus, Britain aimed at creating an invaluable outpost for the defence of the Suez Canal.¹⁹⁰ Later on, in 1914, when the Ottoman Empire entered WWI against the allies, the British annexed the island, and a year later they offered it to the Greeks inviting them to join the war on their side. The offer was rejected by King Constantine of Greece.¹⁹¹ Had the King accepted that offer, there might be no Cyprus Problem today. After the Lausanne Conference, which set the territorial borders of the new Republic of Turkey - that excluded Cyprus - Great Britain formally added the island to its colonies.

¹⁸⁹ Köprülü N. and Duba G. U. 2017. Rethinking National Identities in Divided Societies of Post-Ottoman Lands: Lessons from Lebanon and Cyprus. *European Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies* 4(2), 113-127.

¹⁹⁰ Michael, M. S. 2009. *Resolving the Cyprus conflict: Negotiating history*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

¹⁹¹ Yılmaz, M. E. 2010. Capturing the complexity of the Cyprus conflict. *Turkish Journal of Politics* 1(1). Available online at: https://scholar.google.gr/scholar?hl=el&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=Capturing+the+Complexity+of+the+Cyprus+Conflict&btnG= [Accessed 15 May 2014].

Under their colonial rule, the British never attempted to generate a commonality rather than differences among the island's population – a *Cypriotness* so to speak. Instead, they retained the *millet* system and intensified the *Greekness* and *Turkishness* labels, by calling the Christians 'Greeks' and the Muslims 'Turks' and similarly their communities. This way, through "divide and rule", their interests would be better served.

The G/Cs had always held the view that the T/C community was only one of the national and religious minorities that was not entitled to determine the island's future.¹⁹² They believed that this right was vested with the G/C community as a majority. In 1921, a century following the Greek Revolution for liberation from the Ottoman rule, the G/Cs organised the first referendum on their union (*enosis*) with motherland Greece.¹⁹³ A second referendum took place in 1930, which the British dismissed and a year later, in October 1931, they imposed a massive dictatorship following the first riot of the G/Cs against them. The period of the 1930s is known as *Palmerokratia* - from the name of British Governor *Richmond Palmer* – who introduced martial law due to the G/C rebellion. Mallinson states:¹⁹⁴

When, in 1931, the Colonial Administration proposed a temporary levy of five per cent on official salaries of over £100 a year, the Legislative Council voted thirteen to twelve to reject it. The twelve Greek Cypriots who voted against the measure were joined by a Turkish Cypriot – who became known as the 'Thirteenth Greek'...The measure was nevertheless imposed by an Order in Council, and agitation began. The Bishop of Kition even declared the union of Cyprus with Greece, and on 21 October there were major riots in which Government House was burned down. This led to the suspension by Britain of the Colonial

¹⁹² Stelgias N. and Andreou, M. 2015. Turkish-Cypriots: Minority or co-owners? Different Approaches to the Political Status of the T/C community through the pages of local newspapers *Alithia* and *Halkin Sesi*". In: Prometheus Research Institute (ed.), *Social, Economic and Political History of Cyprus*. Nicosia: Prometheus Research Institute, in Greek, ch. 8.

¹⁹³ In 1821, when the island was still under Ottoman rule and the Greek revolution for independence was raging on, Archbishop *Kyprianos* had assured the Turks of the G/Cs' non-involvement. When the Ottomans discovered revolutionary leaflets, Kyprianos was executed along with hundreds of others. Five years later, a large number of GCs escaped Cyprus to fight in the Greek revolution against the Ottomans as volunteers, thus increasing community cohesion and identification (see Boatswain, T. 2005, *op.cit*).

¹⁹⁴ Mallinson, B. 2005. *Cyprus: A Modern History*. London: IB Tauris, 11.

Constitution, and the introduction of various repressive measures, including the deportation of two bishops and two Communist Party leaders.¹⁹⁵

In World War II, thousands of Cypriots fought in the British army against the axis, so their hopes for *enosis* after the end of the war were heightened. On 15 January 1950, *Makarios* organised a referendum which showed that 96 per cent of the G/Cs were supporting union with Greece.

During the first half of the 1950s, the G/Cs' hopes were raised when the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution according to which each member state was obliged to support the self-determination of all peoples, including those under its sovereignty. However, Britain managed to manipulate the issue in the UN, and the G/Cs hopes evaporated. Thus, in the second half of that decade, the G/Cs' assumed an armed struggle to terminate the British colonial rule in Cyprus and later on fulfil their national aspiration to unite with Greece. Their main apparatus was the liberation organisation EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters), headed by *George Grivas*, a Greek Colonel and supported by Archbishop *Makarios*. Alas, the British were reluctant to give up their sovereignty on Cyprus. They had already harmed their interests by granting India independence in 1947 and by withdrawing from Palestine in 1948. Any further developments of this sort could challenge their existing *status quo* in international affairs.¹⁹⁶

The initial position of the T/C leadership was to support the continuation of the British rule, which was considered better than *enosis* with Greece. The T/Cs felt that the British would be better able to serve their interests and protect them as a minority group.¹⁹⁷ Many years later, *Rauf Denktaş*, a T/C hard-liner leader wrote:¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁵ This riot is also presented outside the British administration's tax proposal on official salaries, as an attempt to unite the pro-*enosis* forces in Cyprus (see Rappas, A. 2014. *Cyprus in the 1930s: British Colonial Rule and the Roots of the Cyprus Conflict*, London: I.B. Tauris).

¹⁹⁶ Karyos, A. 2016. "The Acceleration of History and Decolonization in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Case of Cyprus, 1945-1959". In: Alecou, A. (ed.) *Acceleration of History: War, Conflict, and Politics*, London: Lexington Books.

¹⁹⁷ Papadakis, Y. 2005. *Echoes from the dead zone: Across the Cyprus divide*. London: I.B. Tauris.

¹⁹⁸ Denktaş, R. 1999. The Crux of the Cyprus Problem. *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, 4(3). Available online at: <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/RaufDenktas.pdf> [accessed 17 May 2015].

EOKA terrorism, which aimed to unite the island with Greece (enosis), was at its height and the Turkish Cypriots, who looked upon enosis as changing colonial masters for the worst, resisted it with every means at their disposal. Hence, the message passed on to all young Greek Cypriots was, “the struggle against the real enemy of our nation and religion, the remnants of the occupying power in Cyprus, will commence as soon as the fight for enosis comes to a successful conclusion”!everyone who opposed enosis was declared an enemy and lived under constant threat. All Turkish Cypriots were against enosis!

If the British rule was to end, ignoring the numerical proportions and population composition of the Cypriot society, the T/C community had in mind their plans. It would be either equal representation in political affairs - in the event of a possible new state apparatus - or partition and union (*taksim*) with motherland Turkey. The conflict between the demand for securing the rights of the G/C majority and political equality of the T/C minority was perpetuated. It took on new dimensions with the passage of communal control in the hands of the bourgeois, nationalist leadership.¹⁹⁹

On 7 March 1956, less than a year following the beginning of EOKA's armed struggle that was abetted in the churches by the clergy, *Makarios* was exiled to the isle of *Seychelles*. This came to the applause of the Turkish press and the satisfaction of the Turkish Government.²⁰⁰ However, exactly one year later, *Makarios'* exile was terminated due to the influence of US President Eisenhower on the new British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. The British government justified *Makarios'* release upon acceptance of his renunciation of violence, but the Turkish government was furious.

The T/C leadership began to actively support the idea of *taksim* - as opposition to *enosis*. The British grasped the opportunity to apply their “divide and rule” policies which, this time, drew the T/Cs into a confrontation with the G/Cs. Thus, a bloody struggle between the British and EOKA and a bloody struggle between that organisation and TMT (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı) - the T/C resistance

¹⁹⁹ Stelgias N. and Andreou, M. 2015 *op. cit.*

²⁰⁰ Dodd, C. 2010. *The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

organisation - marked the second half of the 1950s.²⁰¹ TMT's leader was *Rauf Denktaş* who managed to secure arms, money, and organisational support from Turkey.²⁰²

The T/Cs also began preparations for a departure from all local government institutions. On May 4, 1958, 55 T/C delegates convened in Nicosia under the leadership of *Rauf Denktaş* to discuss the issue. In a telegram to the Governor, Sir John Foot, they demanded a law establishing TC municipalities and a call for elections within a week. Otherwise they would hold elections by themselves. Furthermore, they decided to stop paying municipal taxes to G/C mayors. The first TC municipality was set up on 16 June 1958 in Nicosia.²⁰³

By the end of the 1950s, as the British had to abandon many other regions, it was becoming obvious that they would have to end their colonisation of Cyprus. The 1959 Treaties of Zurich and London, established an independent, bi-national or bi-communal state, under the guarantor ship of Greece, Turkey and the UK. To safeguard the rights of the people of both communities these external actors imposed on the Cypriots a *consociational* political governance system with a power-sharing constitution. Officially inaugurated in the summer of 1960, this young state, the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) was a compromise between the two communities. G/Cs and T/Cs had the status of co-founder and equal partner, representing 80 and 20 per cent of the population respectively. However, it was only an intermediate stage solution for both sides, as the remaining alternatives were: the union of the island with Greece, returning the island to its previous owner, Turkey; partition of the island between Greece and Turkey; or, continued British rule. In reality, the Cypriot constitution was an inflexible code designed to institutionalise ethnocultural differences and to accommodate them by sharing political powers in the system. In this compromise solution, the UK kept two sovereign bases for itself, and both Turkey and Greece also kept a small number

²⁰¹ According to a video documentary the precursor of TMT was an organization called *volkan*, meaning "if you want to live you must kill". Available online at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SFw1KTEoplk> [Accessed 17 May 2015].

²⁰² Koyuncu, M. and Balikyoglu, E. 2016. The importance of organizing activities of the Turkish Cypriot Community in the process of becoming a state (1957-1960). *Journal of Human Sciences* 13(3), 4278-4290.

²⁰³ Koyuncu, M. and Balikyoglu, E. 2016, *op. cit.*

of troops on the island as guarantor powers. That is exactly why it was “restricted” independence. The new constitution buried the G/C majority’s right to self-determination and gave the T/C minority disproportionate percentages of participation in the administration, as well as the right of *veto*. The existence of two separate Houses, whose members were to be elected by each community separately and the division of the municipalities meant that the new constitution was impregnated with the principles of partition.²⁰⁴

The life of this state lasted only a few years. Trying to find a true story of what happened after its establishment is like walking in a minefield. In November 1963, claiming that the constitution of Republic of Cyprus was unworkable, the G/C side expressed its intention to amend it. This campaign is known as the famous “thirteen amendments” or “thirteen points”. Eight of the articles proposed for the amendment were so fundamental that they had been included in the 'unalterable' Basic Articles which are the same articles of the Zurich Treaty, such as that of [T/Cs'] having veto power over governmental decisions, having their municipalities, and so forth. The T/Cs feared that the main objective of the amendments was to put them into the status of the minority from the status of co-founder and politically equal partner of the Republic - i.e., to change the bi-communal republic into a unitary state in which the voting power of the G/Cs would be dominant. However, for the G/Cs, the constitution, which embodied the international treaties of London and Zurich, was problematic because it was imposed by the external powers (Great Britain, Greece and Turkey) and was signed by the G/C leadership under coercive conditions. Moreover, it was in disproportionally in favour of the T/Cs, when seeing their rights as a segment of the Cypriot population and, most importantly it was unworkable in practice. Hence, for the G/C leadership, the constitution should be modified to stand for real equality and effective governmentality.

The T/C leadership rejected the amendments. In one instance, the T/Cs took the issue of "establishing separate municipalities" (Article 1734 of the constitution) to the Supreme Constitutional Court. On April 25, 1963, the Court ruled that Article 173 had not been complied with, but *Makarios* declared that he would ignore it, and he did. On May 21 the neutral President of the Court, Professor *Ernst Forsthoff*

²⁰⁴ Stelgias N. and Andreou, M. 2015, *op. cit.*

who was a West German citizen, resigned.²⁰⁵ At that time, all T/C cabinet ministers, members of the House of Representatives and all the T/C civil servants abandoned their posts.

On 21 December 1963, with a dysfunctional state, as the two sides were organising and arming themselves for a foreseeable conflict, an incident led to bloodshed known as “Bloody Christmas”. For the G/Cs, Nicosia’s sector *Omorphita* was a T/C armed stronghold so the government-run routine police patrols for ID checks in the area. When two T/Cs refused to be checked an exchange of shootings left them and a G/C dead, which subsequently flared into an armed conflict between the two sides. Turkey flew fighter planes over Nicosia and threatened to intervene militarily but showed restraint after a phone call from the then US President Lyndon Johnson. Following deliberations between Greece, Cyprus and Britain, Nicosia was separated into G/C, and T/C sectors with a so-called “green line” – from the colour of the ink used to draw it on the map. The T/C side presents the “Bloody Christmas” incident as the story of a brave Turkish high ranking medical officer who returned home from duty to find his wife and three children slaughtered by the G/Cs in the bathtub.²⁰⁶

In 1964, *Makarios* unilaterally amended the Constitution according to his thirteen points and attacked the villages in the *Kokkina (Erenkoy)* area of Northern Cyprus because they were a gateway for the import of arms from Turkey. The Turkish state reacted by bombing EOKA’s forces.²⁰⁷ A similar incident followed in *Kophinou (Gecitkale)* village three years later, when T/C fighters did not allow the G/C police to inspect a reported blockage of the road from Nicosia to Limassol.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁵ Joseph S. J. 2009. Cyprus: Domestic Ethnopolitical Conflict and International Politics. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 15(3-4), 376-397.

²⁰⁶ Keser U. 2013. Bloody Christmas of 1963 in Cyprus in the Light of American Documents”, *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi Journal of Modern Turkish History Studies* XIII/2 (Spring), 249-271. Available online at: <http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/235745> [Accessed 15 May 2015].

²⁰⁷ Dodd, C. 2010, *op. cit.*

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

While each side holds its narrative, the truth about this ethnic division and conflict in Cyprus appears to lie somewhere between ethnonationalism and the form of consociational democracy imposed on the island by external actors. Research outputs by British, G/C and T/C scholars stand in full support of this argument. Studying Ireland and Cyprus in a comparative framework, Byrne was the first to note the T/C's veto powers:

Coercive consociationalism does not appear to have worked in the Cyprus conflict. The veto powers entrenched within the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee encouraged the Turkish Cypriot minority to use the budget veto as a political lever to secure the establishment of separate Turkish Cypriot municipalities on the island. The Turkish Cypriots knew that their external ethno-guarantor, Turkey, would intervene on their behalf.²⁰⁹

Joseph, notes the disproportionate T/C share in the public administration:

The provisions for disproportionate participation of the Turkish Cypriots in the public sector left an opening for a negative reaction among the Greek Cypriots, given its departure from the principle of equal treatment of all citizens... It should also be noted that the Republic of Cyprus came into being as a result of international agreements that were reached in the absence of the Cypriot people.²¹⁰

For Burgess and Özgür *et al*, beyond power sharing, the system failed to provide a sense on national unity:

This bi-communal system had relied on an extremely delicate balance between centrifugal and centripetal forces influencing the polity, but with the emphasis on institutional separation, parallelism and reciprocal veto, the constitution had instead created a polity with too few powers, functions and overlapping relationships that was not equipped to provide its people with an overarching sense of national state unity.²¹¹

However, the 1960 Constitution and the political system were not able to generate cohesion and mutual understanding between the two communities, instead injecting sources of fragmentation. Inter-communal divisions and misperceptions on both sides became an obstacle to the formation of a multi-ethnic national identity... the 1960

²⁰⁹ Byrne S. 2000. Power politics as usual in Cyprus and Northern Ireland: Divided islands and the roles of external ethno-guarantors. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 6(1), 1-23.

²¹⁰ Joseph, S. J. 2009, *op. cit.*, 383.

²¹¹ Burgess, M. 2007. 'What is to be done? Bicomunalism, federation and confederation in Cyprus'. In: Michael Burgess and John Pinder (eds.), *Multinational Federations*. London: Routledge, 130.

Constitution...granted the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities the right to elect their representatives separately... This division culminated in the de facto collapse of the republic hitherto.²¹²

Yakinthou emphasizes the role of the elites in prolonging the conflict under that institutional structure:

As it was the case in Cyprus and argued by the critics of consociational theory, elites are mostly in favor of the continuation of the conflict as they benefit from it due to the fact that they breed their politics from ethnonationalism.²¹³

Looking at EOKA's struggle for independence in retrospect, it appears that the G/Cs had not followed the ideal avenue towards their goal.²¹⁴ Raymond Courtney, an experienced US Consul in Nicosia, had informed his superiors that the G/Cs had failed to see that unification with Greece could come only as a gift from Britain. The British government could be pressed to concede *enosis*, but there was no way of forcing it to do so. The G/Cs only managed to create indignation which allowed British public opinion to follow their government's policy without objection, turning it to Ankara, to defeat both the G/Cs and itself.

Seven years following the *Kokkina* incident, a 1974 *coup d'état* backed by the Greek military junta removed Cyprus' legal president, Archbishop *Makarios* and gave Turkey the pretext to invade the island as one of the guarantor powers. The other two guarantors did not respond. The Greek junta fell apart, and Britain stood to watch silently. The more fertile Northern part of Cyprus was occupied by the Turkish forces and given to the T/Cs. The second wave of displacement came in July-August 1974, when 180,000 to 200,000 G/Cs fled to the south and approximately 50,000 to 60,000 T/Cs, many of whom had been displaced before, escaped to the north. Figure 4.1 highlights the islands 1974 division.

²¹² Özgür, E., Köprülü, N. and Reuchamps, M. 2017. Drawing Cyprus: Power-sharing, identity and expectations among the next generation in northern Cyprus", *Mediterranean Politics*, DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2017.1404720, 2.

²¹³ Yakinthou, C. 2009. *Political Settlements in Divided Societies*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 22.

²¹⁴ Holland, R. 1998. *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Maria Hadjipavlou notes:

This series of events led to the 1974 Greek-junta-engineered coup against Makarios and the subsequent invasion by Turkey allegedly to 'restore constitutional order' on the island, which has been *de facto* partitioned ever since. Thirty-six percent of Cyprus' territory came under Turkish military control, and one-third of the Greek Cypriots fled to become refugees in their own country.²¹⁵

FIGURE 4.1. Divided Cyprus



Source: Adapted by CRS.

Source: Morelli V. 2016.²¹⁶

Various scholars are blaming the then US Secretary of State *Henry Kissinger* for not acting to deter Turkey's invasion.²¹⁷ It appears that both the Greek junta and

²¹⁵ Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, M. 1993. Unofficial Intercommunal Contacts and their Contribution to Peace-Building in Conflict Societies: The Case of Cyprus. *The Cyprus Review* 5(2), 68-87.

²¹⁶ Morelli, V. 2016. Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive, Congressional Research Service, Report 7-5700, Washington DC. Available online at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41136.pdf>. [Accessed 15 May 2015].

²¹⁷ See e.g., Van Hook, L. 2007. *Foreign Relations of the United States: Greece; Cyprus; Turkey; 1973-1976*, Vol. XXX, Washington DC, US Government Printing Office.

Washington were obsessed with *Makarios'* sympathy of Russia and his refusal to make Cyprus a NATO member.²¹⁸

In 1977, three years after the 1974 forceful division of the island, the G/C and T/C leaders *Makarios* - who died the same year - and *Rauf Denктаş* agreed to create a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal Republic with powers and functions to safeguard unity.²¹⁹ Discussions would determine territorial jurisdictions, freedom of movement and settlement taking into account land ownership and productivity and the fundamental basis of the federal system. This agreement was confirmed in 1979 with another high-level agreement between *Kyprianou* and *Denктаş*. With these agreements, the leaders acknowledged the failure of the dispensation created in 1960 and made clear that there can never be a unitary system again.

On 15 November 1983, the T/Cs unilaterally declared their independence as the TRNC. Although the UN Security Council condemned this declaration, Turkey recognised the new "state" and established full diplomatic ties with it, exacerbating the existing tensions between the two communities.²²⁰ In 2003, passages between North and South were opened through the buffer zone (known as 'green line' zone), but freer two-way movement across the line was not welcomed by significant numbers of Cypriots, especially G/Cs.²²¹

The island is divided not only politically but also economically. Following along the Green Line-the internal border that separates the North from the South- there are big differences in per capita income and living standards.²²² Since the division of

²¹⁸ Joseph, S. J. 2009, *op. cit.*,

²¹⁹ Chigas, D. 2015. The Harvard Study Group of Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfulfilled Peace Process". In: Lund, M. and McDonald, S. (eds.), *Across the Lines of Conflict: Facilitating Cooperation to Build Peace*. NY: Columbia University Press, 231-280.

²²⁰ Yilmaz, M. E., 2010. Capturing the Complexity of the Cyprus Conflict. *Turkish Journal of Politics* 1(1), 1-27. Available online at: <http://tjp.fatih.edu.tr/docs/articles/66.pdf>. [Accessed 30 October 2015].

²²¹ Trimikliniotis N. 2007. Reconciliation and Social Action in Cyprus: Citizens' Inertia and the Protracted State of Limbo. *The Cyprus Review* 19(1), 123-160.

²²² Gokcekus O. 2009. A Novel Approach in Calculating the Costs of Economic Isolation. *SosyalBilimlerDergisi/ Journal of Social Sciences*. Available online at: http://works.bepress.com/omer_gokcekus/2 [Accessed 15 April 2013].

Cyprus in 1974, there have been no significant changes in the relative ratios of land and labour between the North and the South.

The two major conflicts in 1963-64 and 1973-74 impacted destructively on peoples' perceptions, raising an issue of collective memory and large group identity. The large group identity creates cohesiveness among the G/Cs and T/Cs that encourages each community to remain stuck in the past.²²³ Each community has their own large-group identity of either G/C or T/C, and there isn't a strong identity connection to being a "Cypriot". There are many casualties of protracted conflict, physical loss of life, or one's construct of distortion and hostility of their neighbours (in the case of Cyprus). Barash suggests the following:

Thus, one of the underlying functions of groups is to identify members of other groups as different from themselves. It is tempting to say that they 'misidentify,' since they exaggerate any existing differences, partly in the service of getting a firmer grip on who they are themselves.²²⁴

To an outsider, the similarities between the G/Cs and T/Cs are much more noticeable than the differences. The G/Cs and T/Cs see themselves entirely different from each other, in many ways. Barash again gives us another perspective to look at it, "...perhaps because it is only by having a clear sense of them that we can get a clear sense of us".²²⁵

4.2 Football in Cyprus: Genesis and conflict

This Section presents a brief history of football in Cyprus, with a focus on: its introduction by the British; the 1955 football schism and the narratives in regards to that schism; the significance of football in Cyprus' political sphere; and, the contribution of sport to nationalistic phenomena. To grasp this historical football background better, the Section covers three historical periods, from the evolution

²²³ Volkan, V. 2008. Trauma, Identity and Search for a Solution in Cyprus. *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 10 No. 4, pp. 95-110. Available online at: http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight-turkey_vol_10_no_4_2008_volkan.pdf [Accessed 12 April 2015].

²²⁴ Barash, D. 1994. *Beloved Enemies: Our Need for Opponents*. NY: Prometheus Books, 89.

²²⁵ *Ibid*, 90.

and development of Cypriot football up to the first major international initiative in 2004 - known as the 'Annan Plan' - to reunite the two communities politically.

4.2.1 The foundation of Cypriot football

Football in Cyprus emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century, and it appears that the British settlers had a crucial role to play in the establishment and spreading of the game.²²⁶ The *English School* in Nicosia in 1900 and the *American Academy of Larnaca* in 1908 played a significant role towards that end, given that later on, local clubs operating in Cypriot cities were attempting to enlist graduates from these schools among their players. However, from the very beginning, Cypriot football teams were established on an ethnic basis, including G/C, T/C and Armenian clubs.

Around that period, the first G/C football team, consisting 30 young men who had trained in an "English sports manner", formed the Hellenic Athletic Club of Nicosia and held matches mostly against footballers from the British armed forces.²²⁷ The first G/C football club was *Anorthosis of Famagusta*.²²⁸ It was founded in 1911 and in its first years of operation its emphasis was mostly on cultural matters. The first club with a clear football orientation was the *Pancyprian Football Club*, founded in 1913 by graduates of the English School. Ten years later the club was divided into *Panergatikos FC* (a labourers' team) and *Trast FC* (a team of social elites). Some of *TRAST's* stakeholders abandoned it two years later to initially create the *Poel* (Football Club of Nicosia's Greeks), and subsequently add the letter A [standing for Athletic] to rename it into *Apoel*. In football matches, *Apoel's* fans wave Greek

²²⁶ Peristianis, N., Kapardis, A., Loizou, C. Fakiolas, N., Puluskas. S. 2002. *Football violence in Cyprus*. Nicosia: Research Promotion Foundation.

²²⁷ Kartakoullis, N. L., and Loizou, C. 2009. Is sport (Football) a unifying force or a vehicle to further separation? The case of Cyprus. *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 26(11), 1652-1667.

²²⁸ The name "Anorthosis" came from a public speech of the Greek Prime Minister, *Eleftherios Venizelos*, referring to the 'rising' of the Greek nation. See, Maniou, T. 2017. Political conflicts in the Cypriot football fields: a qualitative approach through the press. *Soccer & Society*. Available online at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14660970.2016.1267630> [Accessed 12 February 2018].

flags and identify themselves firstly as Greeks and secondly as Cypriots.²²⁹ These first clubs contributed to the development of ethnic consciousness and the national struggle, which climaxed with EOKA's 1955 anti-colonialist struggle.²³⁰ Later on, they followed the G/C's political division closely into right-wing and communist factions.

It was Mr Thompson, a teacher of the English language in the *Idadi* (Turkish high school), who introduced football to the T/Cs in 1902. The first T/C football club was, the *Nicosia Ottoman Football Association* (Lefkoşa Osmalı Futbol Cemiyeti), established in 1907. A second club, *Nicosia Turkish Football Hearth* (Lefkoşa Türk Futbol Ocağı) was founded in 1910, following a 3-year search through the press inviting prospective recruits to apply to the *Nicosia Ottoman Football Association*. The club consisted of students, police officers and civil servants from the T/C community and remained active until 1922. The *Nicosia Turkish Sports Club* (Lefkoşa Türk Spor Kulübü, or LTSK), was founded in 1930.

The first unofficial football tournaments started among G/Cs but later on included T/C and Armenian teams. In 1929, the Nicosia *Idadi* used to play matches against the football teams of the other schools, e.g. the Armenian club. The Armenian Sports Club was one of the seven clubs in the first meeting of the Cypriot football clubs. Noteworthy is that when the Armenian football club *Gaitzak* won one of these tournaments, it caused hatred among the G/Cs who placed an embargo on Armenian business persons. Under such a climate, the Armenians had to discontinue their participation in the tournaments.²³¹

The *Palmerokratia* of the 1930s resulted in the closing of many football clubs. Palmer had introduced martial law due to the G/C rebellion. Nevertheless, interest in football increased on a nationwide scale. The Cyprus Football Association (CFA) was founded on 23 September 1934 in Nicosia on the premises of the *Apoel FC*.

²²⁹ G/C football owes its development to the presence of coaches who were coming mainly from Greece. Almost all G/C teams travelled to Greece to secure the services of experienced players, who acted as coaches.

²³⁰ *Papaharalambous-Papamiltiades, M. 2014. Cyprus*. In: Oboyle, I. and Bradbury, T. (eds.), *Sports Governance: International Case Studies*. London: Routledge, ch. 14.

²³¹ Meletiou, G. 2011. *Cypriot football 1900-1960*. Nicosia: Power Publishing (in Greek).

Five persons had been assigned to the task of preparing CFA's charter, among them *Memduh Asaf*, a T/C pharmacist and representative of the Nicosia Turkish Sports Club. The founders of CFA were seven G/C football clubs -*Anorthosis, Apoel, Olimpiakos, Trast, Ael, Aris* and *Epa* - and one T/C club, the Nicosia Turkish Sports Club (Lefkoşa Türk Spor Kulübü, or LTSK). Official football league and championship matches started three months later, in December 1934.²³²

CFA remained inactive during WWII, but some critical positive and negative developments occurred in the remaining part of that decade. In 1948, CFA became the island's only football governing agency, following the acceptance of its application by the International Football Federation (FIFA).²³³ However, the same year, with the Greek civil war ravaging, the sports authority for Greece and Cyprus, SEGAS, called on all its members to sign a declaration, publicly renouncing any support to the communist party, in favour of the conservative faction of Greece. This move drove many left-leaning athletes out of their sports clubs because they refused to sign the declaration.²³⁴ In 1949, *Chetinkaya* applied for membership in the first league but its application was rejected as only eight teams could participate in that league. A follow-up application requesting *Chetinkaya's* participation in the second category had the same fate for the same reason. The reaction of the T/Cs was the merger of two T/C football teams to form a stronger one to represent their community.²³⁵ The merger was between *Turkish Sports Hearth of the Guilds Chetinkaya* (Türk Spor Esnaf Ocağı Çetinkaya) that was set up in 1943 and LTSK created *Chetinkaya*, the most famous T/C team. *Cetinkaya* won the CFA championship in 1951-52, and two years later with famous T/C player *Defterali* in its ranks, the Cyprus national team held three matches against Israel.²³⁶

²³² An, A. D. 2008, *op.cit.*

²³³ *Rauf Denктаş*, a lawyer, TRNC's first hard-liner president and father of the also hardliner T/C sports minister *Serdar Denктаş*, served as CFA's Vice-president and head of the Disciplinary Committee between 1947-1956 (see An, 2008, *op.cit.*).

²³⁴ Meletiou, G. 2011, *op. cit.*

²³⁵ Dağlı, O. 2015. *Together in Football: Turkish-Cypriot Footballers in Greek-Cypriot Teams*. Limassol, Cyprus: Heterotopia Publishers.

²³⁶ An, A. D. 2008. The first Turkish Cypriot football clubs, intercommunal football matches, multiethnic football teams and *Chetinkaya* (1902-1955). Paper presented at the 4th International Cyprological Congress, Nicosia, 29 April-3 May, available online at:

Chetinkaya's victory provided an example of the harmonious co-existence of G/C and T/C football clubs. *Mehmet Kara*, one of *Chetinkaya's* administrators at the time, stated: ²³⁷

There were two matches left in the football season of 1950-51. We were one point ahead of Anorthosis. AEL and Anorthosis were about to play in Limassol, and if AEL were to lose, Anorthosis would be the champion. If, however, AEL were to win, we would be the champions again. The trainer of AEL was a Greek mainlander. His statement was: I don't accept nationalism in football. In the end, AEL defeated Anorthosis with a score 4 to 0. We learned this result at the Paphos Gate and our football players were brought to the club on the shoulders of the fans. Anorthosis had one point less than us and *Chetinkaya* became the champion.

Another example of this co-existence a July 1953 match between *Chetinkaya* and AEL. The G/C team had two T/Cs, *Kamuran* and *Sevim*, among its players and lost the match with a score 4-3. After the match *Defterali* stated that *Ael's* reinforcement was significant because it showed the formal acceptance of T/C skills, noting that they were receiving match proposals from other G/C clubs such as *Omonoia*. ²³⁸

4.2.2 The football schism: 1955-1974

EOKA's struggle for Cyprus' independence from British colonialism in the mid-1950s brought turmoil to every aspect of social life on the island including sports. During 1955-1959, the engagement of Gymnastic Societies and many unions in the struggle was intense, with many clubs used as centres of nurseries.

