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Identifier 000446952
Title Study on the effect of misinformation in multi-agent systems
Alternative Title Μελέτη της επίδρασης της εσφαλμένης πληροφορίας σε πολυπρακτιρικά συστήματα
Author Βάρσος, Κωνσταντίνος Α
Thesis advisor Πλεξουσάκης, Δημήτρης
Reviewer Τσαμαρδινός, Ιωάννης
Φλουρής, Γεώργιος
Φωτάκης, Δημήτριος
Μαρκάκης, Ευάγγελος
Χαλκιαδάκης, Γεώργιος
Schafer, Guido
Abstract Industrial processes and research activities quite often involve interactions between selfinterested participants. Game theory is a standard tool to analyze and study these interactions, but usually comes along with the assumption that the participants (i.e. agents, players) have a common and correct (albeit not always complete) knowledge with regards to the abstract formulation of the interaction. However, in many real-world situations, it could be the case that (some of) the agents are misinformed with regards to the game that they play, essentially having an incorrect understanding of the setting, without being aware of it. This would invalidate the common knowledge assumption. To study this phenomenon in this dissertation we establish a new framework. We initiate our study by presenting a new game-theoretic framework, called misinformation games, that provides the formal machinery necessary to study this phenomenon, and present some basic results regarding its properties. Interestingly, the new concept provides new equilibrium concepts, related to the Nash equilibrium. Thereupon, we introduce a new metric, called Price of Misinformation, in order to quantify the influence of misinformation in the efficiency of the interaction. Furthermore, we apply our framework in a variety of well-known classes of games. Afterwards, we expand the misinformation game model, by developing a discrete-time iterative procedure, where in each time step each agent chooses an action according to the (possibly erroneous) game specification that she possesses. Then, the actual payoffs that correspond to the agglomeration of the agents’ choices are publicly announced, thus allowing agents to update their information. Consequently, agents may re-evaluate their behaviour in the next time step. We call this process Adaptation Procedure, and we provide various results regarding its properties. Further, we present a complete analysis of the behaviour of the agents as their game specifications are updated, and show that this leads to new equilibrium concepts. Thereafter, we enrich the Adaptation Procedure by incorporating the epistemic view that each agent has regarding the interaction. Towards this direction, we formally define the epistemic perspective of Adaptation Procedure in misinformation games. Namely, we construct a process, called Epistemic Adaptive Evolution, where agents revise both their information and their epistemic knowledge according to the game they play. This also provides new equilibrium concepts. With this at hand, we complete our framework, through which we can study the phenomenon of agent interaction with incorrect information. Evidently, in several cases in our model, it is necessary to compute several equilibrium concepts. For that, we introduce a novel online learning algorithm. Specifically, we propose a novel variant of the multiplicative weights update method using best-response strategies, that guarantees last-iterate convergence for zero-sum games with a unique Nash equilibrium. Next, we consider the case of misinformation games where the misinformation is due to random noise that additively distorts the payoff matrices of the agents (e.g., due to communication errors). We call this setting noisy games. We analyze the general properties of two-players noisy games and we derive theoretical formulas which determine the probability that the noise will significantly affect the strategic behaviour of the agents, based on the noise intensity and pattern. Following the analysis and study of interaction from the perspective of the participants, we approach the problem from the perspective of the game’s designer. In particular, we introduce a novel approach for Coordination mechanisms in games, based on the idea of misinforming agents about the game formulation, in order to steer them towards a behaviour that leads to an improved outcome in terms of social welfare. We propose a mechanism that provides the agents with the right incentives to adopt a socially optimal behaviour by misinforming them.
Language English
Subject Adaptation Procedure
Epistemic Adaptive Evolution
Epistemic games
Epistemic natural equilibrium
Misinformation games
Natural misinformed equilibrium
Stable epistemic natural equilibrium
Stable misinformed equilibrium
Γνωσιολογικά Παίγνια
Γνωσιολογική Προσαρμοστική Εξέλιξη
Γνωσιολογικό φυσικό σημείο ισορροπίας
Διαδικασία Προσαρμογής
Ευσταθές γνωσιολογικό φυσικό σημείο ισορροπίας
Ευσταθές φυσικό σημείο ισορροπίας εσφαλμένης πληροφορίας
Παίγνια εσφαλμένης πληροφορίας
Φυσικό σημείο ισορροπίας εσφαλμένης πληροφορίας
Issue date 2022-03-18
Collection   School/Department--School of Sciences and Engineering--Department of Computer Science--Doctoral theses
  Type of Work--Doctoral theses
Permanent Link https://elocus.lib.uoc.gr//dlib/3/3/0/metadata-dlib-1647937022-963858-8928.tkl Bookmark and Share
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