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Identifier

000437736

Title

Πρόσωπα και μηχανές : μια βιοηθική προσέγγιση

Alternative Title

Persons and machines : a bioethical approach

Author

Γεωργουδής-Πιταροκοίλης, Ιάκωβος

Thesis advisor

Τσινόρεμα Σταυρούλα

Reviewer

Μαρκάτος Ευάγγελος
Χαλεπάκης Γεώργιος

Abstract

The current thesis examines the question whether there can be attributed moral status to «intelligent artificial agents», meaning artificial intelligence machines capable of emulating intelligence and possessing some form of «autonomy». It is a question concerning the attribution of agency and other moral qualities of personhood to robots, autonomous systems, and software agents. The question itself lies at the core of the emerging field of Machine Ethics. The approaches of thinkers such as James H.Moor, Wendell Wallach, Colin Allen, Luciano Floridi shift the philosophical debate from the field of ethics to the field of technology. It is a move from the contemporary and modern empiricist-reductionist thought on the concept of person to a new reductionist attempt, attributing moral status and «agency» to machines based on a causal explanation of the concept of the person. In this dissertation, the empiricist-reductionist theories of the concept of person and personal identity Find a critical response from I. Kant's moral philosophy and contemporary Kantian normative thinking. The dissertation presents the technological phenomenon from the standpoint of which the question of attributing moral status to machines emerges. The dissertation analyses approaches which attempt to extend moral status to machines. Investigates critically modern and contemporary empiricist-reductionist conceptualisations of personhood, particularly those of John Locke and Derek Parfit and contrasts them to a Kantian normative conception of the person. A common ground between these empiricist philosophical theories of the person and the new reductionist approaches of machine agency is detected and critically assessed. In the above light, the present study offers grounds against a naturalistic reductionist understanding of the concept of a person and therefore ends with a strong skepticism regarding the extension of the normative notion of a person to artificial agents and robots.

Language

Greek

Subject

Artificail intelligence

Bioethics

Floridi

Identity

Kant

Machine ethics

Parfit

Personhood

Βιοηθική