In October 1955, after consulting with the *Cyprus Athletic Stadia* authority, TESK - the local committee of the Federation of Greek Athletic Associations - issued an advisory warning [a decision] that only G/Cs could use sports facilities owned by G/Cs. TESK's aim was to prevent any incidents between G/Cs and other ethnic minorities, to be able to maintain good relations between them, 'until the trouble was over'. CFA's General Assembly followed up with a decision of its general assembly to temporarily suspend the participation of T/C teams in the tournament.

[http://www.ahdr.info/ckfinder/userfiles/files/Football%20Clubs_Cavit_An\(1\).pdf](http://www.ahdr.info/ckfinder/userfiles/files/Football%20Clubs_Cavit_An(1).pdf) [Accessed 15 May 2015].

²³⁷ An, A. D. 2008, *op. cit.*

²³⁸ *Ibid.*

Inter-communal relations were already tense, as EOKA's main goal was *enosis*, i.e., unification with Greece, which the T/C community was sternly opposing.

Taken on 30 October 1955, CFA's decision stated:

It is with great sadness that the General Assembly took the decision without of course any political or racial motives, which are unfamiliar to the high ideals of sports. This is proved by the whole attitude of the CFA and of the Greek Cypriot unions towards brother-Turkish Cypriot unions during the 21-year life of the Federation. The decision was taken as a purely provisional measure for the sole and exclusive purpose of maintaining public order, that is, an effort to avoid the risk of disruption of the existing friendly relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Meanwhile, the CFA will continue to treat the Turkish Cypriot unions as members and will be happy to reconsider its decision as soon as the conditions will allow it.

It appears that political or racial motives did not dictate CFA's decision and that the exclusion was temporary. In spite of this, the T/Cs' proceeded the same day on setting up their own separate football federation TCFA, which exists today.

The T/C narrative blames CFA. TCFA's current [April 2018] website does not even report the correct date of their temporary exclusion:

Following the expulsion of Turkish Cypriots in 1934 from the Cyprus Football Association where the Turkish Cypriots were also the founders and where the Greek Cypriots had the majority, the need had arisen for the Turkish Cypriots to form their own organisation.²³⁹

Mehmet Kara, one of *Chetinkaya's* Administrative Council members who participated in CFA's general assembly, said in a 2007 interview:

In 1955, when the terror activities of EOKA started, CFA called for a meeting of the representatives of the clubs. As representatives of Chetinkaya, I myself and Mr Asim Behcet went to this meeting. Their aim was to exclude Chetinkaya from CFA. But no-one could state this openly. Present at this meeting were the Apoel President, an EOKA-man, the advocate Titos Fanos, the representatives of AEL, Mr Nikos Solomonides who used to import Fiat cars and Mr Theodis Solomonidis made a speech starting with the words you know that we love you. But Theodis took over and said: There is no point in mincing

²³⁹ CTFA. No date. History. Available online at: <http://www.ktff.org/CTFA/History> [Accessed 4 April 2018].

words. We have lived for years like brothers but the time has come now to expel Chetinkaya from CFA".²⁴⁰

A previously (1999) uploaded version of TCFA's history was asserting that their expulsion from CFA was racist. Moreover, it had begun on 3 April 1955, with a match between *Chetinkaya* and *Pezoporikos* cancelled, which thousands of disappointed T/C spectators recall vividly.²⁴¹ A decade earlier, *Ahmed Sami Toptzan*, TCFA's president for years, had expressed the same view at a conference in *Ledra Palace* hotel titled "Evolution of Cypriot sport from yesterday to today":

When we went to the GSP Stadium in Nicosia for the football match between Chetinkaya and Pezoporikos, the responsible person for the stadium and the night watch did not open the door. They told us that the Church had given an order that the Turks cannot play football anymore in the Greek Cypriot stadiums Until CFA declared its decision. I think Chetinkaya was able to play one more match in Larnaca. That stadium did not belong to the Church. But the GSP stadium belonged to the Orthodox Church, to the Kykko Monastery. After this event, they excluded Chetinkaya from CFA. ²⁴²

The works of two well-informed T/Cs, *Okan Dağlı* and *Ahmet Djavit An*, refute these assertions, with the latter giving full match details with dates:

Notwithstanding the above developments, Chetinkaya continued for a time to play matches against Greek Cypriot teams. On 17 April 1955, Chetinkaya played with Aris in Limassol and the score was 1 to 1. On 23 April, Chetinkaya defeated Omonia with a score 2 to 1. On 15 May 1955 Anorthosis defeated Chetinkaya with a score 3 to 0 in Famagusta. On 1 June 1955, Chetinkaya and Apoel had a score 2 to 2, but in the juniors Apoel won with a score 3 to 2. Finally, on 9 June 1955, the postponed match between Chetinkaya and Pezoporikos took place and Chetinkaya lost the match with a score 2 to 0. Chetinkaya had

²⁴⁰ An, A. D. 2008, *op. cit.*

²⁴¹ KTFF History. Was available at: <http://www.cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/people/sports/football/ktff.htm> [currently available from the author].

²⁴² Dağlı, O. 2015, *op.cit.*

20 points in 18 matches, obtaining fourth place in the Cyprus Premier League. On 3 July 1955, Chetinkaya was defeated by Pezoporikos in the semi-final, relinquishing the cup.²⁴³

The island's independence in 1960 was marking a new era for Cypriot football, as there would more solid foundations to help the sport grow. However, due to the bi-communal tensions between 1963 and 1968 and the lack of security in cross-city travel, G/C league matches were interrupted for a short period. The T/Cs ceased to play football matches for five years and EOKA's rival TMT prohibited T/C players from competing in G/C teams. Despite the ban, some players passionate for the sport changed their names and even their religion to continue their careers in G/C teams. The Turkish invasion of the island in 1974 placed the final nail on the Cypriot football's coffin.²⁴⁴

4.2.3 TCFA's international isolation: 1974 -

After the invasion of the island by the Turkish troops of 1974, the main two political opponents, the conservative party DHSY and the leftist party AKEL, continued to prevail in the G/C public sphere. However, as public opinion held that DHSY was co-responsible with the Greek junta for the military coup against President *Makarios*, AKEL was on the rise. Compared to the nationalist football club APOEL, the left-leaning club OMONOIA became the favourite team of the G/Cs. In matches between the two teams, APOEL's fans raised the Greek flag instead of the Cypriot flag, shouting "Cyprus is Greek". In contrast, OMONOIA's fans used symbols directly linking to the Communist party ideas and raised the Cypriot flag, chanting the slogan "Cyprus belongs to its people". In several matches, they also burned the Greek flag.²⁴⁵ Thus, the football conflict among G/Cs was, in essence, a societal conflict between the upper and the working class even after 1974.

In the first years after the Turkish invasion in 1974, some T/C players continued to play secretly in CFA. The T/C football teams were able to play international

²⁴³ An, A. D. 2008, *op. cit.* An's affidavit raises the plausible query "how did these matches take place when CFA had decided to temporarily discontinue its partnership with the T/Cs", but this thesis could not address it.

²⁴⁴ Meletiou, G. 2011, *op. cit.*

²⁴⁵ Maniou, T. 2017, *op. cit.*

matches against teams from countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Libya. This was made possible due to FIFA's tolerance with the tacit approval of its secretary general, Dr. Helmut Kaiser.²⁴⁶ However, after the declaration of independence in 1983, Turkish Cypriot teams and the national team lost the ability to play international matches. In 1990, the Turkish team, *Fenerbahçe* was planning a local match with a T/C team but FIFA did not allow it on the grounds that TCFA was not one of its members.²⁴⁷

In April 1996, at the request of the T/Cs to participate in international football competitions, FIFA arranged an unsuccessful meeting with CFA and TCFA. The meeting failed in the outset as the T/Cs strongly denounced the fact that, on the intervention of the Government of Cyprus – as they claimed - it was to take place in a hotel in free *Nicosia* instead of *Ledra Pallas*, located in the buffer zone and used by the UN as headquarters.²⁴⁸

In July 2003, the Embassy of Italy, which was carrying the Presidency of the European Union (EU), organised a football match between a mixed G/C and T/C team and a team representing the UN and the EU. The game took place in the buffer zone. Six T/C players who participated in this match faced TCFA's penalty, which was their expulsion from the local championships for three months.²⁴⁹

In 2004, although the T/C's massive vote in favour of the UN *Annan Plan* to reunify Cyprus politically helped them wipe off the "secessionist" label, it did not alter their status in international football affairs. However, that vote was a sufficiently positive sign so three years later FIFA and UEFA decided to start a new process to improve

²⁴⁶ Menary, S. 2012. *Outcasts! The Lands That FIFA Forgot*. Brighton, UK: Pitch Publishing.

²⁴⁷ Menary, S. 2010, *op. cit.*

²⁴⁸ This information was originally accessed online on 9 September 2012 from Logos, a Greek blogsite: https://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.greek/tree/browse_frm/month/1996-04/ab2ae5f9ede84e18?num=161&_done=%2Fgroup%2Fsoc.culture.greek%2Fbrowse_frm%2Fmonth%2F1996-04%3Fwc%3D1%26 . However it was no longer traceable online in October 2013.

²⁴⁹ Originally available online and accessed on 9 September 2012 from www.typos.com.cy/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=32829. Currently available either from the author or from the newspaper's offline archives. Contact Mr. Andrew Rolandis: <info@typos.com.cy>.

²⁴⁹ In 2013, the 50 seats of the TRNC parliament were distributed as follows: Republican Turkish Party (CTP 21), National Unity Party (UBP 14), Democratic Party (DP 12), and Communal Democracy Party (TDP 3).

inter-communal relations by reunifying football in the island”.²⁵⁰ The next Chapter presents that initiative in detail.

²⁵⁰ Adamides, C. and Sonan, S. 2016, *op. cit.*

CHAPTER 5

THE ANNAN PLAN PERIOD:

OPPORTUNITIES FOR POLITICAL AND FOOTBALL REUNIFICATION

This chapter presents the developments around the referendum on UN's *Annan Plan* project in 2004 to reunite Cyprus and the subsequent conclusion of FIFA's 2008 initiative to terminate TCFA's international isolation. Once again, the focus is on international and local developments in the political and the sports reunification arenas, covering the period from the *Annan Plan* year 2004 to 2012 when FIFA expressed its second initiative to reunite Cyprus symbolically through football. The material in subsection 5.4.2 constitute the first empirical part of the thesis, tracing explicitly within the carved IR model the leader's images of football reunification as a foreign policy issue and the efforts by some segments of the political culture and civil society to influence the T/C leader's decision domain.


Before presenting these developments, it is helpful to clarify the relative position of the two communities as well as the relationship of their respective motherlands in the international political arena at that time. Also, to be able to trace football reunification as a foreign policy dilemma for the T/Cs, this chapter presents TRNC's political power structure and the state of football in the island which is equally relevant for the analysis that follows in the next chapter 6.

5.1. The RoC and TRNC in IR

Figure 1 draws a rudimentary picture of the RoC and TRNC positions in the international system viewed through neo-liberal lens. As Figure 1 illustrates, the T/Cs are entirely isolated and heavily influenced by Turkey, unlike the G/Cs, who maintain a relationship with Greece that is close but not marked by dependency. That is highlighted vividly in the text of a Security Council 2008 report, which states that "Turkey seems to continue to enjoy a more direct influence on the T/Cs than

Greece does about the G/Cs".²⁵¹ The RoC, Greece and Turkey are NATO members and maintain formal relations among them as well as with these four international organisations. Yet, they have different international power connections.

Figure 5.1: The Relative Position of G/Cs and T/Cs and Their Motherlands in International Politics



Source: Lekakis, N. 2015, *op. cit.* Note: A thicker line indicates a stronger link and thus more relative power.

²⁵¹ UN Security Council Special Research Report No. 3, "Cyprus: New Hope after 45 Years on the Security Council Agenda", 4 September 2008. Available online at: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/cyprus/> [Accessed 2 July 2015].

The global powers, US and UK, have a well-demonstrated preference to Turkey's and the T/C's interests over those of Greece and the RoC, as again noted in statements contained in various official UN documents of the post-*Annan Plan* period.

Three UN documents issued in 2007, 2008 and 2011, state:

France and Russia are viewed as traditional supporters of the Greek Cypriots, whereas the UK and the US seem to want a better balance for the Turkish Cypriots".²⁵² "Cyprus' EU membership and Turkey's candidacy have influenced some Council members when dealing with Cyprus. The UK is supportive of Turkey's EU accession, and with support from the US, they have tended to be more sensitive to Turkish Cypriots' complaints regarding their isolation—contrary to France which opposes Turkey's entry".²⁵³ "The dynamics of the Council regarding Cyprus continue to be affected by the relationship of various members with the Cypriot parties. Russia, and to some extent France, lean towards the Greek Cypriots, and the UK is more sympathetic to the Turkish Cypriot side."²⁵⁴

A 2014 document draws a similar picture, stating:

Traditionally, the UK has tended to be more sympathetic to the Turkish Cypriot position while France and Russia have been more sympathetic towards the Greek Cypriot position. Judging from recent developments, there seems to be increased interest by the US in finding a solution to the Cyprus issue in the near future.²⁵⁵

As will be examined subsequently through the lens of various experts on the so-called *Annan Plan* for a reunification of the island, Turkey's relationship with the USA and the UN was stronger compared to that of Greece and the G/Cs, predominantly due to its geopolitical significance as a regional power in the Middle East. The reverse is true in regards to the EU, as it has not yet admitted Turkey and offers only some minimal assistance to the T/Cs.

²⁵² UN Security Council. June 2007 Monthly Forecast. Available online at: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/cyprus/> [Accessed 2 July 2015].

²⁵³ UN Security Council Special Research Report No. 3, 2008, *op. cit.*

²⁵⁴ UN Security Council "June 2011 Monthly Forecast." available online at: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/cyprus/> [Accessed 2 July 2015].

²⁵⁵ UN Security Council "July 2014 Monthly Forecast." available online at: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/cyprus/> [Accessed 2 July 2015].

Though FIFA claims it is not a political institution, it does not act in a political vacuum and is subject to influence by other global actors and organisations. As already explained in Chapter 1, in the past, it acted politically, when it awarded the 2002 and the 2010 World Cup Games. Armstrong sees football as a game that “has become increasingly central to... the politics and universalism of FIFA...”.²⁵⁶ And, FIFA’s head is portrayed by the media as a powerful actor who can meet with any head of state, bypassing the usual diplomatic routes and protocols.²⁵⁷

5.2. TRNC’s Political Power Structure

The identities of the intervening variables in the proposed synthesis of the neoliberal and *neoclassical realist* approaches to studying the football reunification problem in Cyprus are traced to TRNC’s political system, which is a Parliamentary Democracy. In T/C wording, the political power structure includes the President, the government, the political parties plus political elites, and civil society.

5.2.1. The President

TRNC’s 1985 Constitution rules that the President is elected by universal suffrage and has a rather symbolic executive role, e.g. only formally appointing the prime minister on the basis of the national election results. The Constitution stipulates also the parliamentary system, in which the power of the executive branch rests in the prime minister and his ministerial cabinet. Nevertheless, since the 1970s, a tradition has developed outside the constitution, according to which the president acts as a ‘community leader’ and chief negotiator on behalf of the T/Cs in the UN-sponsored peace talks.²⁵⁸ The first TRNC president was nationalist hard-liner *Rauf Denktaş*, who retired in 2005 and was succeeded by the progressive former Prime Minister, *Mehmet Ali Talat*. Likewise, in 2010, the conservative former Prime Minister *Dervis Eroglou* won the presidential election and became TRNC’s third

²⁵⁶ Armstrong, G. 2007, *op. cit.*

²⁵⁷ Borden S. and Montague J. 2013, *op. cit.*

²⁵⁸ Sözen, A. 2009. *The Turkish Cypriot Legislative Election of April 2009: Towards the ‘Last Roll of the Dice’ in the Cyprus Conflict?* *South European Society and Politics* 14(3), 337-350.

president to pass the torch to another progressive former Prime Minister and current president *Mustafa Akinci* in 2015.

5.2.2. Political parties and government

TRNC held its first multi-party elections in 1993, ten whole years since its unilateral declaration of independence. In these elections, a coalition of a leftist and a moderate conservative party (CTP and DP respectively) replaced the ruling UBP conservative party in power. However, three years later, another coalition between the ruling UBP and DP governed until 2003. Thus far, in the post-Annan Plan period, elections were held four times. Table 5.1 shows the T/C political parties represented in the 50-seat parliament, and brief party summaries and government schemes follow.

UBP, a major political party, was founded in 1975 by *Rauf Denktaş*, who served as the first president of the T/Cs from 1976 to 2005. The party was in office when TRNC's independence was declared behind which the mastermind was *Denktaş*. The party has dominated T/C politics for the greater part of TRNC's history, and its name ("National Unity Party") symbolises independence and unity under one flag one country.²⁵⁹ Following a nationalist ideology, UBP is a strong advocate of very close ties with Turkey and against the unification of Cyprus under a federal system (one state), while considering the G/Cs as bastions of Hellenism with the EU standing to their favour.²⁶⁰

CTP was founded in 1970 by a lawyer who opposed *Rauf Denktaş*' nationalist rhetoric and is the oldest party in T/C politics. Until 1993 it had a clear leftist ideology, but subsequently, it adopted a social democratic orientation and changed its flag from red to green. Since 2003 it has formed an alliance with BG – a centre-right/liberal circles movement. CTP (and CTP/BG) resists nationalist policies and stands in favour of a one-state solution to the Cyprus Problem.

²⁵⁹ *Sözen, A. 2009, op. cit.*

²⁶⁰ *Cirakli, M. 2016. Identity, Immigration and Citizenship in Northern Cyprus. A thesis submitted to Lancaster University for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Available online at: <http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/87432/1/2016ciraklihd.pdf> [Accessed 12 March 2017].*

Table 5.1: Parliamentary Parties in TRNC, 2005-2018 (key leaders & seats) *

POLITICAL PARTY	2005	2009	2013	2018
UBP (National Union Party). Key Leader(s): <i>Rauf Denктаş</i> 1975-1983, <i>Dervis Erođlu</i> , 1983-2005 & 2008-2010. <i>Hüseyin Özgürgün</i> 2013-	19	26	14	21
CTP/BG (Republican Turkish Party). Key Leader(s): <i>Mehmet Ali Talat</i> , 1996-2005. <i>Ferdi Sabit Soyer</i> 2005-2011. <i>Ozkan Yorgancioglu</i> , 2011-	24	15	21	12
DP (Democratic Party). Leader: <i>Serdar Denктаş</i> , 1993 –	6	5	12	2
TDP (Communal Democracy Party). Key Leader(s): <i>Mustafa Akinci</i> , 1987-2001, 2003-2007. <i>Tufan Erhurman</i> 2008-		2	3	3
BHD (absorbed by TPD)	1			
ORP (absorbed by CTP)		2		
HP (Peoples Party). Leader: <i>Kudret Ozersay</i> 2016-				9
YDP (Rebirth Party). Leader: <i>Erhan Arakli</i> , 2016-				3

*Assembled by the author, using: Sözen 2005, 2009²⁶¹, Aksit ,2013,²⁶² T-VINE 2018²⁶³.

DP was founded in 1992 by UBP members as a result of personal clashes between Denктаş and *Dervis Erođlu* who was the party’s chairman and Prime Minister at that time. Since 1996 DP is headed by Denктаş’ son *Serdar Denктаş*, it shares the nationalism of UBP and favours a two-state solution for Cyprus. Nevertheless, the party appears also as a moderate movement including liberal-minded candidates. His double-faced campaign seems to communicate a vague message to the electorate so DP’s parliamentary representation keeps nose diving.

²⁶¹ Sözen, A. 2005. The Turkish Cypriot Legislative Election of February 2005: The Rise of CTP/BG. *South European Society & Politics* 10(3), 465-475; Sözen, A. 2009, *op. cit.*

²⁶² Aksit, S. 2013. Parliamentary Elections in the TRNC: Still No Hope for a Thorough Change. Gediz University Newsletter. Available online at: https://www.academia.edu/4873633/July_2013_Parliamentary_Elections_in_the_TRNC_Still_No_Hope_for_a_Thorough_Change_ [Accessed 15 September 2016].

²⁶³ T-VINE. 2018. New four-way centre-left coalition government for North Cyprus. Available online at: <http://www.t-vine.com/new-four-way-centre-left-coalition-government-for-north-cyprus/> [Accessed 12 March 2018].

TDP was officially founded in 2007 but it is an apparent continuation of TKP (Communal Liberation Party), founded in 1976 as an alternative social democratic party to oppose conservative UBP. TDP was formed as a result of a merger between TKP and BDH - an umbrella party which the TKP had created with other small leftist parties and NGOs for the 2003 election. Ever since, TDP has taken an ideological place to the left of CTP/BG. This has resulted in the party's marginalisation, its supporters being mostly young and left-wing T/Cs who do not vote for CTP/BG.

As regards the remaining three parties, **ORP** was founded in 2006 by three UBP MPs and one MP from DP, allegedly as a result of the then Turkish prime minister *Recep Tayyip Erdogan's* desire to rid TRNC's government of the 'Denktaş family' which was critical of his AKP party. **HP** was created in 2016 by *Kudret Ozersay*, a former negotiator for the T/Cs in UN talks for the Cyprus Problem and claims to be a centre party. Its main supporters are Turkish migrants to Northern Cyprus. Finally, **YDP** was also created in 2016 as a far right extreme nationalist party.

The parliamentary parties presented above participated in TRNC's governments as follows. In the 2005 elections, CTP and DP formed a new government, with CTP's leader *Mehmet Ali Talat* appointed as Prime Minister. The T/C voters had supported parties representing moderation and consensus rather than polarization. That is, their support was for parties favouring a solution to the Cyprus Problem and EU-membership, against parties whose campaign appeared "unrealistic" such as the unconditional fight for TRNC's international recognition or that the T/Cs should act independently of Turkey.²⁶⁴

In the 2009 elections, the pro-Cypriot reunification CTP lost to the formerly omnipotent pro-independence UBP. Having secured 26/50 parliamentary seats UBP leader, *Dervis Eroglou* formed a government. CTP had been hurt by several factors including the continued isolation of the TRNC due to the lack of progress in the reunification talks among the same leftist ideology sharing of the T/C and G/C Presidents *Mehmet Ali Talat* and *Dimitris Christofias*; the statement of the UBP leader that he is committed to the communal peace talks; alleged wrongdoings in

²⁶⁴ Sözen, A. 2005, op. cit.

the domestic economy; and, the global economic crisis.²⁶⁵ When Eroglou won the 2010 presidential election, he appointed *Irsen Küçük* as party leader and Prime Minister. However, three months before the 2013 elections, Küçük's government failed to survive a no-confidence vote and CTP's *Simel Siber* became Prime Minister in an interim government.²⁶⁶

In the 2013 elections, CTP rebounded winning 21 seats but still short of securing a ruling majority in parliament. This result had to do, on the one hand, with its record in government between 2003 and 2009 - mainly its failure to achieve a breakthrough in TRNC's international isolation and its inability to restructure the economy. On the other hand, given that UBP's leader failed to be re-elected, indicates the discontent among the UBP voters with his style of handling interparty struggles and governmental affairs. Following talks with DP, CTP's *Özkan Yorgancıoğlu* became Prime Minister of a coalitional government, which among other matters was expected to foster good relations with Turkey's ruling AKP party. The DP was at odds with AKP for indirectly supporting UBP, but it was important not to disregard the Turkish government which supports TRNC economically and diplomatically.²⁶⁷ *Yorgancıoğlu* resigned as prime minister, following President *Akinci's* election in 2015 and an internal party restructuring, turning his post to *Omer Kalyonku* who become head of a CTP-UBP coalitional government. In 2016, UBP withdrew to form a new government with DP under UBP's *Hüseyin Özgürgün*.²⁶⁸

In the 2018 elections, finally, four parties came to an agreement to form a coalitional government. Although UBP finished first, it lacked an absolute majority, and *Özgürgün* did not manage to form a coalitional government as the four remaining parties refused to collaborate with him in the light of allegations of UBP's corruption scandals. President *Akinci* then passed the baton to CTP's *Tufan Erhürman* who

²⁶⁵ Sözen, A. 2009, *op. cit.*

²⁶⁶ Lansford, T. (ed.) 2017. *Political handbook of the World 2016-2017*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

²⁶⁷ Aksit, S. 2013, *op. cit.*

²⁶⁸ Lansford, T. (ed.) 2017, *op. cit.*

managed to form a coalitional government with HP, DP and TPD, combining an absolute majority of 26/50 parliamentary seats.²⁶⁹

5.2.3. Civil society

For some scholars, civil society comprises all those societal segments that are outside the government and the business sectors. It includes various associations, NGOs, not for profit organisations, advocacy and citizens' groups, social mobilisations, as well as the factors that enable their emergence, i.e., cultures, norms, and social values.²⁷⁰

In this narrow view, T/C community civil society organisations are limited to trade unions which are constrained by a lack of autonomy from political forces. The oldest segments of T/C civil society are some 'moderate' trade unions. Among these are the *Cyprus Turkish Teachers Trade Union* (KTÖS) and the *Cyprus Turkish Civil Servants Trade Union* (KTAMS) which are ideologically positioned on the political left and have been critical of the conservative and 'hard-line' governing elites.²⁷¹

KTÖS, specifically, has a rich history of its progressive struggle for democracy and peace in Cyprus under one state. In 2001, when Turkey had imposed an IMF-styled austerity package on TRNC, KTÖS released open statements in the progressive daily press declaring that Turkey's package, money and civil servants were unwelcome. The Republic Turkish Party, CTP, and forty-one NGOs that had formed the platform "*This country is ours*" came to KTÖS' support. President *Rauf Denктаş* called on the Attorney General to find a legal basis on which to ban the trade unionists from teaching at schools. He also opened up a court case and sent the police to the KTÖS headquarters to confiscate their computers, printers and

²⁶⁹ T-VINE. 2018, *op. cit.*

²⁷⁰ Vasilara, M. and Piaton, G. 2007. The role of civil society in Cyprus. *The Cyprus Review* 19(2), 107-121.

²⁷¹ Kyris, G. 2013. Europeanization beyond Contested Statehood: The European Union and Turkish-Cypriot Civil Society. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51(5), 866-883.

fax machines, as evidence of their “crime”.²⁷² Last summer, in official statements, KTÖS complained that TRNC’s society was becoming less secular, as money was being allocated to religious affairs at the expense of education. The teachers union noted that there were 160 schools compared to 190 mosques accusing the minister of education for closing schools and distributing their land to people close to his National Unity Party, UBP and its coalitional partner, the Democratic Party, DP.²⁷³ KTÖS views the TRNC regime as nothing but a puppet of Ankara.²⁷⁴

Before the 2004 rejection of the *Annan Plan* and the RoC’s full EU membership, the T/C civil society had gained ample domestic political influence by organising the public pro-EU/solution movement with an extensive campaign going from ‘door to door’ to inform the people on the new developments and opportunities. Nevertheless, the political culture and system have been and remain important factors that create hindrances working against the role of civil society.²⁷⁵ Moreover, the prevailing political culture and attitudes to civil society are not conducive to providing platforms for citizens in general in the wider foreign policy development process.²⁷⁶

In a wider form, as part of domestic civic actors that may influence foreign policy affairs, civil society embraces segments of the business sector. Following the rejection of the *Annan Plan* EU’s initiative to prioritise TRNC’s civil society over state agents was catalytic in the formation of domestic level actors opposing the regime and its hard-line leaders. A good example is the T/C Chamber of Commerce (KTTO) which existed since 1958. It is now an internationally-

²⁷² KTÖS. 2001. Appeal for support. Available online at: <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51/360.html> [Accessed 12 April 2016]

²⁷³ Yeniduzen. 2017. 160 okula karşılık 192 cami var...(There are 192 mosques against 160 schools ...). Available online at: <http://www.yeniduzen.com/160-okula-karsilik-192-cami-var-90972h.htm> [Accessed 10 January 2018].

²⁷⁴ Ioannou, G. and Sonan, S. 2017. Trade unions and politics in Cyprus: a historical comparative analysis across the dividing line *Mediterranean Politics*, 22:4, 484-503.

²⁷⁵ Kanol, D. 2010. Civil Society’s Role in Peace-Building: Relevance of the Cypriot Case. *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 9(1), 26-45.

²⁷⁶ Gillespie, N., Georgiou, V. and Insay, S. 2011. Cyprus civil society: developing trust and cooperation. EC, International NGO Training and Research Center, Research Briefing Paper. Available online at: <https://www.intrac.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Research-Briefing-Paper-Cyprus-civil-society-developing-trust-and-cooperation.pdf> [Accessed 10 March 2015].

recognised NGO, representing the T/C business community at home and abroad. Because the EU does not recognise the TRNC, in fear of ‘recognition by implication’, the Commission delegated a series of trade responsibilities to KTTO, rather than the T/C administration. KTTO, a supporter of the island’s reunification established a representation office in Brussels, which gradually evolved into an important lobbying centre for the T/Cs.²⁷⁷ In a June 2013 call, representing sixteen civil society organisations including the T/C Business Association, KTTO appeals to the UN for a solution to the Cyprus Problem.²⁷⁸

Following Moravcsik’s *non-utopian* approach, Grigoriadis argues that civil society in both north and south Cyprus need to work toward the expansion of the number and scope of involved NGOs so that wider segments of both communities can address the real needs of their members.²⁷⁹ The year 2017 has witnessed the emergence of an unprecedented bi-communal civil society mobilization which should attempt to fight the *status quo*. If political leadership is hesitant to act, then a critical mass of federalist G/Cs and T/Cs need to take bold initiatives within the scope of their constitutional rights to revitalize the Cypriot peace project. Grigoriadis’ mention of constitutional rights stems from the opening passage of TRNC’s 1985 Constitution, in which the “Turkish Cypriot People” are referred to as the “unquestionable and the unconditional owner of the sovereignty of the State”.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁷ Kyris, G. 2015. *The Europeanisation of Contested Statehood: The EU in Northern Cyprus*. London: Routledge. Also, Bouris, D. and Kyris, G. 2017. Europeanisation, Sovereignty and Contested States: The EU in northern Cyprus and Palestine. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*. 19(4), 755–771.

²⁷⁸ KTTO. 2013. Turkish Cypriot civil society organisations demand urgent solution to the Cyprus problem. Available online at: <http://www.ktto.net/newsletter/june201301.html> [Accessed 12 March 2016].

²⁷⁹ Grigoriadis, I. N. 2017. Cyprus Negotiations Thwarted by Issues on Security and Guarantees. How Can the Peace Process Be Revived? German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Available online at: https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2017C28_gri.pdf [Accessed 12 February 2018].

²⁸⁰ Mamali, B. 2008. Presidential System and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (T.R.N.C). *Ankarabar Review*. 2, 34-39. Available online at: <http://www.ankarabaru.org.tr/siteler/AnkaraBarReview/tekmakale/2008-2/5.pdf>. [Accessed 2 July 2016].

In light of the discussion in the first two sections of this chapter, the next two highlight the UN-drafted *Annan Plan* to reunite Cyprus in 2004 and also analyse the role of intervening variables that shaped a negative foreign sports policy outcome, i.e., the failure of the first football reunification movement in the island.

5.3. The *Annan Plan*

Thirty years following its 1974 invasion by the Turkish Army, Cyprus appears to have had a unique opportunity to become again a single sovereign country. In a *neo-liberal* international relations environment, pressured by great Western powers and the UN, the Cypriots came to vote in a referendum on the so-called *Annan Plan*, establishing a federal state formed of two constituent states.

