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Identifier 000459657
Title Σχηματισμός καρτέλ με Συμπεριφορικές Επιχειρήσεις
Alternative Title Cartel Formation with Behavioral Firms
Author Γρούμπας, Μάριος
Thesis advisor Σταματόπουλος Γιώργος
Reviewer Εμβαλωματής Γρηγόρης
Ζορμπάς Δημήτρης
Abstract In this Master's thesis, the integration of Behavioural Economics, a discipline that elaborately combines Psychology, the findings of Neuroscience and the empirical economic data of the entities of an economy, into the economic analysis of Industrial Organisation is carried out. More specifically, it consists of in-corporating the Cognitive Hierarchy model into the cartel model driven by quantity and price competi-tion, indirectly including the behavioral bias of overconfidence, in order to establish, among other things, the greater ease or difficulty of creating a cartel in the case where it is not known in advance how smart the potential partner is in the same homogeneous market for goods and services, assuming the existence of a rival that randomly chooses to comply with the proposed activity as an informal monopoly. In addi-tion, the comparison of all critical discount rates with the one from the corresponding cartel case of two fully rational firms, the interpretation and analysis of the above findings for different K levels of thinking, mean and variance of the ingenuity value τ and distance of a (constant of market size in the demand function) from c (linear cost variable) is carried out. Although cartel with a randomly cooperating player under quantity competition is rendered impossible, the results at each K level of thinking support the greater difficulty of achieving cartel with a less rational player under price competition in the Behavioral Cartel model, even with the occurrence of a player who randomly decides whether or not to renege on the cooperative agreement, than the one of two rational players in terms of critical discount factors, with the K=3 step showing the same or greater ease of cooperative agreement from all other levels for every τ of the interval [0, +∞) and for any exemplary positive difference of a from c as ε΄, ε΄΄ converge to zero.
Language Greek
Subject Behavioral Economics
Behavioral Industrial Organization
Behavioral cartel
Cartel
Cognitive Hierarchy Model
Game Theory
Industrial Organization
Βιομηχανική οργάνωση
Θεωρία παιγνίων
Καρτέλ
Μοντέλο γνωστικής ιεράρχησης
Συμπεριφορικά οικονομικά
Συμπεριφορική βιομηχανική οργάνωση
Συμπεριφορικό καρτέλ
Issue date 2023-07-24
Collection   School/Department--School of Social Sciences--Department of Economics--Post-graduate theses
  Type of Work--Post-graduate theses
Permanent Link https://elocus.lib.uoc.gr//dlib/6/c/7/metadata-dlib-1697712585-377820-13142.tkl Bookmark and Share
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