| Abstract |
The object of this work is the approach of the moral issues arising from the use of genetic diagnosis made prior to implantation. What is initially dealt with are this technique and its applications. The development of a human organism from its starting point is being observed and its continuation depends on a decision taken by external agents. The use of this technique contributes to avoiding
giving birth to offsprings with genetic or chromo somatic diseases. It also contributes increase the frequency of successful fetus implantation - in the case of in vitro reproduction - and pregnancy, as well as the birth of tissue-compatible siblings, selection of the child’s sex and designation of its nonmedical traits. Moral issues arise regarding the creation and, possibly, rejection of pre-implanted embryo and, also, the selection of genetic traits of children who are to be born. The moral issues and, in addition, the eugenics dimension of mediation, render necessary the delimitation of human deeds.
The stage from which a human organism starts having moral significance is not an empirical question, but a matter of moral decision. Αn attempt is being made to reconstruct the approaches of the concept of “autonomy” by John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant -which are necessary to delimitate human action. Based on the principle of benefit or major happiness, the “individual autonomy” in
Mill’s theory, allows living creatures to pursue augmentation of their happiness - as long as it does not have a negative effect on others’ benefit - and protects it from the exertion of force by others. The “universal self-legislation” in Kant’s theory, bounds each individual’s subjective nature by universal moral rules, acceptable by those who act and applicable to all, irrespective of their individual benefit. In the mental union of respect among individuals as reasonable creatures, and mutual commitment, some forms of human life deprived of reason- such as proembryos- cannot take part. The already existing creatures, however, have the potential-thanks to the autonomy of reason- to bound their actions and decisions by universal moral laws, regarding the treatment of proembryos.
Αpproaches to “liberal eugenics”, influenced to a great extent by Mill’s focus on “individual autonomy”, by Nicholas Agar, Philip Kitcher, John Harris and john Robertson, are being presented. From that point of view, the power of decision -making concerning reproduction, is allocated to parents-to-be as a dimension of their reproductive freedom and the potential to eliminate the role of chance in reproduction. Agar’s “liberal eugonics” supports the individual’s freedom to control his reproductive choices according to his personal perception of well being, questions the moral distinction between the cure and re-enforcement of genetic traits, and raises the differentiation of genetic choice against the environment. Kitcher’s “utopist eugonics” projects a combination of securing the
individual’s freedom of choice and his responsibility to take into consideration the social concepts about. The prospective quality of life of an individual-to-be, under the light of “eugenic education”. John Harris poses as a criterion of taking a morally right decision in reproductive matters the security of the child's benefit. John Robertson poses each application under a pragmatist, casuist approach of theevaluation of the harm and as a primary limit of the reproductive freedom the avoidance of causing harm to the individual itself or the embryo or the society or other people.
Mill’s “individual autonomy” is important in delimitating the freedom of the future parent and other already existing individuals. But the person to be born, the proembryo, deprived, at that developmental stage, of benefit and rights, under the viewpoint of liberal eugenics -influenced to a great extent by Mill-, is safeguarded only by the principal of avoiding damage .On the other hand,
approaches stemming from the Kantian philosophical tradition of Buchanan, Dworkin and Habermas, are trying to commit the subjective doers through universal moral rules that regard the place of the embryo as a future moral being. Buchanan et al support that, for the protection of his basic interests, the
individual needs to participate in the social schema. For that, they project the legal interest of embodiment, which, as they interpret, presupposes that the interest presents no disability, but his capacities correspond to the demands of the social framework. Jurgen Habernas draws attention to the danger the parent, as designer of his ancestor’s gene, adapts the genetic code of the future ιndividual to his personal preferences or social habits, in a way which is asymmetrical and irrevocable, and converts into a parallel author of the individual’s future life, without being in the position to suppose his consent, with impact on moulding the future individual’s self-concept. Ronald Dworkin argues that the embryo does not have the capacity to own interests, as it is deprived of the necessary condition of developed nervous system, and the termination of the biological process of life does not offend his interests or respective rights. Only if his life continues, under favourable circumstances, will there be
later on a human being who will be recognised as a person owning interests. Then, the individual’s formation of crucial interests gives value to his life. An individual affected by serious genetic disease may not have the capacity to form crucial interests and to give his life a content corresponding the inner
quality of life.
In conclusion, the human organism has moral importance because, from the beginning of his life, it is determined to a considerable extent, by his genetic structure, without overlooking the influence of environmental factors, the potential of developing reason and, mainly by the agreement or not of the decisions taken by the parents or the state with moral principles, the potential to shape symmetrical interpersonal relationships protective of his autonomy of reason.
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Προεμφυτευτική γενετική διάγνωση και ευγονική παρέμβαση : ηθικά ζητήματα