The T/Cs had more incentives than the G/Cs to accept the Plan. The prospect for Cyprus to join the EU as a full member and a federal state with two independent states was tempting. Formal recognition of TRNC under a new Cyprus would bring massive economic benefits, for it would include them in the international financial system and international organisations. Access to these institutions would place the North in an accessible position to welcome foreign investment, as investors would now have all the information they needed for their investment decisions.²⁸¹ All in all, the prospect of EU membership and the benefits that would go along outweighed by far any concerns with the content of the Plan.

In specific regard to football, according to article 16 of the Plan, “*Cooperation and coordination*”, the constituent states could conclude agreements aiming to create common organisations and institutions on matters within the competence of the parties. They were also urged to coordinate or harmonise their policies on various issues including culture where sports belong. The T/Cs could either join a federal football team or retain their culture through an own national football team, following

²⁸¹ Gokcekus O. 2009. A Novel Approach in Calculating the Costs of Economic Isolation. *SosyalBilimlerDergisi/ Journal of Social Sciences* [online]. http://works.bepress.com/omer_gokcekus/2 [Accessed 15 April 2013].

the UK model, which includes the national teams of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.²⁸²

Turkey itself was supportive of the entire *Annan Plan*, although some hard-line local politicians such as TRNC's hard-line President *Rauf Denktaş* – father of *Serdar Denktaş*, another hard-line political figure – were against it. The entry of a united Cyprus to the EU would give Turkey “insider” leverage to promote its interests within the Union. Most importantly, admission of a solid Muslim group would eliminate the taboo with regards to Turkey's accession and could facilitate its admission.²⁸³ At that time the Turkish government was striving to prevail over the *Kemalists*, and the military complex and any such positive developments would give it the upper hand. For some T/C researchers Turkey's support for the plan was also due to its concern about ruling of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the *Loizidou vs Turkey* case.²⁸⁴

For the G/Cs, however, things were quite different. They had been assured that they would join the EU anyway, with or without the North, they did not have a problem of international recognition, and their per capita incomes were double of those in the North.²⁸⁵ The costs of reunification would have to be borne by them, let alone that, after so many years, the property rights issue of displaced populations due to war would be difficult to resolve in any court. Veto powers assigned to the T/Cs as well as the presence of Turkish troops on the island, combined with Turkey's right to intervene in the domestic affairs of an EU-member state, in case of ‘emergency’, were very weak points of the Plan the G/Cs did not welcome at all. Voting for “yes” would, in essence, imply an indirect justification of

²⁸² Menary S. 2010, *op. cit.*

²⁸³ Kyris, G. 2011. Turkey, Cyprus and the Turkish-Cypriot Political Parties: The Ephemeral Catalyst of EU? *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 10(2), 97-105. Available online at: <http://www.turkishpolicy.com/dosyalar/files/george%20kyris.pdf>. [Accessed 18 April 2015].

²⁸⁴ Türkmen, E. and Öktem, E. 2016. Major rulings of the European Court of Human Rights on Cyprus: the impact of politics, *Mediterranean Politics*, 22(2), 278-300. Loizidou, a GC from *Kyrenia* in northern Cyprus had sued the Turkish state and claimed that since the invasion of Turkish forces in 1974, she had been prevented from returning to her place and peacefully enjoy her property. The Court's decision was in her favour with a remuneration of 1.1 million Euro, which the Turkish government eventually paid, although it had originally denied the Court's jurisdiction.

²⁸⁵ Georgiou G. C. 2009. Cyprus: Economic Consequences of Reunification. *Mediterranean Quarterly*. 20(3), 51-62.

the Turkish military invasion of the island that was declared illegal in many UN Security Council resolutions, and the abandonment of memories for 200,000 refugees and unaccounted persons. Moreover, they felt they could use their EU membership as a tool to exert more pressure on Turkey and North Cyprus to solve the problem on their terms.²⁸⁶ The ECtHR ruling on the *Loizidou vs Turkey* case had precisely the opposite effect on the G/C vote as the solution to the property were more appealing than the general provisions of the *Annan Plan*.²⁸⁷

On 24 April 2004, 65 per cent of the T/Cs voted in favour, while nearly 76 per cent of G/Cs voted against the Annan Plan. The 2004 referendum marked a change in perceptions of the international community, with frustration directed towards G/Cs, seen as intransigent, while T/C became viewed more positively. In fact, the G/Cs became subjects of *coercive productive power*, portrayed as an inflexible community that missed a 'historic chance' ignoring the mutual benefits of the solution.²⁸⁸ Numerous media reports also addressed the dynamics of failure of this initiative.²⁸⁹ It appears, however, that some simple realities for each community cannot be ignored, and they are essential in understanding the deadlock and its prospective solution. That was, no doubt, a watershed event. As crisply put by Kofi Annan in his report "*What was rejected by the Greek Cypriots was the solution itself rather than a mere blueprint.*" In the wake of the referendum, the spectre of a final partition became more real than ever before since 1974, for this time it was the willingness of the numerical majority for reunification on the basis of equality that was in doubt.

²⁸⁶ As EU members, they have used their weight to block EU attempts to normalize relations with the TRNC, in the form of easing trade restrictions and in providing financial aid.

²⁸⁷ Türkmen, E. and Öktem, E. 2016, *op. cit.*

²⁸⁸ UN. 2004. Cyprus misses 'historic chance' as it rejects UN reunification plan, Annan says. Available online at: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=10512&Cr=Cyprus&Cr1#.UUZBqEqN6So> [Accessed 25 October 2012].

²⁸⁹ See, e.g., Kadritzke N. 2004. Cyprus saying no to the future *Le Monde Diplomatique*, 21. Available online at: <http://mondediplo.com/2004/05/07cyprus> [Accessed 12 September 2015].

The role of global actors should not be downplayed, as *institutional power* was harshly exercised on the Republic of Cyprus. Viola Drath, an expert on American foreign policy, states:

...the Annan Plan was an ill-guided attempt by the UN secretary-general, in collaboration with the president of the United States, to use the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU as an arbitrary deadline to force acquiescence in what ostensibly amounted to a big power play. The UN pushed too hard too far in too little time.²⁹⁰

And, as some T/C and Turkish scientists imply those actors and institutions are to blame for the communal division in Cyprus. Ahmet Sözen, head of the political science and IR department at Eastern Mediterranean University, notes:

The [Cyprus] issue appears on the international agenda mainly whenever it is seen as an obstacle to a bigger international issue. Today, Cyprus issue is in the international agenda simply because it has been blocking or impeding bigger issues beyond Cyprus, such as Turkey's EU accession, a meaningful institutional cooperation between the EU and NATO, and cooperation and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean – especially in the peaceful exploitation of the natural resources, such as gas and oil.²⁹¹

Muzaffer Yilmaz, Professor of IR at Ankara University, Turkey, criticized the ethno-guarantor model which sustains this division:

Three fundamental problems must be overcome in the short run if a real progress is made toward resolution. First, the Turkish government must stop treating the “TRNC” as an independent state. Second, Turkey must also withdraw its troops from northern Cyprus. While the presence of approximately 30,000 Turkish troops provides the Turkish Cypriots with the guarantee of security, they make the Greek Cypriots feel insecure. The third fundamental issue that needs to be overcome is that the Greeks must accept that they cannot have the whole island; they must give up something in return for a settlement.²⁹²

²⁹⁰ Drath, V. 2004. The Cyprus referendum: an Island divided by mutual distrust. *American foreign policy interests*, 26, 341–352 (p. 349).

²⁹¹ Sözen A. 2012. Heading Towards the Defining Moment in Cyprus: Public Opinion vs Realities on the Ground. *Insight Turkey*, 14(1), 109-129. Available online at: http://www.academia.edu/1264495/Heading_Towards_the_Defining_Moment_in_Cyprus_Public_Opinion_vs_Realities_on_the_Ground [Accessed 18 April 2015].

²⁹² Yilmaz, M. E. 2010. Capturing the Complexity of the Cyprus Conflict. *Turkish Journal of Politics*, 1(1), 1-27 (p.17). Available online at: <http://tjp.fatih.edu.tr/docs/articles/66.pdf>. [Accessed 30 October 2015]

And, to conclude with a view from a quite different angle, in his 16 March 2007 address at the War Academies in Istanbul, the Turkish army Staff Chief argued that the Plan wouldn't have brought a just and lasting peace to Cyprus, stating:

The Annan Plan was not a just and lasting peace plan, because the plan contained special provisions, called derogations that were to satisfy both sides. None of these derogations were permanent. If this plan had been implemented, by any Greek Cypriot citizen's applying to the courts of Europe, all of these derogations would have been eliminated in very short order. In this situation, every right that the Turkish Cypriots thought they had won would have evaporated... So... the command echelon in Ankara breathed a sigh of relief when the Annan Plan was rejected by the Greek Cypriots.²⁹³

5.4. The post-Annan Plan period and the first football reunification plan

Since the failure of the Annan Plan, the very slow pace of Turkey's integration progress in the EU has diminished the Turkish public's zeal. Support of EU membership dropped from 62 per cent in 2004 to 47 per cent in 2010. In this context, Turkey has appeared less flexible on the Cyprus issue.²⁹⁴ In fact, Turkey acted in a hostile manner toward the Republic of Cyprus, creating an atmosphere adverse to reunification efforts. Threats by Turkey's foreign minister that Turkey would not recognise Cyprus' EU Presidency in the second half of 2012 or that TRNC would be annexed by Turkey if there was no reunification solution are most revealing.²⁹⁵ Opinion surveys reiterated that the T/Cs were keen to advance themselves economically, in a new united Cyprus but with the Turkish troops guaranteeing peace and holding the right of intervention. The G/Cs on the opposite stand were sceptical about the economic costs of reunification and the presence of foreign troops on their land, a European land.²⁹⁶

With the subsidence of the political unification initiatives, the T/Cs began to turn their attention to alternative routes to break their international isolation. One of these routes was the international recognition of their football sector. The next two

²⁹³ PIO media review No. 63/07, 30.03.07

²⁹⁴ Kyris 2011, *op. cit.*

²⁹⁵ Yeong L. H. 2012. Turkey's boycott of the Cyprus EU presidency: Context, meaning and its consequences. EU Centre in Singapore, Working Paper No. 9, September. Available online at: <http://aei.pitt.edu/39378/> [Accessed 18 April 2015].

²⁹⁶ Sözen A. 2012, *op.cit.*

sections highlight the status of football in the island and present the first football reunification plan.

5.4.1 The state of football in Cyprus

Despite the small size of the island, sport in the RoC holds a predominantly high place in terms of both participating numbers and financial support provided by the government to the Cyprus Sports Organisation (CSO) for the development of sport. In the areas controlled by the RoC, there are 39 national sports federations currently registered with CSO and the Cyprus National Olympic Committee. They are also recognised members of the respective European and international federations, the football association being the only organisation representing the whole island in FIFA. The men's professional football teams have recently enjoyed exceptional sporting successes in European top-level competitions.²⁹⁷

The football sector is the backbone of the G/C sports industry. In 2004-2005 it contributed 1.84% to the country's GDP.²⁹⁸ The G/Cs are considered as a football-loving nation arising from the fact that football draws good spectator attendances as well as from the fact that it is extensively covered in the media. It is unsurprising, for example, that when Apoel Nicosia and Omonoia Nicosia - the two largest football teams of the country - play against each other, they attract crowds of more than 25,000 people. That is indeed a huge number, bearing in mind the small size of the island's G/C sector and population.

Data collected by a survey of the Centre for Leisure, Tourism and Sports R&D in 2006–2007 shows that 77 per cent of men between 21 and 70 years old support a particular football club.²⁹⁹ That is a high percentage that displays the popularity of the game on the Greek-speaking sector of the island. It is worth noting that the even the 22.9 per cent of people that do not support any football club is still aware

²⁹⁷ APOEL for example qualified to the quarterfinals of the UEFA Champions League during 2011-2012.

²⁹⁸ Kartakoullis N. Poulipoulos T. and Loizou C. 2017. CYPRUS: A Small Island County Full of History and Passion for Sport". In: Laine, A., and Vehmas, H. (eds.) *The Private Sports Sector in Europe: A Cross-National Comparative Perspective*. Springer for Science, 57-72.

²⁹⁹ Kartakoullis N. L, Kriemadis, T., Pouloukas S. 2009. Cyprus: a football crazy nation? *Soccer & Society* 10(2), 226-244.

of football activities and are well informed about football match results and news. Rising ticket sales indicate a growing interest in football, and the average attendance at football matches (relative to population) is the highest in Europe. Football enjoys extensive media coverage and is extremely politicised, to the extent that people support teams which are considered to represent left or right wing political parties. The politicisation of football dates back to the civil war in Greece between the nationalists and the communists, following the end of WWII which had an ideological effect in G/C politics - it sparked the separation of Cypriot football clubs on ideological grounds, between 'left' and right'.³⁰⁰ Football fans usually choose as their second favourite teams that belong to the same 'political' domain. State financial support to football clubs has wide social approval, and the vast majority of fans are willing to offer their pocket money to help their team. Nevertheless, during the global economic crisis, the poor state of the Cypriot economy placed many football clubs at risk.

For the T/Cs, football is also a popular game. However, whereas a good stadium in the TRNC can host 25,000 people, only 1,000 to 1,500 spectators attend, and this occurs when there are good matches. The cup final is an exception, as it attracts 6,000-7,000 spectators. The T/Cs watch mostly Turkish and English football league matches, as the local games have neither quality nor prospect. Many T/Cs are fanatic supporters of Turkish teams, while some even travel to Turkey to watch games live. It is the absence of a professional league and a 'national' TRNC team with meaningful matches that does not attract the T/Cs' enthusiasm for local football.³⁰¹ Football is a state-funded sport, and clubs are so spoiled that when the state ceases to allocate funds (flowing in from Turkey), they threaten to lock out and in this way they do manage to achieve their goals.³⁰² The financial status of T/C football clubs is also dependent on their fans' support. However, only a small fraction of the

³⁰⁰ Kassimeris, C., and Xinaris, C. 2018. Politics and identity in European football: Cyprus in comparative context. In: Dolan P. and Connolly J. (eds.) *Sport and National Identities: Globalization and Conflict*. London: Routledge (ch 4).

³⁰¹ Menary, S. 2010, *op. cit.*

³⁰² Yilmaz M. E. 2010. Capturing the Complexity of the Cyprus Conflict. *Turkish Journal of Politics* 1(1), 1-27. Available online at: <http://tjp.fatih.edu.tr/docs/articles/66.pdf> [Accessed 30 October 2015]

population are club members, the majority having a non-positive attitude towards such options. This attitude may arise from the usual assertion that football clubs are not yet institutionalised to be able to build a financially sustainable status.³⁰³ Thus, football cannot develop, unless TCFA breaks its international isolation with approval to host matches with teams from FIFA member countries.

5.4.2 The first football reunification plan

Shortly after the failure of the *Annan Plan*, in early August 2004, TCFA's head *Omer Adal* began to use football towards ending his agency's international isolation and possible state-building. First, he organised a press conference regarding a trip TRNC's national football team had taken to Norway to play a match with *Samiland*. Noting that this was their first serious foreign contact, *Adal* announced *Samiland*'s return to TRNC in February 2005 for the second match and noted that before the match the national anthems of the two countries were played. Also, speaking to the T/C football referees on the occasion of the opening of the new football season, *Adal* revealed his intention to meet with FIFA officials to explain the present situation in the north Cypriot football and request exceptions, e.g. a chance to play with Turkish teams.

During an April 2005 meeting of CFA's chairman *Costakis Koutsokoumnis* with UEFA officials in Europe, the European football organisation advised him to undertake the necessary initiatives as soon as possible to sit at the table with the T/C football officials and organise a common league where some teams from both communities in Cyprus could participate. This initiative was propelled after a football match between the G/C team *Nea Salamina* and T/C team *Yenicami AK* that had taken place a few days earlier. For the T/C media, since Turkey had recognised TRNC as an independent state, FIFA and UEFA could not prevent Turkish teams from playing matches with T/C teams.

³⁰³ Safakli, O. V., Hudaverdi, H., Ertanin, M. 2014. What about the financial sustainability of Turkish Cypriot football? *International Journal of Academic Research in Economics and Management Sciences* 3(2), 8-22.

Throughout 2006, TCFA continued its campaign to promote TRNC's national football team internationally. From an unsuccessful organisation of a friendly match with Monaco's national team in February, they managed to arrange a game with *Occitania's* team in April.³⁰⁴ A couple of days following the match with Occitania, however, to Adal's embarrassment, the T/C football team *Akincilar*, protesting its unfair treatment by TCFA, made an oral application to become a CFA member and start playing as of next year in the second division of the Cyprus Football League. CFA also accepted orally, given that the team was playing in the same division prior to the Turkish invasion and occupation of the island in 1974. TCFA chairman *Niyazi Okutan's* reaction was fervour He stated:

Regarding the TRNC athletes playing in the Greek Cypriot side one has to look into the issue from two fronts. If considered as an individual this is very normal, however, a team from our league going and playing in the Greek Cypriot league as a protest because it had problems with the federation is an action that I cannot approve of.³⁰⁵

In January 2007, T/C media kept reporting of TRNC's national team official invitation by Zanzibar's Football Federation to participate in a tournament. Indicative of TCFA's strong desire to break its international isolation were reports emphasising that TRNC played against the team of a country which is a FIFA member, in one of the matches the referee was bearing the FIFA badge and that another match was played under the TRNC and FIFA flags. Five months later, under the banner "there is no place for politics in sports", the chairman of the American Football Academy attempted to support the T/C football through the organisation of a championship for T/C children like a festival. The Mayor of the occupied part of Nicosia, complained that the T/Cs are isolated and therefore their football players, unable to play matches at the international level, are affected negatively.

³⁰⁴ *Occitania*, is an area located in southern France bordering with northern Spain. Toulouse and Montpellier are its major cities. Its 'national' football team is controlled by the "Associacion Occitania de Fotbol", but as Occitania is not a recognised state it lacks membership of FIFA and UEFA.

³⁰⁵ PIO media report No.75/06, 18.04.06.

In July 2007, the English team *Luton Town FC* and the famous T/C team *Çetinkaya* had scheduled to play a friendly match, but they had to call it off after CFA's complaints to the English Football Association as well as FIFA and UEFA that *Çetinkaya* did not belong to any Association recognised by them. The incident led to a mini-crisis as a scheduled urgent meeting toward re-launching a dialogue on the Cyprus Problem between G/C *Tassos Papadopoulos* and T/C *Mehmet Ali Talat* the two community leaders was cancelled.

During the same month (most likely as an outcome of all these developments) FIFA's president *Sepp Blatter* sent his then general secretary and later foreign policy advisor French diplomat *Jerome Champagne* to Cyprus on an *incognito* mission to evaluate current football affairs and explore the possibility of football reunification in the island. Champagne travelled to Cyprus with his family as a tourist. After their stay in Limassol and Nicosia, they moved to the North, through the border crossing at *Ledra Palace*. Champagne had the opportunity to talk to people and rate their reactions to a possible football merger. Integrating his visit with a stop in *Kyrenia*, Champagne had measured the pulse of his casual informers on the football problem. Upon his return to Zurich, he said to Sepp Blatter "do something for the Turkish Cypriots".³⁰⁶ Sepp Blatter's answer was positive, and the process of setting up the negotiations process had begun.

In September 2007, UEFA's head Michel Platini, while in Istanbul for a meeting with the Turkish Football Federation, urged the G/C and T/C football associations to sit together for a solution to the latter's problem, stating that his organisation held the same views with FIFA. A couple of weeks later, FIFA was hosting two meetings between CFA and TCFA, to help the T/Cs end their isolation. Unaware of Jerome Champagne's mission, Menary attributed this opportunity exclusively to TRNC's political and financial backing and its ability to use the media and football's links with politics, on word of a FIFA press person and the rational that other contentious

³⁰⁶ Jerome Champagne's interview to T/C newspaper *Yeniduzen* on 8 November 2013. Available online in Turkish at: <http://www.yeniduzen.com/Haberler/spor/zurih-zirvesi-nin-gizli-kahramani/9194> [Accessed 12 March 2015].

potential FIFA members such as Gibraltar, Greenland and Zanzibar did not have access to such resources.³⁰⁷

Following this meeting, hopes for a solution to the football problem began to surface on the island, also given the existence of a non-hardliner TRNC 'government' which was in power since 2005. Kartakoullis and Loizou make extensive reference to this opportunity, which shall be revisited here from a more pragmatic perspective, given some inevitable realities.³⁰⁸ That is, first, TRNC is a creation of Turkey and it is hard to overlook its role, given the support it enjoys from global power players for geopolitical reasons. Second, since 1974, there was no interaction between the two communities and it is only natural for them to suspect and distrust each other. There was little appetite for more social, economic, or political integration and, although the reunification discourse is going on, neither side would do anything that would legitimise the other side's opinions and concerns.³⁰⁹ Fourth, in football, the main point is, on the one hand, that if CFA were to recognize TCFA, all it would achieve is giving it a passport to economic gains through its entrance to the world of international football. Most importantly, it would be symbolic support to TRNC's effort to become an internationally recognised state. However, CFA had to negotiate the matter, as the risk of TCFA's international recognition could be looming. On the other hand, while the economic benefits for TCFA after joining CFA are tempting, should it elect to be placed under the CFA umbrella, it would be indirectly accepting the 'hegemonic' power of the G/C government as a sole legitimate state authority on the island.

Political changes in the RoC and the new government elected in February 2008 led to the establishment of a new environment. There was an attempt to resolve conflict on the island, leaving behind the days of intercultural strife and giving way to an era of cross-cultural cooperation. In this new environment of co-operation, it was unavoidable that, at one stage or another, sports were going to become

³⁰⁷ Menary S. 2010, *op. cit.*

³⁰⁸ Kartakoullis N. L. and Loizou C. 2009. Is Sport (Football) a Unifying Force or a Vehicle to Further Separation? The Case of Cyprus. *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 26(11), 1652-1667.

³⁰⁹ Flynn, M. K., and King, T. 2012. Deadlock and (mis) trust in Cyprus. *Peace Review* 24(4), 421-429.

involved in the process of trust-building. Thus, some initial attempts had involved institutionalised sport where football teams (G/C and T/C) initially played friendly games, and at a later stage, a common veterans' tournament was organised.

The success of these initial efforts at an institutionalised level cultivated hopes for even greater cooperation in the field of sports. Thus, the election of *Dimitris Christofias*, a pro-reunification leftist, to the G/C presidency in February 2008 was welcomed by many as a positive development, especially given his close ties with then TRNC President *Mehmet Ali Talat*, who was also pro-reunification. However, talks between *Christofias* and *Talat* later were doomed to be unsuccessful.

In this initially favourable political climate, the T/C Sports Writers Association (KTSYD) was first to issue a statement pointing out that in Cyprus the sports problem should be first in line for a solution. On 31 July 2008, FIFA and UEFA offered the T/Cs an interim resolution according to which they had permission to participate in international friendlies but not regular competitions before they became members of CFA. They gave TCFA a mid-September 2008 deadline for response. The decision was a move to improve relations between the two communities on the island, but also an ultimatum to respect the FIFA charter. The deal appeared to be a promising one. The provisional arrangement for football reunification in Cyprus involved the following principles:

1. Football in Cyprus must contribute to the efforts for uniting the people of Cyprus.
2. Any arrangement concerning the integration of football in Cyprus must reflect and promote the unity of the island based on the principles of fair play and non-discrimination.
3. Any arrangement must be in harmony with (a) sporting values; (b) FIFA and UEFA statutes; (c) Cyprus law.
4. The CFA and the TCFA fully recognise the validity of the FIFA and UEFA statutes for both international as well as national football activities and commit to full compliance with their principles, clauses and regulations.
5. The CFA is a member of UEFA and FIFA, and it is the governing body responsible for organizing, administering and controlling football in

Cyprus as well as the agency responsible for any international football activities in Cyprus.

6. This arrangement is provisional until such time that a solution to the Cyprus Problem is found and does not set a precedent for the Cyprus political issue.

Under these realities, and also given the press statements made by various officials during the talks at that time, however, it became clear soon that this initiative would be doomed to failure. Before recasting the developments in detail, it would help to have some cognition of football reunification benefits for each side - through interviews conducted in June 2016 with experts on the occasion of an identical second plan. The composite hypothetical question was that if TCFA became a CFA member tomorrow, what would be the impact on football and whether it would function under a single Cyprus League. Also, since in every agreement, each side expects to gain something, what would be the benefit to each of them!

According to the statement of a G/C sports journalist with a positive yet ambiguous view concerning the T/C football teams:

TCFA would win its international recognition under CFA's umbrella. T/C teams could play in our modern stadiums. The solution foresees that the T/C league champion will play with champion in our fourth category championship to move up. Their level is low, they are amateurs, and they have no money. They need to start from low to climb the ladder of the relegation system and let the win the first-class championship. There will simply be technical problems at first and some distrust along with some unfavourable conditions because this will be a transitional period. CFA's benefits will be its enlargement with more teams across the whole island, and in 20 years it will logically grow as a state and with-it football, so it is in favour of the CFA to have TCFA join its ranks." (Sports Editor)

Another G/C sports journalist stressed the importance at the political level:

The CFA has nothing to gain much more than a diplomatic victory at the political level. The T/Cs will gain the recognition that they are looking for. They will win a lot. We are talking about chaotic differences in terms of money between G/C football and football in the occupied areas, including their stadiums which were built before 1974. (Sports Journalist)

Furthermore, it appears that sports officials from the G/C side have not come to a conclusion about how the incorporation of T/C football clubs would materialize. They maintain a cautionary view arguing that there are important issues to be addressed especially that of participation. The view of a CFA official was the following:

For us, a recognised federation, the unification of football would be a positive development. It is something I think we could not achieve in politics because the solution of the Cyprus problem requires a different philosophy. After the deal, we could start slowly with some friendlies; we could organise a cup tournament, we will see, it takes time to have all teams play in the championship. (CFA official)

A G/C government sports official was sceptical of the practical aspects of this football unification.

A single Cypriot championship could not exist. The debate was on how to form a regional championship among the Turkish Cypriots and to be able to represent [CFA] in international competitions. Gradually all teams could play between them under the auspices of the CFA supervising the regional championship. They have a lot to win. Football must be building bridges and under certain circumstances, a unified Cypriot football could be considered as a way of co-existence in the football field. I would like to see this happen but I think we have incredible obstacles to overcome, there are problems of participation... we have issues ahead of us. (Government sports official)

The view of a G/C University Professor illustrates the complexity and unpredictability as well as the negative and positive impacts that may arise.


It is not going to be easy because we live in a semi-occupied homeland. *Anorthosis FC* and *Nea Salamina FC*, for example, can imagine what it means to go across the dividing line to play in their stadiums as guests. As a refugee in Cyprus - because I was born in the occupied area - I can fully share this feeling. G/C and T/C teams could join a new league, but it will take time. I am sure that FIFA, in this case, would support the development of football in Cyprus. It would be possible to find money and organize the academies better with the first stage to start from football in the grassroots. (Academician 1).

To conclude with a view from a G/C politician from a similar perspective, he questions whether this football unification could indeed bring the two communities closer. He stated:

The key element was the inclusion of the TCFA in the CFA and the conduct of the TCFA Championships under the auspices of the CFA. At no point at that stage could it lead to football meetings [matches] between G/C and T/C football clubs. First, no one could know what atmosphere would be created. Could football move ahead of the societies of the two communities and could it restrain and control their feelings. Besides, the level [football team] is very different. (Politician)

Tracing the developments under this football reunification plan, firstly, Figure 5.2 highlights the number of mentions to the Cyprus Problem on the one hand and the football problem on the other, that appeared in T/C and Turkish media reports throughout the post-Annan Plan period.

Figure 5.2: T/C & Turkish media mentions to the Cyprus Problem and the football problem, 2005-2012*



* Assembled from PIO media reports during the studied period.

The pattern of mentions indicates a negative correlation between these two variables. More often than not, when efforts to solve the political problem subside, initiatives to take T/C football out of its international isolation are peaking. The highest peaks for football mentions, a full account of which will be drawn in this section, make their appearance during 2008-2009.

Secondly, Table 5.2 highlights the major milestones of the 2008 football reunification initiative and the role of the intervening variables. It shows that, in this phase, the political parties and political elites have no opinion on the matter. The T/C political leadership stands firmly against FIFA's initiative, the essential and sole support of civil society actors to TCFA coming from TRNC's primary school teachers association, KTÖS.

Table 5.2: Football Reunification Milestones & Actor Positions, 2008-2009

PERIOD	MILESTONE	INTER-NATIONAL ACTORS	LEADER	POLITICAL ACTORS	CIVIL SOCIETY	
07.08.08 – 19.08.08	FIFA invitation to TCFA to become a CFA member. Reactions.	FIFA	1 President's Spokesperson <i>Hasan Ercakica</i> Minister of foreign affairs <i>Turgay Avci</i>	0 -	- KTÖS	1
21.08.08 – 23.09.08	TCFA counter proposals to FIFA.		Prime Minister <i>Ferdi Sabit Soyer</i>	1 -	-	
02.10.08 – 31.12.08	FIFA's rejections of T/C counter-proposals and warning to accept CFA membership.	TFF	1 Prime Minister <i>Ferdi Sabit Soyer</i>	0 -	-	
09.01.09 – 07.04.09	Continued reactions to reunification plan.	FIFA UEFA	1 1 President <i>Mehmet Ali Talat</i>	0 -	- KTÖS	1

Note: 0= negative, 1=positive, 2= ambivalent

In early August, the head of TCFA *Ömer Adal* had been interviewed by the news agency *Reuters* and declared [words in bold by this thesis]:

This is an interim measure until the solution to the Cyprus problem. In order to play in official competitions, we must be a member of FIFA. The only way would be to join the Greek Cypriot league, but **we are not intending to do that**. Consequently, we can give only friendly games under this proposal.³¹⁰

CFA's head reiterated that:

If the Turkish-Cypriots wish to conduct international competitions on their territory or to participate in the European Championships, then they need to join the CFA, **otherwise they cannot**.

Commenting on FIFA's proposal, the President's spokesperson *Hasan Ercakica*, described FIFA's invitation to TCFA as 'unacceptable' and noted that the T/Cs would prepare a counter-proposal based on the equal status of the two sides. TCFA was established according to the laws of the RoC and under the laws and regulations of the T/C Communal Chamber. Countering such views the T/C Teachers Trade Union KTÖS issued a written statement stressing that sports should not be used as a material for politics and that youth should not be cut off from sports.

A couple of days before the expiration of the mid-September 2008 ultimatum, TCFA president *Adal* alleged that he was expecting the leaders of the two communities to discuss the FIFA proposals in their meeting and also that he would himself consult *Mehmet Ali Talat* to find out his position before replying to FIFA. To make the football agreement sustainable, Adal argued that it should have the political leader's approval as it would affect the ongoing political talks on the island's unification.³¹¹

³¹⁰ Sigmalive 2008. FIFA: Turkish-Cypriots in international friendlies. Available online in Greek at: <http://www.sigmalive.com/sports/football/other%20news/46853> [Accessed 12 September 2015].

³¹¹ Tsiropoulos V., 2008a. Turkish-Cypriots: *Talat* will decide. Available online in Greek at: www.sigmalive.com/sports/football/cyprus/a%20league/60112 [Accessed 12 September 2015].

