Abstract |
Semantics and pragmatics are two close linguistic fields and the distinction between
the two seems problematic as they both focus on non – natural meaning (according to
Grice) with obvious overlapping. A first frame of study could be the distinction
between linguistic meaning and use, although this can be misleading as even modality
can have illocutionary force. There follows the distinction between sentence,
utterance and proposition. A shift of the semantic focus can be observed; from the
exclusive study of sentence within the boundaries set by Ideal Language to the study
of utterance as part of Natural Language. Also, an attempt to match the notions above
is made; an utterance may relate to two different sentences or a sentence may relate to
two different utterances. The same happens with utterances and propositions. As for
context, the distinctions between natural, linguistic and general knowledge are made.
Finally, truth values are attributed to propositions while truth conditions to sentences.
All the above help trace around but do not solve the problem. Nor do the Huang
criteria (2007). The unclear boundaries between the two fields remain. Two trends
are formed; the first one is advocated by Atlas (1977, 1989, 2005), Recanati (2004,
2005), Jaszczolt (2005), Sperber and Wilson (2004, 2005), Carston (2004) and Searle
(1978, 2007). They follow the solution of a unique processing level and suggest that
there should be pragmatic intrusion into it. The second one is supported by Borg
(2004), Cappelen and Lepore (2005) and Bach (1999, 2004, 2005, 2006) who claim
that there should be two distinct levels of processing, a semantic and a pragmatic one.
A key notion which will help discern between the two fields appears What Is Said and
the initial Gricean conception of it is questioned. What Is Said becomes the catalyst
which will define the architecture of meaning and will lead to the clarification of the
pragmatics – semantics relationship
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