| Abstract |
This thesis consists of four independent chapters that study alternative Örmsílong run strategies
in imperfectly competitive markets.
The Örst chapter, "Comparative vs. Informative Advertising in Oligopolistic Markets", explores the Örmsíincentives to invest in informative and comparative advertising in oligopolistic
markets with horizontally di§erentiated products. It is found that, in equilibrium the Örms
optimally mix over advertising strategies, combining both informative and comparative advertising. Further, it is shown that the optimal advertising mix always favors the aggressive form
of comparative advertising. The chapter also compares equilibrium market outcomes and social
welfare under the endogenous advertising portfolio with the respective ones under no advertising, mere informative advertising and mere comparative advertising, and shows that they
crucially depend on the intensity of market competition and the e¢ ciency of the advertising
technology.
The second chapter, "Comparative Advertising in Markets with Network Externalities",
investigates the Örmsíincentives to invest in comparative advertising in a spatially di§erentiated
duopoly market characterized by network externalities. It is found that Örms often have strong
incentives to invest in comparative advertising, with their equilibrium investment levels to be
positively related to transportation cost and negatively related to the intensity of network
e§ects. More importantly, it is shown that the Örmsílocation distance (or else, their productsí
di§erentiation) increases in the presence of network externalities and decreases in the presence
of comparative advertising.
The third chapter, "The Speed of Technological Adoption under Price Competition: Twotier vs. One-tier Industries", examines the Örmsí incentives to adopt a new cost reducing
technology in vertically related markets, as well as, the e§ects of the vertical relations on the
speed of the downstream Örmsíadoption of the new technology. It is found that, independently
of the upstream market structure (i.e., upstream separate Örms or upstream monopoly), downstream Örms always have strong incentives to adopt the new technology. More importantly, it
is shown that, independently of the upstream market structure, technology adoption may occur
earlier in two-tier than in one-tier industries, depending on the intensity of the Önal market
competition, the drasticity of the new technology on reducing the downstream Örmsímarginal
cost of production and the bargaining power distribution in the market. Moreover, it is found
that the Örst technology adoption takes place earlier under upstream monopoly than under
upstream separated Örms, when the new technology is su¢ ciently drastic and the Önal market
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competition is Öerce enough.
The forth chapter, "Cournot is more Competitive than Bertrand! Upstream Monopoly with
Two-part Tari§s", compares the equilibrium outcomes and social welfare under Cournot and
Bertrand downstream competition when the upstream sector is monopolized by a single input
provider and the vertical trade is conducted via two-part tari§s contracts. It is found that,
in such a setting, a Cournot downstream market turns out to be more competitive than a
Bertrand one. In addition, contrary to the conventional wisdom that suggests that Bertrand
competition leads to higher social welfare than Cournot competition, it is shown that in vertically related markets with upstream monopolistic market structure and two-part tari§s trading
contracts, consumersísurplus and social welfare are higher under Cournot than under Bertrand
competition.
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