Following consultations with TRNC's leadership, TCFA gave a 'positive' response to FIFA's invitation on 23 September. It accepted to become a CFA member so long as CFA and FIFA were ready also to accept four conditions:

- **First:** Set up a committee consisting of four members, one Turkish Cypriot, one from CFA one from FIFA and one from UEFA. This committee should be temporary and independent from CFA and operate until the political issue is resolved in Cyprus. It would be the task of the Committee to take these decisions, not the CFA, about T/Cs. That is, T/Cs did not need to apply to CFA for a license to conduct international friendly matches.
- **Second:** TCFA clubs to have the right to participate in and hold football matches with foreign teams.
- **Third:** The provisional acceptance by the T/Cs not to be taken as an example for other similar issues concerning the RoC and the T/C community.
- **Fourth:** The final solution to the football problem in Cyprus was to be found and discussed between *Demetris Christofias* and *Mehmet Ali Talat*.

FIFA's response ten days later was rejecting the TCFA counter-proposals and warned that they had to become a member of CFA, to be able to play matches abroad. At that time, TFF's Chairman was visiting occupied Cyprus and stated that any action taken for the T/C football should be in line with FIFA's framework. By the end of December 2008, both sides knew the specifics of the proposed football plan and TCFA's conditional response to FIFA that rejected it with a warning to adhere to the governing body's charter. On at least two instances, Prime Minister *Ferdi Sabit Soyer* expressed his opposition to the plan. While Deputy Prime Minister-Foreign Minister *Turgay Avci* also gave negative comments the KTÖS secretary for education *Mustafa Ozgur* said that "those who prevent the Turkish Cypriots from being integrated with the world with their embargo and isolation policies raise the greatest obstacles in sports in front of the youth of this country".³¹²

³¹² PIO media review, No. 05/09 09.01.2009.

From that point on, it was self-evident that the T/Cs would not agree to the proposed plan, which was to be signed in Zurich on 2 February 2009. G/C media fully anticipated this outcome, and on 13 January they wrote:

What remains is the signature of the project by the Turkish-Cypriot side. Recall the recent negative attitude of the Turkish-Cypriot political parties. Their attitude will play an important role in the final outcome of the matter. **It will not be surprising** if the so-called Turkish-Cypriot Football Federation, once again, stepped back and refused to sign the final document for its CFA membership.³¹³

The next day, appearing in a local TV station, TRNC's head *Mehmet Ali Talat* stated that TCFA could not be a 'patch' to CFA, as T/C institutions cannot be placed under G/C institutions.³¹⁴ By the end of January, TCFA's head had informed FIFA that he would not be travelling to Zurich the following month.³¹⁵ That was the end of the football plan which remained dead for almost four years, not given an opportunity to act as a unifying instrument - until the end of 2012. In his June 2016 interview by this thesis, TCFA's official revealed that they saw President *Talat*:

I was responsible for the international relations at the time that we did the provisional Arrangements [and] we went to Mr. Talat, Mr. Talat was believing for a global solution but [so] he said [to] wait to get the global solution [as] everything was going to be solved by the [that] global solution. We published the provisional agreement on our web page [at] the time ...in February when Blatter and Platini were fired, and there's [was] no FIFA president and no UEFA president, so it would need another application and see if they wouldn't accept [it].

During this period of 'silence' there were only three developments worth mentioning. In May 2011, a match between the T/C football teams *Lefka* and *Gentikaya* ended with serious incidents among their supporting groups. TCFA decided to punish *Lefka*'s seat for 13 games and to impose a penalty of 13.000 Turkish *lire* (about 5.590 euros). The head of the team reacted in various ways.

³¹³ Tsiropoulos V., 2009a. CFA: Football integration. Available online in Greek at: www.sigmalive.com/sports/football/cyprus/a-league/110189 [Accessed 12 September 2015].

³¹⁴ Kibris, 2009. Talat: membership can never be broken. Available online in Turkish at: <http://www.kibrisgazetesi.com/index.php/cat/8/news/64821/PageName/Spor> [Accessed 18 April 2013].

³¹⁵ Tsiropoulos V., 2009b. The T/Cs demolished the bridges. Available online in Greek at: www.sigmalive.com/sports/football/cyprus/a-league/118828 [Accessed 16 September 2015].

Among other steps, he forged a decision by his board to apply and become a member of CFA, knowing that this could cause their removal from the league.³¹⁶ Moreover, *Lefka* received an official invitation from the G/C team of *Pyrgos* (a team active in the farmers' league and located near the border of the T/C and G/C sectors) for another friendly match on 11 June 2011. The head of the Republic of Cyprus would attend this match. On the intervention of the G/C minister for domestic affairs, that match did not take place out of fear that it could lead to fights among the supporters of each side.

In May 2012, TCFA's external relations officer, *Orçun Kamali*, called Jerome Champagne and invited him to be his organisation's advisor as "someone who knows and understands what the Turkish Cypriots are living in".³¹⁷ Before deciding on the offer, Champagne - who had been fired from his FIFA post by *Sepp Blatter* two years earlier - met with TCFA's new President *Hasan Sertoğlu*, TRNC's new T/C leader, *Dervis Eroğlu*, and the heads of many T/C football clubs. Following these meetings, Champagne felt that there was a very different atmosphere and thought that what was not possible in 2008 would be possible this time around. He set foot in Cyprus in September the same year and began contacts with foreign actors on TCFA's behalf.

Shortly after Champagne's arrival, a match between the G/C team *AEL* and the Turkish team *Fenerbahçe* gave an opportunity for the Turkish media to create nationalist tensions. The union of T/C journalists issued a revealing statement:

No one will benefit by causing crisis in a period during which the Turkish Cypriot Football Federation is holding contacts with officials, in spite of the embargo implemented in the field of sports. There are more than enough fields of tension between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot peoples and they cannot tolerate tension regarding a football match to be added to these.³¹⁸

³¹⁶ Sigmalive 2011. Football team from pseudo-state wants to become CFA member. Available online in Greek at: www.sigmalive.com/sports/football/cyprus/a+league/387981 [Accessed 12 September 2015].

³¹⁷ Jerome Champagne's interview to T/C newspaper *Yeniduzen* on 8 November 2013, *op. cit.*

³¹⁸ PIO media review No. 206/12, 24.10.12

Two months later, the UEFA director of communications and public affairs conceded that football reunification in Cyprus seemed to be far off, given that as sport is bonded to politics, the solution will emerge only after the solution of the Cyprus Problem.

In the meantime, *Mehmet Ali Talat's* defeat in the 2010 Presidential elections and his replacement by nationalist candidate *Derviş Eroğlu* was considered a setback, although talks continued after *Eroğlu's* victory – again, with no success or resolution in sight. The new President of Cyprus, *Nicos Anastasiades*, had endorsed the *Annan Plan* in 2004 and was considered as a pro-reunification figure. However, reunification talks remained on the ice and became a secondary concern for both sides, particularly the G/Cs given the outbreak of the economic crisis in Cyprus. A new FIFA initiative was needed and it did arise but only four whole years later and constitutes the subject of the next Chapter 6.

CHAPTER 6

NEW INITIATIVES TO REUNITE CYPRUS AND CYPRIOT FOOTBALL

This chapter presents the politics of the 2013 onwards period, around a new FIFA initiative to symbolically reunify the two divided communities through sport and a new UN initiative to reunify Cyprus into a new international political entity. The analysis focuses first on international political developments during that period and then on domestic and international actor roles in sport. As in the previous chapter, the study attempts to unveil the role of domestic level variables and the leader's images on football reunification.

6.1. International developments

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the progressive TRNC administration of the mid to late 2000s was replaced by a hard-line nationalist one since the spring of 2010. In early 2013 [also in 2018], the G/Cs elected *Nicos Anastasiades* as their President who was a strong *Annan Plan* supporter. The new President and his government undertook to deal with both the country's economic crisis and the political reunification problem which had not been abandoned by the UN. Most importantly, the G/Cs have been struggling to ascertain their hydrocarbon rights in their exclusive economic zone. The vast natural gas reserves that have allegedly been discovered within Cyprus's territorial boundaries constituted an incentive for reunification and wealth sharing among the two communities. Powerful external actors, including the US, France and Italy are involved as oil and gas extraction companies serving the interests of these countries have been licensed to perform the exploration operations. These actors do recognise the legal right of the G/Cs to extract energy resources from their maritime territories but they should share them with the T/Cs. This brought Turkey in, first as a guarantor and protector of T/C interests and second as a regional player seeking to act as a hub to secure the hydrocarbon transfer to Europe through pipeline facilities built in its territory. In early 2013, hydrocarbon experts argued that some of those actors may seek ways to 'intervene' to secure their interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

For the moment, no one, including the UN, is pushing the Greek Cypriots to discuss the issue [of reunification]. However, the US, which currently has the most to lose with a US-based company already having drilled, appears to be increasingly concerned about the absence of a settlement and its impact on the hydrocarbons issue.³¹⁹

G/Cs and T/Cs hold persistently and diametrically opposite views on how wealth sharing shall be achieved. The G/Cs aim to proceed with oil and gas extraction independently depositing the T/C's share from the proceeds into an account to be collected once a solution to the Cyprus Problem is achieved. This would give them the upper hand in the political negotiations. Conversely, the T/Cs, fearing the impact of such a deal, want all extraction plans either to proceed jointly or to follow the final solution to the Cyprus Problem.

On 11 February 2014, the G/C and T/C leaders *Nicos Anastasiades* and *Dervis Eroğlu* met under the auspices of the UN and made a *Joint Declaration* to resume decisive negotiations in a positive atmosphere for a settlement of the Cyprus Problem, as the *status quo* was unacceptable to both sides. The agreement would be followed by separate referenda on the creation of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with political equality, a single international legal personality and a single sovereignty.³²⁰ Following the *Joint Declaration* of 2014, negotiations between *Anastasiades*, and the new T/C Cypriot leader, *Mustafa Akıncı*, began on 15 May 2015, only three weeks following the latter's successful campaign against *Eroğlu* and his election to the presidential post. The talks reached a record of meetings, 70 by the two leaders, 150 by the negotiators and 369 at the level of experts.³²¹ This focused engagement at all levels led to substantive progress on all issues and enabled a convening Conference scheduled for the 12th of January 2017 in Geneva.

³¹⁹ Gürel, A., Mullen, F. and Tzimitras, H. 2013. The Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions and Future Scenarios. Available online at: www.prio.no/Global/upload/Cyprus/Publications/Hydrocarbons_Report-ENG.pdf [Accessed 20 October 2013, p. 60].

³²⁰ The seeds of the declaration had been planted much earlier, in September 2008, by the then leaders *Dimitris Christofias* and *Mehmet Ali Talat*.

³²¹ UN Security Council. 2017. Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus. Available online at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2017_814.pdf [Accessed 24 March 2018].

With the talks in process, in June 2016, this thesis sought an assessment and prediction of the Conference outcome from the G/C interviewees.³²²

Both G/C University Professors who were interviewed, share a sceptical view concerning the political unification of Cyprus.

We voted for a president who is in favour of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation and started with great optimism but he seems to be facing tremendous obstacles. Turkey's stance does not change and everything is proceeding for the sake of talks. Nothing has been offered by the Turks as a measure of trust." (Academician 1)

"With the new G/C and T/C leaderships, some expectations have been created that there may be a solution. But after some time with problems, the people are facing this more realistically. If you go around asking people, I believe the majority at this moment are a bit hesitant [to hope for a solution] although there is a positive mood on both sides, as Mr. *Anastasiades* notes. Generally speaking, I think that the people are more 'grounded', as to what may be achieved in these talks." (Academician 2)

Regarding the sports media people, all of them agree that TRNC's political and financial will is solely dependable on Turkey and they do not feel that there have been any changes even after the elections. All in all, they see that there is a will for a solution, but that remains to be seen from the decision of Turkey. A Sports editor from a G/C newspaper stated:

We are in a good stage but in order to come close to a solution the key is a decision by Turkey. A bad solution will not work. After some 40 years of separation, we have gone through so many stages and must find a solution based on a federation. The situation can give a restart to various sectors mainly the economy. Now that things in that sector are tight, the people I think are waiting for something especially for the younger generation and even our generation, a prospect for the future." (Sports editor)

Two Sports journalists from different news channels stated that, even though there is a positive attitude in general from the G/C side, that alone is not enough as Turkey is the one calling the shots on the decisions for the political unification:

There is positive mood at least on our side and I think from the side of the new T/C leadership and the T/Cs. But the main problem at the end of the day, whatever the T/Cs

³²² The interviewed TCFA official avoided a direct response, speaking exclusively about football.

may desire, an important element that cannot escape our attention is that they are financially dependent on Turkey and that is a big problem.” (Sports journalist 1)

I do not think anything will change with the talks as nothing changed after the 2008 elections [meaning the election of progressive T/C President *Mehmet Ali Talat*]. I am very much afraid that there will be no change in 2017 either. This is the harsh reality for Cyprus. I think the Cyprus issue is in the hands of Turkey and the T/Cs since Greece is the weak link in this process. Mr *Akinci* was in favour of a solution of the Cyprus problem but Erdogan and Turkey decide what happens. There is a will, but it may ‘hit a Turkish wall’, if they don’t get what they want. (Sports journalist 2).

In addition, a CFA official and a Foreign ministry official share both a hopeful view but realize the difficulties on the political unification process:

The talks are advancing but with the current developments it's a bit hard. I think this is an excellent opportunity for a solution to the Cyprus problem but Turkey appears to play an important role. I see some inactivity, things in politics change and so do the prevailing conditions.” (CFA official)

The T/Cs lack of political will because they are limited by the Turks. Turkey occupies most of the pseudo-state and controls it financially and militarily. There is a sincere intention on the part of Mr. *Anastasiades*. I consider the property issue to be one of the most difficult ones on the agenda.” (Foreign ministry official).

Finally, before the Mont Pèlerin conference in November 2016 and the failure of the talks in Crans-Montana on 28 June 2017, a G/C politician pointed out the complexity, stating that as years pass it might be more difficult for a solution to be found.

I believe that a new dynamic has emerged that needs to be assessed. Unfortunately, the manipulations are seen from time to time in the process, but at the end of the day the suspensions and the interference of the G/C community will be able to bend if there is a political decision from Turkey to solve the Cypriot and all that will be seen on the table of the talks. We have to realize that as long as the years pass, the conditions did not become more positive but more negative.” (Politician)

Returning to the negotiations narrative, the two sides had managed to reach an almost convergence on many issues, including governance and power sharing, economy and finance, the sensitive issue of citizenship and even property. Thus, the two leaders decided to hold intensive talks in Switzerland’s *Mont Pèlerin* in November 2016. This would formally open their negotiations, with the issue of the

territorial jurisdictions of the Federation's two zones first up, followed by security guarantees that had not been previously concluded. Each side began presenting the other with maps, a process that was seen by both sides as a sign that they were approaching the "end of the game", although a final agreement was still far from reach. When the security issue came up, the conference was interrupted. The T/C side insisted on keeping the Turkish troops on the island as a guarantor of their security. The G/C side rejected this option. Their rejection stemmed from their traumatic memories of the 1974 Turkish military invasion and their undisputable view that the presence of Turkish troops in a new independent European state was unacceptable, let alone unethical. The Conference reconvened on 28 June 2017 *in Crans-Montana*, Switzerland, where the territorial issue appeared not difficult to resolve but only as part of a final agreement including the security guarantees on which there was no convergence at all. The Conference had failed altogether. Turkey rushed to put the blame on the G/Cs. In the meantime, the unsuccessful 2016 military coup in Turkey changed the country's political structure and led it into a more autocratic and rebellious posture in international politics. All of these developments were destined to affect the new football reunification initiative that emerged before the leaders' Joint Declaration of February 2014.

6.2. A new *Annan Plan* in football

The 'new' football initiative surfaced in late 2012 early 2013. Former Secretary General of FIFA, *Jerome Champagne*, had assumed the post of TCFA's advisor, and as he revealed to T/C newspaper *Yeniduzen*:

In November 2012 we established our first contact with CFA in Limassol. Our first official contact was realized in December 2012. During that time I was constantly in communication with Blatter. I gave him information about the country, about developments. Of course, we had many meetings with Sertoğlu and Koutsokoumnis, and I got the opportunity to get more information on this issue. American, French, British ambassadors were also interested. To understand the situation, we talked to a lot of people. It was not a very easy process. As a result, there was a mixed situation. After these lengthy negotiations, we came to Zurich, and both sides signed the "Temporary Arrangement Text". I can understand both sides...³²³

³²³ Jerome Champagne's interview to T/C newspaper *Yeniduzen* on 8 November 2013, *op. cit.*

Within this arrangement, G/C and T/C football leaders entered a new round of talks. Officials of the CFA met with representatives of the TCFA on 11 December 2012. Upon completion of the meeting, the President of CFA expressed his optimism about unifying football in Cyprus. The new TCFA President, *Hasan Sertoğlu*, emphasised that he was interested “in football and not politics” and that he hoped to deliver good news once the negotiations between the two sides reached an end.³²⁴

A follow-up meeting took place on 17 January 2013 at the premises of TCFA where *Sertoğlu* spoke of a new *Annan Plan* in football, noting that both sides were to submit their proposals to FIFA which would then prepare a final text to be placed under a vote at the general assemblies of the two associations.³²⁵ CFA’s head also spoke of such a ‘referendum’. However, nine whole months passed, without any visible signs of progress, during which FIFA continued to work secretly towards ending TCFA’s international isolation.

On 13 October 2013, G/C President *Anastasiades* made a bold statement inviting Turkey to make decisive steps towards a solution to the Cyprus Problem:

Turkey must realize is that a solution can be achieved by Christmas [2013] and possibly before Christmas, but they need to make those convincing steps that show their intent to implement the UN resolutions and to fully align with their aspirations for EU membership.³²⁶

³²⁴ iKypros.com. 2012. *Koutsokoumnis* met with a delegation of the TC Football Federation. Available online in Greek at: <http://www.ikypros.com/easyconsole.cfm/id/60929> [Accessed 15 April 2013].

³²⁵ Newsit. 2013. The occupied want football integration: Their true motives are being examined. Available online in Greek at: www.newsit.com.cy/default.php?pname=Article&art_id=103543&catid=32 [Accessed 16 April 2013]

³²⁶ Inewsg.com. 2013. *Anastasiades*: The time has come for Turkey to accept the obvious solution to the Cyprus problem. Available online at: <http://www.inewsg.com/173/proedros-anastasiadisefthase-i-ora-i-tourkia-na-apodechtei-ta-aftonoita-gia-lysi-tou-kypriakou.htm> [Accessed 25 October 2013].


Five days following *Anastasiades*' call to Turkey, and ten days short of 58 years of separation between the two football communities in Cyprus, media from all locations reported that on 5 November FIFA would be holding meetings in Zurich with TCFA and CFA officials, to discuss the future of football in Cyprus.

No details had been released with the initial announcement of the 'new' plan, although some media claimed to have managed to secure a few fundamentals as follows.³²⁷ The new football integration Plan did not concern the creation of a joint league that would bring together G/C and T/C football teams. Neither did the Plan provide that the Federal Coach would be inviting T/C players to play for Cyprus' national football team. Simply, TCFA would be under CFA and would continue to hold its own competitions in the occupied territories. T/C referees were reserving the right to receive training in the G/C territory. The same clause applied to T/C coaches who could attend coaching sessions and get their UEFA diplomas. The Plan might mean increased UEFA funding for CFA, after placing TCFA under its umbrella. And, since FIFA and UEFA recognise only the CFA, the danger of TCFA's international recognition as a separate federation would disappear.

Figure 6.1 highlights the pattern of mentions to the Cyprus Problem on the one hand and the football problem on the other, that appeared in T/C and Turkish media reports throughout the phase of the new deliberations. Once again, as in the post-Annan Plan period, the pattern of mentions indicates a negative correlation between these two variables. More often than not, when efforts to solve the political problem subside, initiatives to take T/C football out of its isolation are peaking. The highest peaks for football mentions make their appearance in September-November 2013 and January-May 2015.

³²⁷ Charalambous, P. 2013. Which form of integration is being discussed? Available online in Greek at: www.protathlima.com/content/league/story.jsp?league_id=1&id=137243 [Accessed 18 April 2013].

Figure 6.1. T/C media mentions to the Cyprus Problem and the Football Problem, 2013-2017*



*Assembled from PIO media reports during the examined period.

Table 6.1 highlights the significant milestones and actor positions around the new football plan firstly during 2013-2014. As can be seen in the readings, unlike the more progressive elements of TRNC’s political actors, the hard-liners opposed the plan sternly. The detailed developments follow.

The news on the December 2012/January 2013 meetings between the two football associations led to some immediate reactions from both sides. On the T/C side, at a gathering of his Democratic Party (DP), *Serdar Denktaş*’ statement was a warning that “sport and politics do mix”:

It is our desire to explore the possibility of having football matches between Turkish-Cypriot groups and teams from FIFA member countries. However, if relevant contacts are made without informing the Presidency, under the slogan not to mix the politicians in this issue, then they breed great danger.³²⁸

The President's advisor declared that national policy and foreign sports policy are inseparable:

"...the meetings of the two football federations will generate political outcomes. If the procedure leads to placing TCFA under the authority of CFA or part of an organisation under CFA, it would be a mistake and there is no such an issue...our national policy in Cyprus and our national policy in sport must be in harmony".

For President *Dervis Eroğlu*, even after a political settlement of the Cyprus Problem, the two football associations ought to function independently:

I have confidence in the President of TCFA.... CFA is not the only option for us to gain access to European football. In the future, if a political agreement to the Cyprus problem is reached, it would be better for both football federations to act separately... International agencies and organisations must accept the 'realities' in Cyprus and understand which side is inflexible. We have accepted the Cuellar and Annan plans and that proves our determination for a solution.³²⁹

Cemal Ozyigit, the general secretary of the Communal Democracy Party (TDP), expressed his party's full support to the developments and its opposition to the 'malevolent' behaviour of some politicians including *Eroğlu* towards TCFA's initiatives to make an opening for the T/C youth abroad.

On the G/C side, negative reactions surfaced but only from two football clubs. The board of nationalist *APOEL FC* deleted CFA President *Costakis Koutsokoumnis'* name from its member directory for some reasons, including his dealings with the TCFA, which were not in accord with the club's charter.³³⁰

³²⁸ Larkou L., 2013. The ball is now in Zurich. Available online in Greek at: www.larkoslarkou.org.cy/FOOTBALL%20no%202.html [Accessed 18 April 2013].

³²⁹ *Alithia*, 2013. Eroğlu not worried about football contacts. Available online in Greek at: <http://alithia.com.cy/index.php/koinonia/item/3968> [Accessed 18 April 2013].

³³⁰ Papaioannou, J., 2013. APOEL erased *Koutsokoumnis'* membership. Available online in Greek at: www.sigmalive.com/sports/all-other-sports/basketball/23820 [Accessed 19 April 2013].

The chairman of the fans club *Friends of Anorthosis FC* and the head of the football club himself made the following harsh statements respectively:

Could we ever go and fight like guests in our own city, which is held captive for 38 years now by the Turkish conqueror illegally? ³³¹

There will be no football integration. It is not easy. I am assertive. I believe that this issue is a lot of fuss about nothing...As a club we have no official information from CFA, the fans react the way you know, and it requires simple logic to understand them. ³³²

Several months elapsed before another CFA-TCFA meeting took place, in October 2013. This time, it did not produce precisely similar reactions, as details on the content of the discussions were not disclosed, other than a usual line that there was a draft agreement which the general assemblies of the two football associations would need to ratify.

The G/C newspaper *Simerini* made the assessment that [words in bold and brackets by author]:

The meeting aims to discuss and come up with a temporary arrangement for football in Cyprus based on the statutes of FIFA and UEFA ...with the expectation it will be **beneficial** for the G/C side. The ranks of CFA are expressing **cautious optimism** for this meeting since they consider that in case there are further developments they will be **to upgrade the G/C side** for the good of Cypriot football, clarifying at the same time that all discussions and contacts with the T/C side are carried out with the consent of the leadership of the country [Republic of Cyprus], which is fully aware of what is going to transpire. ³³³

³³¹ Georgakopoulos G., 2012. Football unites Cyprus. Available online in Greek at: http://news.kathimerini.gr/4Dcgi/4dcgi/_w_articles_sport_2_22/12/2012_505900 [Accessed 19 April 2013].

³³² Tsamis S., 2013. Beware of the Turkish-Greeks. Available online in Greek at: www.efsyn.gr/?p=14750 [Accessed 19 April 2013].

³³³ Frantzi K., 2013. Meeting between CFA and TCs. Available online in Greek at: www.sigmalive.com/simerini/sport%20time/cyprus/579783 [Accessed 22 October 2013].

Table 6.1: Football reunification milestones & actor positions, 2013-2014

PERIOD	MILESTONE	INTERNATIONAL ACTORS		LEADER		POLITICAL ACTORS		CIVIL SOCIETY			
24.01.13-01.11.13	TCFA & CFA 2nd meeting and announcement of imminent agreement.	FIFA	1	President <i>Dervis Eroğlu</i>	0	TDP General Secretary, <i>Cemal Ozyigit</i>	1	KTÖS	1		
		UEFA	1	President's advisor	0						
				Deputy Prime Minister <i>Serdar Denктаş</i>	0						
06.11.13-28.11.13	TCFA & CFA sign agreement. Reactions.	UN Secretary's special envoy <i>Alexander Downer</i>	1	Prime Minister <i>Ozkan Yorgancioglu</i>	1	UBP chairman <i>Huseyin Ozgurgun</i>	0	TCFA	2		
		French Ambassador	1	President <i>Dervis Eroğlu</i>	0	Former <i>Talat</i> spokesman, <i>Hasan Ercakica</i>	0				
		US Ambassador	1	Deputy Prime Minister <i>Serdar Denктаş</i>	0	DP general secretary, <i>Bengu Sonya</i>	0			T/C Football clubs' association	1
		Turkish Prime Minister <i>Recep Tayyip Erdoğan</i>	1			CTP general secretary <i>Asim Akansoy</i>	0			T/C Businessmen's Association	1
						TDP general secretary, <i>Cemal Ozyigit</i>	1				
				BKP chairman, <i>Izzet Izcan</i>	1						
				Former T/C leader <i>Talat</i>	1						
16.05.14 – 04.12.14	TCFA statement on reaching final agreement with CFA by end of year.	FIFA	1								
		Former Barcelona President, <i>Laporta</i>	1								

Note: 1= positive, 0= negative, 2= ambivalent

Signifying the desperate situation of TRNC's football, the T/C paper *Star Kibris* accentuated *Sertoğlu's* statement, "our expectation is the end of the chaos" while *Yenidüzen* resorted to explaining that the talks had been delayed since January 2013 due to the economic crisis in the South.³³⁴

The usual political and civil society actors took TCFA's side. The KTÖS Secretary-General, in an open statement, claimed that officials from Turkey and the TRNC were trying to sabotage the on-going talks between the two football associations.³³⁵ The leftist Republican Turkish Party (CTP) in power was also in support but avoided interfering with the process, as its partner in the strong coalitional government – 33 out of 50 parliamentary seats - Denktaş' Democratic Party holding 12 seats, was against. The T/C newspaper *Kibris* issued a report according to which the heads of 42 T/C football clubs were backing TCFA's efforts, and it looked that they were ready to ratify the *Zurich* agreement.³³⁶

The key elements that emerged from the *Kibris* report were the resilience of T/C clubs in seeking to escape from their current international isolation (often referred to as 'embargo') and their unanimous belief that politics should finally stay out of this process. Two characteristic slogans that came out of statements by heads of T/C football clubs were: "politicians have already started making prophecies of disaster" (*Değirmenlik FC*), "politicians should make sense and not politics out of hatred" (*K. Kaymaklı FC*) and, "politicians should not be involved in order to satisfy their egos" (*Gençlik Gücü FC*). There were also statements implying minor reservations such as "I do not know whether this will have a negative impact on the Cyprus problem" (*Türkmenköy FC*).

³³⁴ Star Kibris 2013a. Zurich 5 November. Available online in Turkish at: <http://www.starkibris.net/index.asp?haberID=161685> [Accessed 26 October 2013]. Sonay, M. 2013. 'Hope' in the field of merger. Available online in Turkish at: <http://www.yeniduzen.com/Haberler/haberler/saha-da-birlesme-umudu/8468> [Accessed 26 October 2013].

³³⁵ Yenidüzen 2013a. Attempts to sabotage the TCFA-CFA interview. Available online in Turkish at: <http://www.yeniduzen.com/Haberler/haberler/ktff-kop-gorusmesi-sabote-edilmeye-calisiliyor/8599> [Accessed 26 October 2013].

³³⁶ Kibris 2013b. Sertoglu paves the way for the Youth. Available online in Turkish at: <http://www.kibrisgazetesi.com/index.php/cat/8/news/168417/PageName/Spor> [Accessed 15 November 2013]. (Currently available from the author).

By the end of October and very early November 2013, *Sertoğlu* had managed to secure the support of a segment of the civil society engaged in the sports sector - the Sports Writers, Students, Coaches, Referees and the Footballers' Associations - who openly spoke in favour of the forthcoming 5 November meeting in Zurich. He held a press conference in which he tried to refute allegations that the general public was against his trip to Zurich. He presented the results of a poll carried out by a Research Company named *Redborder*, according to which 81.5 per cent of the respondents were supporting his initiative. The respondents, over the age of 18, were residents of T/C *Nicosia* (307), *Famagusta* (261), *Kyrenia* (196), and *Morphou* (134) plus 104 more people from across the island. Of those who were in support: 82.7 per cent lived in T/C *Nicosia*, 81.6 per cent in *Famagusta*, 81.1 per cent in *Kyrenia* and 79.1 per cent in *Morphou*.³³⁷

Upon completion of the Zurich talks, on 5 November, a FIFA news release announced that the two sides had reached a historic agreement (see text of agreement in *Appendix B* and the photo of signatories in *Appendix D*). According to this provisional agreement, TCFA's international isolation would be terminated through its filing an application to become a CFA member, under the *proviso* that the general assemblies of the two institutions would approve the signed document. The Zurich document lists four principles: ³³⁸

- It aims to unify and facilitate the progress of football on the island based on trust, mutual respect and goodwill,
- the parties must fully respect the FIFA and UEFA statutes and all international sport principles,
- CFA is responsible for organising, administering and controlling football in Cyprus as well as any international football activities in Cyprus; and, that

³³⁷ Gürkan B., Belge N. 2013. People in football behind the solution. Available online at: <http://www.yeniduzen.com/Haberler/spor/halk-futbolda-cozumun-arkasinda/8915> [Accessed 2 November 2013].

³³⁸ TCFA. 2013. News. Available online at: <http://www.ktff.org/NewsDetail/Index/26> [Accessed 30 November 2013].

- the agreement does not set any precedent for the Cypriot political issue until a final solution to the Cyprus Problem is found.

Beyond technical details, it is also important to note that the agreement foresees its possible termination, at any time, by either CFA or the TCFA, unilaterally or by mutual consent. In that case, any actions at the national and international level “will be null and void”.

FIFA’s head, *Sepp Blatter*, optimistically stated that the two football associations provided the world with an excellent example of how football can build bridges and bring people together after a long period of conflict. In a video released by CFA, blocked by FIFA but finally released to the known website *You Tube*, *Blatter* disclosed FIFA’s political role in the process.

This is a great achievement, and it shows the political dimension of our sport. We work naturally in developing sport, we are into the social-cultural part and football has become also a big economy but we have a political dimension and this [Cyprus] is one of the problems FIFA is turning around since [for the last] six years and now we are able to find a solution for the two antagonists... on this island, they will play football together and I think this is connecting people and constructing bridges. This is exactly what we want to do in football. Here we are really into the political dimension but we don’t want to intervene in politics but [again] we can offer solutions to political entities.³³⁹

6.2.1 Early signs of a possible TCFA retreat

On this positive news, G/C President *Nicos Anastasiades* released a written statement declaring among others that:

The agreement, which provides integration of TCFA into CFA, that is the authority responsible for the organization, management and control of football in Cyprus, has the full support of the President of the Republic, who sees it as a positive and hopeful development.³⁴⁰

³³⁹ You-tube 2013. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DinOZYuTVJc&feature=player_embedded [Accessed 15 November 2013].

