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Identifier 000418396
Title Essays in corporate governance and labor relations : a game-theoretic approach
Alternative Title Δοκίμια στην εταιρική διακυβέρνηση και στις εργασιακές σχέσεις: μια παίγνιο-θεωρητική προσέγγιση
Author Σκαρτάδος, Παναγιώτης
Thesis advisor Πετράκης Εμμανουήλ
Reviewer Μήλιου Χρυσοβαλάντου-Βασιλική
Σταματόπουλος Γεώργιος
Βλάσσης Μηνάς
Νικολίτσα Δάφνη
Παπαδόπουλος Κωνσταντίνος
Σέρφες Κωνσταντίνος
Abstract This PhD Thesis is written and submitted to the Department of Economics of the University of Crete, Greece, as a partial fulfillment of my obligations as a PhD Candidate. It consists of three chapters dealing with the corporate governance and the labor relations in vertically related markets. In Chapter 1, we deal with the strategic profit–sharing in a unionized differentiated duopoly. We study firms’ incentives to offer profit-sharing schemes in a unionized differentiated goods duopoly in which firms bargain with a sector-wide union or firm-specific unions over the selected remuneration schemes. We show that unions always prefer to form a sector-wide union and conduct coordinated bargaining. Under Cournot competition, ex-ante symmetric firms may choose to offer different remuneration schemes under coordinated bargaining and become ex-post asymmetric. Moreover, universal profit-sharing schemes arise as long as the union’s bargaining power is low enough. In contrast, under Bertrand competition, firms never offer profit-sharing schemes and universal fixed wage schemes is the unique equilibrium. Our welfare analysis indicates that policymakers should institutionalize decentralized bargaining and encourage profit-sharing schemes. In Chapter 2, we consider the strategic implications of the disclosure regime of vertical contract terms. The latter are used in the literature either as observable or as secret. We endogenize this decision and show that the mode and intensity of the downstream competition, as well as the upstream market structure, play a significant role in the observability of the vertical contract terms. When a common supplier bargains with each retailer over a two-part tariff contract, interim observability intensifies the commitment problem, by offering a wholesale price below the marginal cost. The same holds under linear contracts or Bertrand competition. On the other hand, under dedicated suppliers, it is more profitable to bargain over interim unobservable contracts and through them to alleviate the commitment problem. Policymakers could increase the social welfare by encouraging interim observability (unobservability) when firms compete in quantities (prices). Monopolized upstream markets are more prone to have aligned incentives with the policymakers, especially if the downstream retailers compete over quantities. Finally, in Chapter 3, we study the incentives for horizontal upstream mergers in a quantity– setting vertically related industry, under bargain and endogenous contract types. We show that the contract types used could have important consequences to the equilibrium market structure and vice versa. If it is the retailers who choose contract types, they share the same preferences as the policymakers and choose to offer two–part tariff contracts, leading the suppliers not to merge. This result has some obvious policy implications. If it is the suppliers who decide contract types, they prefer to merge and offer a partial forward vertical ownership scheme. Under Bertrand competition, there is always an upstream merger, but the common manufacturer will offer a two–part tariff contract for intermediate bargain power levels. For high bargain power levels, he will choose a partial forward vertical ownership scheme, while for low bargain power will suffer from negative profits. A policymaker, considering the maximization of the social welfare should consider the upstream merger and two–part tariff contracts.
Language Greek
Subject Game theory
Industrial Organization
Labor relations
Nash bargain
Vertical markets
Βιομηχανική οργάνωση
Διαπραγμάτευση κατά Nash
Εργασιακές σχέσεις
Θεωρία παιγνίων
Κάθετες αγορές
Issue date 2018-07-20
Collection   School/Department--School of Social Sciences--Department of Economics--Doctoral theses
  Type of Work--Doctoral theses
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