³⁴⁰ Sigmalive 2013a. CFA towards unification with TCFA. Available online in Greek at: <http://www.sigmalive.com/news/local/74291> [Accessed 5 November 2015].

The following day, the European Commission's website uploaded a statement by the Commissioner for Education, Culture, Multilingualism, Sport, Media and Youth, *Androula Vassiliou* – a former G/C parliamentarian. The statement was commending the two sides on reaching a historic agreement, also thanking the Presidents of FIFA and UEFA for their 'personal involvement and role in this matter'.³⁴¹

The same day, however, interviewed by T/C media, TCFA's head *Sertoğlu* retreated to an obstructionist statement, "*taslak metin bizim isteklerimizi yerine getirmez*" (i.e. the draft text [of the agreement] does not meet our needs).³⁴² CFA's immediate response was that the signed document is not subject to renegotiation and that TCFA's change of position was a result of political pressure.³⁴³

Within hours, powerful hard-line political figures in TRNC were casting the regime's known signal, aiming to manipulate football politically. From the Presidency, *Eroğlu* repeated that TCFA cannot be subjected to the G/C administration and that he had faith the football community would not work to the detriment of the T/Cs.³⁴⁴ From the government and the political parties, reactions were mixed.

Speaking for the National Unity Party (UBP), both its chairman *Huseyin Ozgurgun* and its general secretary *Sunat Atun* found the agreement unacceptable. Football could be put in the forefront and would become a "role model" for the unsolved political problem of Cyprus. Membership to the CFA might harm values on such issues as sovereignty, property and citizenship, which the T/Cs had been supporting for years in the Cyprus talks. *Mehmet Ali Talat's* former spokesman cast

³⁴¹ EC 2013. Commissioner Vassiliou welcomes the agreement reached on provisional arrangement for the organisation of football in Cyprus. Available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/cyprus/news/20131106_football_en.htm [Accessed 6 November 2013].

³⁴² Kibris 2013b, *op. cit.*

³⁴³ Yenidüzen 2013b. Koutsokoumnis "The temporary agreement assessed". Available online in Turkish at: <http://www.yeniduzen.com/Haberler/spor/kutsokumbis-gecici-duzenlemeyi-degerlendirdi/9134> [Accessed 6 November 2013].

³⁴⁴ Sigmalive 2013b. Eroglu: We are not under the G/C administration. Available online in Greek at: <http://www.sigmalive.com/simerini/politics/reportaz/581649> [Accessed 7 November 2015].

an identical view, wondering what the T/Cs would be doing in a negotiating table if they had approved their CFA membership.³⁴⁵

Deputy Prime Minister and DP leader *Serdar Denktaş* insisted that applying to become a member of CFA could not be accepted, a lot of work was needed to modify the text of the provisional agreement and that he was relieved by *Sertoğlu's* statement that the text could not be accepted in its current form. *Denktaş* revealed that in a friendly meeting before departing for Zurich, *Sertoğlu* had assured him that he would not sign any agreement. Since he did exactly the opposite, he should now either stay loyal to his signature or resign. If football were to influence politics, the government would interfere. For *Denktaş*, a solution for the T/C football teams would be to find a way to include them in Turkey's amateur leagues and secure the participation of the T/C champions in the Turkish leagues. His party's secretary general *Bengu Sonya*, added ironically "Let us accept the Republic of Cyprus and let this issue end".³⁴⁶

Running a strong yet fragile coalitional government with *Denktaş*, progressive Prime Minister and head of the Republican Turkish Party, CTP, *Ozkan Yorgancioglu*, took a diametrically opposite stance.³⁴⁷ He said he trusted the TCFA delegation and he did not think they would do anything wrong as they aimed to end the isolation of T/C football. CTP's general secretary *Asim Akansoy* also said that his party supported the prospect of young people's participation in international competitions and appreciated *Sertoğlu's* "serious and determined struggle" in that direction. Changing some articles of the agreement, such as article 2, would be preferred instead of rejecting it. *Izzet Izcan*, chairman of the United Cyprus Party (BKP) - which lacked parliamentary representation - said that the step taken in the direction of the reunification of football constituted a strong basis for the reunification of Cyprus and an early solution. The Zurich agreement was a

³⁴⁵ PIO media review, No. 210/13, 06.11.13

³⁴⁶ PIO media review, No. 211/13, 7.11.2013.

³⁴⁷ Holding 12 seats in parliament, *Denktaş* could abandon CTP to form a new (26/50) government with opposition National Union Party (UBP) that was holding 14 parliamentary seats.

"courageous step" in the right direction as it would secure the reunification of football in Cyprus and the lift the "embargoes" on T/C football.

Cemal Ozyigit, general secretary of the Communal Democracy Party (TDP), held a midway position view. He argued that there might be points in the agreement which everyone could oppose, but the issue which should be discussed is how the T/Cs' could be represented in the CFA.³⁴⁸ Instead of having a rejecting attitude in an environment in which a desire for a united Cyprus exists, it would be best if the text was revised for the agreement to become acceptable to both sides. Finally, international figures offered positive gestures towards the signed Zurich agreement. The US and French Ambassadors to Nicosia as well as the UN Secretary-General's special adviser on Cyprus called the T/C delegation to congratulate it for its achievement.³⁴⁹

Assessing these positions and statements, RoC's Social Democratic Party EDEK dashed to make a prediction.

While it seems there has been a positive step with the inclusion of TCFA in the CFA, which represents the Republic of Cyprus internationally in football, Turkey sought to immediately torpedo the deal, reminding everyone that the army of occupation and the policies of Ankara [Turkey's capital] have the final word in the occupied territories. No agreement can enter into force, unless approved by Ankara, and this fact should not escape the attention of any member of the international community.

On 8 November, *Sertoğlu* held a press conference to repeat that he stood by the announcements he had made before going to Zurich, when he had told everyone that he would bring this agreement home. He scolded false rumours circulating in the press and noted that there were still some cloudy issues on the agreement and therefore it would not be possible to accept it until everything was clarified.

A few days later, the T/C press hosted three positive and one negative statements by four local political figures. The Prime Minister, an official from his party and another one from the Communal Democracy Party expressed their support to the football agreement. Conversely, a representative from *Denktaş'* Democratic Party

³⁴⁸ TDP had only 3 seats in parliament.

³⁴⁹ PIO media review, No. 211/13, 7.11.2013.

(DP) argued that the agreement should be brought to ‘parliament’ for approval.³⁵⁰ The following day, the National Unity Party (UBP) chairman stated that TCFA’s actions had political ramifications; he opposed the Zurich agreement but would not be against a co-operation between the two associations as equal entities. Given these political corollaries and the power balance within the parties in parliament, if the agreement were to be brought about a vote, it might not pass, as UBP and DP together could secure 26 out of the 50 parliamentary votes.

These statements did not jolt *Sertoğlu*, who continued to gather support to his plan from civil society actors, aware that failure to seize this opportunity would push the members of his association to an eventual economic disaster. During a meeting with board members of the T/C Businessmen’s Association on 14 November, where he was welcomed warmly, he revealed that TCFA had been working secretly towards the Zurich agreement for the past two years because of various obstacles lingering along the way. He also called the agreement “a stepping stone for the “country’s tourism and economy”.³⁵¹

On 15 November, the anniversary day of TRNC’s declaration of independence, the heads of the two communities lashed out at each other. *Eroğlu* declared that the T/Cs would never be subjected to a G/C administration while *Anastasiades* and his government condemned the illegal secessionist act that designated a pseudo-state in Northern Cyprus and vowed their resolve to continue to work for the reunification of the island and its people in a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality, a state with a single sovereignty, citizenship and international identity.

Three days later, on 18 November, after a secret ballot in a special session, CFA’s general assembly approved the Zurich agreement – yet not unanimously – with 12 votes in favour, two against and three abstentions.³⁵² On the news, *Sertoğlu* rushed to warn CFA. Speaking to the newspaper *Kıbrıs* on 20 November, he considered

³⁵⁰ Yenidüzen 2013c. Football in the Assembly’s agenda. Available online in Turkish at: <http://www.yeniduzen.com/Haberler/spor/meclis-te-gundem-futbol/9273> [Accessed 10 November 2013].

³⁵¹ PIO media review, No. 216/13, 14.11.13.

³⁵² Politis. 2013a. Interim agreement approved. Available online in Greek at: <http://www.politis-sports.com/cgi-bin/hweb?-A=128555&-V=onlinenews> [Accessed 19 November 2015].

the timing of the ballot outside the agreement, which was to be ratified by the assemblies of the two associations on the same day, and hoped “this move was not dictated by an intention to drive TCFA into the corner because it will be in vain”.³⁵³

To exert pressure on *Sertoğlu*, *Denktaş* intervened the following day again, reiterating that TCFA could not make such a mistake, which was in line with Greek foreign policy. Then, he travelled to Ankara where he met with Turkey’s sports minister *Kilic*. *Denktaş* repeated his negative views, yet *Kilic* said he believed in the autonomy of TCFA.³⁵⁴ To *Denktaş*’ defence came the head of TRNC’s human rights association who argued that legally TCFA could not become a CFA member and only a football confederation of the two associations was possible.

6.2.2 Game change: Support from Turkey?

Surprising all parties and agents on the same day, during his visit to Moscow, Turkey’s Prime Minister *Recep Tayyip Erdoğan*, interviewed by a Russian newspaper, stated he was in favour of the Zurich agreement, and that he was expecting to see the positive influence of this step in the political process as well.³⁵⁵ His detailed statement was:

South Cyprus knows what north Cyprus will say. In the same manner north Cyprus knows what south Cyprus will say. Let us all sit at the negotiating table and put an end to this issue. Perhaps at the end we will have a united island. Because when it is said that Cyprus is in the EU, reference is not made to a united island. In the past few days, an agreement was signed between the football federation of North Cyprus and the football federation of South Cyprus on the issue of representing the entire island and participating in the football events as a single team. I want to see the positive influences of this step in the political process as well.³⁵⁶

³⁵³ PIO media review, No. 219/13 19-20.11.13.

³⁵⁴ PIO media review, No. 221/13, 22.11.13.

³⁵⁵ Yenidüzen 2013d. Erdoğan’s TCFA-CFA review. Available online in Turkish at: <http://www.yeniduzen.com/Haberler/spor/erdogan-dan-ktff-kop-yorumu/9640> [Accessed 23 November 2013].

³⁵⁶ PIO media review, No. 221/13, *op.cit.*

This statement was totally unexpected as in a conference on “Turkey-EU Relations” held a week earlier in Poland, *Erdoğan* first called the attention of the participants and then stated bluntly “*Kıbrıs yok*” (*There is no country called Cyprus*) and that the G/C administration of the South was accepted to the EU for political reasons. TRNC’s former President *Mehmet Ali Talat*, who had vehemently rejected FIFA’s 2008 football reunification initiative, asserted that the regime should now be supportive of the Zurich agreement. These developments appeared as a repudiation of EDEK’s prediction that Turkey would torpedo the football deal. Four of the G/C interviewees who helped the research of this thesis in June 2016, evaluated Erdoğan’s ‘curious’ statement. For a sports journalist, “that statement can be made diplomatically but it means nothing”. A sports editor brought out the Turkish craft in diplomacy, stating:

It is part of the communication games that the Turks know how to play very well, a lot better than the Greeks and the Cypriots. When we read their statements, we are the ones that have the difficulty. They have a goal which they know how to reach or anyway how to get there in the way they know. This statement [*Erdoğan’s*] will be interpreted in several different ways.

An academician reiterated a similar view, emphasizing that sport becomes the victim of politics:

What politicians say does not mean what we think they mean and what they want. For many and various reasons, for intentional purposes, they say and try to show to the world other things, when the reality is different. It is a political game where football and sports generally become the victim of politics.

A government sports official interpreted Erdoğan’s statement as a tactical move to forego pressure as regards Turkey’s consensus on the matter and thus, “... he made statements ‘from behind’ so that he would not appear as someone who plays a game.

During a private visit to the Pope in the Vatican on 22 November, FIFA’s head *Blatter* met with international journalists in Rome. He revealed that FIFA had the solution, He was expecting the T/Cs’ approval to the Zurich document by the end

of the month and that, while “the agreement will not lead to a united Cypriot national team, T/C and G/C football teams may be playing in a combined league”.³⁵⁷

The unexpected positions by both *Erdoğan* and *Talat* and perhaps *Blatter's* optimistic statement could probably be explained by what transpired these days in the international political arena. On 19 November, during a joint press conference in Washington with Turkey's minister of foreign affairs, the head of the US State Department stressed that "talks on Cyprus were held for months, and we were trying 'silently' to find ways to solve the problem. Greek and Turkish Cypriot negotiators are making significant progress". The US official argued that Washington and Ankara had the same strategic objectives, and their relations were 'vital' at many different levels".³⁵⁸ Furthermore, in an interview by G/C paper *Haravgi*, on 25 November, the secretary of the leftist G/C party AKEL noted that there was an upgraded US interest in the Cyprus Problem and stated clearly that “the reason for this is the confirmation of the existence of hydrocarbon reserves in our exclusive economic zone”.³⁵⁹

While this is a plausible and likely scenario, TCFA's 'submission' to CFA could have positive outcomes for the T/Cs, which *Denktaş* and *Eroğlu* failed perhaps to see for their reasons. All that T/C teams would need to do, to end their international isolation, was a mere formality, i.e., make their football association a CFA member. Then, they could carry on their business without having to hold matches with any G/C team. In other words, they could operate as if they were part of an internationally recognised state. This view was also cast by former CFA head *Triantafyllidis*, a lawyer who argued that the solution to the Cyprus Problem should

³⁵⁷ Anadolu Agency. 2013. FIFA "has solution" to end Cypriot football crisis. Available online at: <http://www.aa.com.tr/en/sports/254968--fifa-quot-has-solution-quot-to-end-cypriot-football-crisis> [Accessed 23 November 2015].

³⁵⁸ To Vima. 2013. John Kerry and Ahmet Davutoglu talked about Cyprus. Available online in Greek at: <http://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=540474> [Accessed 20 November 2013].

³⁵⁹ Haravgi. 2013. Andros Kyprianou: Our clear red lines. Available online in Greek at: <http://www.haravgi.com.cy/site-article-43981-gr.php> [Accessed 26 November 2013]. (also, http://aspects.duckdns.org/cyprus/Archive_2013/1311/Haravgi_PDF/20131125_Haravgi.pdf)

have preceded the football agreement.³⁶⁰ Second, by subjecting their football institution to a G/C institution, the T/Cs would be showing the international community their goodwill towards a solution to the overall Cyprus Problem. If future talks were to fail for some reason, the G/C side might again be remembered as the inflexible one. All in all, the FIFA initiative could actually end up dividing the two communities ever further, as two G/C experts had argued earlier evaluating the 2008 plan.³⁶¹

6.2.3 Return to 'business as usual'

Despite these positive developments for the T/Cs, on 23 November, *Eroğlu* reiterated once more his objection to the Zurich agreement. "The merger of CFA and TCFA is an unacceptable combination", and "we are happy to live under the guarantee of Turkey" were among the words in his statements.³⁶²

Three days later, *Sertoğlu*, expressing his resentment for CFA's 'premature' approval to the Zurich agreement, but armed with *Erdoğan's* 'encouragement', announced that his football clubs would be voting on the agreement either of Friday, 29 November or on Monday, 1 December. He repeated that they were on the right path, with a clear aim of not getting into politics, and wondered why those (meaning *Eroğlu* and others) who say that there should be a Cyprus settlement in three months, are in panic and oppose this agreement.³⁶³

Meanwhile, *Denktaş* continued his campaign against TCFA's plans. He met with the heads of the Football Clubs and Players Associations and voiced his strong opposition to the agreement which could not be accepted because it weakens the 'hands' of the T/Cs [in the political negotiations table]. *Sertoğlu's* reaction to

³⁶⁰ Offsite. 2013. The TCFA-CFA agreement breeds risks. Available online in Greek at: <http://offsite.com.cy/simfonia-kop-tpo-egkimoni-kindinous/> [Accessed 27 November 2013].

³⁶¹ Kartakoullis N. L. and Loizou C. 2009. Is Sport (Football) a Unifying Force or a Vehicle to Further Separation? The Case of Cyprus. *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 26(11), 1652-1667.

³⁶² PIO media review No. 222/13 23-25.11.13

³⁶³ PIO media review No. 223/13 26.11.13

Denktaş' moves was that TCFA expects from politicians to show the same respect to his association's opinion as the association does for theirs.

One day prior to CFA's general meeting that was scheduled to cast a vote on the Zurich document, the chairman of the T/C Football Clubs Association *Yurdaer Garip* repeated that the agreement is positive and a big step forward, criticizing those who were against it at a time when it was the only chance for T/C football to be opened to the world.

Indeed, on the evening of Friday, 29 November, at the premises of TCFA, its 42 clubs voted unanimously in favour of the Zurich agreement. A few hours earlier one of the association's former heads, *Niyazi Okutan*, speaking to a local sports channel, stated that if this opportunity was lost and they had to wait until a final solution to the Cyprus Problem, the situation for the T/C clubs would be much worse than at present.³⁶⁴ After the ballot, *Sertoğlu* emphasized the significance of the decision towards the end of their international isolation, avoiding a single word about football integration in Cyprus. This development, he said, is "not the end, but the beginning", "there is a long way to go which will be travelled by the chairmen of the T/C clubs and the T/C people 'hand in hand' "and the agreement is "the first step towards a 'get together' of TRNC's football and people with the international community".³⁶⁵

Commentaries from the G/C side surfaced in the columns of the newspaper *Simerini* and the semi-state *Cyprus News Agency*. Both outlets reported that the above 'vote' appears to be not approval to the agreement but rather a *Sertoğlu's* further assumption of initiatives to 'improve' its text as he had declared only a few hours after signing it in Zurich. However, as the reports added emphatically,

³⁶⁴ Star Kibris 2013c. Okutan: The step should be taken. Available online in Turkish at: <http://www.starkibris.net/index.asp?haberID=164598> [Accessed 30 November 2015].

³⁶⁵ Politis 2013b. Agreement by TCs approved. Available online in Greek at: <http://www.politis-news.com/cgi-bin/hweb?-A=251719&-V=articles> [Accessed 30 November 2015].

TCFA's application to become a CFA member was a priority and that the latter was unwilling to change even a comma in the text of the agreement.³⁶⁶

Serdar Denktaş' reaction was that he had warned TCFA's general assembly and that he would follow the process without making any more statements. Prime Minister *Yorgancıoğlu* argued that a change was already observed in the views of some political circles that originally held a negative approach on the issue, adding that he was in support of the deal and that he did not feel the need to offer any advice to the football clubs. TCFA's advisor *Jerome Champagne* called upon the T/Cs to look at the agreement not as a submission to CFA but as a 'tour' coming back home to retake their position internationally.³⁶⁷

Around mid-January 2014, *Sertoğlu* participated in an international conference on the economics of football industry which had the support of London's Greenwich University and the English Football Association. The conference organiser, Greenwich University Professor *Mete Feridun* – of T/C origin – who had invited such internationally known football figures as *Alex Ferguson*, *Luis Figo* and *Jose Mourinho* stated that *Sertoğlu's* invitation was due to his brave steps in T/C football.³⁶⁸

Less than a month later, T/C media were publicising rumours that *Jerome Champagne*, TCFA's external relations advisor and former general secretary of FIFA, would soon announce his candidacy for the forthcoming FIFA presidential elections officially.³⁶⁹ The announcement would be made in a press conference in London where *Hasan Sertoğlu* and *Orcun Kamali* from TCFA would be present. This news could have revitalised T/C hopes for if Champagne were to win the election, they would have top insider support.

On 19 February 2014, The French Ambassador to Nicosia, *Jean Luc Florent* made a bold move. He organized a special reception in honour of the football agreement.

³⁶⁶ Sigmalive 2013c. Discrepancies between what they sign, do and talk. Available online in Greek at: <http://www.sigmalive.com/simerini/sport%20time/cyprus/584061>[Accessed 1 December 2015].

³⁶⁷ PIO media review, No. 239/13, 18.12.13.

³⁶⁸ PIO media review, No.07/14, 13.1.14.

³⁶⁹ PIO media review, No. 26/14, 07.02.13

Diplomats of more than twenty countries, mostly at the ambassador's level, along with officials from the UN, the EU and the European Parliament attended the event. In his address to his guests, Florent commended the presidents of the two football associations for their leadership and underlined the societal importance of football reunification for the two communities (see also *Appendix E*).³⁷⁰

During another press conference organised by TCFA in mid-May 2014, *Sertoğlu* expressed the firm belief that an agreement with CFA was forthcoming by the end of the year, the odds being less than 30 per cent. If that wouldn't happen his association would not follow a prolonged process of talks.³⁷¹ Speaking also at the press conference, *Jerome Champagne* noted that the two sides should develop mutual trust and understanding beyond the signed agreement and that FIFA's 209 federations from all over the world would be informed about the CFA-TCFA talks during its next Congress in Brazil.

About a week later, on 23 May, T/C media asserted that the cooperation between CFA and TCFA started to bear fruit.³⁷² According to *Afrika* newspaper, the footballers who were holders of the RoC identity card would be able to participate in the "Super league, the 1st division league and the 2nd division league and will also be given a 'license' by the TCFA to play in T/C teams. Also, CFA chairman *Costakis Koutsokoumnis* invited the entire TCFA administration to attend with him a friendly match that would take place in Tokyo between the national teams of Japan and the RoC.

No activities commenced between the time of that news and early July, when the media were publicising the signing of a protocol between Turkey's Ministry of Youth and Sports and TRNC's Ministry of Economy, Tourism, Culture and Sports [headed by *Denktaş*]. The agreement would set up in Nicosia's T/C sector an office to control and supervise TRNC's youth and sports. The office, called "Turkey's Coordination Office Abroad", would act as a Youth and Sports ministry, its staffing

³⁷⁰ Christou, J. 2014. Deal to reunite football on the island to be finalised by summer. Available online at: <https://cyprus-mail.com/tag/costakis-koutsokoumnis/> [Accessed 17 May 2018].

³⁷¹ PIO media review, No 89/14, 16.5.14.

³⁷² PIO media review, No. 94/14, 23.5.14.

and operating costs falling on Turkey's budget.³⁷³ Prime Minister *Ozkan Yorgancioglu* withdrew that protocol for re-evaluation following reactions from various political corners. The Social Democracy Party (TDP), especially, described the protocol unconstitutional, also claiming that TRNC lacked "civilian and democratic" order and that the T/Cs could not govern themselves and be the masters of their institutions.

In mid-September, *Denктаş* and *Sertoğlu* were hosting in *Kerynia Joan Laporta*, a former member of the Catalonian parliament and former Barcelona FC president.³⁷⁴ *Laporta* said the reason for his visit was related to his profession as a lawyer. Arguing that he was unable to comprehend TCFA's isolation in the field of sports and claiming that was an injustice to the youth, *Laporta* expressed his support to the talks between CFA and TCFA. However, as the main reason for FIFA's initiative was that "it owes something to this country", *Laporta* supported TCFA's approach of "one national team for each country". He advised both men to make use of the process launched between Catalonia and Spain for reaching the target of FIFA membership. *Laporta* offered to hold a friendly match between TCFA and Catalonia, although this would not be of great help. On his part, *Denктаş* thanked *Laporta* as a 'valued friend and ally' and underlined that his common position with *Sertoğlu* was the *equality of CFA and TCFA*. *Sertoğlu* resorted to expressing his hope for a successful conclusion of the process with CFA. Were these statements signs of *Sertoğlu's* 'capitulation' to the hard-liners?

A week later civil society organisations organised a rally in support of TCFA's 'unification' with rest of the world.³⁷⁵ *Sertoğlu* congratulated the organisers for giving their best efforts to organise an event with fantastic success. Then he claimed that the event changed the attitude of many of those who were against the 5th of November agreement, after realizing that the T/C community embraced this event warmly.

³⁷³ PIO media review, No. 123/14, 4.7.14.

³⁷⁴ PIO media review, No. 172/14, 15.9.14.

³⁷⁵ PIO media review, No.177/14, 22.9.14.

6.2.4 A final game change

Three whole months later, in early December 2014, officials from the two associations were meeting again, on the occasion of *Jerome Champagne's* arrival in Cyprus.³⁷⁶ This time, Champagne was officially a candidate in the forthcoming FIFA Presidential elections, and the only announcement made was that TCFA would be issuing a *communiqué* later. In a statement to *BRT 1 channel*, the following day, *Sertoğlu*, said that the meetings with the CFA would continue and that the T/C side will “demand its rights”.³⁷⁷ This jargon appeared to be new but, as *Sertoğlu* dashed to explain that CFA did not belong to the G/Cs only because the T/Cs had rights too. He concluded declaring: "We also want our rights from CFA and the G/Cs and we will continue the meetings until we get these [rights]". On 16 December, TCFA released an open letter to all Cypriots which included the following avowals (see *Appendix C*):

The CFA was founded in 1934 by Turkish-Cypriot football leaders and by a T/C football club Lefkoşa Türk Spor Kulübü...After its foundation, Turkish-Cypriots such as TCFA's founder Ahmet Sami Topcan took part in CFA's management...After 60 years of separation, the ambition is clear since the Turkish-Cypriot football community clearly expressed its goal to regain the position it had in CFA before 1955, with all our obligations and all our rights. The CFA is also ours. Everyone should know that the CFA, whose founders we are, does not only belong to Greek-Cypriots. It is ours as well!

Sertoğlu's declarations and TCFA's open letter to the Cypriots were stating clearly that the T/C rights with CFA were stemming from the T/Cs' membership of CFA since 1934 when CFA was created and 1948 when FIFA recognised the association. This assertion was indirectly sending various messages. It was claiming that, because their departure from CFA in 1955 was 'forced' on them by the G/Cs – or it was not their decision anyway - they could claim their rights in that institution sixty years later. Leaving aside legal questions, this claim might have been a plausible one, had the island remained a socially-culturally divided society but under the same institutions.

³⁷⁶ PIO media review, No 225/14, 2.12.14.

³⁷⁷ PIO media review, No. 227/14, 4.12.14.

Sertoğlu was purposely overlooking the island's political history. In the early 1960s, the T/Cs had withdrawn altogether from all political institutions of the independent *consociational* democratic state of Cyprus. In 1976, they created an autonomous T/C canton, which they proclaimed as an independent state later in 1983. *Sertoğlu* was trying to send the message that a T/C application to become CFA member was not necessary. All that was needed to fulfil the conditions of the Zurich agreement was a statement by CFA admitting that TCFA was already one of its members historically. Such a comfortable option was undoubtedly satisfactory to the hard-liners' position of "equality among the two associations". All in all, this novel theorisation was, in essence, arguing that a country which had declared its independence as a sovereign state could legally claim membership rights in the institutions of another sovereign state! At the same, *Sertoğlu's* contentions also constituted derogatory remarks for FIFA, which had pointed out to him that TCFA had to apply and become a CFA member to play international matches, as per the provisional Zurich agreement of 5 November 2013. FIFA had all the records. Why hadn't *Sertoğlu* asked it in the first place to certify that TCFA was a CFA member! This suspicious TCFA approach marked the end of 2014, as the coming year was withholding various new domestic and international challenges, including TRNC's and FIFA's presidential elections. Table 6.2 highlights the dynamics arising from the positions of multiple actors on the new football reunification initiative. As seen in the readings, once again, unlike the more progressive elements of TRNC's political actors, the hard-liners opposed the plan sternly. Some external actors also enter the picture – chiefly Turkey's football association.

The year 2015 began with a confrontation between TCFA and the Turkish Football Federation (TFF) that stirred political reactions on football reunification in Northern Cyprus as well. TCFA had given Turkey and TRNC's government a 45-day deadline to resolve the issue of unpaid training fees to T/C teams by Turkey's amateur league BAL during player transfers. The Turkish league was claiming payment was not possible due to TCFA's lack of FIFA and UEFA membership. *Sertoğlu* countered that his organisation's membership of FIFA was imminent with joining CFA, stating:³⁷⁸

³⁷⁸ PIO media review, No. 29/15, 12.2.15.

Then let us determine our own way. Let us become a member of the Greek Cypriot Federation and be recognized. I am ready to become a traitor of the country.

The ruling government coalition and the opposition National Union Party (UBP) suggested solving the problem through a dialogue between the TCFA and TFF. *Denktaş'* Democratic Party (DP) called for an immediate solution of the confrontation as joining CFA was not a viable solution.

The Communal Democracy Party (TDP) was resolute in its support to *Sertoğlu*. Its chairman, *Cemal Ozyigit*, reminded that his party was always supportive of TCFA's membership with CFA and congratulated *Sertoğlu's* reaction, adding:

There is hypocrisy in the Turkish government and its officials. On the one hand they say they are the only country in the world which recognizes the TRNC, but on the other they recognize absolutely none of its institutions, they ignore it and by-pass it. TCFA is an example for this [hypocrisy].³⁷⁹

In a televised programme of ADA TV, the presidential spokesman, *Osman Ertug* stated:

This is a move that could create a political cost for us. For this reason, it needs to be examined very well. Our president is very sensitive on this issue. Still, beyond of this sensitivity, initiatives were undertaken on this matter. We follow the issue very closely. Our football confronts difficulties, but those difficulties are not related only to football. We managed to put this issue into the report of the UN's Secretary General. This is an issue which interests all of us. But, I say that the remedy for this is certainly not to become members of the Greek Cypriot Football Federation.³⁸⁰

The developments on the issue accelerated a visit to TRNC by the Turkish Deputy Prime Minister responsible for Cyprus affairs, *Bulent Arinc*. *Arinc* promised that, upon his return to Turkey, he would hold contacts with TFF president *Yildirim Demiroren* and would ask him to solve the financial problem of TCFA footballer transfers to Turkey's League BAL.³⁸¹ Indeed, on 17 February, *Demiroren* was visiting TRNC, upon *Eroğlu's* invitation. *Demiroren* met with *Sertoğlu*, *Serdar*

³⁷⁹ PIO media review, No. 29/15, *op.cit.*

³⁸⁰ PIO media review, No. 30/15, 13.2.15.

³⁸¹ PIO media review, No. 32/15, 17.2.15.

Denktaş, the chairmen of the football clubs union and the sports writers association and other persons engaged in T/C football, at *Eroğlu's* office, rather than at TCFA's premises. He provided as an excuse the possible reactions by FIFA and UEFA, but *Sertoğlu's* criticism was that *Derminoren* never called him up before coming to the island and TFF never really sat to talk with TCFA representatives. Demiroren said that the problem would definitely be solved, but whatever the form of the solution, it would have to be within FIFA's regulations. *Eroğlu* agreed with *Derminoren* but attempted to mend the strained relations between TFF and TCFA, arguing that it was important for the football federations of the two countries to have good relations. A possible solution thrown at the table, bypassing the FIFA rules, was a protocol between the two countries, i.e., between Turkey and the TRNC.³⁸² A couple of days later, *Sertoğlu* argued that *Derminoren's* concession that the solution to the transfer fee problem required observing the FIFA rules was a clear indication that TCFA's pursuit of FIFA membership through CFA was correct.³⁸³ Also, he asserted that false allegations had created the wrong impression in some segments of the T/C society that TCFA would become a CFA member when the truth was that it would become a partner.

As the TRNC Presidential elections campaign began to unfold, exploiting the football friction between TFF and TCFA, the independent presidential candidate *Mustafa Akinci* issued a written statement supporting *Sertoğlu* and condemning *Derminoren's* visit at the "Presidential Palace" instead of the TCFA premises.³⁸⁴ *Sertoğlu's* traditional ally, KTÖS, also issued a written statement describing *Derminoren's* visit as an attempt to exclude the T/C community from international law and *Eroğlu's* initiative as an attempt to preserve the *status quo*. It also stressed the need for TCFA and CFA to come to an agreement so the young T/C footballers could play in international matches.

³⁸² PIO media review, No. 33/15, 18.2.15.

³⁸³ PIO media review, No. 35/15, 20.2.15.

³⁸⁴ PIO media review, No. 36/15, 21.2.15.

Table 6.2: Football re-unification milestones & actor positions, 2015

PERIOD	MILESTONE	INTERNATIONAL ACTORS	LEADER	POLITICAL ACTORS	CIVIL SOCIETY				
02.03.15 – 15.03.15	Representation office of Turkish Football Federation (TFF) to be established in TRNC.	TFF general secretary <i>Kadir Kardas</i> FIFA's general secretary <i>Jerome Valcke</i> Youth and Sports Minister of Turkey, <i>Akif Cagatay Kilic</i>	1 2 1	Minister <i>Serdar Denktas</i>	1 0 0	UBP's <i>Huseyin Ozgurgun</i> TDP's <i>Suphi Hudaoglu</i> BKP's <i>Abdullah Korkmazhan</i>	1 0 0	KTÖS T/C football trainers association (KTFAD)	0 1
28.03.15 – 29.10.15	TCFA communication to FIFA, UEFA and CFA, regarding its application to join CFA.	French Ambassador <i>Jean Luc Florent</i>	1	Prime Minister, <i>Ozkan Yorgancioglu</i> President <i>Dervis Eroglu</i> Minister <i>Serdar Denktas</i>	1 0 0	CTP's <i>Kutlay Erk</i> UBP's <i>Huseyin Ozgurgun</i> TDP's <i>Suphi Hudaoglu</i> BKP's <i>Abdullah Korkmazhan</i> SDP's <i>Tozun Tunali</i> Former President <i>Talat</i>	1 0 1 1 1 1	KTÖS	1

1= positive, 0=negative, 2= ambivalent

On 2 March 2015, TFF proceeded to another step in patronising TCFA's affairs. TFF's general secretary, *Kadir Kardas* sent a letter to FIFA requesting permission to open a "representation office" in TRNC, to help the Turkish football players. Acting prudently, FIFA's general secretary *Jerome Valcke*, took his turn to send a letter to TCFA asking them whether they had been informed on the issue and what their opinion was. *Valcke* was also inquiring on the process of their talks with CFA. *Sertoğlu* took this opportunity to remind everyone of TCFA's "rights once again". Criticizing TFF's initiative strongly and promising to send out a protest letter, he said "we have never been so much humiliated since TCFA's establishment in 1955".³⁸⁵

Serdar Denктаş characterised the TFF initiative as a "spectacular" plan and maintained that any adverse reactions were the product of either lack of information or complete unawareness. *Denктаş* revealed that TFF had assumed this initiative at the regime's request and criticised all those who reacted negatively stating:

I don't understand where this complex is coming from. Those who have taken on a duty to attack Turkey on the grounds that it is bypassing us should reconsider and review their actions.³⁸⁶

While Turkey's Youth and Sports Minister *Akif Cagtatay Kilic* was expressing his belief that the issue regarding TFF's "representation office" would be resolved soon, TRNC's coalitional government appeared divided on the issue. In the opposition bench, the leader of the National Unity Party (UBP) *Huseyin Ozgurgun*, insisted that it was not possible for TCFA to come under the CFA, adding that whatever they have accomplished until now had always been with the cooperation and consultation of Turkey. Communal Democracy Party (TDP) leader, *Cemal Ozyigit*, described TFF's initiative without prior notification of TCFA as an act of disrespect to the T/C people, stressing his support to the only viable solution which was TCFA's inclusion in CFA. A similar criticism came from the United Cyprus Party (BKP) whose general secretary *Abdullah Korkmazhan* described TFF's initiative both as an indication of Turkey's treatment of TRNC as a Turkish province

³⁸⁵ PIO media review, No. 46/15 10.03.15.

³⁸⁶ PIO media review, No. 48/15 12.03.15.

and as a separatist effort aiming to prevent the T/C football from uniting with world football.³⁸⁷

Civil society organisations did not appear united on the issue. KTFAD - the T/C football trainers association - expressed their belief that TFF's initiative would help TCFA to become a FIFA member.³⁸⁸ KTÖS held a protest demonstration during which *Denktaş* showed up and attempted to explain to the protesters that his aim was to solve the problem with the football players' transfers in order their football clubs to be able to get their money. The KTÖS secretary general *Sener Elcil*, countered that the reason the TFF wanted to open a "representation office" in TRNC was to prevent the ongoing meetings between TCFA and CFA, as well as to prevent the T/Cs' opening to the world. He added that politicians should not mingle with sports and that *Sertoğlu* had the KTÖS support regarding any rights deriving in the RoC.

Towards the end of March, TCFA's initiatives led to some hysteric front pages in Turkish media reports including the mainstream *Hurriyet* and *Milliyet* newspapers. *Hurriyet's* 28 March report on football reunification was titled "*Kıbrıs'ta korkulan oldu! KKTC Futbol Federasyonu, Rum Federasyonu'na üye oluyor*" (The fear became true in Cyprus: TRNC's football federation becomes member of the Greek federation".³⁸⁹ The fear of such a development would have political repercussions and caused great confusion among both government and TFF officials. TFF's general secretary Kadir Kardas told *Hurriyet* that they had offered the T/Cs all kinds of support but with FIFA being the boss and as TRNC was in national elections period, TFF could not make any further decisions on the matter. *Milliyet's* 29 March report was titled "*KTFF'de üyelik krizi*" (*Membership crisis in TCFA*). The report

³⁸⁷ PIO media review, No. 48/15, *op.cit.*

³⁸⁸ PIO media review, No. 50/15, 14.3.15.

³⁸⁹ *Hurriyet*. 2015. The fear became true in Cyprus! The TRNC Football Federation is becoming member of the Greek Cypriot Federation! Available online in Turkish at: <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/spor/futbol/28583205.asp>. [Accessed 22 February 2018].

argued that *Sertoğlu's* statement that the government could not solve TCFA's problem had caused a crisis.³⁹⁰

A day later, *Serdar Denktaş*, sent a letter to the football clubs expressing once more his view that the salvation of TCFA in CFA was tantamount to the bankruptcy of politics and suicide of the TRNC's football. He also alleged that because of a "promise given behind closed doors", the application to the CFA had been turned into a single alternative.³⁹¹ Taking his turn, *Sertoğlu* made a tactical move. He sent a letter to FIFA and UEFA regarding TCFA's application to join CFA. In that letter, also communicated to the CFA, the TRNC presidency and the ministry of sports, *Sertoğlu* was noting that joining CFA had five requirements of which the most difficult one was an amendment to TCFA's charter harmonising it with those of FIFA and UEFA. They had self-set a 45-day time limit within which to complete the amendments that would strip the chairman's powers to half. He characterised this move as "a clear step which confirms our decisiveness *to take our place, rights and responsibilities in the CFA again*". As usual, *Sertoğlu's* letter stirred up political reactions once more.

Dervis Eroğlu stated that he had discussed the issue with *Sertoğlu* and had told him that TCFA could not join CFA because it was contrary to its charter let alone that it would bring no benefit to T/C football.³⁹² He blamed the G/C church for not allowing the G/C clubs to play matches in the north and noted that CFA's chairman *Costakis Koutsokoumnis* had made a speech which had escaped the attention of the majority of the sporting editors. Allegedly, *Koutsokoumnis* had tried to convince his clubs to cooperate with the Turks to prevent developments similar to those in *Kosovo*.

National Unity Party (UBP) chairman, *Huseyin Ozgurgun*, held the two partners in the coalitional government equally responsible for TCFA's wrong path. *Denktaş* said the TRNC had been established after many difficulties with Turkey's provision

³⁹⁰ *Milliyet*. 2015. Membership crisis in TCFA. Available online in Turkish at: <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/ktff-de-uyelik-krizi-gundem-2035746/>

³⁹¹ PIO media review, No. 59/15, 30.03.15

³⁹² PIO media review, No. 60/15 31.03.15

of financial assistance to its institutions and *Sertoğlu* was underestimating the state's political and financial contribution to football. The sports ministry was allocating a significant portion of its budget to sport, and therefore, he would re-examine its agency's relations with TCFA if the process with CFA was to continue.³⁹³ When *Sertoğlu* heard these statements, he started laughing. Supposedly, he had done his homework well – he had succeeded in passing around the line that TCFA was fighting for its rights in CFA.

Prime Minister *Yorgancıoğlu* along with several other political elites described Denктаş' statements as "unacceptable" for ignoring and not trusting TRNC institutions as well as freezing relations with them. He added that Denктаş had stated his own views when unilaterally announcing the freezing of relations with TCFA. Commending TCFA's initiatives, the general secretary of the governing Republican Turkish Party (CTP), *Kutlay Erk*, said these initiatives derive from the T/Cs' football rights in the RoC and are undifferentiated from rights on natural gas and the island's exclusive economic zone. The general secretary of the Communal Democracy Party (TDP), *Suphi Hudaoglu* noted that TCFA's step in the direction of taking back their rights in the CFA was correct. *Abdullah Korkmazhan*, general secretary of the United Cyprus Party (BKP) saluted TCFA's initiative and added that BKP will continue to support the courageous steps taken in the direction of the reunification of the Cyprus football. *Tozun Tunali*, chairman of the Social Democrat Party (SDP) called on all the sports federations to support the TCFA, expressing the belief that if the door opens for the TCFA, the same development will happen for all the other federations. The T/C referees' and observers' association and the sport editors' association also threw their support behind TCFA's initiatives. After all these reactions, turned his powers as sports minister to the Prime Minister, stating bitterly "I will not wear out myself any further for people and issues that are not worth it".³⁹⁴

³⁹³ PIO media review, No. 61/15, 1.4.15.

³⁹⁴ PIO PIO media review, No. 61/15, *op. cit.*

On 3 April, former T/C leader *Mehmet Ali Talat* was invited to comment on the different views he had expressed in the past regarding TCFA's attempt to become a CFA member.³⁹⁵ In 2009 he had said TCFA could not become a member of CFA, while in 2013 he was positive to such a development. *Talat* responded that his 2009 position was rooted in his hopes for a quick solution to the Cyprus Problem and his fear that TCFA's submission to CFA could influence other federations. TCFA's current drive should be supported because there is no hope for a solution to the Cyprus Problem. The Trade Unions Platform (Sendikal Platform) comprising 28 trade unions including KTÖS, announced their support to TCFA's initiative to join TCFA, claiming that the initiative was part of the "existence" debate within the T/C community and the belief for a federal state solution in Cyprus.

As TRNC's presidential election campaigns were peaking, the sole female candidate, speaker of the assembly *Sibel Siber*, visited the "Fenerbahce Association" and the "Kucuk Kaimakli (Omorfita) sport club, escorted by *Sertoğlu*. During her visits, *Sibel* stated that sports are not a symbol of conflicts but also a symbol of peace and friendship and expressed the wish to see T/C teams competing in international matches, free of "embargos".³⁹⁶ Throwing his support behind *Eroğlu's* candidacy, *Serdar Denktaş* claimed that since 1960 sports between the two communities in Cyprus have been administered separately and alleged that TCFA would also become a member of FIFA separately, like Scotland and San Marino. Despite their not being UN members, these two countries are members of FIFA under a different federation. Also, since the members of FIFA are autonomous federations, if TCFA joined CFA, the regime would not be able to provide it with direct financial aid. He reiterated that TCFA's latest actions are weakening the position of the T/Cs at the negotiation table. As mentioned earlier, *Eroğlu* lost the election to independent candidate *Mustafa Akinci*.

In early May, as TCFA was completing all preparations for its membership to CFA and conveyed its demand to FIFA, UBP's *Huseyin Ozgurgun*, announced the perfect solution that his party was supporting. He said that there is a CFA and there

³⁹⁵ PIO media review, No. 62/15, 3.4.15.

³⁹⁶ PIO media review, No. 64/15 07.04.15

is also a TCFA, the two being equal and if both were to participate to a common league with equal rights, his party would not have any objections.³⁹⁷ Put in simple terms; there should be a bi-zonal system with two football federations of equal status, which would establish a joint federation and attend a joint league. At that same point in time, the Ambassador of France to Nicosia was paying a visit to TCFA's offices where he met with *Sertoğlu*. After a friendly one-hour meeting, the French Ambassador wished *Sertoğlu* success to his efforts to unify Cypriot football.

The summer passed with few developments. In late July, TCFA pursued once more the unresolved issue of fee payments for T/C footballer transfers. He sent a letter to TFF's head *Demiroren* and placed FIFA's chairman *Sepp Blatter* among the recipients, requesting FIFA's help.³⁹⁸ In early August, *Sertoğlu* announced that *Sepp Blatter's* resignation from FIFA's presidency would not affect the football reunification process in Cyprus.³⁹⁹ Later the in the same month TRNC's council of ministers approved TCFA's charter regarding the 'work, practices and principles' statute and *Sertoğlu* vowed to intensify discussions with the CFA.⁴⁰⁰ The new statute was in harmony with FIFA's and UEFA's criteria. TCFA's advisor and now former FIFA presidential candidate, *Jerome Champagne* would be visiting TRNC to hold a meeting with CFA's president. A meeting with FIFA's president also was outstanding, with the T/C side proposing the establishment of a Steering Committee to discuss the issue of how to establish a relationship with CFA. The Committee would comprise four T/C members, four G/C members and one FIFA representative. The obvious answer to these initiatives was simple, 'file an application to become a CFA member'.

On 22 September, during a meeting held with sports media representatives, *Sertoğlu* stated that the football reunification talks had reached a deadlock, as CFA's chairman informed him for the first time that TCFA could be accepted as a member, only on the presentation of documents certifying its 1955 membership.

³⁹⁷ PIO media review, No. 81/15, 05.05.15

³⁹⁸ PIO media review, No. 140/15, 28.07.15.

³⁹⁹ PIO media review, No. 148/15, 07.08.15. Blatter had resigned in mid-June 2015, plagued by scandals and US threats.

⁴⁰⁰ PIO media review, No. 158/15, 21.08.15.

Sertoğlu also spoke of a trip to the UK, to search UK's archives and find the required document.⁴⁰¹

Two days before the year's end, finally, referring to the progress achieved in the talks with CFA, *Sertoğlu* presented an *alibi* of his procrastinations. He stated that the most important obstacle was the difficulties that CFA's chairman was experiencing with the Church and his country's political party leaders who pressured him not to accept TCFA as a member.⁴⁰² Stating also that the football reunification process would not be intensified before February 2016 - when an extraordinary FIFA Presidential election would take place - *Sertoğlu* reminded that the two leaders of the island were aware of the process. That was the last development and silence has prevailed across the two sides to date. It appears, therefore, that this football initiative will take a long way to bear fruit if any. The Zurich agreement indeed opened a new chapter in the G/C-T/C relations but its impact on the actual reunification of football and an eventual solution to the Cyprus Problem remains obscure.

Some of the interviewees, in June 2016, provided explanations to the failure of the "Football Annan Plan". Both G/C Sports journalists believe that Turkey has the final say when it comes to the negotiations with the T/C community.

The T/Cs made some modifications to their statutes so that they could be within FIFA's institutional framework. They and their leadership want[ed] unification, but I think that Turkey's policy always intervenes at the end." (Sports journalist 1)

Yes, there is always a mood, but always at the crucial point Turkey always has the last say. That is, they consider soccer as one of the many pieces they want to control. They see it as something united in separate pieces. I was surprised that the T/Cs were so determined that they could reach an agreement, but as we have seen, it did not go even when *Akinci* was very determined. At the end of the day, only Turkey decides. (Sports journalist 2)

⁴⁰¹ PIO media review, No. 180/15, 22.9.15.

⁴⁰² PIO media review, No. 185/15, 29.12.15.

A G/C University Professor, a government sports official and a politician stated that if the political unification is not resolved the football unification will not move forward:

The suggestion that T/Cs should join the CFA was right but the discussion that was taking place at that time [2007-2009] was within a framework that some different approaches on the subject could not be avoided. But [even] now it is something that will not go on for many different reasons, especially because of the political dimension that does not allow football to unify and to move forward (Academician 1).

The truth is that at some point it seemed that there was enough political will to attain a football unification. Everything went smoothly until Turkey interfered again sending agents who were essentially instructed to stop the registration of TCFA with CFA. I find it hard to talk about the unification of Cypriot football before serious progress can be made in reaching a political solution. (Government sports official).

I have dealt with the matter. I consider it an important aspect of the whole effort of rapprochement of the two communities since the conditions and the history that have developed since 1974. It should be seen from the perspective of the more general solution to the Cyprus problem. Unfortunately, we cannot return to the pre-1974 status and football reunification will not occur without the solution of the Cyprus problem.” (Politician)

A G/C CFA official was positive towards football unification and stated that the failure was due to the delay of paperwork:

Mr. Sertoğlu is [was] more positive and there is [was] good communication with CFA's president. If TCFA becomes [became] our member, it will [would] be a very good agreement for Cypriot football. Under the auspices of CFA, TCFA will [would] be able to organize its own championship. However, we expected some documents to register them legally and this is [was] not affected by the departure of the FIFA and UEFA Presidents. We expect [ed] their application to become a CFA member but it never came.” (CFA official)

As TCFA's membership application never reached CFA's desk, the interviewed officials from the two associations provided their own dissimilar explanations.

CFA official statements:

It's a very old story. There is still confusion about the withdrawal of the T/C teams from the Cypriot championship in the 1950s. The blame was not solely on the shoulders of the G/Cs [who had asked the T/Cs to withdraw due to the G/C's armed struggle against

the British]. The T/Cs were looking for ways to show that the two communities could not live together. A good avenue to prove this was football, which they used as an excuse saying that “these bad guys the G/Cs do not want us in their federation” - an untrue allegation. I think they played a game with the 1955 document. But in a world where the circumstances have changed, it is both misleading and inappropriate to invoke upon the existence and purpose of an old document.” (CFA official)

The TCFA official blamed the G/C side for delaying the reunification process.

We don't have the missing document. There is no parameter in the provisional agreement asking for this document. And in the 1960 article it says that the organisation of the societies shall accept the football clubs as members. The person who signed the provisional agreement is the president of CFA. I could say that they are trying to delay this agreement in that sense. This [document] is a proof of our identity and they have to find it not us. (TCFA official)

Finally, the views of all interviewees on the theoretical contention that, in such cases, political reunification precedes that of sport converged, excluding those of the CFA and TCFA representatives. A sports editor considered football reunification at this stage as utopian and dangerous.

It will be utopian and dangerous to make plans to try to apply something on paper unless we have a solution to the political problem. The Cyprus problem must be solved, it is clear. (Sports editor).

Two sports journalists, a government sports official and a foreign ministry official conceived football reunification as a ‘regional’ (peripheral) issue.

Without the overall settlement of the [Cyprus] problem, there can be no [football] unification. It must first be solved politically and then it will open up all the regional issues. I think it will be political unification first and it offers unless a turn is made and a decision is made and committed to realizing that they signed (Sports journalist 1).

This is the logical order. Both sides have to retreat. The logical series is to solve the Cyprus problem and then the football and all the regional ones (Sports journalist 2).

There must be a political solution, otherwise it is not going to solve this particular problem but also all the other regional problems in the same philosophy (Government sports official).

The political unification will solve all the regional issues of Cyprus. Turkish Cypriot footballers have been told that they can get transcripts in any country they want if they have Cypriot identity (Foreign ministry official).

A university professor argued that football reunification might actually produce an opposite outcome, given the existing football cultures.

Ideally, I think it would be smoother to make political unification first... Will it [football reunification] act to unite or will it work to the contrary? Think of the differences of the fans who exist only in the Cypriot community that are known to each other and imagine what differences with the Turkish Cypriot fans..." (Academician 2).

The representatives of the two football associations were positive and categorical, especially the one from the T/C side.

I think it could set an example for politics. Football unites and it is definitely what makes the sport specific in the world but, especially in Cyprus, there would be a message for political unification." (CFA official).

If football can divide, then why cannot it unite? I think it depends [on] what people want. We have a big advantage because football has its own rules and regulations. The representation is an issue, but we have to look [at the] individual club and the national level. Three G/Cs came to play here even if they consider them traitors and everything was OK, as T/C players also play for CFA teams. In our side, we have people who accept the equality of all Cypriot people. We have to join CFA no matter what (TCFA official).

One month following these interviews, a suspicious *coup d'etat*, took place in Turkey. The coup looked like an act staged by amateurs but the Turkish President diligently grasped the opportunity to blame his former collaborator *Fethullah Gulen* who lives in the US. Almost immediately, to supposedly cleanse the Turkish state and society he ordered a massive wave of purges on domestic institutions and the people. The war in Syria also diverted global and regional attention on Cyprus' problems, with no further mention to football reunification by the T/C media thus far.

CHAPTER 7

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This final chapter summarises all the observable evidence around the football reunification problem in Cyprus, with a relevant discussion following. As already stated in this thesis, the problem cannot be fully appreciated, unless considered in the light of progress made in the communal negotiations for political reunification, and within an appropriate theoretical framework - which is applied for the first time in sport and politics research. Both the evidence and the discussion subsections begin with some essential points regarding the Cyprus Problem.

7.1. Summary of the evidence

Revisiting the Cyprus Problem, first, through secondary data analysis, the thesis advances the view that the Problem is an outcome not just of ethnic nationalism. Perhaps, more important has been the impact of institutional structures that parsimonious external actors designed and applied to serve their own interests. These structures date back to the time of the island's occupation by the Ottoman Empire. They commenced with the introduction of the *millet* system, continued with the imposition of a dysfunctional *consociational democracy* after the island's independence from Britain and its current geographic, ethnic and international political division into North and South. These same structures appear to also determine to a large extent the future of football reunification in the island, despite the positive signals sent to TRNC's leaders by the international system.

Given that both international institutions and powerful global actors were involved in the football reunification as well as the political unification in Cyprus, the thesis could not ignore the interconnection of the two problems, given that both involve the rapprochement of the two communities. The interconnection is evident in the pattern of media mentions to these problems (Figures 5.2 and 6.1 in chapters 5 and 6), indicating that T/C actors avoid pursuing one problem when the other is evolving.

On the theory front, the thesis set the issue of football reunification outside the subject of studies that deal with 'sport for peace' in divided societies - under SfPD programmes. In addition, compared to the scant literature on football reunification in Cyprus, the evidence gathered by the thesis leads to new dissimilar conclusions. Kartakoullis and Loizou, who examined FIFA's first initiative within a "socialization through sport" framework, attributed its failure to prejudice and ethnocentrism on the T/C side.⁴⁰³ As this thesis has documented, that negative outcome was due to the leader images, which the neoclassical realist model proposes. According to T/C leader *Mehmet Ali Talat's* image, football reunification was a 'foreign policy' problem whose solution was imminent with the forthcoming solution to the Cyprus Problem – that he was anticipating.

The thesis placed the problem in an appropriate IR theoretic framework fully substantiated and conducted, with the research following an also appropriate methodology. The evidence indicates in detail the uniqueness of this case compared to other cases researched in IR frameworks. It unveils the domestic and international dynamics around football reunification, through a testable hypothesis. The studies of the two Koreas rely on either *neo-liberalism* or *constructivism*, but not a synthesis of the two approaches. The authors of Kosovo's case, while applying a mixture of itemised components from various IR approaches, offer no signs of a testable hypothesis. The empirical evidence derives from studying the football reunification problem in a combined *neo-liberal/neoclassical realist* framework. It shows that, despite FIFA's initiatives to take TCFA and its clubs out of their international isolation, through an agreement requiring their membership in CFA, the T/C leaders never endorsed these initiatives. This negative 'foreign policy' outcome was a disappointment to both the TCFA and a segment of TRNC's political power structure - parties and civil society organisations – with progressive attitude. Judging from the interview statements of the CFA and TCFA officials, hope for a solution is not dead. It would set an example for politics as football can divide but also unite, but it remains to be seen if such an outcome would ever occur. Although this evidence is in line with findings of sports research indicating that

⁴⁰³ Kartakoullis, N. L. and Loizou, C. 2009, *op. cit.*

political reunification must precede that of football, it calls for a detailed discussion on the matter.

7.2. Discussion

A solution to the Cyprus Problem appears to be distant so long as the Turkish army remains on Cypriot soil, which is the reason why both G/Cs and T/Cs continue to follow non-converging securitised national policies. As shown in chapter 6, the latest UN initiative to solve Cyprus was abandoned by both sides when the issue of guarantees came to the negotiating table. That was the result, despite the fact that the T/C President was a liberally-minded negotiator. It is reasonable, therefore, to argue that so long as these conditions remain unchanged, Cyprus will also remain divided with TRNC internationally isolated.

From a theoretical point of view, seeing the Cyprus Problem through the lens of *neo-liberalism*, Cyprus exemplifies a case where international institutions have failed to produce a positive-sum game, with external power interests clashing over its geostrategic position, preventing a harmonious co-existence of its two communities. Thus far, after so many years of pain across the two communities, the neo-liberal paradigm has failed to convincingly answer to this problem – a clear sign of continued ‘anarchy’. All of the interviewed G/Cs conceded that Turkey can influence TRNC’s international politics. Their views can be summarised in the argument that *Akinci’s* decisions have been dictated by Turkey. However, it can be countered on the grounds that *Akinci* was himself taking into account TRNC’s national security issue.

Viewing the Cyprus Problem through the lens of *neoclassical realism*, the evidence originates from two grand events in Cyprus’ recent political history; the *Annan Plan* referendum in 2004, and the *Crans-Montana* communal talks in 2017. In 2004, hardliner President *Rauf Denktaş* had conceived the international system’s (UN and powerful global actors) mediation for a solution to the Cyprus Problem as a threat to his plans for an internationally recognised TRNC. However, domestic state power was so strong (as measured by the size of the ‘yes’ vote) that was able to ‘force’ him to accept the referendum and the accompanying solution it was

bringing along.⁴⁰⁴ Had the G/Cs voted in favour of the Plan, TRNC's foreign policy outcome would have indeed materialised. In 2017, although the progressive president *Mustafa Akinci* had accepted the international system's mediation and also had the support of the domestic state power, his rejection of the final plan was based on his image that it was a threat to TRNC's national policy, equivalent to a crisis.

Turning now to the Football Problem and starting with a dialectic argument, its solution within a pure *neo-liberal* framework appears unrealistic. It would imply that FIFA - as the international institution governing world football - could mediate effectively, locking the two sides into a *co-operative* and *collaborative* arrangement. That option would also imply that FIFA could shape TCFA's expectations and its appropriate behaviour, making also sure that it would actually be observed. Even international political institutions often fail to achieve similar arrangements. Furthermore, FIFA's charter does not foresee the locking two NGOs such as CFA and TCFA into a cooperative agreement. The charter gives this organisation power to decide only on specific football affairs, e.g. to discipline a member country for breaching the charter, to accept a country's membership or to select the venue of the World Cup Games.

FIFA could, of course - within a *neo-liberal* environment - boost TRNC's international image and IR prospects, by unilaterally deciding to admit TCFA as a full member - by granting it nationhood status, as it had done in the past with Palestine. As mentioned in chapter 6, CFA's head, the late *Costakis Koutsokoumnis*, was allegedly afraid of this option which might have been a hidden hope on the part of TCFA. However, as mentioned also in chapters 1 and 2, Palestine's football association had managed to enter FIFA five years after the Palestinian leaders signed the 1993 "Oslo Accord" in Washington DC that allowed them to represent their nation internationally. Kosovo too had received partial international recognition from a number of countries before it was admitted to the IOC. As the TRNC has been recognised only by Turkey and the UN consider it as an occupied region of Cyprus, the above option was not available to FIFA. TCFA's

⁴⁰⁴ The international system was also exerting pressure on him.

supporters, former FIFA official and TCFA advisor, *Jerome Champagne*, former member of the Catalanian parliament and former Barcelona FC president, *Joan Laporta*, and even Turkish Football Federation's head, *Yildirim Derminoren* had warned that FIFA would not change its policy. The Turkish President's positive statement towards the Zurich agreement appears to fall under those cases that IR researchers should bear in mind. That is, in international politics, some actors' behaviour may be characterised by an incentive to bluff or deceive the opponent, which makes IR issues so complex with the phenomena that follow them ending to be *sui generis* and intricate. Obviously enough, Turkey's negative stance stems from its anxiety over its future within the European Union and its final role in the hydrocarbons game played in the Eastern Mediterranean. Finally, in a loose form, the neo-liberal concept of *soft power* may have some relevance in this case. Indeed, unlike hard power, football is a cultural resource that may affect IR between two rivals. Examined, however, strictly within *Joseph Nye's* frame, i.e. as something that a country processes and others try to imitate, the concept is not relevant. The T/Cs love football anyway, but their problem is institutional.

The neoclassical realist model cannot explain the Football Problem unless merged with the neo-liberal approach. As developed in chapter 2, searching for a 'foreign policy outcome', i.e., a T/C leader decision approving the details of FIFA's initiatives for football reunification in Cyprus, the first research question was "how interpretive can the proposed synthesis of *neoliberal* and *neoclassical realist* ideas be as regards both that policy outcome and the role of the intervening variables". The combined *neo-liberal/neoclassical realist* model sheds ample light into Cyprus' football reunification problem, which began with the international system sending the signal for an end to TCFA's international isolation. The signal came through FIFA's invitation and the subsequent signing of a provisional agreement between the G/C and T/C football associations. In this case, the international system remains 'anarchic', not from the neoclassical realist perspective, but from the neo-liberal view point, which accepts anarchy but counters that international institutions and powerful global actors can help states follow cooperative behaviours. FIFA's signal (second phase) appears to have been applauded by such great powers as the US and France, whose ambassadors expressed their support to TCFA for its

positive posture on the matter. These countries have geostrategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean (extraction of hydrocarbons) that a possible football reunification could facilitate by speeding-up political reunification. The provisional agreement called for TCFA's entrance to world football via its membership of CFA. This was an opportunity which TRNC's leader had obligation to decipher and assess. According to the neoclassical realist theory, the leader's (foreign policy executive's, FPE's) own traits are crucial in determining a foreign policy outcome. These traits include beliefs about politics, images of the enemy, best strategies to serve their country's interests, as well as unwillingness to accept even temporary losses in their state's relative power, status, or prestige. Before making a final decision, the leader would also need to evaluate the *extractive capacity* of TRNC's domestic state power – in this case the ability of political parties and civil society organisations to influence his image of the opportunity. He also needed to assess his *resource mobilisation capacity* vis-à-vis domestic state power. Who were the key members in TRNC's FPE, what were their political and other philosophies and how intense was domestic state power?

7.2.1. Leader images

During the first phase/initiative (2007-2009) the FPE was comprised of President *Mehmet Ali Talat* and his spokesperson, Prime Minister *Ferdi Sabit Soyer* and Foreign Minister *Turgay Avci*. President *Talat* was a progressively minded individual, member of the also progressive Republican Turkish Party, CTP. He had fully supported the *Annan Plan* and had served as TRNC's prime minister before his election as president. However, although his image of the provisional football agreement was as something that he could endorse, he rejected the opportunity based on his idea of a forthcoming 'global' solution – a solution to the Cyprus Problem - that would include the football reunification theme as well.⁴⁰⁵ His philosophy and vision had an impact on the attitude of Prime Minister *Ferdi Sabit*

⁴⁰⁵ The TCFA official's interview statement was that *Talat* had told them to wait as he was anticipating a 'global' solution. In his own statement to the press after Turkish President Erdogan's positive remarks on the provisional agreement, *Talat* argued that this time the regime should be supportive of the Zurich agreement.

Soyer, who was a comrade and CTP's head, but running a coalitional government with National Unity Party, UBP, that was against any reunification. Foreign minister *Turgay Avci*, another conservative political elite, had been elected as MP with the National Unity Party in the 2003 and 2005 general elections. This FPE advised TCFA to accept the proposed agreement on such conditions that FIFA would reject. When this occurred, *Talat* himself declared that TCFA could not be a 'patch' to CFA, as T/C institutions could not be placed under G/C institutions. For *Talat*, therefore, this opportunity was an essential threat to TRNC's national policy and accepting it when his anticipation was a forthcoming overall solution to the Cyprus Problem would be an act that would breed a national crisis.

During the second phase (2013-2015), beyond FIFA and UEFA, the international system included more actors - UN Secretary's special envoy on Cyprus, the US and French Ambassadors, a globally known European football club's former head, the Turkish Football Federation as well as the Turkish President. TRNC's FPE comprised the new President *Dervis Eroğlu* and his spokesperson, Prime Minister *Ozkan Yorgancıoğlu* and Deputy Prime Minister *Serdar Denktaş*. President *Eroğlu* was an extreme hard-liner politician, member of the conservative National Unity Party, UBP, staunch advocate of T/C close ties with Turkey and proponent of a two separate independent states solution for Cyprus. *Serdar Denktaş*, an ex-UBP member and head of the Democratic Party, DP, was the son of the first ever extreme hard-liner in the T/C community's political history – *Rauf Denktaş*, the head of EOKA's rival organisation TMT and the person who masterminded the declaration of TRNC's independence. *Serdar Denktaş* shared the same values with President *Eroğlu*. On the opposite side, Prime Minister *Ozkan Yorgancıoğlu* was a progressive political figure, originating from the Republican Turkish Party, CTP. However, leading a coalitional government with extremist *Serdar Denktaş* under an also extremist *Eroğlu*'s presidency, he was in an inferior position compared to his predecessor, *Ferdi Sabit Soyer*. Therefore, he did not have the needed power to influence the final posture of his country's FPE. Characterized by the same philosophy and values, *Eroğlu* and *Denktaş* made clear to all interested parties, from the very beginning, that "sport and politics do mix" and that the proposed football unification agreement was a clear threat to TRNC's national policy. Prime

Minister *Yorgancıoğlu* countered that he did not believe TCFA's managers would do anything wrong for their country as their sole aim was to end the international isolation of T/C football. This split of opinion between the members of the FPE was the single notable difference compared to what had transpired during the previous phase (2008-2009). FPE's most outspoken member was *Denktaş* with six public proclamations, followed by *Eroğlu* and *Yorgancıoğlu*, with five and three public announcements respectively. Further to uttering his objections to the football agreement, *Denktaş* travelled to Turkey to draw support.

This evidence brings another dimension to the *neoclassical realist* perspective in which the strategic environment's qualitative elements, *permissiveness* or *restrictiveness*, depend on how imminent and intense the threats and opportunities are. An imminent threat, e.g. national security, is restrictive and also requires the use of material resources. The opposite holds in a permissive strategic environment where the threat is not imminent-intense and domestic political circumstances, ideology and ideas that have priority over material resources. In the Cyprus case this culture-based opportunity emerged as a national security issue not requiring the use of material resources.

7.2.2. Domestic state power

The fractured distribution of power among political parties in TRNC did not allow reformist parties to exert any impact on the leader's images so that football reunification could begin. During the first phase of football's reunification opportunity (2008-2009), there was no recorded reaction on the side of political parties, whether conservative or progressive. This might have been because both the presidency and the coalitional government were in the hands of the social democracy oriented Republican Turkish Party, CTP. During the second phase (2013-2015), all political parties became engaged in the discourse on football's reunification. A simple count of public statements for or against the football agreement by political party representatives yielded: UBP (4 against), DP (4 against), TDP (4 in favour), CTP (3 in favour), BKP (3 in favour). Of these parties, only three portrayed appreciable popular representation based on the parliamentary seats won in the 2013 general election. As shown in Table 5.1

(chapter 5), UBP, DP and CTP, held 47 of the parliament's 50 seats, with BKP not represented at all. The three parties kept a delicate balance, as any pair of them could collude to form a new government.

The parties' positions did not differ from the positions of their members in the FPE. UBP set the conservatives' offensive line of argument according to which football would become a "role model" for the solution to the Cyprus Problem, with the T/Cs having no options at the negotiating table. TCFA's subjection to the CFA could harm such values as sovereignty, property and citizenship. The reformists' line of defence in support of the agreement was that the case ought to be examined seriously, taking into account the problems T/C football was facing with no intention on behalf of TCFA to do any harm. In the neoclassical realist model for Cyprus, the components 'dominant ideologies' and 'degrees of nationalism' of the intervening variable *strategic culture* were merged and treated as attributes of TRNC's political parties and civil society. As seen, the conservative parties' dominant ideology and nationalism for a separate T/C independent state in Cyprus, that prevailed drawing from TRNC's electorate, were in support of the leader images.

Civil society's extractive capacity appeared as a skimpy one. During the first phase (2008-2009) only KTÖS dashed to manifest its support to the Zurich agreement with two public announcements. During the second phase (2013-2015), except some professional NGOs engaged in sports affairs – the T/C football clubs, football trainers' and sports writers associations – only KTÖS and the Businessmen's association stood in support of the football agreement. That was an unfortunate performance on the part of civil society organisations. KTAMS, the influential civil servants' union and KTTO, the T/C Chamber of Commerce (an internationally recognised NGO) were entirely invisible. The 41 NGOs of the platform "this land is ours" that had supported KTÖS when *Rauf Denktaş* arrested its members and confiscated their office equipment had also disappeared. TCFA itself as the NGO with prime interest on the agreement retreated with excuses and defensive attacks against the CFA.

These observations bring up the issue concerning the direction of influence in the leader-domestic state power relationship. As seen in chapter 2, according to the

neoclassical realist view, the leader images always prevail over those of the other intervening variables (in this case political parties and civil society organisations) in crisis situations. It is obvious, based on the evidence, that T/C leaders treated football reunification as a national threat. They were able to set the course of developments for, as mentioned in chapter 5, the T/C leader acts as a chief negotiator on behalf of the T/Cs in international affairs, such as the UN-brokered talks for the solution of the Cyprus Problem. This follows from a political tradition developed in Northern Cyprus since the 1970s.

This takes us to the second research question this thesis posed. Success or failure of the two communities to reunite symbolically in football would determine whether political reunification, as the only viable alternative, should actually follow or precede that of football. The answer to that question is obvious, as the evidence shows that football reunification under FIFA's auspices failed to materialize in two consecutive attempts. Although the representatives of the two associations were optimistic on the success of some opportunity in the future, siding with the contrary evidence advanced by sport and politics research, all remaining interviewees were doubtful. The prospects for a future communal agreement in football appear rather dim. Unfortunately, TRNC's society is standing at the crossroads of huge geostrategic interests, while also facing the threat of losing its secular identity, as more Turkish settlers continue to arrive to Northern Cyprus from the mainland. The emergence of two new political parties in the 2018 national elections that won a considerable segment of the electorate - the HP with main supporters being those migrants and the far right extreme nationalist party YDP - signifies the beginning of a new phase in TRNC's international politics. In this phase, domestic state power will have an even weaker positive impact on the leader's image as regards the rapprochement among the island's two communities in both the political and the football fronts.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Barash, D. 1994. *Beloved Enemies: Our Need for Opponents*. NY: Prometheus Books, 89.
- Baylis, J., Smith, S. and Owens, P. 2011. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bloom, W. 1993. *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boatswain, T. 2005. *A traveller's history of Cyprus*. Northampton: Interlink Books.
- Bryman, A. 2012. *Social research methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bull, H. 2012. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Carr, E. H. 1946. *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. London: Macmillan.
- Cashman, R. 2002. *National Imagination: Australian Sport in the Federation Decades*, Sydney: Walla Walla Press.
- Coufoudakis, V. 1976. *Essays on the Cyprus conflict*. New York: Pella Publishing Co.
- Creswell, J. W. 2013. *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches*. London: Sage.
- Dağlı, O. 2015. *Together in Football: Turkish-Cypriot Footballers in Greek-Cypriot Teams*. Limassol, Cyprus: Heterotopia Publishers.
- Denzin, N. K. 2017. *The research act: A theoretical introduction to sociological methods*. London: Routledge.
- Dodd, C. 2010. *The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Elman, C. and Jensen, M. A. 2014. *The Realism Reader*. London: Routledge.

- Flick, U. 2009. *An introduction to qualitative research*. London: Sage.
- Hargreaves, J. 2000. *Freedom for Catalonia: Catalan nationalism, Spanish identity and the Barcelona Olympic Games*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Harrison, L. 2001. *Political Research: An Introduction*. London: Routledge
- Holland, R. 1998. *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Houlihan, B. 1994. *Sport and International Politics*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Ioannou, G. and Sonan, S. 2017. Trade unions and politics in Cyprus: a historical comparative analysis across the dividing line *Mediterranean Politics*, 22:4, 484-503.
- Isachenko, D. 2012. *The Making of Informal States: State-building in Northern Cyprus and Transdnestrria*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jackson, R. and Sorensen, G. 2007. *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Keohane, R. O. 1984. *After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Keohane, R. O. and Nye Jr., J. S. 1973. *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Kozinets, R. V. 2010. *Netnography: Doing ethnographic research online*. London: Sage.
- Krippendorff, K. 2012. *Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology*, London: Sage.
- Kurki, M. 2008. *Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kyris, G. 2015. *The Europeanisation of Contested Statehood: The EU in Northern Cyprus*. London: Routledge.

- Landsford, T. (ed). 2017. *Political Handbook of the World 2016-2017*. London: Sage.
- Lane, P. 2013. *French Scientific and Cultural Diplomacy*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
- Lansford, T. (ed.). 2015. *Political handbook of the World 2015*. New York: CQ Press.
- Lansford, T. (ed.) 2017. *Political handbook of the World 2016-2017*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Lee, R. M. 2000. *Unobtrusive Methods in Social Research*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Levermore, R. and Budd, A. (eds.) 2004. *Sport and International Relations: An Emerging Relationship*. London: Routledge.
- Lowe, B, Kanin, D B. and Strenk, A. (eds.) 1978. *Sport and International Relations*. Champaign, IL: Stipes Publishing Co.
- Mallinson, B. 2005. *Cyprus: A Modern History*. London: IB Tauris, 11.
- Meletiou, G.2011. *Cypriot football 1900-1960*. Nicosia: Power Publishing (in Greek).
- Michael, M. S. 2009. *Resolving the Cyprus conflict: Negotiating history*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Morelli V. 2016. Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive, Congressional Research Service, Report 7-5700, Washington DC. Available online at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41136.pdf>. [Accessed 15 May 2015].
- Morgenthau, H. 1948. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Knopf.
- Murray, R. W. (ed.) 2015. *System, society and the world: Exploring the English School of international relations*. Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing.
- Nye Jr., J. S. 2011. *The Future of Power*. New York: Public Affairs
- Papadakis, Y. 2005. *Echoes from the dead zone: Across the Cyprus divide*. London: I.B. Tauris.

- Patton, M. Q. 2002. *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Paul, T. V., Welch Larson, D. and Wohlforth, W. C. 2014. *Status in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pegg, S. 1998. *International Society and the de Facto State*. London: Ashgate Publishing.
- Peristianis, N., Kapardis, A., Loizou, C. Fakiolas, N., Puluskas. S. 2002. *Football violence in Cyprus*. Nicosia: Research Promotion Foundation.
- R. K. 2009. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. London: Sage
- Rappas, A. 2014. *Cyprus in the 1930s: British Colonial Rule and the Roots of the Cyprus Conflict*, London: I.B. Tauris.
- Ripsman, N. M., Taliaferro, J. W. and Lobell, S. E. 2016. *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ritchie, J., Lewis, J., Nicholls, C. M., Ormston, R. (eds.). 2013. *Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science students and researchers*. London: Sage.
- Ronen, Y. 2011. *Transition from Illegal Regimes Under International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rourke, J. T. 2004. *International Politics on the World Stage*. Boston: McGraw Hill.
- Schweller, R. L. 2006. *Political Constraints on the Balance of Power*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Simon, M. K. 2011. *Dissertation and scholarly research: Recipes for success*. Seattle, WA: Dissertation Success, LLC.
- Sprinz D. F. and Wolinsky-Nahmias Y. (eds.) *Cases, Numbers, Models: International Relations Research Methods*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Stake, R. E. 1995. *The art of case study research*. London: Sage.

Sugden, J. and Bairner, A. (eds.) 1999. *Sport in Divided Societies*. Aachen: Meyer and Meyer.

Waltz, K. N. 2001. *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Waltz, K. N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*, Boston: McGraw-Hill.

Webb, E. J., Campbell, D. T., Schwartz, R. D., Sechrest, L. 1966. *Unobtrusive measures: Nonreactive research in the social sciences*. Oxford, England: Rand McNally.

Yakinthou, C. 2009. *Political Settlements in Divided Societies*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 22.

Yin, R. K. 2003. *Case study research: Design and methods*. London: Sage

Yin, R. K. 2012. *Applications of Case Study Research*. London: Sage

Journal articles/book chapters/working papers/conference papers

Adler E. 2013. Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, contributions and debates. In: Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T. and Simons, B. A. (eds.) *Handbook of International Relations*, London: Sage.

Allison, L. and Monnington, T. 2005. Sport, prestige and international relations. In: Allison, L. (ed.), *The Global Politics of Sport*. London: Routledge, 5–25.

An, A. D. 2008. The first Turkish Cypriot football clubs, intercommunal football matches, multiethnic football teams and Chetinkaya (1902-1955). Paper presented at the 4th International Cyprological Congress, Nicosia, 29 April-3 May, available online at:

[http://www.ahdr.info/ckfinder/userfiles/files/Football%20Clubs_Cavit_An\(1\).pdf](http://www.ahdr.info/ckfinder/userfiles/files/Football%20Clubs_Cavit_An(1).pdf)

Armstrong, G. 2007. The global footballer and the local war-zone: George Weah and transnational networks in Liberia. *Global Networks* 7(2), 230–247.

Bahcheli, T. 2004. Under Turkey's wings: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the struggle for international acceptance. In: Tozun Bahcheli, Barry

Bartmann and Henry Srebrnik (eds.) *De Facto States: The quest for sovereignty*. London: Routledge.

Bairner, A. 2002. Sport, sectarianism and society in a divided Ireland revisited. In Sugden, J. and Tomlinson, A. (eds.), *Power games: a critical sociology of sport*. London : Routledge.

Bairner, A. 2008. Sport, Nationalism and Globalization: Relevance, Impact, Consequences. *Hitotsubashi Journal of Arts and Sciences* 49, 43-53.

Bairner, A. 2009. National sports and national landscapes: In defence of primordialism. *National Identities* 11(3), 223-239.

Bairner, A. 2013. Sport, the Northern Ireland peace process, and the politics of identity. *Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research* 5(4), 220-229

Bairner, A. 2015. Assessing the sociology of sport: On national identity and nationalism. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport* 50(4-5), 375-379.

Barnett, M. and Duvall, R. 2005. Power in International Politics. *International Organization* 59(1), 39-75.

Baxter, P., and Jack, S. 2008. Qualitative case study methodology: Study design and implementation for novice researchers. *The Qualitative Report* 13(4), 544-559.

Beck, P. J. 2013. 'War Minus the Shooting': George Orwell on International Sport and the Olympics. *Sport in History* 33(1), 72-94.

Benghida, S. 2014. World Cup Football in International Relations: The 2009 Algerian-Egyptian football conflict. *International Journal of Innovation and Applied Studies* 9(1), 234-238, 237.

Bennet, A. 2004. Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantages. In: Sprinz D. F. and Wolinsky-Nahmias Y. (eds.) *Cases, Numbers, Models: International Relations Research Methods*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Bennett, A., and Elman, C. 2006. Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Study Methods. *Annual Review of Political Science* 9, 455-476; Mahoney, J., and Goertz, G. 2006. A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research Political Analysis (Summer 2006) 14 (3): 227-249.

- Bennett, A., and Elman, C. 2007. Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield. *Comparative Political Studies* 40(2), 170-195.
- Berg, B. K., Kessler, S. E. and Hunt, T. M., 2012. A realist perspective of sport and international relations: US government perceptions of the Olympic boycott movements, 1936-2008. *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics* 4(3), 1-14.
- Biswas A. R., 2010. The Cyprus Issue: Reflection on TRNC. *The Arts Faculty Journal*, July, 139-146;
- Bouris, D. and Kyris, G. 2017. Europeanisation, Sovereignty and Contested States: The EU in northern Cyprus and Palestine. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 19(4), 755–771.
- Bryman, A. 2008. The end of the paradigm wars. In: Alasuutari, P., Bickman, L., Brannen, J. (eds.) *The Sage Handbook of Social Research Methods*. London: Sage, 13-25.
- Burgess, M. 2007. 'What is to be done? Bicomunalism, federation and confederation in Cyprus'. In: Michael Burgess and John Pinder (eds.), *Multinational Federations*. London: Routledge, 130.
- Byrne S. 2000. Power politics as usual in Cyprus and Northern Ireland: Divided islands and the roles of external ethno-guarantors. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 6(1), 1-23.
- Cable V. 1969. The 'Football War' and the Central American Common Market. *International Affairs* 45(4), 658-671.
- Chehabi, H. E. 2001. Sport Diplomacy between the United States and Iran. *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 12(1), 89-106.
- Chigas, D. 2015. The Harvard Study Group of Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfulfilled Peace Process". In: Lund, M. and McDonald, S. (eds.), *Across the Lines of Conflict: Facilitating Cooperation to Build Peace*. NY: Columbia University Press, 231-280.

- Cooley, A. and Mitchell, L. A. 2010. Engagement without Recognition: A New Strategy toward Abkhazia and Eurasia's Unrecognized States. *The Washington Quarterly* 33(4), 59-73.
- Cooley, L. 2018. The governance of sport in deeply divided societies: Actors and institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus and Northern Ireland. *In: Rofe, J.S. and Dichter, H.L. (eds.) Sport and Diplomacy: Games within Games*, Manchester: Manchester University Press (forthcoming).
- Creswell, J. W., and Miller, D. L. 2000. Determining validity in qualitative inquiry. *Theory into practice* 39(3), 124-130.
- Damion, T. 2011. Around the world: problematizing the Harlem Globetrotters as cold war warriors. *Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics* 14(6), 778-791.
- Denktash R. 1999. The Crux of the Cyprus Problem. *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, 4(3). Available online at: <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/RaufDenktas.pdf> [accessed 17 May 2015].
- Drath, V. 2004. The Cyprus referendum: an Island divided by mutual distrust. *American foreign policy interests*, 26, 341–352.
- Dunne T., Hansen, L. and Wight, C. 2013. The end of IR theory? *European Journal of International Relations* 19(3), 405-425.
- Florea, A. 2014. De facto States in International Politics (1945-2011): A New Data Set. *International Interactions* 40, 788–811.
- Flynn, M. K., and King, T. 2012. Deadlock and (mis) trust in Cyprus. *Peace Review* 24(4), 421-429.
- García, B. and Meier, H. E. 2016. Global Sport Power Europe? The Efficacy of the European Union in Global Sport Regulation”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12512.
- Gardenas, A. 2013. Peace Building Through Sport? An Introduction to Sport for Development and Peace. *Journal of Conflictology* 4(1), 24-33.
- Geeraert, A. 2015. Football is war: the EU's limits and opportunities to control FIFA. *Global Affairs* 1(2), 139-147.

- Georgiou G. C. 2009. Cyprus: Economic Consequences of Reunification. *Mediterranean Quarterly*. 20(3), 51-62.
- Giulianotti, R., Collison, H., Darnell, S. and Howe, D. 2017. Contested states and the politics of sport: the case of Kosovo – division, development, and recognition. *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics* 9(1), 121-136, 122.
- Gokcekus O. 2009. A Novel Approach in Calculating the Costs of Economic Isolation. *SosyalBilimlerDergisi/ Journal of Social Sciences* [online]. http://works.bepress.com/omer_gokcekus/2 [Accessed 15 April 2013].
- Golafshani, N. 2003. Understanding reliability and validity in qualitative research. *The Qualitative Report* 8(4), 597-606.
- Goldman, M. H. 2016. Turkey, Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Oxford Centre for the Study of Law & Public Policy, Research Paper No. 15-8. Available online at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2781735 [Accessed 17 May 2018].
- Grix, J. and Brannagan, P. M., 2016. Of Mechanisms and Myths: Conceptualising States' "Soft Power" Strategies through Sports Mega-Events. *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 27(2), 251-272.
- Grix, J. and Houlihan, B., 2014. Sports Mega-Events as Part of a Nation's Soft Power Strategy: The Cases of Germany (2006) and the UK (2012). *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 16, 572-596.
- Grix, J., Brannagan, P.M. and Houlihan, B., 2015. Interrogating States' Soft Power Strategies: A Case Study of Sports Mega-Events in Brazil and the UK. *Global Society* 29(3), 463-479.
- Grix, J. and Lee, D., 2013. Soft Power, Sports Mega-Events and Emerging States: The Lure of the Politics of Attraction. *Global Society* 27(4), 521–536.
- Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, M. 1993. Unofficial Intercommunal Contacts and their Contribution to Peace-Building in Conflict Societies: The Case of Cyprus. *The Cyprus Review* 5(2), 68-87.
- Hall, T. 2010. An Unclear Attraction: A Critical Examination of Soft Power as an

Analytical Category. *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3, 189-211, 208.

Hannay, L. 2005. Cyprus: not yet a problem solved. In: Lake, M. (ed.) *The EU and Turkey: A Glittering Prize or a Millstone*, London: Federal Trust for Education Research, 165-170.

Harrison, J., MacGibbon, L., Morton, M. 2001. Regimes of trustworthiness in qualitative research: The rigors of reciprocity. *Qualitative inquiry* 7(3), 323-345.

Hartley, J. 2004. Case Study Research. Essential guide to qualitative methods in organizational research". In: Cassell, Catherine and Symon, Gillian eds. *Essential Guide to Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research*. London: Sage.

Heraclides, A. 2011. The Cyprus Gordian Knot: An Intractable Ethnic Conflict *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 17(2), 17-139.

Hough, P. 2008. Make Goals Not War: The Contribution of International Football to World Peace, *International Journal of the History of Sport* 25(10), 1287-1305.

Hyde, S. D. 2010. The Future of Field Experiments in International Relations. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 628, 72-84.

Jackson P. T. 2004. Bridging the Gap: Toward A Realist-Constructivist Dialogue. *International Studies Review* 6, 337-352.

Joseph S. J. 2009. Cyprus: Domestic Ethnopolitical Conflict and International Politics. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 15(3-4), 376-397.

Kacowicz, A. M. 2007. Case Study Methods in International Security Studies. In: Sprinz, D. F. and Wolinsky-Nahmias, Y. (eds.) *Cases, Numbers, Models: International Relations Research Methods*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 4th edn.).

Kalpakistan, J. and Ipek, V. 2011. The Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement Processes: A Case Study Approach. *Digest of Middle East Studies* 20(2), 291–321. Available online at: <http://baltvilks.livejournal.com/106450.html> [Accessed 18 November 2013].

Kanol, D. 2010. Civil Society's Role in Peace-Building: Relevance of the Cypriot Case. *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 9(1), 26-45.

Kanol, D. and Köprülü, N. 2017. Quality of democracy in unrecognized states: lessons from Northern Cyprus. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 17(3), 389-402.

Kasim, K. and Kasim E. R. 2017. Taiwan-Cyprus-Kosovo Cases: Differences and Similarities. *Yönetim Bilimleri Dergisi/Journal of Administrative Sciences* 15(30), 553-572. Available online at: <http://ybd.dergi.comu.edu.tr/dosyalar/Ybd/taiwan-cyprus-kosovo-cases-differences-and-similarities.pdf> [Accessed 17 May 2018].

Kartakoullis N. L, Kriemadis, T., Pouloukas S. 2009. Cyprus: a football crazy nation? *Soccer & Society* 10(2), 226-244.

Kartakoullis N. L. and Loizou C. 2009. Is Sport (Football) a Unifying Force or a Vehicle to Further Separation? The Case of Cyprus. *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 26(11), 1652-1667.

Kartakoullis N., Pouliopoulos T., and Loizou C. 2017. CYPRUS: A Small Island County Full of History and Passion for Sport". In: Laine, A., and Vehmas, H. (eds.) *The Private Sports Sector in Europe: A Cross-National Comparative Perspective*. Springer for Science.

Karyos, A. 2016. "The Acceleration of History and Decolonization in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Case of Cyprus, 1945-1959". In: *Acceleration of History: War, Conflicts and Politics*. Lexington Books, Lanham, MD, pp. 113-132

Kassimeris, C., and Xinaris, C. 2018. Politics and identity in European football: Cyprus in comparative context. In: Dolan P. and Connolly J. (eds.) *Sport and National Identities: Globalization and Conflict*. London: Routledge.

Ker-Lindsay, J. 2015. Engagement without recognition: the limits of diplomatic interaction with contested states. *International Affairs* 91(2), 267–285.

Keser U. 2013. Bloody Christmas of 1963 in Cyprus in the Light of American Documents", *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi Journal of Modern Turkish History Studies* XIII/2 (Spring), 249-271. Available online at: <http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/235745> [Accessed 15 May 2015].

Kohlbacher, F. 2006. The use of qualitative content analysis in case study research. In *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social*

Research 7(1). Available online at: <http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/75/154> [Accessed 15 March 2014].

Köprülü N. and Duba G. U. 2017. Rethinking National Identities in Divided Societies of Post-Ottoman Lands: Lessons from Lebanon and Cyprus. *European Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies* 4(2), 113-127.

Koyuncu, M. and Balikyoglu, E. 2016. The importance of organizing activities of the Turkish Cypriot Community in the process of becoming a state (1957-1960). *Journal of Human Sciences* 13(3), 4278-4290.

Krasniqi, G. 2018. Contested territories, liminal polities, performative citizenship: A comparative analysis. EUI Working Papers, ARCAS 13. Available online at: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/52225/RSCAS_2018_13.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [Accessed 18 May 2018].

Kyris, G. 2011. Turkey, Cyprus and the Turkish-Cypriot Political Parties: The Ephemeral Catalyst of EU? *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 10(2), 97-105. Available online at: <http://www.turkishpolicy.com/dosyalar/files/george%20kyris.pdf>. [Accessed 18 April 2015].

Kyris, G. 2013. Europeanization beyond Contested Statehood: The European Union and Turkish-Cypriot Civil Society. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 51(5), 866-883.

Lamont, M., and Swidler, A. 2014. Methodological pluralism and the possibilities and limits of interviewing, *Qualitative sociology* 37(2), 153-171.

Lekakis, N. 2015. Can football loosen the 'Gordian Knot' in Cyprus? *International Journal of Sports Policy and Politics* 7(2), 255-282.

Mamali, B. 2008. Presidential System and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (T.R.N.C). *Ankarabar Review*. 2, 34-39. Available online at: <http://www.ankarabaru.org.tr/siteler/AnkaraBarReview/tekmakale/2008-2/5.pdf>. [Accessed 2 July 2016].

Manzenreiter, W., 2008. Football diplomacy, post-colonialism and Japan's quest for normal state Status. *Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics* 1(4), 414-428.

- Manzenreiter, W., 2010. The Beijing Games in the Western Imagination of China: The Weak Power of Soft Power. *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* 34(1), 29-48.
- Meier, H. E. and García, B. 2015. Protecting Private Transnational Authority Against Public Intervention: FIFA's Power Over National Governments', *Public Administration* 9(4), 890-906.
- Menary, S. 2010. Football and the Cyprus conflict. *Soccer & Society* 11(3), 253-260.
- Menary, S. 2012. *Outcasts! The Lands That FIFA Forgot*. Brighton, UK: Pitch Publishing.
- Merkel U. 2009. Sport, Politics and Reunification – A Comparative Analysis of Korea and Germany. *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 26(3), 406-428.
- Merkel, U. 2008. The Politics of Sport Diplomacy and Reunification in Divided Korea, One Nation Two Countries and Three Flags. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport* 43(3), 289-311.
- Moravcsik, A. 2003b. Theory Synthesis in International Relations: Real Not Metaphysical. *International Studies Review* 5, 131-136.
- Moravcsik, A. 2010. Active Citation: A Precondition for Replicable Qualitative Research. *Political Science and Politics* 43(1), 29-35. See also, Moravcsik, A. 2015. One Norm, Two Standards: Realizing Transparency in Qualitative Political Science. Available online at: <https://thepoliticalmethodologist.com/2015/01/01/one-norm-two-standards-realizing-transparency-in-qualitative-political-science/>
- Moravcsik, A., 2003a. Liberal International Relations Theory: A Scientific Assessment. In: Elman, C. and Elman, M. F. (eds). *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 159-204.
- Murray, S. 2012. The two halves of sports diplomacy. *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 23, 576–592.
- Murray, S. 2013a. Moving Beyond the Ping-Pong Diplomacy in the Modern Diplomatic Environment. *Public Diplomacy Magazine*, Winter, 11-16.

- Murray, S. 2013b. Sports diplomacy in the Australian context: A case study of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *Sports Law eJournal*. Available online at: <http://epublications.bond.edu.au/slej/18> [accessed 14 February 2015].
- Nye Jr., J. S. 2008. Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, 94–109, 95).
- Özgür E., Köprülü N. & Reuchamps M. 2017. Drawing Cyprus: Power-sharing, identity and expectations among the next generation in Northern Cyprus”, *Mediterranean Politics*, DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2017.1404720 (p.2).
- Papaharalambous-Papamiltiades, M. 2014. Cyprus. In: Oboyle, I. and Bradbury, T. (eds.), *Sports Governance: International Case Studies*. London: Routledge, ch. 14.
- Pegg, S. 1998. De Facto States in the International System. Institute of International Relations. The University of British Columbia, Working Paper No. 21. Available online at: <http://www.liu.xplorex.com/sites/liu/files/Publications/webwp21.pdf> [Accessed 17 May 2018].
- Safakli, O. V., Hudaverdi, H., Ertanin, M. 2014. What about the financial sustainability of Turkish Cypriot football? *International Journal of Academic Research in Economics and Management Sciences* 3(2), 8-22.
- Sanders, B. 2016. An own goal in sport for development: Time to change the playing field. *Journal of Sport Development* 4(6), 1-5.
- Schulenkorf, N. 2010. Sport events and ethnic reconciliation: Attempting to create social change between Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim sportspeople in war-torn Sri Lanka. *International review for the sociology of sport* 45(3), 273-294.
- Seale, C. 1999. Quality in qualitative research. *Qualitative inquiry* 5(4), 465-478.
- Showkat, N. 2013. Cricket Diplomacy between India and Pakistan: A Case Study of Leading National Dailies of Both the Countries (The Hindu & Dawn). *Journal of Mass Communication Journalism* 3(1): <http://dx.doi.org/10.4172/2165-7912.1000142> .

- Sözen A. 2012. Heading Towards the Defining Moment in Cyprus: Public Opinion vs Realities on the Ground. *Insight Turkey*, 14(1), 109-129. Available online at:
http://www.academia.edu/1264495/Heading_Towards_the_Defining_Moment_in_Cyprus_Public_Opinion_vs_Realities_on_the_Ground [Accessed 18 April 2015].
- Sozen, A. 2002. The Role of the European Union as a Third Party in Resolution of external Conflicts: The Case of the Cyprus Problem. In: IACM 15th Annual Conference;
- Sözen, A. 2005. The Turkish Cypriot Legislative Election of February 2005: The Rise of CTP/BG. *South European Society & Politics* 10(3), 465-475.
- Sözen, A. 2009. The Turkish Cypriot Legislative Election of April 2009: Towards the 'Last Roll of the Dice' in the Cyprus Conflict? *South European Society and Politics* 14(3), 337-350.
- Stein A. 1982. Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World. *International Organization* 36(2), 299-324.
- Stelgias N. and Andreou, M. 2015. Turkish-Cypriots: Minority or co-owners? Different Approaches to the Political Status of the T/C community through the pages of local newspapers Alithia and Halkin Sesi". In: Prometheus Research Institute (ed.), *Social, Economic and Political History of Cyprus*. Nicosia: Prometheus Research Institute, in Greek, ch. 8.
- Stenbacka, C. 2001. Qualitative research requires quality concepts of its own. *Management decision* 39(7), 551-556.
- Stevenson T. B. and Aloug, A. K. 2008. Sports Diplomacy and Emergent Nationalism Football Links between the Two Yemens, 1970–1990. *Anthropology of the Middle East* 3(2), 1–19.
- Szwajdler, P. J. 2015. The Disciplinary Committee and the Ethics Committee: Main Judicial Bodies of FIFA. *Journal of Education, Health and Sport* 5(5), 510-515. Available online at:
<http://www.ojs.ukw.edu.pl/index.php/johs/article/view/2015%3B5%285%29%3A510-515>.

- Talmon, S. 2001. The Cyprus Question before the European Court of Justice. *European Journal of International Law* 12 (4): 727–750.
- Taylor, T. 1986. Sport and international relations: A case of mutual neglect. In: Allison, L. *The Politics of Sport*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Thies C. G. 2002. A Pragmatic Guide to Qualitative Historical Analysis in the Study of International Relations. *International Studies Perspectives* 3, 351-372.
- Tomlinson, A. 2014. The supreme leader sails on: leadership, ethics and governance in FIFA. *Sport in Society* 17(9), 1155-1169.
- Trimikliniotis N. 2007. Reconciliation and Social Action in Cyprus: Citizens' Inertia and the Protracted State of Limbo. *The Cyprus Review* 19(1), 123-160.
- Türkmen, E. and Öktem, E. 2016. Major rulings of the European Court of Human Rights on Cyprus: the impact of politics, *Mediterranean Politics*, 22(2), 278-300.
- Van Tassell, D. H. and Terry, D. E. 2012. An overlooked path to peace and stability: sport, the state and the case of the Koreas. *Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics* 15(6), 814-822.
- Vasilara, M. and Piaton, G. 2007. The role of civil society in Cyprus. *The Cyprus Review* 19(2), 107-121.
- Volkan, V. 2008. Trauma, Identity and Search for a Solution in Cyprus. *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 10 No. 4, pp. 95-110. Available online at: http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight-turkey_vol_10_no_4_2008_volkan.pdf [Accessed 12 April 2015].
- Walt S. M. 1998. International Relations: One World, Many Theories. *Foreign Policy* 110, 29-32 & 34-46.
- Waltz, K. N. 2001. *Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Xenakis, D. and Lekakis, N. 2018. From *hasbara* to the Palestine-Israel Sport Conflict. *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 28(2), forthcoming.
- Yeong L. H. 2012. Turkey's boycott of the Cyprus EU presidency: Context, meaning and its consequences. EU Centre in Singapore, Working Paper No. 9,

September. Available online at: <http://aei.pitt.edu/39378/> [Accessed 18 April 2015].

Yilmaz M. E. 2010. Capturing the Complexity of the Cyprus Conflict. *Turkish Journal of Politics* 1(1), 1-27. Available online at: <http://tjp.fatih.edu.tr/docs/articles/66.pdf> [Accessed 30 October 2015].

Reports/Theses/newsletters

ACCD. 2005. 'Cultural Diplomacy: The Lynchpin of Public Diplomacy', Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy U.S. Department of State. Available online at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/54374.pdf> [Accessed 28 May 2016].

Aksit, S. 2013. July 2013 Parliamentary Elections in the TRNC: Still No Hope for a Thorough Change. Gediz University Newsletter. Available online at: https://www.academia.edu/4873633/July_2013_Parliamentary_Elections_in_the_TRNC_Still_No_Hope_for_a_Thorough_Change_ [Accessed 15 September 2016].

Charalambous P. 2013. Which form of integration is being discussed? Available online in Greek at: www.protathlima.com/content/league/story.jsp?league_id=1&id=137243 [Accessed 18 April 2013].

Cho, H. 2012. International sporting events, nationalism and sport diplomacy. Doctoral Thesis, Loughborough University, UK. Available from: <https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/dspace-jspui/handle/2134/12565>, [accessed 29 March 2015].

Cirakli, M. 2016. Identity, Immigration and Citizenship in Northern Cyprus. A thesis submitted to Lancaster University for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Available online at: <http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/87432/1/2016cirakliphd.pdf> [Accessed 12 March 2017].

Dedovic E. 2013. The Bosnian national football team: a case study in post-conflict institution building. Available online at:

<http://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/edin-dedovic/bosnian-national-football-team-case-study-in-post-conflict-instituti> [Accessed 25 October 2013].

Dorsey, J. M. 2015. Contours of future Israeli-Palestinian battles emerge on the soccer pitch. Available online at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-dorsey/contours-of-future-israel_b_6966574.html [accessed 30 March 2015].

Dorsey, J. M. 2015b. Soccer moulding in the Middle East and North Africa. RSIS working paper No. 286. Available online at: <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/WP286.pdf>. [Accessed 2 June 2016].

EC 2013. Commissioner Vassiliou welcomes the agreement reached on provisional arrangement for the organisation of football in Cyprus. Available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/cyprus/news/20131106_football_en.htm [Accessed 6 November 2013].

Freedom House. 2017. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/fiw-2017-table-country-scores> [Accessed 19 May 2018].

Gibson, O. 2015. Fifa's Sepp Blatter says 2018 World Cup in Russia will stabilise region. Available online at: <http://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/mar/20/fifa-sepp-blatter-2018-world-cup-russia-peace-region> [accessed 2 April 2015].

Gillespie, N., Georgiou, V. and Insay, S. 2011. Cyprus civil society: developing trust and cooperation. EC, International NGO Training and Research Center, Research Briefing Paper. Available online at: <https://www.intrac.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Research-Briefing-Paper-Cyprus-civil-society-developing-trust-and-cooperation.pdf> [Accessed 10 March 2015].

Grigoriadis, I. N. 2017. Cyprus Negotiations Thwarted by Issues on Security and Guarantees. How Can the Peace Process Be Revived? German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Available online at: https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2017C28_gri.pdf [Accessed 12 February 2018].

Gürel, A., Mullen, F. and Tzimitras, H. 2013. The Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions and Future Scenarios. Available online at:

www.prio.no/Global/upload/Cyprus/Publications/Hydrocarbons_Report-ENG.pdf
[Accessed 20 October 2013, p. 60].

High Court of Justice. 2009. Case No: CO/3512/2007. Available online at:
<http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sann2029/Judgment%20-%20Kibris%20Turk%20Hava%20Yollari%20v%20SS%20for%20Transport%20and%20The%20Republic%20of%20Cyprus.pdf> [Accessed 18 May 2018].

IBP. 2013. *Cyprus: Country Study Guide: Strategic Information and Developments*. Washington DC: International Business Publications.

KTTO. 2013. Turkish Cypriot civil society organisations demand urgent solution to the Cyprus problem. Available online at:
<http://www.ktto.net/newsletter/june201301.html> [Accessed 12 March 2016].

KTOS. 2001. Appeal for support. Available online at: <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51/360.html> [Accessed 12 April 2016]

Larkou L., 2013. The ball is now in Zurich. Available online in Greek at:
www.larkoslarkou.org.cy/FOOTBALL%20no%202.shtml [Accessed 18 April 2013].

Odell, J. S. 2004. *How to Negotiate Over Trade: A summary of new research for developing countries*. Available at SSRN 1803489.

UN Security Council “July 2014 Monthly Forecast”, Available online at:
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/cyprus/> [Accessed 2 July 2015].

UN Security Council “June 2011 Monthly Forecast” Available online at:
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/cyprus/> [Accessed 2 July 2015].

UN Security Council Special Research Report No. 3, “Cyprus: New Hope after 45 Years on the Security Council Agenda”, 4 September 2008. Available online at:
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/cyprus/> [Accessed 2 July 2015].

UN Security Council. 2007. June 2007 Monthly Forecast. Available online at:
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/cyprus/> [Accessed 2 July 2015].

UN Security Council. 2017. Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus. Available online at:

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2017_814.pdf [Accessed 24 March 2018].

UN. 2004. Cyprus misses 'historic chance' as it rejects UN reunification plan, Annan says. Available online at:

<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=10512&Cr=Cyprus&Cr1#.UUZBqEqN6So> [Accessed 25 October 2012].

Van Hook, L. 2007. Foreign Relations of the United States: Greece; Cyprus; Turkey; 1973-1976, Vol. XXX, Washington DC, US Government Printing Office.

PIO Turkish and T/C media reports

No. 75/06, 18.04.06

No. 63/07, 30.03.07

No. 05/09 09.01.2009

No. 206/12, 24.10.12

No. 26/14, 07.02.13

No. 210/13, 06.11.13

No. 211/13, 7.11.2013

No. 211/13, 7.11.2013

No. 216/13, 14.11.13

No. 219/13 19-20.11.13

No. 221/13, 22.11.13

No. 222/13 23-25.11.13

No. 223/13 26.11.13

No. 239/13, 18.12.13

No.07/14, 13.1.14

No 89/14, 16.5.14

No. 94/14, 23.5.14

No. 123/14, 4.7.14
No. 172/14, 15.9.14
No.177/14, 22.9.14
No 225/14, 2.12.14
No. 227/14, 4.12.14
No. 29/15, 12.2.15
No. 30/15, 13.2.15
No. 32/15, 17.2.15
No. 33/15, 18.2.15
No. 35/15, 20.2.15
No. 36/15, 21.2.15
No. 46/15 10.03.15
No. 48/15 12.03.15
No. 50/15, 14.3.15
No. 59/15, 30.03.15
No. 60/15 31.03.15
No. 61/15, 1.4.15
No. 62/15, 3.4.15
No. 64/15 07.04.15
No. 81/15, 05.05.15
No. 140/15, 28.07.15
No. 148/15, 07.08.15
No. 158/15, 21.08.15
No. 180/15, 22.9.15
No. 185/15, 29.12.15

Newspaper articles

Alithia, 2013. Eroglu not worried about football contacts. Available online in Greek at: <http://alithia.com.cy/index.php/koinonia/item/3968> [Accessed 18 April 2013].

Anadolu Agency. 2013. FIFA "has solution" to end Cypriot football crisis. Available online at: <http://www.aa.com.tr/en/sports/254968--fifa-quot-has-solution-quot-to-end-cypriot-football-crisis> [Accessed 23 November 2015].

Borden, S. and Montague, J. 2013. In FIFA Politics, Blatter Is the Consummate Player. Available online at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/02/sports/soccer/in-fifa-politics-blatter-is-the-consummate-player.html? r=0> [Accessed 24 October 2015].

Christou, J., 2014. Deal to reunite football on the island to be finalised by summer. Available online at: <https://cyprus-mail.com/tag/costakis-koutsokoumnis/> [Accessed 17 May 2018].

Frantzi K., 2013. Meeting between CFA and TCs. Available online in Greek at: www.sigmalive.com/simerini/sport%20time/cyprus/579783 [Accessed 22 October 2013].

Georgakopoulos G., 2012. Football unites Cyprus. Available online in Greek at: http://news.kathimerini.gr/4Dcgi/4dcgi/_w_articles_sport_2_22/12/2012_505900 [Accessed 19 April 2013].

Gürkan B., Belge N. 2013. People in football behind the solution. Available online at: <http://www.yeniduzen.com/Haberler/spor/halk-futbolda-cozumun-arkasinda/8915> [Accessed 2 November 2013].

Haravgi. 2013. Andros Kyprianou: Our clear red lines. Available online in Greek at: <http://www.haravgi.com.cy/site-article-43981-gr.php> [Accessed 26 November 2013]. (also, http://aspects.duckdns.org/cyprus/Archive_2013/1311/Haravgi_PDF/20131125_Haravgi.pdf)

Hurriyet. 2015. The fear became true in Cyprus! The TRNC Football Federation is becoming member of the Greek Cypriot Federation! Available online in Turkish

at: <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/spor/futbol/28583205.asp>. [Accessed 22 February 2018].

iKypros.com. 2012. *Koutsokoumnis* met with a delegation of the TC Football Federation. Available online in Greek at:

<http://www.ikypros.com/easyconsole.cfm/id/60929> [Accessed 15 April 2013].

Inewsgr.com. 2013. Anastasiades: The time has come for Turkey to accept the obvious solution to the Cyprus problem. Available online at:

<http://www.inewsgr.com/173/proedros-anastasiadisefthase-i-ora-i-tourkia-na-apodechtei-ta-aftonoita-gia-lysi-tou-kypriakou.htm> [Accessed 25 October 2013].

Kadritzke N. 2004. Cyprus saying no to the future *Le Monde Diplomatique*, 21. Available online at: <http://mondediplo.com/2004/05/07cyprus> [Accessed 12 September 2015].

Kibris 2013b. Sertoglou paves the way for the Youth. Available online in Turkish at:

<http://www.kibrisgazetesi.com/index.php/cat/8/news/168417/PageName/Spor>[Accessed 15 November 2013]. (Currently available from the author).

Kibris, 2009. Talat: membership can never be broken. Available online in Turkish at: <http://www.kibrisgazetesi.com/index.php/cat/8/news/64821/PageName/Spor> [Accessed 18 April 2013].

LGC News. 2017. KTFF asks for lifting of embargo in sports. Available online at: <https://www.lgcnews.com/ktff-asks-for-lifting-of-embargo-on-sports/> [Accessed 17 May 2018].

Milliyet. 2015. Membership crisis in TCFA. Available online in Turkish at:

<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/ktff-de-uyelik-krizi-gundem-2035746/>

Newsit. 2013. The occupied want football integration: Their true motives are being examined. Available online in Greek at:

www.newsit.com.cy/default.php?pname=Article&art_id=103543&catid=32 [Accessed 16 April 2013]

Offsite. 2013. The TCFA-CFA agreement breeds risks. Available online in Greek at: <http://offsite.com.cy/simfonia-kop-tpo-egkimoni-kindinous/> [Accessed 27 November 2013].

Papaioannou, J., 2013. APOEL erased *Koutsokoumnis'* membership. Available online in Greek at: www.sigmalive.com/sports/all-other-sports/basketball/23820 [Accessed 19 April 2013].

Politis 2013b. Agreement by TCs approved. Available online in Greek at: <http://www.politis-news.com/cgi-bin/hweb?-A=251719&-V=articles> [Accessed 30 November 2015].

Politis. 2013a. Interim agreement approved. Available online in Greek at: <http://www.politis-sports.com/cgi-bin/hweb?-A=128555&-V=onlinenews> [Accessed 19 November 2015].

RCB. 2018. Disagreement between Cavusoglou-Akinci. Available online in Greek at: <http://dialogos.com.cy/blog/diafonia-tsavousoglou-akintzi-gia-kipriako/#.Wt7O5RuFPKU> [Accessed 22 April 2018].

REUTERS. 2010. Soccer-Egypt get Cairo World Cup ban over Algeria trouble. Available online at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/soccer-world-egypt/soccer-egypt-get-cairo-world-cup-ban-over-algeria-trouble-idUSLDE64H2BK20100518> [Accessed 15 March 2015].

Ronen, Y. 2011. *Transition from Illegal Regimes under International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sigmalive 2008. FIFA: Turkish-Cypriots in international friendlies. Available online in Greek at: <http://www.sigmalive.com/sports/football/other%20news/46853> [Accessed 12 September 2015].

Sigmalive 2011. Football team from pseudo-state wants to become CFA member. Available online in Greek at: www.sigmalive.com/sports/football/cyprus/a+league/387981 [Accessed 12 September 2015].

Sigmalive 2013a. CFA towards unification with TCFA. Available online in Greek at: <http://www.sigmalive.com/news/local/74291> [Accessed 5 November 2015].

Sigmalive 2013b. Eroglu: We are not under the G/C administration. Available online in Greek at: <http://www.sigmalive.com/simerini/politics/reportaz/581649>) [Accessed 7 November 2015].

Sigmalive 2013c. Discrepancies between what they sign, do and talk. Available online in Greek at: <http://www.sigmalive.com/simerini/sport%20time/cyprus/584061> [Accessed 1 December 2015].

SWI. 2006. Fifa hands six-match penalty to Turkey. Available online at: <https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/fifa-hands-six-match-penalty-to-turkey/55256> [Accessed 22 May 2018].

Sonay, M. 2013. 'Hope' in the field of merger. Available online in Turkish at: <http://www.yeniduzen.com/Haberler/haberler/saha-da-birlesme-umudu/8468> [Accessed 26 October 2013].

Star Kibris 2013a. Zurich 5 November. Available online in Turkish at: <http://www.starkibris.net/index.asp?haberID=161685> [Accessed 26 October 2013].

Star Kibris 2013c. Okutan: The step should be taken. Available online in Turkish at: <http://www.starkibris.net/index.asp?haberID=164598> [Accessed 30 November 2015].

To Vima. 2013. John Kerry and Ahmet Davutoglu talked about Cyprus. Available online in Greek at: <http://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=540474> [Accessed 20 November 2013].

Tsamis S., 2013. Beware of the Turkish-Greeks. Available online in Greek at: www.efsyn.gr/?p=14750 [Accessed 19 April 2013].

Tsiropoulos V., 2008a. Turkish-Cypriots: *Talat* will decide. Available online in Greek at: www.sigmalive.com/sports/football/cyprus/a%20league/60112 [Accessed 12 September 2015].

Tsiropoulos V., 2009a. CFA: Football integration. Available online in Greek at: www.sigmalive.com/sports/football/cyprus/a+league/110189 [Accessed 12 September 2015].

Tsiropoulos V., 2009b. The T/Cs demolished the bridges. Available online in Greek at: www.sigmalive.com/sports/football/cyprus/a%20league/118828 [Accessed 16 September 2015].

T-VINE. 2018. New four-way centre-left coalition government for North Cyprus. Available online at: <http://www.t-vine.com/new-four-way-centre-left-coalition-government-for-north-cyprus/> [Accessed 12 March 2018].

Yenidüzen 2013a. Attempts to sabotage the TCFA-CFA interview. Available online in Turkish at: <http://www.yeniduzen.com/Haberler/haberler/ktff-kop-gorusmesi-sabote-edilmeye-calisiliyor/8599> [Accessed 26 October 2013].

Yenidüzen 2013b. Koutsokoumnis “The temporary agreement assessed”. Available online in Turkish at:
<http://www.yeniduzen.com/Haberler/spor/kutsokumbis-gecici-duzenlemeyi-degerlendirdi/9134> [Accessed 6 November 2013].

Yenidüzen 2013c. Football in the Assembly’s agenda. Available online in Turkish at: <http://www.yeniduzen.com/Haberler/spor/meclis-te-gundem-futbol/9273> [Accessed 10 November 2013].

Yenidüzen 2013d. Erdoğan’s TCFA-CFA review. Available online in Turkish at: <http://www.yeniduzen.com/Haberler/spor/erdogan-dan-ktff-kop-yorumu/9640> [Accessed 23 November 2013].

Yeniduzen. 2017.160 okula karşılık 192 cami var...(There are 192 mosques against 160 schools ...). Available online at: <http://www.yeniduzen.com/160-okula-karsilik-192-cami-var-90972h.htm> [Accessed 10 January 2018].

APPENDIX A

Questionnaire for Greek Cypriots

Dear Sir / Madam, first of all, according to the requirements of the Ethics Committee of the University of Crete that no one else will have access to this interview, it is purely for the purposes of my dissertation. As soon as I transcribe the interview I will send you the relevant text.

1. Let's begin with current political developments. Tell me what you think about them. How are the Anastasiades-Akinci talks going? What is your prediction? Will they bring any result and when? Have the recent elections changed the political landscape in this regard? What are the difficult issues of the negotiation process?

2. Let's go to football. I have watched all the developments through the digital press. Tell me something. In November 2013 Zurich launched this case of unification of football. It is known that the TCFA is isolated and wants to play international games. The meeting there was the initiative of one of the three? (CFA, TCFA, FIFA).

3. The delay in unification is largely due to the fact that the previous political administration of the Turkish Cypriots was opposed to the registration of the TCFA as a member of the CFA (known statements of Eroglu and Denktash). Mr. Sertoglu appears in various reports determined to make TCFA a CFA member. What is the position of the new political administration of the Turkish Cypriots? And, why (what is to blame) has not yet made the football unification in your opinion, it's almost 3 years since then!

4. The Media project some social groups to support Mr Sertoglu (eg the TC Teachers Association, the TC Association of Manufacturers, etc.). Do you think there is a strong urban / popular front in favour of football unification but loses by bumping into the strong political web?

5. I saw that Turkey's President Erdogan made statements in favour of football unification. I could not interpret this. What do you have to say?

6. One of your teams deleted Mr. Koutsokoumnis from its member records because he was talking to the Turkish Cypriots and recently there was a

commotion because he wore a shirt with the Turkish flag. What happened exactly, please explain to me!

7. The most recent thing I know is that the T/Cs are talking about a 1955 document which indicates that they were members of your association so they do not have to apply again. What happens with this issue? This move could be interpreted in a number of ways. e.g. "I am already a member of the CFA and the T/C administration can't do anything about it" or "I am already a member of the CFA and thus I will not file a request to become member which would show what the T/C political administration doesn't have to be afraid of the likelihood that T/C institutions would need to be included in the G/C institutions, "or possibly some other interpretation. What would you say about it?

8. Let the T/Cs become members of the CFA tomorrow. What will be the impact on football? Will there be a single Cyprus League? Every deal is done because both parties expect to gain something from it. What will the Turkish Cypriots gain from the football unification and what will you win?

9. What is your assessment of the time of unifications (only as agreements). Which one will precede the other? Will the TCFA sign up as a member or will there be a final settlement of the Cyprus issue first?

10. Same question. Research on issues of unification in divided societies through sports such as football shows that, in essence, political unification should take precedence, followed by football. What is your view of Cyprus?

Questions for the TCFA official

1. Let's go back to the Annan Plan and then assess the current face of negotiations. What went wrong with the Annan Plan? Why did not the Greek Cypriots vote for it? Was it the property issue? The security issue? Or the Economic issue?
2. What is your assessment of the current round of negotiations?
3. In 2007, FIFA hosted talks with both sides to help towards football reunification. Why did that initiative not produce a positive outcome?
4. How are the developments going with FIFA's November 2013 initiative? Your clubs voted unanimously in favor of the Zurich agreement. Also I know that you have voted to become a CFA member.
5. How do you envision this football reunification? Will there be a unified Cyprus football league? With matches played between both sides?
6. In the media I read that Turkey's president was in favor of football reunification in Cyprus!
7. It appears that Mr. Sertoglu is very keen on this initiative, but the media has painted a picture in which he meets domestic political resistance to your plan of joining CFA. How about the new administration? Does it have the same view?
8. The media reported that the delay of football reunification is due to a missing document of your past membership with CFA in 1955.
9. The literature says that political unification must precede football unification. Could a football unification be the starting point for the solution of the Cyprus problem?



PROVISIONAL ARRANGEMENT FOR FOOTBALL IN CYPRUS

This Arrangement is governed by the following principles:

- To unify and facilitate the progress of football on the island based on trust, mutual respect and goodwill;
- This Arrangement is covered by the commitment to fully respect the FIFA and UEFA statutes and all international sport principles;
- The CFA is a member of FIFA and UEFA and the governing body responsible for organizing, administering and controlling football in Cyprus as well as the body responsible for any international football activities in Cyprus;
- This Arrangement concerns only football related matters, does not set any precedent for the Cypriot political issue and is provisional until a solution to the Cyprus problem is found;

This Arrangement will be implemented in accordance with the following parameters:

Parameter n°1: The CTFA will become a member of the CFA as an association in accordance with CFA statutes and regulations. In such a case, all the clubs registered under the CTFA will automatically become indirect members of the CFA.

Parameter n°2: The CFA will recognize the competences of the CTFA, as an association of the CFA, over CTFA football matters including the right to organize championships amongst its members in accordance with sporting principles as well as FIFA and UEFA statutes and regulations.

Parameter n°3: The CFA will invite the CTFA to be represented in the CFA General Assembly and in the CFA Council with full rights. The CTFA will invite one member of the CFA Council to sit on the meetings of the CTFA Council and General Assembly as an observer.



Parameter n°4: The CFA and the CTFA agree on the setting up of a "steering committee" to work for the implementation of this arrangement. The CFA Council will establish this "steering committee" consisting of four representatives appointed by the CFA and CTFA respectively, covering amongst others the following matters,

- Turkish Cypriot participation in the CFA General Assembly, Council and committees,
- Regulations on the players' status, player transfer and TMS,
- Participation to the CFA competitions,
- Development programs offered by FIFA and UEFA,
- Club friendly matches and club friendly international matches,
- Participation to the UEFA Regions Cup,
- UEFA coaching license system for Turkish-Cypriot Coaches,
- Referee Committee, Refereeing, Match observers and International Referees,
- Inclusion of Turkish-Cypriot representatives in CFA delegations,

The decisions of the steering committee are subject to approval by the CFA Council and by the CTFA Executive Committee.

Parameter n°5: The CFA and the CTFA agree on the setting up of a "joint committee" to deal with the management of CTFA football matters. The CFA Council will establish this "joint committee" with the majority of the seats of this committee will be reserved to CTFA members.

Parameter n°6: This Arrangement may be terminated, at any time, by either the CFA or the CTFA, unilaterally or by mutual agreement. Should this Arrangement be terminated, the state of affairs in relation to Cyprus football, both on national and international level, created by this Arrangement, will be null and void. Nothing in this Arrangement



FIFA®

For the Game. For the World.

will be considered as creating or having created any legal rights or precedent for or in relation to the participants in this Arrangement.

Parameter n°7: This Arrangement will come into force and will be binding on both the CFA and the CTFA upon approval by their respective General Assemblies.

A blue ink signature of Costakis Koutsokoumnis, written in a cursive style, positioned above a horizontal line.

Costakis Koutsokoumnis
President
Cyprus Football Association

A black ink signature of Hasan Sertoglu, written in a cursive style, positioned above a horizontal line.

Hasan Sertoglu
President
Turkish Cypriot Football Association

Witnesses:

A black ink signature of Joseph S. Blatter, written in a cursive style, positioned above a horizontal line.

Joseph S. Blatter
FIFA President

A black ink signature of Michel Platini, written in a cursive style, positioned above a horizontal line.

Michel Platini
UEFA President



KTFF

Appendix C

Kibns Turk Futbol Federasyonu

Cyprus Turkish Football Association



KTFF

OPEN LETTER
TO ALL CYPRIOTS
AND

TO ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CYPRIOT FOOTBALL COMMUNITY

16 December 2014, Nicosia

A year ago, the Turkish-Cypriot football community, its clubs and all the actors represented by the Cyprus-Turkish FA (CTFA/KTFF), endorsed the strategic vision of the reunification of football on the island.

The goals behind this historic decision were clear:

- Ending more than three decades of isolation to give hope to our clubs, to our players and above all to our youth who all strive to gain access to this global village of the sport called football.

Our kids in particular, boys and girls, and our youth deserve that we spare no effort to give them the feeling that they finally belong to the world community of the game. Because they deserve it.

- Resuming the glorious role played by Turkish-Cypriot football in the history of football on our island of Cyprus.

The CFA/KOP was founded in 1934 by Turkish-Cypriot football leaders and by a Turkish-Cypriot club, Lefkosa Tiirk Spor Kuiuibu. Turkish Cypriot football clubs like Genglik Gucii and Cetinkaya took part in its competitions. After its foundation, Turkish Cypriots such as the CTFA's founder Ahmet Sami Topcan took part in KOP's management. Our clubs performed well with Cetinkaya winning the league once, the FA Cup twice and the FA Shield thrice. Our players performed well too with talents such as Mr. Sevim Ebeoglu and others playing regularly at all levels. Furthermore, many Turkish Cypriot football players took part in the Cyprus national team.

After 60 years of separation, the ambition is clear since the Turkish-Cypriot football community clearly expressed its goal to regain the position it had in the CFA/KOP before 1955, with all our obligations and all our rights. The CFA/KOP is also ours!





Kibns Turk Futbol Federasyonu

Cyprus Turkish Football Association



KTFF

KTFF

- Everyone should know that the CFA/KOP, whose founders we are, does not only belong to Greek Cypriots. It is ours as well!

Far from me to ignore or to forget the past, its sufferings, its injustices, its lingering sour memories, the lack of trust - on both sides - but football with its general trans-generational appeal can and should play its role to bridge the gaps between our two communities and restart the relations which existed.

I cannot ignore the resistances or all the political and legal issues which represent so many hurdles, so many "red lines", blocking us from doing things together again or even slowing down the best initiatives from both sides. But we have no choice other than overcoming them. Our duty is to contribute to the rapprochement of our youth by spreading seeds of peace.

This is why I would like to praise here publicly the Turkish-Cypriot club Degirmenlik (Kythrea), that following the appropriate changes made by the CTFA/KTFF in its regulations, decided to recruit Greek-Cypriot players and technical staff members giving us the proof that football is much stronger than hatred and prejudice. The recent positive atmosphere and excitement brought along with the car racing rally which recently took place on the two sides proved the rightfulness of the courageous decision taken by the CTFA/KTFF.

The task is complex but its goals are clear. The reunification of football on the island will be possible if we are able to find the pragmatic and realistic solutions we need to play football with each other again, to be fairly represented and to end these decades of isolation.

It should be known that we, as the CTFA/KTFF, are ready to live up to all our responsibilities along this path.

Please allow me to express my confidence in the CFA/KOP leadership and in particular to my counterpart Mr. Costakis Koutsokoumnis who have shown courage and vision as well.

We will not achieve all of these goals overnight but ending 60 years of football separation as soon as possible is our main objective!


Hasan Sertoğlu
PRESIDENT

APPENDIX D

Sepp Blatter (FIFA), Hasan Sertoglu (TCFA), Costakis Koutsokoumnis (CFA) and Michel Platini (UEFA) sign the Zurich Provisional Agreement of Football



Source:

<http://www.uefa.com/memberassociations/association=cyp/news/newsid=2018929.html>

APPENDIX E

The French Ambassador with the protagonists of football reunification in Cyprus



From left: TCFA chairman, *Hasan Sertoglu* – French Ambassador, *Jean Luc Florent* and CFA chairman, the late *Costakis Koutsokoumnis*.

Source: <https://cyprus-mail.com/tag/costakis-koutsokoumnis/>

Reproduced by permission of cyprus-mail.com